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Court of Appeals Division III
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: 18109-0-III
Title of Case: State of Washington
v.
Washington James Bridges, Jr.
File Date: 07/27/2000
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County
Docket No: 98-1-00621-9
Judgment or order under review
Date filed: 12/15/1998
Judge signing: Hon. Kathleen O'Connor
JUDGES
------
Authored by Kenneth H Kato
Concurring: Frank L. Kurtz
Dennis J. Sweeney
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s)
David N. Gasch
Attorney At Law
PO Box 30339
Spokane, WA 99223-3005
Counsel for Respondent(s)
Kevin M. Korsmo
Spokane County Prosecutor's Office
W. 1100 Mallon
Spokane, WA 99260
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 18109-0-III
Respondent, )
) Division Three
v. ) Panel Nine
)
WASHINGTON JAMES BRIDGES, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JR., )
)
Appellant. ) FILED
KATO, J. -- Washington James Bridges Jr. was convicted of first degree
rape, first degree robbery, first degree burglary, and fourth degree
assault. He appeals the assault conviction, contending the evidence was
insufficient. He also appeals his sentence, contending the trial court
improperly concluded the robbery and burglary convictions did not encompass
the same criminal conduct. We affirm.
On the early morning of March 13, 1998, two men entered the Spokane
home of Diane Davis.1 One of the men, whom Ms. Davis later identified as
Mr. Bridges, held a gun to her head and ordered her into the bathroom,
where he required her to have sexual intercourse with him.
The two men then took Ms. Davis to an upstairs bedroom; they demanded
money and marijuana, which she gave them. Ms. Davis then heard the men
leave the residence. A few minutes later, Ms. Davis heard a loud noise at
the front door; she saw Mr. Bridges run into the home again.
Martha Scott, the 71-year-old grandmother of Ms. Davis' boyfriend, was in
an upstairs bedroom. She heard a noise and went downstairs to investigate.
She testified a man hit her in the stomach, knocked her down, and kicked
her on the shoulder.
Mr. Bridges and another man were arrested within a couple of hours.
Lab tests on semen found in Ms. Davis' body revealed a 10 million to 1
chance of it being anyone's but Mr. Bridges'. A footprint on the home's
broken front door matched a shoe Mr. Bridges was wearing.
Mr. Bridges was charged with first degree robbery of Ms. Davis; first
degree assault (as an accomplice) of David Willis, Ms. Davis' boyfriend;
first degree rape of Ms. Davis; first degree burglary of the residence; and
second degree assault of Ms. Scott.2 The court dismissed the first degree
assault charge during trial.
A jury found Mr. Bridges guilty of the robbery, rape, and burglary
charges and of the lesser included charge of fourth degree assault of Ms.
Scott.3 At sentencing, Mr. Bridges argued the robbery and burglary
encompassed the same criminal conduct so they should count as only one
crime for purposes of calculating his offender score. The court held the
crimes did not involve the same victim and therefore could not be
considered the same criminal conduct. For the felony convictions, Mr.
Bridges was sentenced to 360 months plus a 60-month deadly weapon
enhancement.4
We first consider whether the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find
Mr. Bridges guilty of the fourth degree assault of Ms. Scott. On a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 220-22, 616 P.2d 628
(1980).
We draw all reasonable inferences in the State's favor and interpret them
most strongly against the defendant. State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899, 906-
07, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977). The sole issue here is the identity of Ms.
Scott's assailant.
Ms. Davis testified that Mr. Bridges alone re-entered the residence
after the two men left, and that he ran into Ms. Scott. At trial, Ms.
Scott was asked if she could identify the man who struck and kicked her:
A. No, not exactly.
Q. Okay.
A. Except that I think it's just that fellow right there, his eyes.
Ms. Scott also testified she could 'see his eyes.'
Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, a reasonable inference
from this evidence is that, after the two men left the residence, Mr.
Bridges returned for some reason and assaulted Ms. Scott. A rational jury
thus could have found Mr. Bridges guilty of the assault. The evidence was
sufficient.
We next consider whether the sentencing court erred in concluding the
robbery and burglary did not encompass the same criminal conduct under RCW
9.94A.400(1)(a), which provides in pertinent part:
{W}henever a person is to be sentenced for two or more current offenses,
the sentence range for each current offense shall be determined by using
all other current and prior convictions as if they were prior convictions
for the purpose of the offender score: PROVIDED, That if the court enters
a finding that some or all of the current offenses encompass the same
criminal conduct then those current offenses shall be counted as one crime.
. . . 'Same criminal conduct,' as used in this subsection, means two or
more crimes that require the same criminal intent, are committed at the
same time and place, and involve the same victim.
A sentencing court's determination of what constitutes the same criminal
conduct is reviewed for abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law.
State v. Maxfield, 125 Wn.2d 378, 402, 886 P.2d 123 (1994).
Ms. Davis was the sole victim of the robbery, and she was a victim of
the burglary. However, other residents of the home also were victims of
the burglary. See State v. Lessley, 118 Wn.2d 773, 778-79, 827 P.2d 996
(1992). The robbery and burglary convictions thus did not involve the same
victims, and the court properly declined to treat them as the same criminal
conduct.
Moreover, RCW 9A.52.050, the burglary antimerger statute,5 'gives the
sentencing judge discretion to punish for burglary, even where it and an
additional crime encompass the same criminal conduct.' Lessley, 118 Wn.2d
at 781. Even if Ms. Davis were the only victim of the burglary, the
sentencing court could have exercised its discretion to punish the crimes
separately.
The court properly held that the crimes did not encompass the same
criminal conduct.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record
pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Kato, J.
WE CONCUR:
Kurtz, C.J.
Sweeney, J.
1 Several other persons also lived at the home, including Ms. Davis'
boyfriend, David Willis; Mr. Willis' grandparents; and a friend, Matt
Morehouse.
2 The original information also charged Shawn D. Cranford, who apparently
pleaded guilty or was tried separately. An additional charge of taking a
motor vehicle without permission was severed.
3 The jury also found Mr. Bridges was armed with a deadly weapon during the
commission of the robbery, rape, and burglary.
4 He also was sentenced to 365 days for the misdemeanor fourth degree
assault conviction, to run concurrently with the felony convictions.
5 The statute provides: 'Every person who, in the commission of a burglary
shall commit any other crime, may be punished therefor as well as for the
burglary, and may be prosecuted for each crime separately.'