TERESA WILSON BEAN LEWIS

v.	Record No. 032153

OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
		                     March 5, 2004

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY
Charles J. Strauss, Judge

	As required by Code  17.1-313, we review the sentences 
of death imposed upon Teresa Wilson Bean Lewis.
I.
	On November 20, 2002, the defendant was indicted by a 
grand jury for the following offenses:  capital murder for 
hire of Charles J. Lewis in violation of Code  18.2-31(2); 
capital murder for hire of Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr., in 
violation of Code  18.2-31(2); conspiracy to commit capital 
murder in violation of Code  18.2-22 and -31; robbery of 
Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr., in violation of Code  18.2-58; use 
of a firearm to commit the murder of Julian Clifton Lewis, 
Jr., in violation of Code  18.2-53.1; use of a firearm to 
commit the murder of Charles J. Lewis in violation of Code 
 18.2-53.1; and use of a firearm to commit the robbery of 
Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr., in violation of Code  18.2-53.1.
	The defendant pled guilty to these offenses.  Before 
accepting the pleas, the circuit court questioned the 
defendant and made a determination that her guilty pleas were 
made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly.  Additionally, 
the court considered a competency assessment of the defendant 
made by Barbara G. Haskins, M.D., a board-certified forensic 
psychiatrist.  Dr. Haskins opined that the defendant had the 
capacity to enter pleas of guilty to charges of capital murder 
and had the ability to understand and appreciate the possible 
penalties that might result from her pleas.
Haskins stated the following in her competency 
assessment:
"Ms. Lewis is aware of her charges and the 
possible penalties she is facing (life without 
parole or death).  She knows who her attorneys are 
and feels comfortable working with them.  She is 
able to provide them with information, and to ask 
questions.
"Cognitive testing showed a Full Scale IQ of 
72.  Verbal IQ was 70, and Performance IQ was 79.  
This places the defendant in the borderline range of 
mental retardation (Borderline Intellectual 
Function)."

Haskins opined that Lewis, who had graduated from high school 
and had completed one year of college, was competent to stand 
trial, make a plea agreement and enter pleas.
	The Commonwealth submitted, and the circuit court 
accepted, a written summary of the evidence that the 
Commonwealth would have presented had the case proceeded to a 
trial.  The circuit court scheduled a separate hearing to 
consider evidence before fixing punishments.  The circuit 
court also received the probation officer's report in the 
manner prescribed by law.
After considering the evidence adduced during the 
sentencing hearing and the written summary of the 
Commonwealth's evidence, the circuit court found that the 
defendant's conduct was outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible, or inhumane and sentenced her to death for both 
capital murder offenses.  The court fixed her punishments for 
the remaining convictions as follows:  20 years imprisonment 
for each conspiracy charge; life imprisonment for the robbery 
charge; and 13 years imprisonment for the firearms charges.
	The court conducted a post-sentencing hearing and 
clarified its decision regarding the imposition of the 
sentences of death.  The court stated that the defendant's 
sentences of death were based upon the statutory vileness 
predicate because her acts reflected a depravity of mind.  The 
court also concluded that the actual murderers had committed 
aggravated batteries upon each victim and those aggravated 
batteries were imputed to the defendant.
II.
	Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr., had been employed for several 
years by Dan River, Inc.  His first wife, who had been ill for 
a long time, died in January 2000.  In March or April 2000, 
Julian Lewis met the defendant, who was also employed by Dan 
River.  The defendant began to live with Julian Lewis at his 
home in Danville in June 2000.  Subsequently, Julian Lewis 
married the defendant.
	In December 2001, Julian Lewis' older son, Jason Clifton 
Lewis, died in a car accident.  Julian Lewis was the 
beneficiary of his son's life insurance policy, and Julian 
Lewis received proceeds in excess of $200,000.  He placed 
those proceeds in a draft account with Prudential Securities, 
Inc.  The proceeds of the account were accessible only by use 
of drafts bearing the signature of Julian Lewis.
	In February 2002, Julian Lewis purchased a five-acre 
parcel of land in Pittsylvania County.  He also purchased a 
mobile home and placed it on the property, where he and the 
defendant resided.
	In August 2002, Julian Lewis' younger son, Charles J. 
Lewis, an Army reservist, was required to report for active 
duty with the National Guard in Maryland.  According to 
Lieutenant Michael Booker, Charles Lewis' commanding officer, 
Lewis made estate arrangements in the event he died while on 
active duty.  Charles Lewis executed a will and identified his 
father as his primary beneficiary and his stepmother, the 
defendant, as the secondary beneficiary.  Charles Lewis 
obtained a policy of life insurance in the amount of $250,000 
payable in the event of his death.  He designated his father 
as the primary beneficiary of the life insurance policy and 
the defendant as the secondary beneficiary.
In the autumn of 2002, Rodney L. Fuller and Matthew J. 
Shallenberger met the defendant at a retail store.  Prior to 
this meeting, the defendant did not know these men.  After a 
conversation, Shallenberger and the defendant exchanged 
telephone numbers and began to communicate frequently.  
Shallenberger and the defendant discussed the possibility that 
Shallenberger, with Fuller's help, would kill Julian Lewis, 
and they would share any insurance proceeds that the defendant 
might receive.
	One day, the defendant and her 16-year-old daughter, 
Christie Bean, met Shallenberger and Fuller at a parking lot 
in Danville.  Christie, who had never met Fuller previously, 
had sexual intercourse with him in one car while the defendant 
and Shallenberger engaged in sexual intercourse in another 
vehicle.  On a later date, Fuller and Shallenberger went to 
the defendant's home where she performed a "lingerie show" for 
the men, and she had sexual intercourse with both men.
	On October 23, 2002, the defendant met Shallenberger and 
Fuller at a shopping center in Danville.  The defendant went 
to a bank and obtained $1,200 in cash that she gave to the men 
to use to purchase firearms and ammunition to kill Julian 
Lewis.  Antwain D. Bennett, an acquaintance of Shallenberger, 
used the money to purchase three firearms.  Two of the 
firearms were shotguns.  Additionally, Bennett purchased 
ammunition for the weapons.
	On that same date, the defendant told Shallenberger and 
Fuller the route that Julian Lewis traveled from his place of 
employment to his home.  The men planned to kill Julian Lewis 
and "make the murder . . . look like a robbery."  While the 
defendant remained at her home, the men were "to follow and 
stop Julian Lewis on the highway and kill him."  The plan, 
however, was unsuccessful.
	Consequently, the defendant, Shallenberger, and Fuller 
decided to kill Julian Lewis at his home on October 30, 2002.  
They also decided to kill his son, Charles Lewis, when he 
returned to Virginia to attend his father's funeral and share 
the proceeds from Charles Lewis' policy of life insurance.  
However, when the conspirators learned that Charles Lewis 
would be with his father at the mobile home on October 30, 
2002, they decided to kill him and his father simultaneously.
	During the early morning of October 30, 2002, 
Shallenberger and Fuller drove a vehicle past the Lewis' home 
about three times.  The men did not stop their vehicle because 
they observed that lights were on in the home.  Eventually, 
Shallenberger and Fuller entered the residence through a rear 
door that the defendant had unlocked.  Each man carried one of 
the shotguns that had been purchased with the $1,200 cash the 
defendant had given them.  Shallenberger and Fuller awakened 
the defendant, who was in bed with her husband.  Shallenberger 
told the defendant, "Teresa, get up."  The defendant got out 
of her bed and walked into the kitchen, and she heard 
gunshots.  Shallenberger shot Julian Lewis several times.  The 
defendant went to the bedroom where her husband lay bleeding, 
retrieved Julian Lewis' pants and wallet, and returned to the 
kitchen with Shallenberger.
	Fuller entered a room that was occupied by Charles Lewis.  
Fuller shot Charles Lewis three times.  Then Fuller went to 
the kitchen where he observed the defendant and Shallenberger 
"pulling money from a wallet."  Fuller told the defendant and 
Shallenberger that Charles Lewis "wouldn't die."  Fuller got 
Shallenberger's shotgun and returned to the bedroom occupied 
by Charles Lewis where Fuller shot him two more times.  The 
men retrieved most of the shotgun shells, and they divided 
$300 in cash that had been taken from Julian Lewis' wallet.
	After shooting the victims, Shallenberger told the 
defendant that he was sorry she "had to go through something 
like this; hugged her and kissed her; and the men left."  The 
defendant waited about 45 minutes after the "last shot was 
fired," and she made a telephone call to her former mother-in-
law, Marie Bean.  Next, she made a telephone call to her best 
friend, Debbie Yeatts.
	On Wednesday morning, October 30, 2002, approximately 
3:55 a.m., the defendant placed a telephone call to emergency 
response personnel in Pittsylvania County.  She reported that 
an intruder had entered her home and shot her husband and his 
adult son.  She stated that both men were dead.  She said that 
she had been in the bed with her husband when an intruder 
armed with a pistol entered her bedroom and said, "Get up."  
Her husband told her to go into the bathroom, and her husband 
asked the intruder, "What's going on?"  The defendant said 
that her husband was shot four or five times while she was in 
the bathroom.  She reported that the shooting had occurred at 
3:15 or 3:30 a.m.
	Sheriff deputies Harris Silverman and Corey Webb arrived 
at the murder scene at approximately 4:18 a.m., 23 minutes 
after the defendant made the telephone call to the emergency 
response personnel.  The deputies met the defendant at the 
front door of her home, and she stated that her husband's body 
was on the floor in one bedroom and that her stepson's body 
was in another bedroom.  When Deputy Webb entered the master 
bedroom, he learned that Julian Lewis was alive.  Julian Lewis 
"made slow moans" and uttered, "[B]aby, baby, baby, baby."  
Deputy Webb asked the victim his name, and he responded, 
"Julian."  Deputy Webb asked Julian Lewis if he knew who had 
shot him, and the victim responded, "My wife knows who done 
this to me."
	While the deputies tried to assist the victims, Deputy 
Webb observed the defendant conversing on the telephone, and 
he heard her state, "I told C.J. [Charles Lewis] about leaving 
that back door unlocked."  Julian Lewis died in his residence.  
When Deputy Webb informed the defendant that her husband and 
stepson were dead, she did not appear upset.
	Investigator J.T. Barrett of the Pittsylvania County 
Sheriff's Office arrived at the murder scene approximately 
7:00 a.m. on October 30, 2002.  Barrett interviewed the 
defendant twice.  Investigator Keith N. Isom also interviewed 
the defendant.  During one of the interviews, the defendant 
claimed that her husband had physically assaulted her a few 
days before his death, and she denied knowledge of her 
husband's killer.  She said that she would not kill her 
husband or have him killed.
	Investigator Barrett asked the defendant what she and her 
husband did before they went to bed on the night of the 
murders.  She said that she talked with her husband, and that 
they prayed together.  She told her husband that she was going 
to pack his lunch, and he went to sleep.  She prepared a lunch 
and placed it in the refrigerator.  She wrote a note on the 
lunch bag that stated, "I love you.  I hope you have a good 
day."  A picture of a "smiley face" was drawn on the bag and 
inscribed in the "smiley face" was the message, "I miss you 
when you're gone."
Mike Campbell, Lewis' supervisor, testified that Julian 
Lewis did not use bags to bring his lunch to work.  Rather, 
Julian Lewis took his lunch to work in a blue and white 
cooler.
	Investigator Isom interviewed the defendant again on 
November 7, 2002.  During this interview, the defendant 
admitted that she had offered Matthew Shallenberger money if 
he would kill her husband.  After the interview, the defendant 
again spoke with Investigator Isom.  The defendant told Isom 
that she had met her husband's killer at a retail store and 
that he was from New York.  The defendant stated that she had 
"let him in" her mobile home, and he shot both Julian Lewis 
and Charles Lewis, took some money, and left.  She told the 
investigator that she had agreed to give Shallenberger half of 
the insurance proceeds that she expected to receive, but she 
changed her mind and decided to keep all the money.  She 
informed the investigator of Shallenberger's address, and Isom 
and the defendant went to Shallenberger's residence where she 
identified him.
	On November 8, 2002, the defendant, who was in the 
Danville City Jail, requested to speak with Investigator Isom.  
He interviewed her at the jail, and she told Isom that Rodney 
Fuller was also involved in the murders of her husband and 
stepson.  The defendant also stated that her daughter had 
assisted with the murders.  The defendant "acknowledged that 
after the shooting and after the men left the house [on the 
night of the murders], she had waited about thirty minutes to 
call 911."
	On the day of the murders, the defendant made a telephone 
call to Campbell and told him that her husband had been 
killed, and that she wanted his paycheck.  Campbell informed 
the defendant that she could not retrieve the paycheck before 
4:00 p.m. on that day.  The next day, October 31, 2002, the 
defendant again called Campbell and asked for Julian Lewis' 
paycheck.  Campbell responded that he could not give the 
paycheck to her.
	Lieutenant Michael Booker, Charles Lewis' commanding 
officer, called the defendant to express his condolences early 
on the afternoon of October 30, 2002, the day of the murders.  
The defendant told him, "I'm still in shock.  The police had 
me in Chatham today, all in my face.  There is no way I would 
have killed my husband and stepson.  They guessed that because 
I didn't get shot that I might have done it.  My husband told 
me to go into the bathroom, so I did."  The defendant informed 
Booker that she was the secondary beneficiary on the life 
insurance policy of Charles Lewis, and that she wanted the 
insurance proceeds.
On November 4, 2002, the defendant called Booker by 
telephone and left a message for him because he was not 
available.  When Booker spoke to her later that day, the 
defendant asked him about Charles Lewis' personal effects.  
Booker advised the defendant that she could not have them 
because she was not the beneficiary of Lewis' estate.  The 
defendant asked Booker whether she was still entitled to the 
life insurance proceeds in the amount of $250,000.  Booker 
told the defendant that she was, and she responded, "[W]ell, 
Kathy [Charles Lewis' sister] can have all his stuff as long 
as I get the money."
	Before the murders, the defendant told a woman, Debbie 
Anderson, that the defendant was just "using Julian for money 
and that he would buy her things."  Bobby Demont, who had 
known Julian Lewis and the defendant for several years, heard 
the defendant say "a couple months before the murders" that if 
Julian died, "she would get the money, and if [Charles Lewis] 
was killed and Julian was dead, she would get that money, 
too."
	The defendant told Kathy L. Clifton, Julian Lewis' 
daughter, that the defendant waited 45 minutes after the 
murders and then called her ex-mother-in-law, Marie Bean, and 
her best friend, Debbie Yeatts, before she "called 911 for 
help."  On the day of the victims' funerals, the defendant 
told Kathy Clifton that the defendant had purchased a 
beautiful suit to wear to the funeral.  The defendant asked 
Clifton, "[Y]ou don't think I had anything to do with this, do 
you?"  The defendant also offered to sell the mobile home and 
land to Clifton.  After the murders, but before the funeral, 
the defendant made a number of statements in Clifton's 
presence to the effect that the defendant had ample money to 
pay for the funerals and that she would benefit financially 
because of the deaths of Julian Lewis and Charles Lewis.
After the murders, the defendant tried to withdraw 
$50,000 from Julian Lewis' account with Prudential Securities.  
The defendant appeared at a bank and presented a check, 
purportedly signed by Julian Lewis and made payable to her in 
the amount of $50,000.  A bank employee refused to negotiate 
the check because the signature on the check did not match 
Julian Lewis' signature in the bank's records.
	The deputy sheriffs searched a mobile home where Matthew 
Shallenberger and Rodney Fuller resided.  Two shotguns were 
recovered from the residence and delivered to a forensic 
science laboratory for analysis.  The shotgun shells recovered 
from the room where Julian Lewis was murdered were fired by 
one of the shotguns recovered from the mobile home where 
Shallenberger and Fuller lived.  The deputies also found two 
pairs of rubber household gloves in a closet in 
Shallenberger's bedroom.  Primer residue caused by the 
discharge of a firearm bullet or shell was present on the 
gloves.
	Assistant Chief Medical Examiner Susan E. Venuti 
performed autopsies on the bodies of Julian Lewis and Charles 
Lewis.  She determined that each man died as a direct result 
of multiple shotgun wounds.  Julian Lewis suffered shotgun 
wounds to the upper left arm, shoulder, abdomen, pelvis, 
penis, thighs, legs, arms, and chest.  The bullets destroyed 
or removed large areas of tissue in his upper arm, shoulder, 
and upper chest.  The bullets also fractured several ribs.  
Plastic wadding from a shotgun shell was lodged in his left 
lung tissue.  Julian Lewis eventually died from extensive 
blood loss.
	Charles Lewis received a total of eight wounds from an 
undetermined number of discharges of a shotgun.  He suffered 
wounds to his back, abdomen, chest, neck, left upper arm and 
shoulder, elbow, left thigh, face, and forearm.
III.
A.
	The defendant argues that "because Virginia has never 
executed a female who (i) lacks a violent criminal history, 
(ii) accepted responsibility for her offenses, (iii) merely 
contracted for the murders giving rise to the offenses, and 
(iv) observed co-defendants receive life sentences despite 
their roles as actual triggermen, the circuit court erred by 
sentencing [her] to death in that such sentence[s] [are] 
excessive and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in 
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant."  
We disagree with the defendant.
	Initially, we observe that we do not and cannot consider 
the defendant's gender in determining whether the sentences of 
death are excessive and disproportionate when considering both 
the crime and the defendant.  All criminal statutes in this 
Commonwealth must be applied without regard to gender.  
Therefore, we decline the defendant's invitation to apply 
Virginia's capital murder statutes in a discriminatory fashion 
based upon gender.
B.
The defendant argues that her sentences are excessive and 
disproportionate when compared to similar cases.  She states 
that she "did not physically engage in conduct giving rise to 
the deaths;" rather, she was convicted of capital murder 
because she was the employer of the men who committed the 
actual murders.  Continuing, she contends there is no reported 
case in which this Court approved the death penalty for a 
"mere hirer" due to the vileness predicate alone.
	Code  17.1-313(C)(2) requires that this Court consider 
and determine "[w]hether the sentence[s] of death [are] 
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in 
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant."  
The test of proportionality that we apply is whether "juries 
in this jurisdiction generally approve the supreme penalty for 
comparable or similar crimes."  Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 
193, 226, 576 S.E.2d 471, 490, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 
S.Ct. 566 (2003) (quoting Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 
328, 342, 513 S.E.2d 634, 642, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 
(1999)); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 145, 431 S.E.2d 
48, 54, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993).
	In conducting this review, this Court considers the 
records of all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court, 
including cases in which the defendant received a life 
sentence.  In conducting the proportionality review, it is not 
the function of this Court to understand why the trier of fact 
imposed the sentence of life instead of the sentence of death.  
Rather, "[t]he purpose of our comparative review is to reach a 
reasoned judgment regarding what cases justify the imposition 
of the death penalty.  We cannot insure complete symmetry 
among all death penalty cases, but our review does enable us 
to identify and invalidate a death sentence that is 'excessive 
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.'"  
Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 
(1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113 (2000).  Simply stated, 
this Court's proportionality review enables this Court to 
identify and invalidate the aberrant sentence of death.  And, 
we emphasize that in making the determination whether a 
sentence of death is aberrant, this Court must consider the 
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime 
and the defendant.
	We have examined the records of all capital murder cases 
reviewed by this Court when, as here, the death penalty was 
based upon murder for hire.  Wolfe, 265 Va. 193, 576 S.E.2d 
471; Williams v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 3, 472 S.E.2d 50, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 998 (1996); Murphy, 246 Va. 136, 431 S.E.2d 
48; Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 374 S.E.2d 46 (1988), 
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 
227 Va. 124, 314 S.E.2d 371, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 
(1984); Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).  Even though the 
facts in all capital murder cases differ, we are confident 
that given the special heinousness associated with the murder 
for hire in this particular case, emphasizing that the 
defendant was the mastermind of the plan to kill her husband 
and stepson solely for greed and monetary gain, the sentences 
of death are neither excessive nor disproportionate to 
sentences generally imposed by other sentencing bodies in this 
Commonwealth for crimes of a similar nature considering the 
crime and the defendant.
	The defendant also argues that her punishment is 
excessive or disproportionate because her accomplices, 
Shallenberger and Fuller, did not receive a sentence of death.  
However, as we have repeatedly stated, "[u]pon our prior 
determinations of excessiveness and disproportionality, we 
have rejected efforts by defendants to compare their sentences 
with those received by confederates."  Murphy, 246 Va. at 145, 
431 S.E.2d at 53; Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 26, 419 
S.E.2d 606, 620, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); King v. 
Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 371, 416 S.E.2d 669, 679, cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 957 (1992); Evans v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 
766, 780, 284 S.E.2d 816, 823 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
1038 (1982), aff'd on remand, 228 Va. 468, 323 S.E.2d 114 
(1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1025 (1985).  Accordingly, we 
reject the defendant's effort to make a similar comparison 
here.
C.
	The defendant argues that the circuit court "erroneously 
imputed the vileness of [the] co-defendants to [her] to 
determine if [her] conduct satisfied the aggravated battery 
sub-element [sic] to the vileness predicate."  Continuing, the 
defendant also argues that the circuit court erred by 
concluding that her acts reflected a depravity of mind.
	Code  19.2-264.2 states:
	"In assessing the penalty of any person 
convicted of an offense for which the death penalty 
may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be 
imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after 
consideration of the past criminal record of 
convictions of the defendant, find that there is a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 
serious threat to society or that his conduct in 
committing the offense for which he stands charged 
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of 
mind or an aggravated battery to the victim; and (2) 
recommend that the penalty of death be imposed."

	We have stated that "depravity of mind" as used in Code 
 19.2-264.2, is "a degree of moral turpitude and psychical 
debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of 
ordinary legal malice and premeditation."  Stewart v. 
Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 245, 427 S.E.2d 394, 409, cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993); Thomas, 244 Va. at 25, 419 S.E.2d 
at 619-20.  We observed in Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 
387, 484 S.E.2d 898, 907, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1018 (1997) 
that
"[a] finding of 'vileness' must be based on 
conduct which is 'outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, 
depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the 
victim.'  Code  19.2-264.2.  Proof of any one of 
these three components will support a finding of 
vileness.  Id.; Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 
386, 411, 422 S.E.2d 380, 395 (1992), cert. denied, 
507 U.S. 1043 . . . (1993)."

	Additionally, in Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. at 339-
40, 513 S.E.2d at 640, we stated that 
"a mere inspection of the statutory language in 
[Code  19.2-264.2] demonstrates clearly that the 
term 'vileness' includes three separate and distinct 
factors, with the proof of any one factor being 
sufficient to support a finding of vileness and 
hence a sentence of death.  Bunch v. Commonwealth, 
225 Va. 423, 442, 304 S.E.2d 271, 282 [1983]. . . . 
We have also stated that 'Code  19.2-264.2 and -
264.4(C) define vileness as conduct that involves 
torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to 
the victim; the use of the disjunctive word 'or,' 
rather than the conjunctive 'and,' signifies the 
availability of alternative choices.' "

	Applying these principles, we need not, and do not, 
decide whether the circuit court erred in imputing the 
aggravated battery committed by Fuller and Shallenberger to 
the defendant.  The circuit court held that the defendant's 
acts were vile because they demonstrated depravity of mind 
and, without question, the evidence of record is overwhelming 
that the defendant's conduct showed a depravity of mind.
As we have already stated in Part II of this opinion, the 
defendant was the mastermind of these gruesome crimes, which 
would not have occurred but for her actions.  The evidence 
shows that she married her husband because she was interested 
in his money.  She planned to kill him and her stepson so that 
she could acquire her husband's assets and proceeds from her 
stepson's life insurance policy.  She made a prior 
unsuccessful attempt along with Shallenberger and Fuller to 
kill her husband, and, when that plan failed, she initiated 
another plan which resulted in the deaths of her husband and 
her stepson while they lay asleep in their home.  She involved 
her 16-year-old daughter in the plan to kill the victims, and 
she encouraged her daughter to have sexual relations with one 
of the murderers.  The defendant also paid for the shotguns 
and ammunition used to kill her husband and stepson.
After Shallenberger and Fuller had shot the victims 
several times with shotguns, the defendant went to her 
husband's bedroom and took his pants and wallet.  She removed 
cash from her husband's wallet and gave it to the murderers 
while her husband lay bleeding to death from the wounds that 
he had suffered.  Even then, however, the defendant waited at 
least 45 minutes, while her husband was still alive suffering 
and bleeding from the bullet wounds, before she reported the 
crimes by calling emergency response technicians by telephone.  
Once the deputy sheriffs arrived at the residence, at least 
one hour after her husband and stepson had been shot, 
defendant's husband remained alive, suffering and bleeding to 
death.  After her husband's death, the defendant showed no 
emotion or remorse, and she initially denied any involvement 
in this murder.  Moreover, on the night of the murders, prior 
to the killings, the defendant prayed with her husband and 
arranged for her daughter to speak to her husband so that he 
would not think that something was awry.
	Additionally, we observe that the defendant was the wife 
of one victim and the stepmother of the other victim.  As we 
have already stated, but for the conduct of this defendant, 
who was the mastermind of these heinous acts, the killings 
would not have occurred.  We hold that the evidence 
sufficiently establishes the defendant's depravity of mind 
that supports a finding of vileness.
D.
	The defendant also claims that the circuit court 
erroneously sentenced her to death in that "such decision was 
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice and other 
arbitrary factors."  Continuing, the defendant states that her 
cohorts, "despite being actual triggermen, did not receive 
death sentences."  Defendant maintains "her sentences of death 
were influenced by passion, prejudice or other arbitrary 
factors because (i) evidence indicated that her two co-
defendants were more directly culpable in the slayings, (ii) 
the same Judge sentenced all three defendants, and (iii) 
vileness was the only predicate relevant to the death sentence 
inquiry (and vileness of the crime, of course, applies to all 
defendants here in that it is the same crime)."  We disagree.
	We have reviewed the evidence of record, and we find no 
evidence that would permit us to conclude that the sentences 
of death were imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, and other arbitrary factors.
E.
	We do not consider defendant's assertions that the 
circuit court erroneously denied her motion to declare 
Virginia's death penalty statute unconstitutional.  The 
defendant's sole argument on brief is "[t]he Virginia death 
penalty statute is unconstitutional for reasons contained in 
Teresa's Memoranda contained in the Appendix."  The 
defendant's constitutional arguments were waived by the entry 
of her guilty pleas.  Murphy, 246 Va. at 141, 431 S.E.2d at 
51; Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 539, 391 S.E.2d 276, 
278, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882 (1990); Stout v. Commonwealth, 
237 Va. 126, 131-32, 376 S.E.2d 288, 291, cert. denied, 492 
U.S. 925 (1989).
	The defendant argues that the circuit court "erroneously 
sentenced [her] to death because indictments for which death 
was imposed omitted essential aggravating elements."  We do 
not consider defendant's assertion.  Defendant failed to 
assert this argument in the circuit court and, therefore, she 
may not assert the argument on appeal.  Rule 5:25.
IV.
	We have considered all the defendant's remaining 
arguments, and they are without merit.  Having reviewed the 
sentences of death, finding no reversible error in the record, 
and perceiving no reason to commute the death sentences, we 
will affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
Affirmed.
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