BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN & ENGINEMEN ET AL.
v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS. No. 16.
Argued October 22, 1968.
Decided November 18, 1968. *
[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 18, Hardin, Prosecuting Attorney, et al. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. et al., on appeal from the same court.
Appellees, a group of interstate railroads operating in Arkansas, sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court, claiming, inter alia, that Arkansas' "full-crew" laws violate the Commerce Clause, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The full-crew laws require minimum train crews for certain conditions of railroad operation in the State but, through mileage classification, have the effect of exempting the State's intrastate railroads from those requirements. The laws were enacted in 1907 and 1913 to further railroad safety and, though several times subsequently re-evaluated, have been retained for that purpose. Conflicting evidence was given to support the railroads' claims that full-crew requirements merely facilitate featherbedding and appellants' claims that such requirements promote safety. Though earlier decisions of this Court upheld the statutes against constitutional challenge, the District Court concluded that conditions have changed and that the full-crew laws now impermissibly burden interstate commerce. The court also held that the full-crew laws are "unreasonable and oppressive," and thus violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court did not reach appellees' contention that the laws discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. Held:
James E. Youngdahl argued the cause for appellants in No. 16. Leslie Evitts, Chief Assistant Attorney General of Arkansas, argued the cause for appellants in No. 18. With them on the briefs were Joe Purcell, Attorney General of Arkansas, Robert D. Ross, and John P. Sizemore.
Robert V. Light and Martin M. Lucente argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With them on the brief were W. J. Smith, H. H. Friday, and R. W. Yost.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases raise the question whether the Arkansas "full-crew" laws, specifying a minimum number of employees who must serve as part of a train crew under certain circumstances, violate the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. The constitutionality of these Arkansas laws has been specifically upheld against challenges under the same constitutional provisions in three decisions of this Court, in 1911, in 1916, and again in 1931. 1 In the present cases, however, the District Court found that as a result of economic and technical [393 U.S. 129, 131] developments since our last decision on this subject, the statutes were no longer justified as safety measures, the ground on which they had formerly been sustained, and struck them down as contrary to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 274 F. Supp. 294 (D.C. W. D. Ark. 1967). We noted probable jurisdiction, 390 U.S. 941 (1968). We disagree with the District Court's holding that the railroads have shown a change in circumstances sufficient to justify departure from our three previous decisions. We therefore reaffirm those cases and reverse the judgment of the District Court.
The first of the two statutes challenged here was enacted in 1907, and this law makes it an offense for a railroad operating a line of more than 50 miles to haul a freight train consisting of more than 25 cars, unless the train has a crew of not "less than an engineer, a fireman, a conductor and three 3. brakemen . . . ." 2 The second statute, enacted in 1913, makes it an offense for any railroad with a line of 100 miles or more to engage in switching operations in cities of designated populations, with "less than one 1. engineer, a fireman, a foreman and three 3. helpers . . . ." 3 These two statutes, the constitutionality of which this Court previously upheld, are precisely the statutes here challenged and struck down.
This latest attack on these Arkansas laws was commenced by a group of interstate railroads operating in Arkansas which asked the United States District Court to declare the statutes unconstitutional and enjoin two Arkansas prosecuting attorneys, appellants here, from enforcing them. The railroad brotherhoods, also appellants [393 U.S. 129, 132] here, were allowed to intervene in the District Court in order to defend the validity of the state statutes. In their complaint appellees charged that both statutes (1) operate in an "arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory and unreasonable" manner in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) unduly interfere with, burden, and needlessly increase the cost of interstate transportation in violation of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution, and contrary to the National Transportation Policy expressed in the Interstate Commerce Act; (3) discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of local or intrastate commerce; and (4) invade a field of federal legislation pre-empted by the Federal Government primarily through Pub. L. 88-108, passed by Congress in 1963 4 to avert a nationwide railroad strike.
In its first opinion in these cases, the District Court granted the railroads' motion for summary judgment, holding that the field of full-crew legislation was pre-empted by Pub. L. 88-108, 239 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. W. D. Ark. 1965), but we reversed on the pre-emption question, sub nom. Engineers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 382 U.S. 423 (1966). We also held that the railroads were not entitled to summary judgment on their alternative theory that because the effect of the mileage exemption in the two Acts is to free all of the State's intrastate railroads from the full-crew requirements while ensuring coverage of most of the interstate railroads, the two Acts "constitute discriminatory legislation against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce." Id., at 437-438. On remand the District Court held an evidentiary hearing and, after compiling a voluminous record, found that the full-crew requirements had "no substantial effect on safety of operations," placed "substantial financial burdens" upon the carriers, and caused [393 U.S. 129, 133] "some delays" and interference with the continuity of railroad operations. On the basis of these findings the District Court held the Arkansas laws unconstitutional as impermissible burdens on interstate commerce and also ruled that because the laws were "unreasonable and oppressive" they violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court did not reach the railroads' further argument that the Arkansas laws discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. Appellants challenge both the accuracy of the District Court's findings and holdings and their relevance to adjudication of the constitutional issues presented. They ask us to hold that the Arkansas laws do not impermissibly burden interstate commerce or otherwise violate any provision of the Constitution.
In spite of this background of frequent and recent legislative re-evaluation of the full-crew problem, both at the state and national levels, the railroads now ask us to determine as a judicial matter that these laws no longer make a significant contribution to safety and so [393 U.S. 129, 135] seriously burden the railroads in their operations that they should no longer stand under the Commerce Clause. The essence of the railroads' position is that the requirement of additional crewmen amounts to nothing more than featherbedding. They claim that the firemen once needed to tend the furnaces on steam locomotives are not necessary on the diesel engines now generally in use. Although the railroads recognize that the fireman performs a valuable lookout function on passenger trains, where he and the engineer are the only crewmen in the engine cab, they assert that in both freight hauling operations and yard switching operations other railroad employees are available to provide an adequate lookout and assist the engineer in correcting mechanical problems and performing other miscellaneous duties. The railroads thus maintain that the firemen, and some of the other required crewmen, perform no useful function and make no significant contribution to safety. At the same time, the railroads contend, the full-crew requirements substantially increase their cost of operation, hampering their ability to improve railroad service and to compete with other modes of transportation, and also burden commerce by requiring interstate trains passing through Arkansas to slow down or stop at the border to pick up and let off the extra crewmen.
The State of Arkansas and the railroad brotherhoods, all appellants here, take a different view of the functions performed by the firemen and other additional crewmen required under the statutes. They claim that the work performed by these employees - serving as lookout, passing signals, relieving the engineer in emergencies, inspecting the engine and other cars, and helping to make needed adjustments and repairs while the train is moving - is still necessary and cannot be performed by other employees without unduly burdening them and interfering with the proper performance of their other tasks. Appellants [393 U.S. 129, 136] argue that although some technological improvements have tended to eliminate safety hazards and lighten the work of the train crew, other developments, such as the increased size and speed of trains, the heavier automobile traffic over train crossings, and the competitive pressures for faster switching of trains, have had exactly the opposite effect.
The District Court analyzed these conflicting contentions and the conflicting evidence adduced to support them and concluded that the full-crew requirements have "no substantial effect on safety of operations." The court also said that even if these requirements did add "some increment of safety to the operation, we think that such an increment is negligible . . . and not worth the cost." As additional factors justifying its conclusion that the laws created an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, the court emphasized "the financial burden of compliance, which is out of all proportion to the benefit, if any, derived, and the added burden involved in the taking on and discharging men at or near the Arkansas State line . . . ."
We think it plain that in striking down the full-crew laws on this basis, the District Court indulged in a legislative judgment wholly beyond its limited authority to review state legislation under the Commerce Clause. The evidence as to the need for firemen and other additional crewmen was certainly conflicting and to a considerable extent inconclusive. Many railroad employees gave direct testimony as to incidents in which, for example, the presence of a fireman as a lookout helped avert a serious accident. With respect to statistical evidence, the District Court itself noted: "The statistical evidence as to the effect upon safety of the reductions in force authorized by the basic award and by the awards of the special adjustment boards [under the 1963 arbitration] is not entirely satisfactory either way . . . ." Indeed, as the [393 U.S. 129, 137] court below recognized, the statistics showed that railroad accidents had actually increased during the period from 1964-1966, when the size of train crews was being reduced. 11
It would hardly be possible to summarize here all the other evidence in the record relevant to the safety question, and, as we have indicated, it is wholly unnecessary to do so. A brief summary of some of the findings of Arbitration Board No. 282, the panel set up pursuant to Pub. L. 88-108, should suffice to show that the question of safety is clearly one for legislative determination. In quoting from this report, of course, we in no way intend to indicate that the District Court should have accepted any of its specific conclusions or that this evidence was necessarily any more persuasive than any of the many other sources of information about the problem. We single it out only because it is one of the more recent reports and because it was heavily relied upon by the District Court and by the railroads themselves. The Board stated as its very first finding:
Of the other matters relied upon by the District Court, the problem of delay at the state borders apparently has not changed appreciably since the days of this Court's earliest full-crew decisions, and this Court's statement of the insignificance of the problem in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 782 (1945), is equally valid today:
Despite the extensive testimony and exhibits added to the record since our previous consideration of these cases, we have found no basis for altering our conclusion that the mileage classification is permissible. The railroads argue that the extra men, if needed at all, are equally necessary on all trains, regardless of whether the company operating them happens to own a more or a less extensive system of track. But evidence in the record establishes a number of legitimate reasons for the mileage exemption. In the case of at least one of the short-line roads, the maximum speed for trains running over its main track is 35 miles per hour, while trains moving over the longer lines have speed limits of 65 and in some cases 75 miles per hour. The apparent use of much slower trains over the short lines certainly provides a basis upon which the Arkansas Legislature could conclude that the hazards encountered in line-haul operations are less serious, and accordingly that the need for regulation is less pressing, on the short lines. Similarly in connection with the switching operations, there was evidence that the usefulness of additional employees depends to some extent on the length of the train being switched, [393 U.S. 129, 142] another factor that - like speed - tends to vary according to the railroad's total trackage. Finally, the legislature could also conclude that the smaller railroads would be less able to bear the cost of additional crewmen, even though the total additional cost would of course tend to be smaller in the case of the smaller companies.
Although the railroads claim that other criteria could provide a more precise test of the situations where a larger crew is desirable, these other standards have inadequacies of their own, and are for the most part far too vague to provide a basis for a statutory classification. And in any event the courts may not force a state legislature to attain scientific perfection in determining the coverage of statutes of this type. As we stressed in the Bibb case, 359 U.S., at 524 :
The railroads also argue that the statutes violate the Due Process Clause because they are "unduly oppressive" and impose costs on the regulated industry that exceed the public benefits of the regulation. The District Court agreed with this position, holding that the impact of the full-crew laws today is "unreasonable and oppressive" and therefore a violation of due process. Insofar as these arguments seek to present an independent basis for invalidating the laws, apart from any effect on interstate commerce, we think, with all due deference to appellees and the District Court, that these contentions require no further consideration. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
[ Footnote 2 ] Ark. Laws 1907, Act 116, Ark. Stat. Ann. 73-720 through 73-722 (1957 Repl. Vol.).
[ Footnote 3 ] Ark. Laws 1913, Act 67, Ark. Stat. Ann. 73-726 through 73-729 (1957 Repl. Vol.).
[ Footnote 4 ] 77 Stat. 132, 45 U.S.C. following 157.
[ Footnote 6 ] See, e. g., Ark. Stat. Ann. 73-704 through 73-706; 73-718, 73-719 (1957 Repl. Vol.).
[ Footnote 7 ] The approach taken in other States is summarized in the opinion of the District Court in these cases, 274 F. Supp., at 299.
[ Footnote 8 ] See New York Central R. Co. v. Lefkowitz, 23 N. Y. 2d 1, 241 N. E. 2d 730 (1968).
[ Footnote 9 ] E. g., Ark. Laws 1951, Act 253, Ark. Stat. Ann. 73-740 (1957 Repl. Vol.); Ark. Laws 1953, Act 130, Ark. Stat. Ann. 73-741 through 73-744 (1957 Repl. Vol.).
[ Footnote 10 ] E. g., Ark. Laws 1965, Act 501, Ark. Stat. Ann. 73-730 (Supp. 1967).
[ Footnote 11 ] The District Court dealt with this fact by simply stating that this trend had been observed in years preceding the effective date of the arbitration award and concluding: "Why accident rates have been increasing we do not know with certainty, but it would be pure speculation to say that crew size has had anything to do with it."
[ Footnote 12 ] The record contains no meaningful estimate of what this cost actually is. The railroads computed the total wages paid per year to the allegedly unnecessary employees and claimed that this total figure, $7,600,000, represents the cost of compliance. But it was admitted that the net cost is actually lower than this because elimination of the additional crewmen would create new expenses, such as the special compensatory allowance paid to engineers who operate without the assistance of a fireman, additional overtime pay, and other costs associated with somewhat slower operations in terminals [393 U.S. 129, 140] and en route. The railroads introduced no evidence to indicate the approximate amount of such new expenses, and we have no way of knowing whether, as appellants claim, these expenses would to a substantial extent offset the wage savings associated with the reduction in crew sizes.
[ Footnote 13 ] Although we struck down the Illinois law in Bibb, we did so on the carefully limited basis that the contour mudguard requirement flatly conflicted with laws, enforced in at least one other State, that trucks must be equipped with straight mudguards.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
I would agree with the Court that if the constitutionality of these Arkansas laws were to be judged as safety measures under the State's police power, they would have to be sustained. But as I indicated in my dissent in Engineers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 382 U.S. 423, 438 , Congress in enacting Pub. L. 88-108, 77 Stat. 132, undertook to displace state "full-crew" laws by delegating power to a national arbitration board to determine, for example, the necessity of firemen on diesel freights and the minimum size of train and switching crews.
I would, therefore, remand the cases to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with Pub. L. 88-108 and the awards that have been made under it. [393 U.S. 129, 145]