IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 1997
March 27, 1998
MARIO A. ROSALEZ, )
)
Appellant )
(Defendant), )
)
v. ) No. 97-93
)
THE STATE OF WYOMING, )
)
Appellee )
(Plaintiff). )
Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County:
The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge
Representing Appellant:
Mario A. Rosalez, pro se.
Representing Appellee:
William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D.
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior
Assistant Attorney General.
Before
TAYLOR, C.J.,
and
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,
and
LEHMAN, JJ.
THOMAS
, Justice.
The only question in this case is whether Mario Rosalez (Rosalez) is entitled to relief
under W
YO
. R. C
RIM
. P. 35(a) from an illegal sentence because he was not given credit
against his sentence for all time spent in confinement prior to the imposition of sentence.
After his arrest and release on bond, Rosalez was arrested on a detainer from the State of
Washington. That arrest interfered with his appearance before the county court, and his
bond was revoked. A higher bond was set, and Rosalez was unable to post the higher
amount. The detainer from the State of Washington was still in effect. The district court did
not afford Rosalez credit for this time spent in confinement prior to the imposition of
sentence, and Rosalez appeals from the denial of his motion seeking such credit. We hold
that, under the circumstances reflected in the record, Rosalez was not entitled to the claimed
credit. The Order entered in the district court denying sentence reduction is affirmed.
In the Brief of Appellant, filed by Rosalez on his own behalf, the issues that are
asserted are:
1. Did the Judge err in denying Appellant[']s
MOTION
FOR CREDIT FOR ALL JAIL TIME,
and
MOTION TO
RECONSIDER MOTION FOR CREDIT FOR ALL JAIL
TIME AS A MOTION TO CORRECT AN ILLEGAL
SENTENCE
, as
MOTION FOR SENTENCE REDUCTION[]
?
2. Did the Judge err in failing to grant Appellant credit for
Appellant[']s
total
jail time?
In the Brief of Appellee, filed by the State of Wyoming (State), the issue is said to be:
Did the district court properly deny appellant additional
presentence confinement credit?
A Response to Brief of Appellee was filed by Rosalez, but it does not state any additional
issues.
By a complaint and affidavit, filed in Natrona County on March 13, 1993, Rosalez
was charged with committing indecent liberties against two minor children. He was released
on a personal recognizance bond in the amount of $3,000.00, but the County Court required
him to post a cash bond of $2,000.00. After posting the initial bail, Rosalez apparently went
to Sheridan where, on March 24, 1993, he was arrested on a warrant from the State of
Washington. This arrest caused him to miss a scheduled appearance in the Natrona County
Court, and the court then issued a bench warrant for his arrest and return to Natrona County.
The warrant was executed on March 30, 1993.
Rosalez' bond was not forfeited after his return to Natrona County, but a new bond
was set in the amount of $15,000.00 cash or surety bond, which he was not able to post. The
warrant from the State of Washington still was outstanding, and it would have prevented
Rosalez' release from custody had he been able to post the new bond. On April 20, 1993,
Rosalez entered a plea of guilty to one count of the Amended Information that had been
filed, and on May 19, 1993, the district court sentenced him to a term of not less than two
and one-half years nor more than six years in the state penitentiary. He was given credit
against that sentence for three days previously served in the Natrona County Jail and six days
served in the Sheridan County Jail. He was not given credit for any jail time after March 30,
1993.
On February 28, 1997, Rosalez filed a Motion for Credit for All Jail Time, asserting
that he was endeavoring to correct an illegal sentence. He sought credit for an additional
fifty-one days of presentence confinement. The district court entered its Order denying
Rosalez' motion on the same day. Rosalez appeals from that Order.
Our decisions require that one who is convicted of a crime must be credited with time
spent in presentence confinement, against both the minimum and maximum sentence, if the
defendant was unable to post bond for the offense of which he was convicted.
Milladge v.
State
, 900 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Wyo. 1995);
Eustice v. State
, 871 P.2d 682, 684 (Wyo. 1994);
Prejean v. State
, 794 P.2d 877, 878 (Wyo. 1990);
Renfro v. State
, 785 P.2d 491, 498 (Wyo.
1990);
Harley v. State
, 737 P.2d 750, 756 (Wyo. 1987). We also have held that credit for
presentence confinement need not be awarded to one whose confinement would have
continued regardless of the posting of the required bond for the offense of which he was
convicted.
Smith v. State
, 932 P.2d 1281, 1282 (Wyo. 1997);
Wayt v. State
, 912 P.2d 1106,
1110 (Wyo. 1996);
Wilson v. State
, 896 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Wyo. 1995);
Van Duser v. State
,
796 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Wyo. 1990); and
Duffy v. State
, 730 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1986). In
Jones
v. State
, 602 P.2d 378 (Wyo. 1979), we held that the presentence confinement was not due
to indigency, but was required because of Jones' violation of the terms of his initial pretrial
release. Stated another way, a defendant need not be granted credit for presentence
confinement unless the confinement was solely due to his inability to post the bond set for
the offense of which he was convicted.
Wilson
.
In his Motion for Credit for All Jail Time, Rosalez alleged that he was arrested in
Sheridan on a warrant from the State of Washington and held without bail. He also asserted
that, because of the detainer from the State of Washington, his bail on the charge for which
he was convicted was raised to an amount he could not meet. While these allegations are
less than precise, they do make a clear record that Rosalez was not confined solely because
of his inability to post the bond for the offense of which he was convicted. His case closely
resembles
Smith
and
Duffy
in that regard. There was no error in the decision of the trial
court to deny credit for presentence confinement after March 30, 1993.
The Order entered in the district court is affirmed.