Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Central District of CaliforniaWilliam Matthew Byrne, Jr., Chief Judge, PresidingArgued and SubmittedSeptember 30, 1999--Pasadena, CaliforniaFiled October 21, 1999Before: Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Ferdinand F. Fernandez,and Thomas G. Nelson, Circuit Judges.Opinion by Judge Fernandez
_____________________________COUNSEL Michael Tanaka, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Ange-les, California, (argued); Carlton F. Gunn, Deputy FederalPublic Defender, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellant.Daniel S. Goodman, Assistant United States Attorney, LosAngeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.
_____________________________OPINION FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge:Earthy D. Daniels, Jr., appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C.S 2255 motion in which he sought to challenge the constitu-tionality of two state convictions, which were used in sentenc-ing him under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.S 924(e) (ACCA). We affirm.BACKGROUNDDaniels was convicted of being a felon in possession of afirearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). The districtcourt determined that Daniels, who had four prior convictions,was subject to the ACCA and sentenced him to imprisonmentfor 176 months. Daniels appealed to this court. He assertedthat the district court's conclusion that his two California bur-glary convictions constituted predicate offenses under theACCA was incorrect. In an unpublished disposition, werejected that assertion. See United States v. Daniels, No. 95-50044, 86 F.3d 1164, 1996 W.L. 292231, at * 3-4 (9th Cir.June 3, 1996).Daniels then filed a S 2255 motion to set aside, vacate orcorrect his federal sentence, and collaterally attacked his twoCalifornia robbery convictions, which were also used toenhance his sentence. Although he claimed that he had beenunconstitutionally convicted, he did not contend that he wasdenied the right to counsel as guaranteed by Gideon v.Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335
, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799(1963), in either case.The district court denied his motion on the ground that hecould not maintain that collateral attack underS 2255. Hethen appealed.JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEWWe have jurisdiction pursuant to 22 U.S.C. S 2253(a). Wereview denials of petitions under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 de novo.See Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir.1995).DISCUSSION[1] In Custis v. United States,
511 U.S. 485
, 114 S. Ct.1732, 128 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1994), the Supreme Court declaredthat, except for Gideon1 challenges, a defendant may not col-laterally attack prior state convictions in sentencing proceed-ings where the ACCA is being used to enhance the sentence.The statute does not permit it. See id. at 490, 114 S. Ct. at1735. The Constitution does not require it. See id. at 497, 114S. Ct. at 1739. Concomitantly, ease of administration and theinterest in finality argue against it. See id. at 496-97, 114S. Ct. at 1738-39.We have recognized the force of the Custis reasoning andhave, therefore, expressly determined that it applies to sen-tencing proceedings in general. See, e.g., United States v.Ricardo, 78 F.3d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.Price, 51 F.3d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1494-95 (9th Cir. 1995); UnitedStates v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 885 (9th Cir. 1994). In thesame vein, we have decided that, on other than Gideongrounds, a defendant may not collaterally challenge a stateconviction through the medium of a motion seeking dismissalof his indictment. See United States v. Zarate-Martinez, 133F.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied , _______ U.S. _______,119 S. Ct. 123, 142 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1998).But, says Daniels, we have not yet decided that collateralattacks on state convictions cannot be brought underS 2255.If he were correct, we would doubt that they could bebrought. Among other things, a S 2255 petition asserts thatthere was some error at sentencing, which must be corrected,and we know from Custis that there could not have been anyerror whatsoever. As it is, Daniels is not correct.In Clawson v. United States, 52 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1995),a defendant brought a S 2255 motion and asserted that his fed-eral sentence under the ACCA "was improperly enhancedthrough use of a state conviction that later became nonfinalwhen his appeal from the state judgment was reopened, andwas unconstitutionally obtained." Id. at 807 (emphasis added).We responded: We hold that there is no finality requirement in the version of the ACCA under which Clawson was sen- tenced, and that under Custis, there is no constitu- tional right to collaterally attack the validity of a state conviction in a federal sentencing hearing on any basis other than denial of the right to counsel . . . .Id. (emphasis added). If that were not clear enough, wereturned to the topic in a case which, though not aS 2255matter, called upon us to expatiate on Clawson . We explainedthat, in Clawson, "[w]e read Custis to bar federal habeasreview of the validity of a prior conviction used for federalsentencing enhancement unless the petitioner raises a Gideonclaim." Contreras v. Schiltgen, 151 F.3d 906, 907 (9th Cir.1998).We believe that we have spoken with a good deal of clarity,but because Daniels does not find it so, perhaps others are ofthe same mind as he. We hesitate to leave uncertainty hover-ing about an issue that is so quotidian. Therefore, we restateour position here.2CONCLUSIONWe return to the S 2255 locale in order to clear away anybosk that still obscures our position regarding collateralattacks on prior convictions.[2] In S 2255 proceedings, Custis bars "federal habeasreview of the validity of a prior conviction used for federalsentencing enhancement unless the petitioner raises a Gideonclaim." Contreras, 151 F.3d at 907.AFFIRMED.
___________________________FOOTNOTES 1 See Gideon,
372 U.S. at 342
-45, 83 S. Ct. at 795-97.2 Incidentally, Daniels's invocation of our decision in Brock v. Weston,31 F.3d 887, 889-91 (9th Cir. 1994), does not alter the result. That casedealt with a 28 U.S.C. S 2254 petition, which can be a vehicle for chal-lenging state convictions in proper circumstances. See id. at 890-91 &nn.6&7; see also Allen v. Oregon, 153 F.3d 1046, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 1998);Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,_______ U.S. _______, 118 S. Ct. 865, 139 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1998); Price, 51 F.3dat 177. It is not relevant to this proceeding.