UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,Plaintiff-Appellee,                                                      No. 96-10473v.                                                      D.C. No.                                                      CR-96-00352-4-RCBJUVENILE MALE,Defendant-Appellant.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,Plaintiff-Appellee,                                                      No. 96-10474v.                                                      D.C. No.                                                      CR-96-00352-2-RCBJUVENILE MALE,Defendant-Appellant.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                      No. 96-10477Plaintiff-Appellee,                                                      D.C. No.v.                                                      CR-96-00352-3-RCBJUVENILE MALE,       OPINIONDefendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Courtfor the District of ArizonaRobert C. Broomfield, District Judge, PresidingSubmitted June 12, 1997*San Francisco, CaliforniaFiled July 8, 1997Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, Dorothy W. Nelson, andStephen S. Trott, Circuit Judges.Opinion by Judge Trott

_____________________________COUNSEL Carmen L. Fischer, Phoenix, Arizona, for defendant-appellantN.P.Thomas A. Gorman, San Diego, California, for defendant-appellant M.A.C.Charles M. McNulty, Wisdom & Logan, Phoenix, Arizona,for defendant-appellant R.B.Patrick J. Schneider, Assistant United States Attorney, Phoe-nix, Arizona, for plaintiff-appellee, United States of America.

_____________________________OPINION TROTT, Circuit Judge:OVERVIEWThree juvenile defendants--R.B., N.P., and M.A.C. (col-lectively, "Defendants")--appeal the district court's orderstransferring them for prosecution as adults on charges of con-spiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in violationof the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. S 1962(d).1 Defendants contend that thedistrict court erred in concluding that the Government needonly show that their acts had a "de minimis" effect on inter-state commerce in order for the court to have jurisdiction ina RICO prosecution. In addition, juvenile N.P. argues that theRICO conspiracy count is not a "crime of violence " under 18U.S.C. S 5032--a necessary predicate to transferring a juve-nile for adult prosecution. Lastly, juvenile M.A.C. argues thatthe district court erred in transferring M.A.C., an Indian, foradult prosecution because the indictment did not allege one ofthe thirteen offenses listed in the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18U.S.C. S 1153. We find no error in the district court's transferorders, and we affirm.BACKGROUNDThe following facts are taken from the testimony of Detec-tive Karl Auerbach of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa IndianCommunity Police Department, who testified in the districtcourt during an October 4, 1996 transfer hearing on the Gov-ernment's motion to proceed against the juveniles as adults.We recognize that Defendants have not been convicted ofthese allegations.Defendants were all members of the "Rolling 30's " Cripsgang. In the early 1990's, the gang began having problemswith other gangs on the Salt River Reservation who wouldcross out Defendants' gang graffiti and replace it with theirown. Ultimately, Defendants' gang began to acquire firearmsbecause of conflicts with other gangs.In April 1994, the gang implemented a plan to commitarmed robberies as a way of acquiring money with which topurchase additional firearms. On May 15, 1994, "Rolling30's" Crips gang members, including juvenile R.B., robbed aSubway sandwich store located on the Salt River Reservation.The robbers took a bank bag containing $100.00, along withseven sandwiches and five bags of potato chips. The gangmembers murdered the lone Subway employee working dur-ing the robbery. The firearm used during the robbery had beentransported in interstate commerce.The Subway store was a franchise of the Subway Corpora-tion in Milford, Connecticut. Most of the items purchased andsold by this particular store were acquired through interstatecommerce. For example, the meats, cheeses, bread dough,cookies, paper and plastic products, and uniforms used by therestaurant were purchased from distributors outside of Ari-zona. In addition, a certain percentage of the profits of thisstore were paid out in royalties to an organization based inConnecticut.As a result of the robbery, the Subway restaurant wasforced to close for approximately two or three days, and thestore experienced a significant decrease in sales and revenuefor some period of time. Every employee working at that Sub-way quit after the murder.In addition to the Subway robbery, "Rolling 30's " Cripsgang members committed a series of other crimes, includingarson, assault, robbery, and murder.On August 13, 1996, the United States filed a twelve-pageinformation charging Defendants, along with other juvenilemembers of the "Rolling 30's" Crips, with numerous federaloffenses committed between April of 1994 and December of1995.On October 11, 1996, the district court made specific fac-tual findings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 5032, as to whether theDefendants could be prosecuted as adults. Finding that eachDefendant qualified for transfer, the district court thenordered Defendants transferred for adult prosecution. The dis-trict court also rejected Defendants' arguments that, becausetheir activities did not substantially affect interstate com-merce, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the cases.Defendants appeal the transfer orders.STANDARD OF REVIEWWe generally review de novo a district court's assumptionof jurisdiction. United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d754, 762 (9th Cir. 1995), amended on other grounds, 98 F.3d1100 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 965 (1997).However, the question of whether or not Defendants' actionssufficiently affected interstate commerce to provide jurisdic-tion is a jurisdictional question intertwined with the merits.United States v. Barone, 71 F.3d 1442, 1444 n.4 (9th Cir.1995). In instances where the question of jurisdiction is inter-twined with the merits and must be resolved by a jury, thestandard of review is unsettled. Id. "Because the question isresolved by the jury, the standard for reviewing the suffi-ciency of evidence to support a jury verdict, see Jackson v.Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 319
  (1979), may well apply to thisissue." Id.In the instant case, however, we are not reviewing a juryverdict; rather, we are reviewing the district court's factualfindings based on Detective Auerbach's testimony and itslegal conclusions as to whether the factual connection tointerstate commerce is sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Wetherefore review the district court's findings of fact for clearerror, and its jurisdictional conclusion de novo. DISCUSSIONI. RICO's Jurisdictional Nexus Requirement.We must determine whether the Government must provethat a defendant's individual racketeering activities had morethan a "de minimis effect" on interstate commerce in order toestablish federal jurisdiction in a RICO prosecution. BecauseRICO is aimed at activities which directly affect interstatecommerce, we hold that all that is required to establish federaljurisdiction in a RICO prosecution is a showing that the indi-vidual predicate racketeering acts have a de minimis impacton interstate commerce.[1] Relying on United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624(1995), Defendants argue that the activities prohibited byRICO must substantially affect interstate commerce. Other-wise, they contend, Congress exceeded its Commerce Clauseauthority in enacting RICO. In Lopez, the Supreme Court heldthat Congress exceeded its authority under the CommerceClause by enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act becausepossession of a gun in a school zone was not an economicactivity that substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. at1634. Since Lopez, numerous defendants have made chal-lenges to federal criminal statutes enacted under Congress'Commerce Clause authority. See, e.g., United States v.Michael R., 90 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C.S 922(x)(2), which prohibits juvenile possession of a hand-gun); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461 (9th Cir.) (uphold-ing 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1), which prohibits the use of afirearm while engaged in drug trafficking), cert. denied, 117S. Ct. 318 (1996); United States v. Lomayaoma, 86 F.3d 142(9th Cir.) (upholding the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.S 1153), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 272 (1996). Neither theSupreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit, however, has decidedwhether Lopez affects the interstate commerce aspect of theRICO statute.[2] In United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1733(1995), the Supreme Court left open the question of whetherindividual RICO predicate acts must "substantially affect"interstate commerce. In Robertson, the defendant was chargedwith various narcotics offenses and with violating RICO byinvesting the proceeds of the narcotics offenses in a goldmine. Id. at 1732. We reversed the defendant's conviction onthe ground that the Government had failed to introduce suffi-cient evidence proving that the gold mine was engaged in oraffected interstate commerce. Id.; United States v. Robertson,15 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1732. TheSupreme Court reversed, concluding that the activities of thegold mine operation2 "assuredly brought the gold mine withinS 1962(a)'s alternative criterion of `any enterprise . . .engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce.' " Id. at 1733.Significant to the instant case, the Supreme Court stated,"[w]hether or not these activities met (and whether or not, tobring the gold mine within the `affecting commerce' provi-sion of RICO they would have to meet) the requirement ofsubstantially affecting interstate commerce," the mine itselfengaged in interstate commerce. Id. Thus, the Supreme Courtleft open the question of whether the individual predicateRICO acts must substantially affect interstate commerce.[3] In United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1096 (1997), we recentlyaddressed the impact of Lopez on the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.S 1951. We said that, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act,"which was aimed at purely local, noneconomic activities, theHobbs Act is directly aimed at economic activities which `inany way or degree . . . affects commerce.' 18 U.S.C.S 1951(a)." Atcheson, 94 F.3d at 1242. Thus, "[b]ecause theHobbs Act is concerned solely with inter state, rather thanintra state, activities, we conclude that Lopez's `substantiallyaffects' test is not applicable." Id. "Where the crime itselfdirectly affects interstate commerce, as in the Hobbs Act, norequirement of a substantial effect is necessary to empowerCongress to regulate the activity under the CommerceClause." Id. at 1242-43. To establish jurisdiction in an indi-vidual case under the Hobbs Act, the Government thereforeneeded only to prove that the crime had a "de minimis effect"on interstate commerce. Id. at 1243.[4] Like the Hobbs Act, the RICO statute contains a similarjurisdictional requirement. See 18 U.S.C.S 1962(a),S 1962(b), or S 1962(c) ("any enterprise engaged in, or theactivities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce").Thus, the RICO statute, like the Hobbs Act, regulates activi-ties which, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on inter-state commerce; hence, the "de minimis character ofindividual instances arising under [the] statute is of noconsequence." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (citation omitted).[5] The district court correctly concluded that, because ofthe similarity between the aims of RICO and the Hobbs Act,Atcheson is persuasive authority that guides our analysis inthis case. Using Atcheson as a guide, we conclude that all thatis required to establish federal jurisdiction in a RICO prosecu-tion is a showing that the individual predicate racketeeringacts have a de minimis impact on interstate commerce.Prior Ninth Circuit interpretations of RICO's interstatecommerce requirements, as well as two recent out-of-circuitcases examining the jurisdictional requirements of the RICOstatute after Lopez, support our conclusion. As far back as1979, we held that, in order to order to establish federal juris-diction in a RICO prosecution, "[t]he Government must showa nexus of the enterprise to interstate or foreign commerce,albeit minimal . . . ." United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573(9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added; citations omitted). Signifi-cantly, Rone relied in part on a case interpreting the HobbsAct jurisdictional requirements. Id. (citing United States v.Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 501 (9th Cir. 1978)). In 1990, we reit-erated that in a civil RICO prosecution, the interstate com-merce connection may be "minimal." Musick v. Burke, 913F.2d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990).More recently, in a non-RICO related case, we stated that,where the regulated activity is commercial in nature, "thegovernment need only prove that the individual transactionsin this case each had a minimal effect on interstate commercethat, through repetition by others similarly situated, couldhave a substantial effect on interstate commerce. " UnitedStates v. Ripinsky, 109 F.3d 1436, 1444 (9th Cir. 1997)(emphasis added) (affirming money laundering convictionwhere money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1957(f), requiresthat monetary transaction be "in or affecting interstatecommerce"). The RICO statute contains a jurisdictionalrequirement similar to the money laundering statute. See 18U.S.C. S 1962(a), S 1962(b), or S 1962(c) ("any enterpriseengaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-eign commerce"). Ripinsky, Rone, and Musick, all support ourholding that the interstate commerce connection in a RICOprosecution may be de minimis.Since Lopez, at least two courts have considered RICO'sjurisdictional nexus requirement. In United States v. Maloney,71 F.3d 645, 663 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 295(1996), the Seventh Circuit stated that "[u]nlike RICO, thestatute in Lopez `contain[ed] no jurisdictional element whichwould ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearmpossession in question affects interstate commerce.' " Id.(quoting Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629). The Maloney court notedthat in Robertson, 115 S. Ct. at 1733, the Supreme Court leftopen the question whether, under the affecting commerce pro-vision in RICO, the activities of the enterprise would have tomeet the requirement of substantially affecting interstate com-merce. Maloney, 71 F.3d at 663. Although the reasoning andlanguage in Maloney leads one to believe that the SeventhCircuit would adopt a "de minimis" interstate commercenexus requirement, the Maloney court never actually decidedthe jurisdictional standard required under RICO. Instead, thecourt concluded that, under either the "de minimis" or the"substantial affect" jurisdictional standard, there was no plainerror. Id. at 663-664.Our conclusion is also supported by the Eleventh Circuit'sdecision in United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518 (11th Cir.),cert. denied sub nom. James v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2570(1996). Although the defendants in Beasley did not expresslymake a Lopez challenge, the court concluded that in a RICOprosecution, "[t]o satisfy the interstate commerce require-ment, only a slight effect on interstate commerce is required."Id. at 1526 (emphasis added; citations omitted). Thus, ourconclusion that the Government need only show a de minimiseffect on interstate commerce is consistent with both priorNinth Circuit and out-of-circuit decisions.II. Defendants' Actions Had a "De Minimis " Effect on       Interstate Commerce.Defendants next contend that their actions did not have a deminimis effect on interstate commerce. This contention iscontrary to the findings made by the district court.[6] In Atcheson, we clarified what is necessary to prove ade minimis effect on interstate commerce:       To establish a de minimis effect on interstate com-       merce, the Government need not show that a defen-       dant's acts actually affected interstate commerce.       Rather, the jurisdictional requirement is satisfied by       proof of a probable or potential impact.Atcheson, 94 F.3d at 1243 (internal quotation and citationsomitted). Thus, in Atcheson, it was enough that the defendants"attempted to obtain, or obtained, out-of-state credit or ATMcards from each of the victims." Id.[7] The evidence in this case establishes that Defendants'activities had a probable or potential impact on interstatecommerce. As the district court stated,       defendants allegedly robbed the Subway sandwich       franchisee which sends a percentage of its profits to       its out-of-state headquarters. In addition to the       $100.00 taken, defendants allegedly stole, among       other things, sandwiches and chips, many of whose       ingredients were purchased from out-of-state suppli-       ers.In addition, the store was forced to close down for severaldays after the robbery and murder. New employees had to behired. Moreover, the firearm used during the robbery hadmoved in interstate commerce, and the reason for the robberywas to obtain additional firearms (which has a potentialimpact on interstate commerce). Under these circumstances,the district court did not err in finding that the Governmenthad shown a sufficient impact on interstate commerce for thecourt to exercise its jurisdiction.[8] Lastly, juvenile M.A.C. argues that it is the activities ofthe enterprise, not the victim, which must affect interstatecommerce. Although he is correct that it is the enterprise'sactivities which must ultimately affect interstate commerce,he overlooks the possibility that the activities may affectinterstate commerce by impacting the victim. Title 18 U.S.C.S 1962(c) provides,       It shall be unlawful for any person . . . associated       with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of       which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to. . .       participate . . . in the conduct of such enterprise's       affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .(emphasis added). Therefore, a plain reading of the statutepermits the district court to assume jurisdiction either if theenterprise engaged in interstate commerce, or if the activitiesof the enterprise affected interstate commerce. Here, theenterprise robbed the sandwich shop; the robbery affectedinterstate commerce. We conclude that a district court maylook at both the enterprise's activities and its impact on thevictim to determine whether the interstate commerce nexus issatisfied.In light of the above, the district court had jurisdiction overDefendants' cases.III. A RICO Conspiracy to Commit Hobbs Act Rob-       beries Is a Crime of Violence for Purposes of the       Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. S 5032.Juvenile N.P. contends that the district court erred by trans-ferring him on the RICO count, because he alleges that aRICO violation is not a crime of violence as required by theJuvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. S 5032. Whether or nota conspiracy is a crime of violence is a question of statutoryinterpretation reviewed de novo. United States v. Mendez, 992F.2d 1488, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993).[9] The United States Code provides that a district courtmay transfer a juvenile for adult prosecution if, among otherprerequisites, the alleged act is a crime of violence, a particu-lar controlled substance offense, or one of a number of certainweapons offenses. 18 U.S.C. S 5032. In Mendez, we held that"conspiracy to rob in violation of S 1951[Hobbs Act robbery]`by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force. . . may be used in the course of committing the offense.' "992 F.2d at 1491 (quoting 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(3)(B)). Wetherefore determined that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Actrobberies constituted a crime of violence. "[A]scribing anordinary meaning to the words, a conspiracy to commit an actof violence is an act involving a `substantial risk' ofviolence." Id. (quoting United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d400, 404 (2nd Cir. 1985)); see also United States v. Doe, 49F.3d 859, 866 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding RICO conspiracy tocommit robbery is a crime of violence within the meaning ofthe Juvenile Delinquency Act and noting that "the nature ofthe conspiracy's substantive objective may provide an indica-tion as to whether the conspiracy creates the substantial riskthat physical force against the person or property of anothermay be used in the offense").[10] In the instant case, the RICO charge alleges, in part,a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies. The informationfiled against the juveniles specifically alleges that the gangmembers "used, attempted to use, and conspired to use rob-bery, which affected interstate commerce." Therefore,because a RICO conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberiesis a crime of violence, the district court did not err in transfer-ring juvenile N.P.IV. Federal Jurisdiction Over Indians Is Not Limited to       Crimes Enumerated in the Indian Major Crimes       Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1153.Juvenile M.A.C. argues that the district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction over the RICO charge against him becausehe contends that federal jurisdiction over criminal matters thatoccur between Indians in Indian country extends only to thosecrimes enumerated in the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.S 1153.3 We reject this contention.[11] We recently rejected a virtually identical argument inUnited States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 497-500 (9th Cir. 1994).In Begay, Indian defendants made the same argument withregard to conspiracy, as defined in 18 U.S.C. S 371. Werejected this argument, stating       [o]ur reading of SS 1152 and 1153 leads us to reject       Appellants' contention that Indians may not be       charged for any criminal conduct beyond those       crimes enumerated in S 1153. . . .[T]he [Indian]       Major Crimes Act[ ] deals only with the application       of federal enclave law to Indians and has no bearing       on federal laws of nationwide applicability that make       actions criminal wherever committed.Id. at 498 (quoting United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483,484 (9th Cir. 1976) (Bald Eagle Protection Act, a law of gen-eral applicability throughout the United States, applies toIndians even though conduct the Act proscribes is not an enu-merated offense under S 1153)). Moreover, we have previ-ously held that RICO applies to Indians on their reservations.See United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that 18 U.S.C. S 1955 applies to Indians' on-reservation gambling activities). Thus, the district court hadsubject matter jurisdiction over M.A.C.'s RICO charge.CONCLUSIONThe district court did not err in concluding that the Govern-ment need only prove that Defendants' predicate acts have ade minimis effect on interstate commerce to establish jurisdic-tion in a RICO prosecution. Further, because a RICO conspir-acy to commit Hobbs Act robberies is a crime of violence, thedistrict court did not err in transferring juvenile N.P. Finally,the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over juvenileM.A.C.'s RICO charge, even though RICO is not one of theenumerated crimes under the Indian Major Crimes Act.Therefore, we affirm the district court's orders transferringthe juveniles for prosecution as adults.AFFIRMED. the end

___________________________FOOTNOTES *The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision withoutoral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4.1 In addition to the RICO counts, the juveniles were charged with thefollowing: 1) juvenile R.B.--Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. SS 1951,5031-37), conspiracy to commit arson (18 U.S.C.SS 1153, 371, and 81),and witness tampering (18 U.S.C. S 1512(b)(3)); 2) juvenileN.P.--conspiracy to commit arson (18 U.S.C. SS 1153, 371, and 81),arson (18 U.S.C. SS 1153 and 81), and witness tampering (18 U.S.C.S 1512(b)(3)); and 3) juvenile M.A.C.--witness tampering (18 U.S.C.S 1512(b)(3)).2 The gold mine operation purchased supplies from out of state, hiredout-of-state workers and brought them to Alaska, and exported proceedsfrom the operation out of state. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. at 1733.3 The Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1153, provides in part:       Any Indian who commits against the person or property of       another Indian or other person any of the following offenses,       namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, maiming, a felony       under Chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit mur-       der, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious       bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault       against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years,       arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this       title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law       and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above       offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.