MURRAY'S LIQUORS, INC. vs. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES CONTROLCOMMISSION & another.(1)
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 8, 1995.
The case was heard by Barbara J. Rouse, J.
Evan T. Lawson for the plaintiff.
Jane L. Willoughby, Assistant Attorney General, for Alcoholic BeveragesControl Commission.
Richard G. Chmielinski, Assistant City Solicitor, for Board of LicenseCommissioners of Newton.
PERRETTA, J. General Laws c. 138, § 34B, provides that a licensedseller of alcoholic beverages who reasonably relies upon a Massachusettsdriver's license as proof of sufficient age to purchase such beverages will bepresumed to have exercised due care in making the sale. Murray's Liquors, Inc.(Murray's), sold alcoholic beverages to four minors, three of whom presentedfalse out-of-State drivers' licenses as proof of their ages. On appeal from ajudgment of the Superior Court affirming the decision of the AlcoholicBeverages Control Commission (commission) upholding the local licensing board's(board) suspension of its license, Murray's principal argument is that §34B violates the full faith and credit and equal protection clauses of theFederal Constitution because it does not extend the benefit of the presumptionof due care to sellers of alcoholic beverages who rely upon out-of-Statedrivers' licenses. We affirm the judgment.
1. The presumption. As here relevant, the second paragraph of G. L. c. 138,§ 34B, as amended by St. 1994, c. 48, § 1, reads:
"Any [liquor] licensee, or agent or employee thereof, under thischapter who reasonably relies on a . . . liquor purchase identification card ormotor vehicle license issued pursuant to section eight of chapter ninety, or ona valid passport issued by the United States government, or by the government,recognized by the United States government, of a foreign country, or a validUnited States issued military identification card, for proof of a person'sidentity and age shall not suffer any modification, suspension, revocation orcancellation of such license, nor shall he suffer any criminal liability, fordelivering or selling alcohol or alcoholic beverages to a person undertwenty-one years of age. Any licensee, or agent or employee thereof, under thischapter, who reasonably relies on such a liquor purchase identification card ormotor vehicle license issued pursuant to said section eight, for proof of aperson's identity and age shall be presumed to have exercised due care inmaking such delivery or sale of alcohol or alcoholic beverages to a personunder twenty-one years of age. Such presumption shall be rebuttable; provided,however, that nothing contained herein shall affect the applicability ofsection sixty-nine."(2)
2. The evidence. During the late afternoon of February 9, 1995, Newtonpolice officer Richard M. McGrath saw four males loading several cases of beerinto the trunk of a taxicab outside of Murray's. All four appeared to McGrathto be about eighteen or nineteen years of age. McGrath stopped the taxi andasked the four young men whether any of them was at least twenty-one years ofage. All said no and, in response to McGrath's request, produced valididentification confirming the fact that each was underage. When McGrath nextasked whether any of them possessed documentation indicating that he was overtwenty-one, two produced out-of-State licenses, one of which did not match theappearance of the holder. The second license had the correct name of theindividual but an erroneous date of birth. McGrath confiscated the liquor andrecovered the sales receipts which evidenced two separate sales. Later thatsame day, McGrath again saw a taxi pull up in front of Murray's. Two males,youthful in appearance, got out, went into the store, and purchased two casesof beer. When they saw the police cruiser, they put the cases on the ground andstarted to walk away. McGrath stopped and questioned them. Both admitted tobeing underage, and one told McGrath that he had shown a false out-of-Statelicense to the sales clerk.
Two days later, McGrath saw two youthful appearing males go into Murray'sand exit with beer. Both were underage. One of them told McGrath that he had atransparency that altered the date of his birth on his out-of-State license.McGrath escorted this young man back into Murray's and spoke with the salesclerk. The clerk told McGrath that prior to the sale, this purchaser hadproduced a Massachusetts license. The young man then gave McGrath theMassachusetts license which had been issued in the name of another. The youngman told McGrath that he had found the license at his school.
3. Murray's reliance on the Massachusetts license. As to one of the foursales, Murray's argues that it reasonably relied upon the Massachusetts licensepresented to the sales clerk. The standard of review on this issue is a narrowone, that is, whether the commission's decision was supported by substantialevidence. "Judicial inquiry under the substantial evidence test is limitedto determination of whether, within the record developed before theadministrative agency, there is such evidence as a reasonable mind might acceptas adequate to support the agency's conclusion." Seagram Distil. Co. v.Alcoholic Bevs. Control Commn., 401 Mass. 713, 721 (1988).
There was substantial evidence before the commission to show that Murray'sreliance on the Massachusetts license in selling beer to the minor was notreasonable. At the time of the sale, the minor was nineteen years of age. Hepresented a license stating that he was twenty-three. McGrath testified that,although the minor's hair and skin pigmentation appeared, at a glance, similarto the photographed male, the differences between the two individuals wereapparent. He stated that a person would be able to discern those differenceswithin thirty seconds and know that the photograph on the license did notdepict the individual presenting it as proof of his age. McGrath also said thatthe minor appeared to him to be no more than eighteen years old.
In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the commission functionsas the finder of facts and determines the credibility and weight to be given tothe evidence before it. See Guarino v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec.,393 Mass. 89, 92 (1984), and cases therein cited. On the evidence presented tothe commission, we agree with the Superior Court judge's conclusion that therewas substantial evidence to show that Murray's reliance upon the Massachusettsdriver's license was not reasonable.
4. Murray's reliance on the out-of-State licenses. As to the remaining threesales, Murray's argues that the legislative line-drawing in § 34B -- thata vendor may reasonably rely upon Massachusetts drivers' licenses as well aspassports issued by the United States government and other governmentsrecognized by it but not upon out-of-State drivers' licenses -- violates thefull faith and credit and equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution.
a. Full faith and credit. Article IV of the Federal Constitution -- and itsimplementing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (1994) -- command that full faithand credit be granted to valid "public Acts, Records and judicialProceedings" as well as to valid State records.(3)Compliance with this Federal mandate is found in G. L. c. 90, § 10, whichaccords nonresidents of Massachusetts the right and privilege to drive a motorvehicle in Massachusetts in reliance upon drivers' licenses issued by theirhome States.(4)
Section 34B does not, in any way, infringe upon the right of a holder of anout-of-State driver's license to drive on the roadways of Massachusetts, nordoes the statute prohibit anyone from presenting or accepting such license asproof of the identity or age of a purchaser of alcoholic beverages. Rather,§ 34B simply affords certain protections to a liquor licensee whoreasonably relies upon a Massachusetts driver's license as proof of therequisite age to purchase alcoholic beverages. Our sister States are free toenact similar legislation. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 436.1801§ 801(7) (West Supp. 1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.639(A)(Baldwin 1995).
b. Equal protection.(5) "The Equal Protection Clauseof the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any personwithin its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'" Cleburne v.Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985), quoting from Plyler v.Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). Because Murray's does not, and cannot, arguethat § 34B burdens a suspect group or fundamental interest, the questionis whether the statute is rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimateState interest. Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 743 (1986). Tobin'sCase, 424 Mass. 250, 252-253 (1997). Chebacco Liquor Mart, Inc. v. AlcoholicBevs. Control Commn., 429 Mass. 721, 722 (1999). Section 34B serves alegitimate State interest, viz., to encourage vendors to refrain from puttingalcoholic beverages in the hands of minors. See Michnik- Zilberman v. Gordon'sLiquor, Inc., 390 Mass. 6, 11-12 (1983).
As noted in Take Five Vending, Ltd. v. Provincetown, 415 Mass. 741, 748(1993), citing Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Marshfield, 389 Mass. 436,445 (1983), the "rational basis test . . . is the lowest level of judicialscrutiny." Murray's has the burden of proof on the issue of the invalidityof the statute, a burden described in Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 366Mass. 539, 541 (1974), as "onerous," that is, "a statutoryclassification will not be set aside as a denial of equal protection or dueprocess if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."Id. at 542. Take Five Vending, Ltd. v. Provincetown, 415 Mass. at 748."Moreover, . . . it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposeswhether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivatedthe legislature." Federal Communications Commn. v. Beach Communications,Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
We conclude that it was conceivable that the Legislature was of the opinionthat Massachusetts vendors of alcoholic beverages are likely to be morefamiliar with drivers' licenses or liquor purchase identification cards issuedby the Commonwealth than with those issued by the other forty-nine States. Itis also conceivable that the Legislature extended the "reasonablereliance" defense to passports based upon the view that false passportswould rarely be used to purchase liquor, especially in view of the Federalconsequences for use of false passports, both Federal and foreign. See, e.g.,18 U.S.C. §§ 1541 through 1544 (1994); United States v. Dangdee, 616F.2d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir. 1980).
As stated in Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. On theNecessaries of Life, 307 Mass. 408, 418 (1940), "It is not for us toinquire into the expediency or the wisdom of the legislative judgment. Unlessthe act of the Legislature cannot be supported upon any rational basis of factthat reasonably can be conceived to sustain it, the court has no power tostrike it down as violative of the Constitution."
Judgment affirmed.
Footnotes
(1) 1 Board of License Commissioners of Newton.
(2) 2 General Laws c. 138, § 34, prohibits the sale ofalcoholic beverages to any person under twenty-one years of age, and § 69prohibits any on-premises sale of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person.
(3) 3 More specifically and as relevant, § 1739 reads:"All nonjudicial records . . . kept in any public office of any State . .. shall be proved or admitted in any court . . . in any other State . . . .Such records . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court . .. within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts . .. of the State . . . from which they are taken."
(4) 4 Section 10, as appearing in St. 1985, c. 146, reads,in pertinent part: "The motor vehicle of a nonresident may be operated onthe ways of the commonwealth . . . by any non- resident operator without alicense from the registrar if the nonresident operator is duly licensed underthe laws of the state or country where such vehicle is registered and has suchlicense on his person or in the vehicle in some easily accessible place."
(5) Murray's does not challenge the constitutionality of§ 34B by reason of the establishment of a presumption. See, e.g., Mobile,Jackson & Kan. City R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42- 43 (1910);DiLoreto v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 383 Mass. 243, 248 (1981); Tobin's Case,424 Mass. at 255. Rather, its argument is that, because it reasonably reliedupon out-of-State drivers' licenses, the equal protection clause entitled it tothe benefit of the presumption.