State v. Chandler, No. 69140-1, (Slip Op., April 19, 2001).
State v. Chandler, No. 69140-1, (Slip Op., April 19, 2001).
Apr. 2001 STATE v. CHANDLER 1
Cause No. 69140-1
[No. 69140-1. En Banc.]
Argued January 17, 2001. Decided April 19, 2001.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 69140-1
Respondent, )
)
v. ) En Banc
)
BENJAMIN J. CHANDLER, )
)
Petitioner. )
___________________ ) Filed: April 19, 2001
Trial Court: Superior Court, Skamania County,
No. 98-8-00013-2, E.T. Reynolds, J.
Knapp O'Dell & Lewis, by R. A. Lewis, for petitioner.
Skamania County Prosecutor's Office, by Peter S. Banks and
Bradley W. Andersen, for respondent.
ALEXANDER, C.J. - Benjamin Chandler obtained review of a decision
of the Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirming his Skamania County
Juvenile Court conviction on a charge of indecent exposure. The only
issue before us is whether Chandler's adjudicatory hearing occurred
within the time frame required by Juvenile Court Rule (JuCR) 7.8(b). We
reverse the Court of Appeals, concluding that because Chandler's
adjudicatory hearing did not occur within 60 days of his true
arraignment date, not counting time properly excluded pursuant to JuCR
7.8(d), Chandler's conviction must be reversed and the information
dismissed.
I. FACTS
By information filed in Skamania County Juvenile Court on February 9,
1998, the State of Washington charged Benjamin Chandler, then age 15,
with one count of indecent exposure. Chandler's arraignment was
initially scheduled for March 11, 1998, Skamania County's "Juvenile Day" /1
for the month of March 1998. Chandler did not appear in court on
that date, however, because he had not been served with notice to appear
in court on that date. /2 Consequently, the trial court rescheduled
Chandler's arraignment for April 15, 1998, the next regularly scheduled
day that juvenile court matters would be heard in Skamania County.
Chandler, who was not in custody or subject to conditions of
release, appeared on April 15 with his attorney and entered a plea of
"[n]ot guilty" to the indecent exposure charge. Videotaped Proceedings
(VP) (Apr. 15, 1998) at 3. Chandler's counsel also noted Chandler's
objection to the date of his arraignment, claiming that it was untimely
under JuCR 7.6(a) as interpreted by the Court of Appeals in State v.
Day, 46 Wn. App. 882, 734 P.2d 491 (1987). /3 He, therefore,
requested that the trial court set the date for Chandler's adjudicatory
hearing on or before April 24, 1998, thus ensuring that the adjudicatory
hearing would be within 60 days of the date on which Chandler should have
been arraigned pursuant to JuCR 7.6(a). In that regard, counsel stated:
"[W]e're formally requesting that the trial be conducted within 60 days
of February 23rd, which is 14 days after the Information was filed." VP
(Apr. 15, 1998) at 6.
The trial court indicated that it agreed with Chandler's counsel
that the true arraignment date was February 23, 1998, a date that was 14
days following the date charges were filed against Chandler, and that,
pursuant to JuCR 7.8(b), Chandler's adjudicatory hearing "shall begin
within 60 days following the juvenile's arraignment in juvenile court on
the charges contained in the information." JuCR 7.8(b). It nevertheless
denied Chandler's request to schedule the adjudicatory hearing date
within that time frame, i.e., on or before April 24, 1998. It, instead,
set Chandler's hearing for April 30, 1998, concluding that it was
permissible for it to do so pursuant to JuCR 7.8(e)(3). That rule
provides: "The court on its own motion may continue the case when
required in the due administration of justice and the alleged juvenile
offender will not be substantially prejudiced in the presentation of his
or her defense." In support of its ruling, the trial court stated:
For the record, Skamania County shares one judge with
Klickitat County. I'm not in this county every week. We have
certain dates that are set for hearing. The 24th of April,
which is the date that's being requested by the Defendant, is
not a date when I would be in this county. It's also a date
that has other matters set in Klickitat County, which have to
be heard.
I'm finding that in the due course of administration of
justice that there's good reason to set the matter outside of
the time limits. And also I cannot find that the Defendant
would be substantially prejudiced in having the matter set
over. He's not going to be detained. The conditions of his
release are rather innocuous, that all he has to do is stay out
of trouble and keep in contact with his attorney and show up in
court. So, he's not under any great imposition or-and his
freedom's not being restricted to any great extent.
VP (Apr. 15, 1998) at 7-8.
Chandler's adjudicatory hearing was eventually held on May 29, 1998. /4
At that time, Chandler's counsel renewed his client's objection to the
adjudicatory hearing not being held within 60 days of Chandler's true
arraignment date as required by JuCR 7.8(b). At the conclusion of the
hearing, the trial court found Chandler guilty of indecent exposure. It
sentenced him to three months of community supervision and ordered him
to perform 24 hours of community service work. It also fined Chandler
$25 and required him to contribute $100 to the Victim's Assistance Fund.
Chandler, thereafter, appealed his conviction to Division Two of the
Court of Appeals. That court affirmed his conviction. Chandler then
petitioned this court for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals'
decision. We granted his petition.
II. ANALYSIS
Chandler contends that his adjudicatory hearing was not held within the
time frame provided in JuCR 7.8. He submits, therefore, that pursuant to
JuCR 7.8(g) his conviction should be vacated and the information charging
him with indecent exposure should be dismissed with prejudice. /5 The
State does not dispute that "the time for conducting a fact finding
hearing under the speedy trial rules expired on April 24th." Resp't's
Answer to Pet. for Discretionary Review at 10. It asserts, rather, that
"the court acted with sound discretion to set the case four judicial days
later." Id. In support of this argument, the State cites to
JuCR 7.8(e)(3), which, as indicated above, permits the juvenile court to
"continue the case when required in the due administration of justice and
the alleged juvenile offender will not be substantially prejudiced in the
presentation of his or her defense." The State contends that because
"[t]he trial court's decision to set the hearing beyond the expiration of
the speedy trial period [was] in the `due administration of justice,'"
this is somehow an "exception" /6 to JuCR 7.8(g)'s rule that "[i]f the
juvenile court violates the rules, the Information must be dismissed with
prejudice." Id. at 9.
Both parties raise a number of arguments in support of their respective
assertions that there was or was not "good cause" for granting a
continuance of the adjudicatory hearing pursuant to JuCR 7.8(e)(3). We
need not address these arguments because, in our judgment, JuCR 7.8(e)(3)
has no application here because it only authorizes a trial court to
continue the case after it has been set within the time
frame set forth in JuCR 7.8(b). In the instant case, the trial court was
not continuing an adjudicatory hearing that had been properly set within
the time limits prescribed in that rule. It was, instead, initially
setting Chandler's adjudicatory hearing for a date outside of
the 60-day time frame of JuCR 7.8(b). The provisions of JuCR 7.8(e)(3)
simply do not apply in these circumstances.
Because we have concluded that the trial court's action in initially
setting the hearing date did not implicate JuCR 7.8(e)(3), the period of
time from April 15, 1998, to April 30, 1998, was not properly excluded in
computing the date by which Chandler's adjudicatory hearing must occur
pursuant to JuCR 7.8(b). That being the case, it cannot be said that
Chandler's adjudicatory hearing occurred within 60 days from the date of
his true arraignment. His right to have his "adjudicatory hearing . . .
begin within 60 days following [his] arraignment in juvenile court on the
charges contained in the information[,]" as provided by JuCR 7.8(b), was,
therefore, violated when the hearing was held after April 24. The charge
against Chandler of indecent exposure must, therefore, be dismissed with
prejudice pursuant to JuCR 7.8(g).
III. CONCLUSION
For reasons stated above, we conclude that Chandler's adjudicatory
hearing did not occur within the time limits required by JuCR 7.8(b). In
reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of the unique problems
that confront a single superior court judge in a multi- county judicial
district. A judge in such circumstances is not, however, without
remedies to mitigate those problems. The judge may seek to utilize the
services of a visiting superior court judge, a judge pro tempore, or a
court commissioner in order to meet the strict time requirements set
forth in the Juvenile Court Rules. In the event that resort to those
avenues of assistance are unavailing, a continuance of the adjudicatory
hearing may be justified pursuant to JuCR 7.8(e), but only if the
hearing was initially set within the time provided for in the Juvenile
Court Rules.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and vacate
Chandler's conviction and sentence. We remand to the Skamania County
Juvenile Court to dismiss the charge against Chandler with prejudice
pursuant to JuCR 7.8(g).
GUY, SMITH, JOHNSON, MADSEN, TALMADGE, SANDERS, IRELAND, and
BRIDGE JJ., concur.
_______________
1 Skamania County is in a joint superior court judicial district with
Klickitat County. Under the local court rules for the Klickitat/Skamania
County Superior Court, the court hears juvenile matters on specified
"Juvenile Days." The local rule provides that: "The Court will sit in
Juvenile Court session regularly [in Skamania County] on the 1st
Wednesday after the 2nd Monday of each month and such other days as set
by the Court." Local Court Rule No. 1(I)(A)(2)(b).
2 The trial judge concluded that "[the summons] apparently
hasn't been served, so I guess Mr. Chandler wouldn't know to be here
today." Videotaped Proceedings (VP) (Mar. 11, 1998) at 2.
3 JuCR 7.6(a) provides that a "juvenile who is detained
or subject to conditions of release must be arraigned within 14 days
after the information or indictment is filed." (Emphasis added.) In the
case of juveniles who are not detained or subject to conditions
of release, Superior Court Criminal Rule (CrR) 4.1(a), which applies to
juveniles by virtue of JuCR 7.6(a), states the applicable rule,
providing: "Promptly after the indictment or information has
been filed, the defendant shall be arraigned thereon in open court."
(Emphasis added.) In Day, Division Three of the Court of
Appeals held that "a prompt arraignment means an available juvenile
defendant [who is not detained or subject to conditions of release after
arrest] must be arraigned within 14 days after the information is filed."
Day, 46 Wn. App. at 892.
4 Chandler's counsel had a scheduling conflict, which he claimed
prevented him from being available on April 30, 1998. He, therefore,
requested a continuance of the trial at the suggestion of the trial
judge. The trial judge granted his request, and continued Chandler's
hearing to May 29, 1998. Neither party asserts that the Court of Appeals
erred in excluding the period from April 30 to May 29 in computing the
time for Chandler's adjudicatory hearing.
5 JuCR 7.8(g) provides: "If the adjudicatory hearing on a juvenile
offense is not held within the time limits in this rule, the information
shall be dismissed with prejudice."
6 Although the State characterizes JuCR 7.8(e)(3) as an "exception" to
JuCR 7.8(g), it is actually a tolling provision. By virtue of JuCR
7.8(d)(3), the period of a continuance granted pursuant to JuCR
7.8(e)(3) is "excluded in computing the time for the adjudicatory
hearing" under JuCR 7.8(b).