No. 02-333
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2003 MT 212
IN THE MATTER OF K.S, D.S., and C.S.,
Youths In Need of Care.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade, Cause No. BDJ-99-180-Y,
The Honorable Julie Macek, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Carl Jensen, Cascade County Public Defender’s Office, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Mark Mattioli,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Brant Light, Cascade County Attorney; Gina Bishop, Deputy County
Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 27, 2003
Decided: August 12, 2003
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
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Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶ 1The Appellant, mother S.S., appeals from the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order entered by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, which terminated her
p arental rights with respect to K.S., D.S., and C.S. We affirm.
¶ 2The mother presents the following issues on appeal:
¶ 31. Did the District Court err when it permitted Martina Heavy Runner to testify as
an expert for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act?
¶ 42. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it terminated the mother’s parental
rights?
BACKGROUND
¶ 5On October 6, 1999, the Cascade County Attorney’s Office, on behalf of the
Departm ent of Public Health and Human Services (“DPHHS”), filed a Petition for
Tem porary Investigative Authority and Protective Services. The petition sought to
tem porarily remove N.S., K.S., D.S., and C.S. from their natural mother’s care. The
children ’s father passed away in 1996. DPHHS requested the temporary investigative
authority based on a report that the m other and children were living in a trailer with very
little food and no electricity, running water, or furniture. The report also indicated that the
m other used alcohol and drugs in front of the children and attempted suicide on several
occasions in the children’s p resence. DPHHS maintained that the children were either
m embers or eligible for membership in the Little Shell Tribe and requested that the court
furnish notice of the hearing to the tribe pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).
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The District Court g ranted DPHHS’s petition on October 12, 1999, and DPHHS arranged
for the children to liv e with their maternal uncle in Pondera County, Montana.
¶ 6After obtaining extensions on the temporary investigative authority, DPHHS filed a
Petition for Tem porary Legal Custody over K.S., D.S., and C.S. on March 30, 2000. The
petition did not im plicate N.S., presumably because N.S. would attain the age of majority in
A pril 2000. Following a hearing on the petition, the District Court declared the children
youths in need of care and granted temporary legal custody of the children to DPHHS for a
period of six months. Further, the District Court ordered the mother to complete a treatment
plan which required her to: im prove upon her parenting sk ills, maintain a chemically free
lifestyle, provide adequate housing and a safe environment for the children, achieve a healthy
me ntal status, maintain a relationship with the children while they remained in DPHHS’s
custody, and to cooperate fully with DPHHS.
¶ 7On February 9, 2001, DPHHS petitioned the District Court to terminate the mother’s
parental rig hts with respect to K.S., D.S., and C.S. and grant permanent legal custody of the
children to it. DPHHS sought permanent custody based upon the length of time the children
rem ained in foster care and the failure of the court-ordered treatment plan. After multiple
hearing s and continuances the District Court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and order on January 25, 2002. The court found that the mother “did not comply with or
successfully com plete the treatment plan” and that the conduct or cond ition rendering her
unfit is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. Therefore, the District Court terminated
the m other’s parental rights with respect to K.S., D.S., and C.S. and granted permanent legal
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custody of the children to DPHHS , assigning to DPHHS the right to consent to the children’s
adoption. The mother appeals from the District Court’s order of termination.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 8Determinations regarding an expert witness’s qualifications and competency are
within the discretion of the trial co urt and will not be overturned absent an abuse of
discretion. In re M.R.G. , 2003 MT 60, ¶ 6, 314 Mont. 396, ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 312, ¶ 6. Further,
a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights is discretionary and we review that
decision to determine whether the court abused its discretion. In re J.W. , 2001 MT 86, ¶ 7,
305 Mont. 149, ¶ 7, 23 P.3d 916, ¶ 7. In reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights,
we determine whether the district court’s findings of fact supporting termination are clearly
erroneous and whether the district court’s conclusions of law are correct. In re C.B. , 2001
MT 42, ¶ 6, 304 Mont. 252, ¶ 6, 20 P.3d 117, ¶ 6. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if
it is not supported by substantial ev idence; if the district court misapprehended the effect of
the ev idence; or if, after reviewing the record, this Court is left with a definite and firm
conv iction that the district court made a mistake. In re J.N. , 1999 MT 64, ¶ 11, 293 Mont.
524, ¶ 11, 977 P.2d 317, ¶ 11.
DISCUSSION
ISSUE ONE
¶ 9Did the District Court err when it permitted Martina Heavy Runner to testify as an
expert for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act?
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¶ 10Throughout the proceedings, DPHHS maintained that the children were enrolled or
enrollable m embers of the Little Shell Tribe. Despite the fact that the Little Shell Tribe has
yet to g ain federal recognition as an “Indian tribe,” the District Court concluded that the
“ appropriate thing to do is to err on the side of caution and apply the ICWA standard . . . .”
Toward this end, DPHHS introduced Martina Heavy Runner as an expert witness. Over the
m other’s objection, the District Court permitted Heavy Runner to testify as an ICWA
qualified expert witness. On appeal, the mother contends that the District Court abused its
discretion when it accepted Heav y Runner as a qualified ICWA expert witness because she
“ had absolutely no credentials to give such expert testimony.”
¶11Recently, in In re M.R.G. , we looked to guidelines promulgated by the Bureau of
I ndian Affairs for direction on expert witnesses for purposes of ICWA as ICWA itself does
not define the term “qualified expert witness.” See In re M.R.G. , ¶ 10. Interestingly, In re
M.R.G. presented the identical expert witness issue regarding the same expert, Heavy
Runner. We noted that the guidelines provide as follows:
D.4. Qualified Expert Witnesses
(a) Rem oval of an Indian child from his or her family must be based on
com petent testimony from one or more experts qualified to speak specifically
to the issue of whether continued custody by the parents or Indian custodians
is lik ely to result in serious physical or emotional damage to the child.
(b) Persons with the following characteristics are most likely to meet
the requirem ents for a qualified expert witness for purposes of Indian child
custody proceedings:
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(i) A member of the Indian child’s tribe who is recognized by the tribal
com munity as knowledgeable in tribal customs as they pertain to family
organization and childrearing practices.
(ii) A lay expert witness having substantial experience in the delivery
of child and family services to Indians, and extensive knowledge of prevailing
soci al and cultural standards and childrearing practices within the Indian
child’s tribe.
(iii) A professional person having substantial education and experience
in the area of his or her specialty.
44 Fed. Reg. 67,593 (1979). DPHHS does not indicate which provision of the above
g uidelines qualifies Heavy Runner as an ICWA expert witness for the case at bar.
¶ 12For purposes of subpart b(iii) above, in addition to possessing “substantial education
and experience in the area of his or her specialty,” it is preferable that the witness possess
expertise in, and substantial knowledge of, Indian culture, family structure, and childrearing
practices. In re M.R.G. , ¶ 12. However, the witness does not have to possess knowledge of
the cultural standards of a particular I ndian tribe. In re M.R.G. , ¶ 12.
¶ 13Heavy Runner testified that she is a member of the Blackfeet Tribe. Heavy Runner
stated that she has a full-blooded L ittle Shell aunt who related information about the Little
S hell Tribe to her at a very young age. Heavy Runner maintained that she is familiar with
L ittle Shell tribal customs pertaining to family organizations, child rearing, and social and
cultural practices. At the time of trial, Heavy Runner worked as a family resource specialist
f or the State of Montana. Prior to that, she worked on numerous “Indian child cases” in
v arying professional capacities (child welfare specialist, social worker on an Indian
reserv ation in Minnesota, adoption clerk on the Blackfeet Reservation, and teacher). Heavy
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Runner testified that she has prov ided family services to multiple Little Shell members in the
past.
¶ 14Based on the foregoing, we conclude that DPHHS sufficiently established Heavy
Runner’s personal and professional knowledge of Indian culture, family structure, and
childrearing practices for purposes of ICWA’s qualified expert witness requirement.
Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Heavy Runner’s expert
testim ony. Based on this conclusion, we need not address DPHHS’s contention that ICWA
should not apply based on the federally “ unrecognized” status of the Little Shell Tribe.
ISSUE TWO
¶ 15Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it terminated the mother’s parental
rights?
¶16 Section 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, provides that a court may terminate parental rights
upon a finding that the child is an ad judicated youth in need of care and both of the
following exist:
(i) an appropriate treatment plan that has been approved by the court has not
been complied with by the parents or has not been successful; and
(ii) the conduct or condition of the parents rendering them unfit is unlikely to
change within a reasonable time.
The mother does not dispute the court’s findings that the children are youths in need of care.
Fur ther, the mother admits that “not all of the conditions of treatment were technically
complied with.” The mother contests the District Court’s “unlikely to change within a
r easonable time” finding, stating that she “demonstrated, repeatedly, the remarkable progress
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she had made in ending substance abuse and making herself more fit to parent. If anything,
a complete turnaround was likely.
¶ 17The court-approved treatment plan contained various goals and tasks. The plan, in
p art, required the mother to: complete parenting classes, enroll in a family based services
prog ram, obtain a chemical dependency evaluation, complete any recommended chemical
dependency prog rams, submit to random urinalysis tests, maintain an appropriate residence,
abstain from criminal activity, obtain mental health counse ling, complete a gambling
addiction ev aluation, complete an anger management program, attend regularly scheduled
v isits with the children, and contact her social worker on a weekly basis.
¶ 18At the termination hearing, Vickie Leigland, a community social worker for DPHHS,
testified about the m other’s compliance with the treatment plan. Leigland testified that the
m other’s cooperation level with the treatment plan has been “extremely low.” Leigland
receiv ed no documentation regarding completion of pare nting classes, the chemical
dependency ev aluation, or anger management classes. Leigland stated that the mother failed
to contact her on a week ly basis and maintain contact with the children on a regular basis.
L eigland testified that, “[The mother] hasn’t completed her treatment plan. There’s still
som e of the same concerns, her anger, her unwillingness to admit that maybe she does have
a problem . She tends to blame everyone else for her problems and doesn’t take
responsibility for what has happened. ” Based on these observations, Leigland concluded that
the treatment plan was not successful, that the mother’s conduct which renders her unable
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to parent is unlikely to change within a reasonable time, and that termination of her parental
rig hts was in the children’s best interest.
¶ 19Coral Beck, supervisor of the intervention unit in Missoula, Montana, echoed
L eigland’s sentiment regarding the mother’s compliance with the treatment plan. Beck
indicated t hat the mother failed to: attend parenting classes, cooperate with the random
urinaly sis tests, maintain the appropriate level of sobriety, or comply with the crime-free
m andate. Pamela Kay Johnson, a licensed clinical professional counselor who worked with
K. S. from November 2000 to May 2001, testified that “it is in [K.S.’s] best interest to remain
outsid e the custody of her mother.” Finally, for reasons discussed above, Heavy Runner
testified that, in her opinion, the children should not be returned to their mother.
¶ 20Admittedly, the mother presented favorable testimony from friends, family, and
professionals. However, because a termination of parental rights case is a non-jury matter,
it is the trial court’s responsibility to weig h the evidence presented and ascertain the
witnesses’ corresponding credibility. In re J.W. (1988), 232 M ont. 46, 50, 757 P.2d 769,
771. Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the court’s findings are clearly
e rroneous. That is, substantial evidence supports the findings, the court did not
m isapprehend the effect of the evidence, and we are not convinced that the court made a
mistake. Further, the law presumes that termination is in the best interests of a child when
that child has remained in foster care under the state’s custody for fifteen of the most recent
twenty-two months. See § 41-3-604(1), MCA. The mother does not dispute the fact that the
children have been in foster care since October 1999.
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¶21 Given the evidence presented at trial, in conjunction with the presumption articulated
in § 41-3-604(1), MCA, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it
terminated the mother K.S., D.S., and C.S.
¶22Affirmed.
/S/ JIM REGNIER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE