Shannon v. Department of Corrections, No. 26446-3-II, (Slip Op., February 22, 2002).
Shannon v. Department of Corrections, No. 26446-3-II, (Slip Op., February 22, 2002).
Feb. 2002 SHANNON v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 1
Cause No. 26446-3-II
[No. 26446-3-II. Division Two. February 22, 2002.]
MICHAEL E. SHANNON, WILLIE M. ) 26446-3-II
SHANNON and MICHAEL E. SHANNON, )
on behalf of the ESTATE OF )
THERESA M. SHANNON, )
)
Respondents, )
)
v. )
)
STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT ) PUBLISHED OPINION
OF CORRECTIONS, LACEY POLICE )
DEPARTMENT and CITY OF LACEY, )
)
Appellants. )
Trial Court: Superior Court, Thurston County,
No. 99-2-01328-7, Gary Tabor, J., September 1, 2000.
Freeley & San Nicolas PLLC, by Silvia Ann San Nicolas, for
respondents.
Michael Patrick Lynch, Assistant Attorney General, for appellants.
Law Lyman Daniel Kamerrer & Bogdanovich P.S., by John Edward Justice,
for defendant City of Lacey.
ARMSTRONG, C.J. -- The Shannons filed a tort claim against the Department
of Corrections. The Department moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the claim was deficient because the Shannons' attorney signed and verified
it for them. The trial court denied summary judgment and ruled that RCW
4.92.100 is ambiguous as to whether a claimant must ever verify a claim
against the State. The Department appeals. We hold that the statute is
unambiguous; it requires the claimant, unless incapacitated, to verify the
tort claim. We reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment in the
Department's favor.
FACTS
Cynthia Boskofsky and Teresa Shannon were coworkers at the women's prison
in Purdy, Washington. They became romantically involved in May 1994 and
had an apartment together. But their relationship was violent and Shannon
eventually obtained a restraining order against Boskofsky. Shannon and her
sons, Willie and Michael, complained to police that Boskofsky stalked,
harassed, and threatened them despite the restraining order. The
Department of Corrections fired Boskofsky in March 1996 for doing a poor
job. In July 1996, Boskofsky shot and killed Teresa Shannon in her car.
In 1999, Willie and Michael Shannon filed a tort claim against the
Department of Corrections. They alleged that the Department negligently
hired, supervised, and monitored Boskofsky. The Shannons' attorney
signed the tort claim for them.
The Department of Corrections moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the claim against it was deficient under RCW 4.92.100 because only the
Shannons' attorney signed it. The statute provides that all claims must
be verified but, if the claimant is incapacitated from verifying the
claim, an attorney or other representative can verify it. RCW 4.92.100.
The Shannons argued that RCW 4.92.100 is ambiguous. They also argued
that the State was estopped from challenging the sufficiency of their
tort claim because the State's tort claim form instructed that the
"claimant or legal representative" must sign the form. The trial court
denied the State's motion for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
We ordinarily will not review a denial of a motion for summary judgment.
RAP 2.2(a); Sea-Pac Co., Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Local Union 44, 103 Wn.2d 800, 801-02, 699 P.2d 217 (1985). But an
appellate court will accept discretionary review if the trial court
"committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings
useless." RAP 2.3(b)(1). And the trial court here found that an immediate
appeal would serve judicial economy and simplify the trial. We agree.
I. Interpretation of RCW 4.92.100
We review a trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion and its
interpretation of a statute de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the
trial court. Enter. Leasing, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 139 Wn.2d 546,
551-52, 988 P.2d 961 (1999). When interpreting a statute, we look for
the legislature's intent. Duke v. Boyd, 133 Wn.2d 80, 87, 942
P.2d 351 (1997). A court must give effect to every part of the text,
rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous. City of Seattle v.
Dep't of Labor & Indus., 136 Wn.2d 693, 698, 965 P.2d 619 (1998). And
we look outside the statute for intent only if the statutory language is
ambiguous. Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 117 Wn.2d 325, 329,
815 P.2d 781 (1991). "A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two
or more reasonable interpretations." United States Tobacco Sales &
Mktg. Co., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 96 Wn. App. 932, 938, 982 P.2d
652 (1999).
RCW 4.92.100 provides that claims against the State "shall be verified."
But "[i]f the claimant is incapacitated from verifying, presenting, and
filing the claim or if the claimant is a minor, or is a nonresident of the
state, the claim may be verified, presented, and filed on behalf of the
claimant by any relative, attorney, or agent representing the claimant."
RCW 4.92.100.
Courts will liberally construe the contents of a claim and accept
substantial compliance with the content requirements of RCW 4.92.100; but
the filing requirements are strictly construed. RCW 4.92.100; Levy
v. State, 91 Wn. App. 934, 942, 957 P.2d 1272 (1998). While the
filing requirements are not so rigid as to demand unjust results,
compliance is mandatory even if the requirements seem "harsh and
technical." Levy, 91 Wn. App. at 942.
The Shannons argue that RCW 4.92.100 is ambiguous because it does
not state that claims against the State shall be verified by
the claimant. But the statute specifically provides that a relative,
attorney, or agent may verify a claim if the claimant is a minor,
a nonresident, or is incapacitated from verifying, presenting, and filing
the claim. This provision has meaning only if in all other circumstances,
the claimant must personally verify the claim. And we must interpret the
statute in a way that renders all of its language meaningful.
The Shannons do not claim that they are minors or nonresidents or
that they were incapacitated. Thus, under RCW 4.92.100 they had to
personally verify and sign their tort claim.
A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing
portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate
Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record pursuant
to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
BRIDGEWATER, and HUNT, J., concur.