SYSTEM FEDERATION NO. 91, RAILWAY EMPLOYES' DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO, ET AL.
v. WRIGHT ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. No. 48.
Argued December 5, 1960.
Decided January 16, 1961.
In 1945, when the Railway Labor Act prohibited union-shop agreements between railroads and labor unions, nonunion employees of a railroad brought a suit against the railroad and certain unions of its employees which resulted in a consent decree forbidding the defendants to discriminate against nonunion employees because of their refusal to join unions. After the Act was amended in 1951 so as to permit union-shop agreements between railroads and labor unions, the petitioner unions moved that the decree be modified so as not to prohibit the defendants from entering into such agreements. The District Court, which had retained jurisdiction of the suit, denied the motion. Held: It erred in doing so. Pp. 643-653.
Richard R. Lyman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Robert E. Hogan.
Marshall P. Eldred argued the cause for respondents and filed a brief for respondents other than Louisville & [364 U.S. 642, 643] Nashville Railroad Co. John P. Sandidge, H. G. Breetz, W. L. Grubbs, M. D. Jones and Joseph L. Lenihan filed a brief for Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., respondent.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
By a complaint filed on July 16, 1945, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, 28 nonunion employees of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad began an action for declaratory relief, an injunction, and damages against the railroad and a number of unions representing its employees. Particularly relevant to the complaint were those provisions of the fourth and fifth paragraphs of 2 of the Railway Labor Act 1 which make it
By a settlement agreement dated December 1, 1945, the 28 plaintiffs released the railroad and union defendants from all claims 2 or actions then accrued "in consideration of the sum of $5000.00 this day paid to the undersigned . . . and the consent of said defendants to the entry of a decree in said action, a copy of which is attached hereto . . . ." The attached decree was adopted by the District Court on December 7, 1945. After detailing and then enjoining a number of specific discriminations on the basis of union status, the decree provided that the defendants
In 1951 the Railway Labor Act was amended to permit, under certain circumstances, a contract requiring a union shop. 3 In order to avail themselves of the newly granted statutory privilege, in 1957 the petitioners filed in the District Court a motion under Rule 60 (b) of the Federal [364 U.S. 642, 645] Rules of Civil Procedure 4 asking for a sufficient modification of the consent decree to make clear that it
At the outset it should be noted that the power of the District Court to modify this decree is not drawn in question. That proposition indeed could not well be disputed. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421; United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 ; [364 U.S. 642, 647] Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 . In the Swift case, Mr. Justice Cardozo put the matter thus, at 114:
Where there is such a balance of imponderables there must be wide discretion in the District Court. But discretion is never without limits and these limits are often far clearer to the reviewing court when the new circumstances involve a change in law rather than facts. When the decree in this case was originally made, union shop agreements were prohibited by the Railway Labor Act and thus constituted in themselves a form of statutorily forbidden discrimination. Congress has since, in the clearest terms, legislated that bargaining for and the existence of a union shop contract, satisfying the conditions provided in 2 Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, are not forbidden discriminations by union or employer. Congress has therefore determined that whatever ways such a union shop arrangement facilitates other, unauthorized discriminations must be borne as inescapable incidents of a legislatively approved contract term.
Had the 1945 decree simply represented relief awarded by the District Court after a trial of the action instituted by petitioners, there could be little doubt but that, faced with the 1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act, it would have been improvident for the court to continue in effect this provision of the injunction prohibiting a union shop agreement as being unlawful per se, or its use as an instrument to effectuate other statutorily forbidden discriminations. That provision was well enough under the earlier Railway Labor Act, but to continue it after the 1951 amendment would be to render protection in no way authorized by the needs of safeguarding statutory rights at the expense of a privilege denied and deniable to no other union. This conclusion would not be affected by the circumstance, which the District Court here found, that the unions' hostility to nonunion employees still continued, for any discriminations that might be facilitated [364 U.S. 642, 649] by the union shop clause have been legislatively determined to be an expense more than offset by the benefits of such a provision.
What seems plain to us in reason, as to a litigated decree, is amply supported by precedent. In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., supra, this Court was also required to deal with the effect upon an outstanding injunction of subsequent congressional action. The Court had earlier held that a bridge across the Ohio River obstructed navigation in such a way as to be in conflict with certain Acts of Congress regulating navigation on the river. The decree "directed that the obstruction be removed, either by elevating the bridge to a height designated, or by abatement." 18 How., at 429. A later Act of Congress declared the bridge to be a lawful structure in its existing position and elevation. The injunction was dissolved, the Court saying, 18 How., at 430-432:
That it would be an abuse of discretion to deny a modification of the present injunction if it had not resulted from a consent decree we regard as established. Is this result affected by the fact that we are dealing with a consent decree? Again we start with the Swift case, supra, where the Court held, at pp. 114-115:
The record leaves no room for doubt that the parties in fact attempted to conform the consent decree to the dictates of the Railway Labor Act as it then read. We can attach no weight to either of the two factors that led the lower courts to find that the parties had bargained, free of the requirements of the Act, for an injunction serving only their own interests. The first factor - that an independently arrived at contract rather than a decree effectuating rights accorded by the Act must have been contemplated because the unions agreed to equitable relief when their acts were already declared unlawful by statute - ignores completely the fact that this was precisely the relief sought in the complaint filed by the 28 plaintiffs and the relief that had been granted after litigation in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 , and in Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 . The second factor - that the unions agreed to be bound as to bargaining agreements that might later be in effect as well as the contract then in effect - ignores the fact that the parties, in all likelihood, meant only to cover any later bargaining agreements under the Act as it read at the time of the consent decree. 8
The type of decree the parties bargained for is the same as the only type of decree a court can properly grant - one with all those strengths and infirmities of any litigated decree which arise out of the fact that the court will not continue to exercise its powers thereunder when a change in law or facts has made inequitable what was once equitable. The parties could not become the conscience [364 U.S. 642, 653] of the equity court and decide for it once and for all what was equitable and what was not, because the court was not acting to enforce a promise but to enforce a statute.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed, and the case remanded to it for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[ Footnote 2 ] Each of the 28 plaintiffs had claimed $5,000 in damages.
[ Footnote 4 ] The relevant provisions of Rule 60 (b) are as follows: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . . (5) . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
[ Footnote 5 ] In the view we take of the case we need not consider whether such a commitment of indefinite duration is valid.
[ Footnote 6 ] In McGrath v. Potash, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 94, 199 F.2d 166, after Congress passed a statute excluding from the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act deportation proceedings, the District of Columbia Circuit vacated an injunction against the Government requiring compliance with that Act. There are many cases where a mere change in decisional law has been held to justify modification of an outstanding injunction. E. g., Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699 (whether a garage in a residential district is a nuisance); Santa Rita Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 112 Mont. 359, 116 P.2d 1012 (what federal instrumentalities are exempt from state taxation); Coca-Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., 138 F.2d 788 (whether the use of the word "cola" infringed Coca-Cola's trademark); and see Western Union Tel. Co. v. International Brotherhood, 133 F.2d 955 (whether ordinary strikes are forbidden by the Sherman Act and what picketing can constitutionally be enjoined).
[ Footnote 7 ] In Coca-Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., 138 F.2d 788, 790, a Circuit Court could say with some certainty: "We know of no case which holds that a consent decree imposing a continuing injunction deprives the court of its supervisory jurisdiction in the matter."
[ Footnote 8 ] We consider unpersuasive the argument of the railroad that in 1945 there was already on foot a movement to amend the Railway Labor Act so as to permit union shop agreements.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER concur, dissenting in part.
This controversy commenced in 1945 prior to the time when so-called union shop agreements were authorized by Congress. Act of Jan. 10, 1951, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. 152 Eleventh. Since the date of that law, which we upheld in Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 , employees and carriers may negotiate that type of agreement, though they are not required to do so. Id., p. 231. Prior to that date, however, a union shop was barred by law in this industry; and a union that discriminated against nonunion members was accountable to them. See Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 207 .
Twenty-eight nonunion members sued petitioners, in 1945, claiming damages in the amount of $140,000. The complaint purported to state a class action. But the case never came to trial. A settlement was reached which provided for (a) the payment of $5,000 in cash; (b) the waiver and release by the 28 plaintiffs of all their claims; and (c) a consent decree which would protect "the undersigned" against future acts of discrimination by petitioners. [364 U.S. 642, 654]
The consent decree did not purport to protect future employees. By its terms it protected only "the plaintiffs in this action and all other employes of the defendant Railroad employed in" designated crafts or classes and not members of the union. The petitioners agreed to refrain from discriminating "against the plaintiffs and the classes represented by them."
I do not think the consent decree, read in light of the settlement, did more than settle claims of then-existing employees. Employees hired in the future were, by its terms, not included. Yet apparently a host of them have intervened, seeking the protection of the status quo created by that decree. I use the word "apparently" because the record does not show which intervenors were on the payroll of the carrier in 1945. Those who became employed after that date plainly are not entitled to the protection of the decree. Of those who were employed at that time, we know that some are still employed. Of the latter group, at least seven of the original 28 employees are still on the payroll. These seven released valuable claims for settling their disputes. It is harsh and unjust to deprive them of those fruits of the settlement. Whether there are others employed in 1945 who have a like claim to fair dealing is impossible to tell from the record.
We are all agreed that there is power in the District Court to modify the consent decree, whether or not the power to modify was reserved. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 . I agree with the Court that the union should not be disabled by that decree from carrying out the new union shop policy which Congress has made permissive. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 435-436. Certainly all employees who have joined the ranks since 1945 have no claim to its protection, as they are not included in its [364 U.S. 642, 655] terms and gave nothing up in exchange for it. To construe it to include them would as a result of changing circumstances turn the consent decree "into an instrument of wrong." United States v. Swift & Co., supra, 115. But when we set aside the decree as respects those who gave up something of value to get it, we do an injustice. I think the applicable principle is stated in United States v. Swift & Co., supra, 119: "The injunction, whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its application to the conditions that existed at its making." [364 U.S. 642, 656]