Appeal by plaintiff from judgment filed 2 February 1998 by Judge Timothy L.Patti in Cleveland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16March 1999.
Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore, L.L.P., by Matthew M. Sawchak and Mary M.Dillon, for plaintiff-appellant.
Ali Paksoy, Jr., and Brenda S. McLain, for defendant-appellees.
LEWIS, Judge.
Plaintiff Fire Baptized Holiness Church of God of the Americas, Inc. ("thedenomination") filed a complaint on 20 March 1996 against defendants ("theShelby church"), seeking a declaration that it was the fee simple owner ofproperty then in possession of the Shelby church. In its answer andcounterclaim, the Shelby church asked the trial court to declare the newlyformed Westside Praise and Worship Center the fee simple owner of the property.
At the close of all the evidence at trial, the jurors were asked to determinetwo issues: first, whether the denomination was a connectional churchorganization; and second, whether the Shelby church, prior to 20 October 1994,was in a connectional relationship with the denomination with respect toproperty matters. The jury found that the denomination was a connectionalchurch but that the Shelby church was not in a connectional relationship withthe denomination with respect to property matters. Judgment was entered forthe Shelby church, and the denomination's claims were dismissed with prejudice.The denomination's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied,just as its earlier motion for a directed verdict at the close of its evidencehad been. From the judgment filed 2 February 1998, the denomination appeals.
To better understand the nature of this case, it is important to firstunderstand some background of the denomination and the Shelby church. Thedenomination is now over one hundred years old, with a claimed internationalmembership of over 24,000. It is organized into three dioceses, each headed bya bishop. The bishops ordain elders to act as the bishops' representatives tolocal churches. The denomination assigns pastors to its local churches, andthe local churches raise the money to pay these pastors. The Shelby churchjoined the denomination in the 1930s. The Shelby church raised money to submitat the denomination's annual convention, and the denomination would sometimesgive money to the Shelby church for various expenses.
At the center of the present debate is ownership of certain property inShelby. The facility on Pickney Street that housed the Shelby church beginningin 1937 was condemned in 1970. The Reverend Samuel Ervin, the pastor of theShelby church in 1970, located another church building on Blanton Street ownedby the Davidson Memorial Baptist Church, which agreed to sell this property tothe Shelby church and to acquire the condemned property on Pickney Street. InJanuary 1970, Davidson Memorial deeded its property to the "Trustees of theFire Baptized Holiness Church of God of the Americas, Mt. Sinai Church"; thissame name appeared as the grantor on the deed to the Pickney Street property.The Shelby church purchased the Blanton Street property for $25,000 by making adown payment of $5,000 ($2,500 in the form of property traded, and theremaining $2,500 to be raised by the Shelby church) and by covering the balancewith a $20,000 mortgage.
This transaction was undertaken without the approval or permission of thedenomination, and in spite of a statement made by a bishop within thedenomination that both the Blanton Street property and its accompanyingfinancial obligations were too large and unnecessary for the Shelby church.The denomination nevertheless provided a matching gift of $1,000 toward thedown payment, but the Shelby church raised money for the remaining portion ofthe down payment, the mortgage payments and funding for subsequentrenovations.
In a 1983 condemnation action brought against the "Trustees of the FireBaptized Holiness Church of God of the Americas, Mt. Sinai Church," the City ofShelby paid the Shelby church approximately $28,800 for a parking lot andboarding house on the Blanton Street property. This was done without thepermission or approval of the denomination. The Shelby church used theseproceeds to buy three new parcels of property and to pay for churchrenovations, relocation of the fellowship hall, and improvements to the churchsanctuary. When the condemnation proceeds did not cover all of the renovationexpenses, the Shelby church took out a second mortgage on the church property,without the permission or approval of the denomination, for $25,000 in 1990.The Shelby church neither sought nor received assistance from the denominationin making these renovations.
In October 1994, the Shelby church voted to end its affiliation with thedenomination. On 3 January 1996, the trustees of "the Fire Baptized HolinessChurch of God of the Americas, Mt. Sinai Church" conveyed the church propertyto themselves as trustees of the Westside Praise and Worship Center. It wasthis conveyance that led to the denomination's legal action against the Shelbychurch, and the Shelby church's success at trial has led to the denomination'sappeal to this Court.
The denomination's first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred bydenying the denomination's motions for directed verdict and for judgmentnotwithstanding the verdict. Within this argument the denomination makes threeseparate contentions: (1) that the jury's finding that the denomination isconnectional, with nothing more, justified judgment for the denomination; (2)that the nature of the deed required judgment for the denomination; and (3)that "the verdict that the Shelby church and the [denomination] lacked aconnectional relationship on property matters does not support the judgment."
Although constitutional guarantees and the concept of separation of church andstate preclude us from ruling on purely ecclesiastical issues, our courts "dohave jurisdiction as to civil, contract and property rights which are involvedin, or arise from, a church controversy." A.M.E. Zion Church v. UnionChapel A.M.E. Zion Church , 64 N.C. App. 391, 412, 308 S.E.2d 73, 85 (1983), disc. review denied , 310 N.C. 308, 312 S.E.2d 649 (1984). In decidingthese issues, a central question is whether the church is connectional orcongregational. As established in Simmons v. Allison , 118 N.C. 763, 24S.E. 716 (1896) and summarized more recently in Looney v. Community BibleHoliness Church , 103 N.C. App. 469, 473, 405 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1991),
[c]onnectional churches are governed by large bodies and individualcongregations bear the same relation to the governing body as counties bear tothe State. Congregational churches are independent republics, governed by themajority of its [sic] members and subject to control or supervision by nohigher authority. Although congregational churches often associate togetherfor mission purposes, these associations are strictly voluntary and have nogovernmental authority over the individual congregations.
Id. (citations omitted). One early Supreme Court case in this statecited the Protestant Episcopal, Methodist, Presbyterian and Roman Catholicchurches as examples of connectional churches and the Baptist, Congregationaland Christian churches as congregational. Conference v. Allen , 156 N.C.524, 526, 72 S.E. 617, 618 (1911).
There seems to be little dispute that the denomination and the Shelby churchwere generally in a connectional relationship prior to the Shelby church'ssplit from the denomination. The question before us is whether this isdispositive of the issue of property ownership, or whether the relationshipcould be connectional in some respects and congregational in others. In Looney , the jury determined that the denomination was a connectionalchurch organization but that the local church was not in a connectionalrelationship with the denomination with respect to property matters. Looney , 103 N.C. App. at 470-71, 405 S.E.2d at 811-12. This Court foundno error in the verdict based on "the nature of the property transactionsthemselves." Id. at 474, 405 S.E.2d at 813. The Court noted that underthe facts of that case,
[w]hen the defendant local church affiliated with the plaintiffdenominational church, the property was deeded to trustees of, or for, thelocal church, not to the denominational church or to trustees of, or for, thedenominational church. This pattern was followed in all property transactionsduring the entire period of affiliation. Thus this evidence created a juryquestion as to whether as to church property the local church intendedto establish a connectional relationship with the denominational church.
Id . Because Looney established that a church could becongregational as to property matters though connectional in other ways, thedenomination's argument that the jury's finding of a connectional relationshipwas enough, standing alone, to justify judgment for the denomination isunconvincing.
Unlike the local church in Looney , however, the Shelby church neverowned any property before it was associated with the denomination. The firstShelby church property was purchased in 1937, and the deed for this propertygranted it to the "Trustees of the Fire Baptized Holiness Church of God of theAmericas/Mt. Sinai Church and their successors in office." Subsequent deedsinvolving the local church in 1970, 1984, 1986, and 1996 were similarly titledwith the name of the denomination followed by the name of the local church.The denomination claims that General Statute section 61-3 required judgment inits favor.
According to the denomination, section 61-3 "provides that all church property'shall be and remain forever to the use and occupancy of that church ordenomination . . . for which the [church property was] sopurchased, given, granted or devised.'" See N.C. Gen. Stat. §61-3 (1989). Such a reading ignores the language of the statute that specifiesthat this be done "according to the intent expressed in the conveyance, gift,grant or will . . . ." Id. The Shelby church arguesthat the lack of specificity in the deeds, which named both the denominationand the Shelby church as the grantees of church property, fails to demonstratethe intent of the grantor and that this question was properly resolved by thejury. The denomination, citing A.M.E. Zion , 64 N.C. App. at 414-15, 308S.E.2d at 86-87, claims any dispute on this point was not a question of factfor the jury but a question of law to be resolved by the trial court byconsulting the church discipline.
The rules of the denomination are enumerated in the Discipline of the FireBaptized Holiness Church of God of the Americas ("the Discipline "),published by the denomination. In the 1970 Discipline , Section 4 ofArticle XVI, "Directions Regulating Deeds, Titles, Etc.", read as follows:"Let it be specified in each deed to church property that it shall be for theuse and benefit of the ministry and membership of the Fire Baptized HolinessChurch of God of the Americas." In the 1994 Discipline , Article XVIIIbore the same title as Article XVI above, and Section 4 stated, "It shall bespecified in each deed to church property that it shall be for the use andbenefit of the ministry and membership who are worshipping according to thecustoms and usages of the Fire Baptized Holiness Church of God of theAmericas."
The deeds presented as evidence at trial and included as exhibits on appeal donot make these required specifications. There is no mention of the purpose ofthe property or any reference to the customs and usages of the denomination.Instead, the deeds simply include the names of both the denomination and theShelby church as grantees.
Under the language of the Discipline , it seems clear that local churchproperty that is recorded as specified in the Discipline belongs tothe denomination, and that a local church seeking to secede from thedenomination could not keep such property. Here, though, the deeds were notrecorded as set out in the Discipline . Furthermore, evidence at trialindicated that the decision to move into a new sanctuary in 1970 did not meetwith the approval of the denomination. According to Section 2 of the Discipline 's articles on property in both 1970 and 1994, the localchurch's board of trustees was required to receive the approval of the bishopor ruling elder before securing any warranty deeds. This was not done by thetrustees of the Shelby church. In fact, the denomination clearly expressed its disapproval of the Shelby church's plan to acquire the property now indispute, but the Shelby church nevertheless did so, using its own money. Wefind that it would be inequitable, if not unconstitutional, for a court of thisstate to enforce the Discipline against the Shelby church nunc protunc when the denomination made no effort to enforce it at the time of anyviolations. As was true in Looney , "[t]he discipline of thedenominational church manifest an implied assent of local churches todenominational control of local church property. This evidence, if notcontradicted, would make the plaintiffs' case." Similarly to Looney, this evidence was contradicted. The question at trial then became one of theShelby church's desire for independence prior to its ultimate secession fromthe denomination, and this question was one of fact to be resolved by thejury.
The denomination's third contention within its first argument is that theverdict that the Shelby church and the denomination lacked a connectionalrelationship with regard to property matters did not support the take-nothingjudgment against the denomination. The denomination emphasizes that in both A.M.E. Zion and Looney , the local churches were permitted to keepthe property they owned independently before joining the connectionaldenomination. According to the denomination, the verdict in this action isinconsistent with A.M.E. Zion and Looney , since the Shelby churchowned no property before joining the denomination and it therefore cannot keepthe property acquired during its affiliation with the denomination.
We do not read A.M.E. Zion or Looney to limit a secedingchurch's property rights to that property it owned prior to joining adenomination. It is our understanding that references in these cases to takingproperty "independently owned prior to and retained during its limitedaffiliation with the general church", see Looney , 103 N.C. App. at473-74, 405 S.E.2d at 813 (citing A.M.E. Zion , 64 N.C. App. at 413-14,308 S.E.2d at 86), were based on decisions prior to Looney 's explicitacceptance of a connectional church being congregational as to propertymatters. In A.M.E. Zion , we remanded the case and stated that "uponremand, the major question to be answered . . . is whetherthe defendant local church was in fact in a hierarchical relationship with theplaintiff parent body with respect to property matters ." A.M.E.Zion , 64 N.C. App. at 416, 308 S.E.2d at 87. Because that case involveddifferent names on the deeds, we further stated that "[u]pon retrial, adetermination must be made as to whether 'Union Chapel Methodist Church' wouldbe entitled to fee simple ownership of lands deeded to a Methodist EpiscopalChurch in the 1873 deed and to an A.M.E. Zion Church in the 1976 deed." Id . at 416, 308 S.E.2d at 88. This indicates to us that ownership ofproperty acquired over 100 years after the local church joined the denominationcould have been kept by the local church when it left the denomination,depending upon the nature of the relationship between the denomination andlocal church. Although Looney recited the same "independently ownedprior to" language as A.M.E. Zion , the ultimate result was that thelocal church was permitted to keep both the church property it acquired priorto joining the denomination in 1955 and the new sanctuary it constructed in1972 and 1973, before leaving the denomination in 1988. In light of thisinterpretation of these cases, the denomination's argument fails. The trialcourt properly denied the denomination's motions for directed verdict and forjudgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The denomination's second argument on appeal is that the trial court erred byadmitting, over objection, certain lay opinion testimony regarding theownership of church property. The denomination objected to the testimony ofJackie Williams, who testified that the words "Mt. Sinai" were on the deeds"because it belonged to the members of Mt. Sinai"; of Jeffrey Ross, who statedthat it was his understanding and intent as a trustee that the propertybelonged to the Shelby church; and of Reverend Verlon Pompey, who claimed itwas his understanding that the property was to be held by the trustees of thechurch for the Shelby church. The denomination argues on appeal that thecourt's admission of the opinions expressed on these points by these witnesseswas improper. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 602 (1992)(stating that lay witness must testify from his personal knowledge); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 701 (1992) (limiting lay opinions to those which are"(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful toa clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact inissue"); see also Beam v. Kerlee , 120 N.C. App. 203, 216, 461S.E.2d 911, 921 (1995) (precluding testimony of the legal conclusion that aparty "owns" property by adverse possession), cert. denied , 342 N.C.651, 467 S.E.2d 703 (1996).
We hold that even if the trial court erred in admitting this testimony, theerror was not reversible. "Where improperly admitted evidence merelycorroborates testimony from other witnesses, we have found the error harmless." State v. Wynne , 329 N.C. 507, 519, 406 S.E.2d 812, 818 (1991). ReverendErvin, who served as pastor of the Shelby church at the time of the 1970property change, testified without objection that the congregation of theShelby church intended to own the property and that "Mt. Sinai" was on thedeeds "because the people thought they were buying the church for Mt. Sinai."Clara Louise Williams, a trustee of the Shelby church at that same time, statedwithout objection that she intended and understood that the trustees of theShelby church would own the building and property. Similarly, the denominationdid not object to Reverend Pompey's testimony that his understanding during thetransactions in the 1980s was that the Shelby church owned the property andthat he understood and intended throughout the time of his affiliation with theShelby church that the property belonged to the local congregation.
In light of these facts, the testimony to which the denomination objectedmerely corroborated the unchallenged testimony without adding any newsubstantive information. Any error in admitting the challenged testimony washarmless, and defendant's second argument is without merit.
For the reasons set out above, we hold that the parties to this actionreceived a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.
No error.
Judges GREENE and HORTON concur.