228487MAJ
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                          Court of Appeals Division III
                               State of Washington

                            Opinion Information Sheet

Docket Number:       22848-7-III
Title of Case:       In re The Matter of: Monte Lee Richie
File Date:           06/07/2005


                                SOURCE OF APPEAL
                                ----------------
Appeal from Superior Court of Asotin County
Docket No:      03-2-00326-9
Judgment or order under review
Date filed:     03/05/2004
Judge signing:  Hon. William D Acey


                                     JUDGES
                                     ------
Authored by Stephen M Brown
Concurring: Dennis J. Sweeney
            Kenneth H. Kato


                                COUNSEL OF RECORD
                                -----------------
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
            Scott David Gallina
            Attorney at Law
            1229 Main St
            PO Box 285
            Lewiston, ID  83501-0285

Counsel for Respondent(s)
            Charnelle Marie Bjelkengren
            WA State Atty General's Office
            1116 W Riverside Ave
            Spokane, WA  99201

            Jacqueline Bolden
            Office of Attorney
            900 4th Ave Ste 2000
            Seattle, WA  98164


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In re the Matter of:                             ) No. 22848-7-III
                                                 )
MONTE LEE RICHIE,                                ) Division Three
                                                 ) Panel One
                                                 ) Appellant. )
PUBLISHED OPINION
                                             BROWN, J.--Monte L. Richie was
arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) by a Washington State
Trooper at an Idaho regional hospital following Mr. Richie's transport from
an Asotin County Washington accident scene.  This court granted
discretionary review of Mr. Richie's Department of Licensing (DOL)
administrative license suspension affirmed by the Asotin County Superior
Court.   Mr. Richie contends: (1) the hearing officer erred in finding he
was lawfully arrested in Idaho; and (2) the hearing officer erred in
finding his blood was legally drawn by a 'qualified technician' under RCW
46.61.506.  We clarify this court's consistent holding in City of Clarkston
v. Stone, 63 Wn. App. 500, 820 P.2d 518 (1991).  Finding no error, we
affirm.
FACTS
On June 29, 2003 at 1:11 a.m., Deputy John Jeffers was dispatched to a one
vehicle accident near Anatone, Washington.  There, he saw a pickup that had
rolled to a stop on its top near the highway.  He saw Mr. Richie on the
ground next to the driver's side of the pickup with numerous injuries.
During the investigation, Mr. Richie was transported to St. Joseph's
Regional Medical Center in Lewiston, Idaho.  Remaining to investigate,
Deputy Jeffers saw an empty beer can near the truck.  Washington State
Patrol Trooper G.K. Bancroft arrived on the scene to investigate.  His
analysis indicated the pickup had been traveling about 87.7 miles per hour
prior to the accident.  Trooper Bancroft was suspicious of driving under
the influence (DUI).
     Trooper Bancroft pursued his investigation at the Idaho hospital.  Mr.
Richie was mainly unconscious and unresponsive to the Trooper's loud
questions.  Trooper Bancroft smelled an odor of alcohol on Mr. Richie's
breath.  At 4:46 a.m., the Trooper informed Mr. Richie he was under arrest
for DUI by reading the special evidence warning for an unconscious driver.
Trooper Bancroft asked the hospital staff to call a phlebotomist to take a
blood sample from Mr. Richie.  Tammy Bower, a phlebotomist from Regional
Pathology Laboratory, responded.  Ms. Bower took the blood samples, which
the Trooper sent to the Washington State Toxicology Laboratory.  Mr.
Richie's blood alcohol content was tested at .13.  The chain of custody and
blood test results are unchallenged except for the phlebotomist
qualifications.
     Under the above facts, DOL suspended Mr. Richie's license for 90 days.
Mr. Richie elected a DOL administrative hearing without testimony.  At the
administrative hearing, Mr. Richie unsuccessfully contended the Idaho
arrest was unlawful and his blood was illegally drawn.  The hearing officer
relied upon the sworn report of Trooper Bancroft and Deputy Jeffers to
uphold Mr. Richie's license suspension and concluded State v. Steinbrunn,
54 Wn. App. 506, 744 P.2d 55 (1989) allowed the Idaho arrest.
     Based upon the administrative record, the Asotin County Superior Court
affirmed.  The superior court rejected both Mr. Richie's continued illegal
arrest argument under City of Clarkston v. Stone, 63 Wn. App. 500, 820 P.2d
518 (1991), and his challenge to the phlebotomist's qualifications.  This
court granted discretionary review.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether, considering City of Clarkston v. Stone, 63 Wn. App.
500, 820 P.2d 518 (1991), the hearing officer erred in finding Trooper
Bancroft made a lawful arrest of Mr. Richie in Idaho.
     We review the administrative decision like the superior court.
Clement v. Dep't of Licensing, 109 Wn. App. 371, 373, 35 P.3d 1171 (2001).
Our review is 'limited to a determination of whether the Department has
committed any errors of law.'  RCW 46.20.308(9).  We accept the DOL
findings of fact, expressly made or inferred from the final order, which
are supported by substantial evidence in the record below.  Id.  Mr. Richie
offered no evidence to dispute the facts at the DOL administrative hearing.
Mr. Richie contends his arrest in Idaho by a Washington law officer was
unlawful.  A lawful arrest triggers implied consent to a sobriety test.
State v. Wetherell, 82 Wn.2d 865, 869, 514 P.2d 1069 (1973).  Generally,
law enforcement officers lack the authority to make valid arrests outside
of their appointed jurisdiction.  State v. Barker, 143 Wn.2d 915, 921, 25
P.3d 423 (2001).  However, the State responds that Idaho's fresh pursuit
statute, I.C. sec. 19-701, authorized Mr. Richie's arrest in Idaho.
The hearing officer relied on Steinbrunn, 54 Wn. App. 506, a case applying
Washington law, in concluding Mr. Richie's arrest was lawful.  By its
terms, Washington's fresh pursuit statute is inapplicable to arrests made
in other states.  See RCW 10.89.010.  Rather, the legality of Mr. Richie's
arrest depends on Idaho law:
     {a}ny member of a duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit
of another state of the United States who enters this state in fresh
pursuit and continues within this state in such fresh pursuit, of a person
in order to arrest him on the ground that he is believed to have committed
a felony in such other state, shall have the same authority to arrest and
hold such person in custody, as has any member of any duly organized state,
county or municipal peace unit of this state, to arrest and hold in custody
a person on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in
this state.

I.C. sec. 19-701 (emphasis added).
In City of Clarkston v. Stone, 63 Wn. App. 500, 820 P.2d 518 (1991), this
court held a Washington police officer did not have the authority under
I.C. sec. 19-701 to arrest in Idaho for a DUI.  In Clarkston, the court
decided police lacked reasonable suspicion of drinking and driving behavior
in Washington before pursuing the driver into Idaho.  Here, Washington
officers found Mr. Richie at a Washington accident scene where uncontested
evidence suggested drinking and driving.  The authorities facilitated Mr.
Richie's removal from the accident scene to an Idaho regional hospital for
emergency care.  Trooper Bancroft soon left the accident scene to follow
Mr. Richie into Idaho to continue his investigation, suspicious of drinking
and driving behavior.
This is not a case of hot pursuit into a private area like a home, a
different kind of analysis altogether.  Rather, this is a case of applying
the Idaho fresh pursuit statute to different facts than those found in
Clarkston.  Our focus is whether Trooper Bancroft possessed a reasonable
suspicion that Mr. Richie had been drinking and driving in Washington
before he entered Idaho to continue his investigation of Mr. Richie.  This
is not a case like Clarkston, where the police lacked reason to believe Mr.
Clarkston had been drinking and driving in Washington before pursing him
into Idaho.  The short investigative delay to facilitate Mr. Richie's
emergency medical care is immaterial.  The State asks us to overturn
Clarkston, but we take this opportunity to clarify its holding because the
facts are distinguishable, and thus, its legal analysis is susceptible of
misinterpretation.
In interpreting its fresh pursuit statute, Idaho's Supreme Court has found
'felony' to include misdemeanors treated as felonies for purposes of arrest
in the other state.  State v. Ruhter, 107 Idaho 282, 283-84, 688 P.2d 1187
(1984).  In Ruhter, the court decided a Nevada officer lawfully followed a
weaving driver into Idaho and arrested him for suspected DUI under I.C.
sec. 19-701, because facts developed in Nevada justified the pursuit.
Further, DUI is treated as a felony for purposes of arrest in Nevada.  Id.
at 283; see also N.R.S. 484.379 (allowing arrests for certain misdemeanors,
including DUI, without a warrant).  The Clarkston court correctly reasoned
the holding from Ruhter was factually distinguishable because it concluded
the pursuing officer in the Clarkston case lacked drinking-and-driving
facts before entering into Idaho in pursuit of Mr. Clarkston.
Here, the record shows the facts suggesting Mr. Richie's drinking and
driving behavior were observed in Washington before Trooper Bancroft's
pursuit into Idaho.  In Ruhter, the officer had reason to believe the
driver may have been under the influence prior to pursuing him into Idaho.
See Ruhter, 107 Idaho at 283.  Our facts are similar to those in Ruhter.
Thus, we reach the same result as in Ruhter.
Like Nevada, Washington treats DUI as a felony for purposes of arrest.  See
RCW 10.31.100(3)(d) (allowing officers with probable cause to believe that
a person is driving under the influence to arrest without a warrant).  This
was true when Clarkston was decided on its unique facts.  See Laws of 1987,
sec. 20, ch. 280 (codified as amended at RCW 10.31.100).  Although
Washington's fresh pursuit statute is not directly applicable, we note
since Clarkston, Washington amended its fresh pursuit statute in 1998 to
give foreign law enforcement the authority to make lawful arrests in
Washington on suspicion of a felony or DUI.  See RCW 10.89.010.
     Considering the law and our unique facts, we clarify Clarkston and
hold that pursuing Washington officers may effectuate a lawful arrest in
Idaho for DUI if reasonable suspicion exists to believe the suspect may
have been driving under the influence in Washington before the officer
pursues the suspect into Idaho.  Accordingly, we decline the State's
invitation to overturn Clarkston, because its holding is based upon
distinguishable facts, even if its legal reasoning may be capable of
misinterpretation as suggested by the State.
In sum, Trooper Bancroft's accident investigation revealed Mr. Richie was
involved in an accident with facts indicative of drinking and driving.
Trooper Bancroft knew these facts before entering Idaho to pursue his
ongoing investigation of Mr. Richie's accident.  The Idaho statute merely
requires a belief that an individual has committed a felony, not probable
cause.  See I.C. 19-701; see also Steinbrunn, 54 Wn. App. at 510
(recognizing probable cause to arrest is not required at the time of
pursuit).  In other words, similar to the situation in Ruhter, Trooper
Bancroft had reason to believe Mr. Richie was a DUI suspect prior to
'pursuing' him into Idaho.  See Ruhter, 107 Idaho at 283.  In Idaho,
Trooper Bancroft properly established probable cause for arrest.
B.  Qualifications of Phlebotomist
The issue is whether, considering Ms. Bower's qualifications, Mr. Richie's
blood was legally drawn within the standards of RCW 46.61.506.  The
standard of review remains the same.
In 2003, RCW 46.61.506(4) provided, 'the withdrawal of blood for purpose of
determining its alcoholic or drug content may be performed only by a
physician, a registered nurse, or a qualified technician.'1  RCW
46.61.506(4); see also RCW 46.20.308(2) (a blood test shall be administered
by a qualified person as provided in RCW 46.61.506(5)).  '{T}he plain
meaning of that section is that someone who has appropriate and adequate
medical training or experience must draw the blood.'  State v. Merritt, 91
Wn. App. 969, 975, 961 P.2d 958 (1998).  'Whether a technician is a
'qualified technician' as required by statute is a matter for the
discretion of the trial court.  A person may qualify as an 'expert' by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.'  Id. at 975-76.
However, a sworn report submitted by a law enforcement officer to DOL is
prima facie evidence of compliance with RCW 46.20.308, including the
requirement that the blood test was administered by a qualified technician.
See RCW 46.20.308(8).
{I}f DOL meets its prima facie evidence requirements as specified in the
first paragraph of RCW 46.20.308(8), admissibility is determined and DOL
may rest without calling witnesses to further authenticate its
documentation.  If the driver presents no evidence . . . then the hearing
officer can, without more, apply RCW 46.20.308(8) to the case facts after
deciding the weight of the evidence.

State v. Alforde, 115 Wn. App. 576, 582, 63 P.3d 170, review denied, 150
Wn.2d 1004 (2003); see also Lytle v. State of Washington Dep't of
Licensing, 94 Wn. App. 357, 362, 971 P.2d 969 (1999) (finding that an
officer's sworn report is prima facie evidence of compliance with the
implied consent statute, requiring rebuttal by a defendant).
Here, the hearing officer relied on circumstantial evidence provided in the
officers' sworn report to determine Ms. Bower was a 'qualified technician.'
The sworn report evidences that Ms. Bower responded to Trooper Bancroft's
request for a phlebotomist, and that Ms. Bower is a phlebotomist with the
Regional Pathologist Laboratory.  Although the report does not list Ms.
Bower's license status, training, education or experience, the sworn report
is prima facie evidence that Mr. Richie's blood was drawn by a 'qualified
technician.'  See RCW 46.20.308(8).
At that point, it was Mr. Richie's burden to come forward with evidence to
refute the prima facie case.  See id.  Mr. Richie failed to do this.
Because Mr. Richie did not present any evidence, the hearing officer did
not err in deciding the case on the evidence presented.  Therefore we
conclude the hearing officer did not err in finding Ms. Bower was a
'qualified technician' for purposes of RCW 46.61.506(4).
     Affirmed.

                                   Brown, J.
WE CONCUR:

Kato, C.J.

Sweeney, J.

1  RCW 46.61.506 was amended in 2004.  Under the new statute, blood may be
drawn by a physician, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nursing
assistant, physician assistant, first responder, emergency medical
technician, health care assistant, or 'any technician trained in
withdrawing blood.'  RCW 46.61.506(5).
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