___________

         

                                   No. 95-1981

                                   ___________

         

         Rick L. Norton,                 *

                                         *

                        Petitioner,      *   

                                         *   On Petition for Review of

              v.                         *   an Order of the Railroad

                                         *   Retirement Board.

         Railroad Retirement Board,      *

                                         *

                        Respondent.      *

                                   ___________

         

                           Submitted:  October 17, 1995

         

                               Filed:  November 9, 1995

                                   ___________

         

         
Before FAGG, LAY, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

                                   ___________

         

         

         FAGG, Circuit Judge.

         

              Rick L. Norton, a former employee of the Burlington Northern

         Railroad, was injured on the job in 1990.  Norton received a cash

         settlement from Burlington and applied to the Railroad Retirement

         Board for an occupational disability annuity.  Because of gaps in

         Norton's employment with Burlington during the 1970s and 1980s, a

         hearing officer decided Norton did not have the required twenty

         years of service and denied Norton's application.  See 45 U.S.C. SS

         231a(a)(1)(iv)(A) (1988).  The Board adopted and affirmed the

         hearing officer's decision.  We deny Norton's petition for review.

         

              Norton contends the Board erroneously determined he does not

         have twenty years of service.  Norton argues the Board should have

         treated the months Norton did not work during the 1970s and 1980s

         as months of service, because Norton's settlement agreement with

         Burlington designates part of the cash settlement as compensation

         for these months.  We conclude the Board's calculations are

         supported by substantial evidence and are not based on an error of

         law.  See Kleinberg v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 18 F.3d 1432, 1433

         (8th Cir. 1994).

         

              Under the Railroad Retirement Act, "time lost" from active

         service counts toward an employee's total years of service if the

         employer compensates the employee for the time lost.  See 45 U.S.C.

         SS 231(f)(1) (1988);  20 C.F.R. SS 211.3(a) (1995).  A payment is

         considered compensation for time lost if the payment is for "an

         identifiable period of absence from the active service of the

         employer, including absence [due to] personal injury."  45 U.S.C.

         SS 231(h)(2) (1988); see 20 C.F.R. SS 211.3(a)(1) (1995). 

         According to the Board, a payment to settle an injury claim may be

         considered compensation for periods of time the injured employee

         missed from work because of that particular injury, but the

         settlement payment may not be treated as compensation for other

         periods of time lost.  See Deputy Gen. Counsel's Op. L-89-121

         (Sept. 13, 1993).  We defer to the Board's reasonable

         interpretation.  See Miernicki v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 20 F.3d

         354, 356 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural

         Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842-45
 (1984)).  The

         parties agree the cash settlement between Norton and Burlington was

         payment for Norton's 1990 injury, and the 1990 injury could not

         have caused Norton's absences from work in the 1970s and 1980s,

         years before the injury occurred.  Thus, the Board properly refused

         to treat the settlement as compensation for Norton's time lost

         during the 1970s and 1980s and correctly concluded the

         uncompensated time lost does not count toward Norton's total years

         of service under 45 U.S.C. SS 231(f)(1).

              Norton contends the Board should nevertheless count his time

         lost as months of service because while Norton was negotiating the

         settlement with Burlington, one of the Board's general attorneys

         sent Norton a letter indicating the settlement agreement would

         allow Norton to be credited with the additional service months. 

         Having carefully reviewed the letter and the rest of the record, we

         disagree.  The general attorney did not suggest Norton could treat

         a payment for a 1990 injury as compensation for time lost before

         1990.  In fact, the general attorney referred to another letter the

         Board had sent Norton that states, "Pay for time lost due to a

         personal injury may not be allocated to service months missing from

         an employee's record [before] the date of injury."  Norton simply

         was not justified in taking the general attorney's letter as a

         promise by the Board to credit Norton with additional months of

         service.

         

              We conclude the Board properly denied Norton an occupational

         disability annuity based on Norton's insufficient years of service. 

         We thus deny Norton's petition for review.

         

              A true copy.

         

                   Attest:

         

                        CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.