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http://laws.findlaw.com/5th/9831183cv0.html |
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 98-31183
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Melanie K. Starkman,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Tommy N. Evans, also known as Nick Evans, individually and in his official
capacity as Senior Pastor of Munholland United Methodist Church;
Munholland United Methodist Church,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
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December 27, 1999
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
BACKGROUND
In December, 1992, Defendant Munholland United Methodist Church ("the Church")hired Plaintiff Ms. Starkman, who served as Choirmaster and Director of Music. Ms.Starkman's supervisor at the Church was the Reverend Tommy N. Evans. During heremployment, Ms. Starkman allegedly suffered various disabilities, including asthma,osteoarthritis in both knees, migraine headaches, and endometriosis. According to Ms.Starkman, the defendants unreasonably failed to allow her requests for work schedule changesto permit her recovery after knee surgery. In addition, Ms. Starkman, having sufferedchemical exposure from cleaning materials, claims that the defendants refused to accommodateher sensitivity to chemicals.
In May, 1995, when the Church terminated Ms. Starkman's employment, she filed suitagainst the Church and Rev. Evans, alleging that her discharge violated the Americans withDisabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and a Louisiana retaliatory dischargestatute, La. R.S. § 23:1361. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which thedistrict court denied as it related to the prescription of Ms. Starkman's state law claims. Thebasis of this decision was that Ms. Starkman's filing of a claim with the Office of Worker'sCompensation ("OWCA") within the one-year period properly interrupted the prescription. However, having concluded that Rev. Evans did not qualify as an "employer," the districtcourt summarily dismissed both claims against him. It also granted the motion for summaryjudgment as to her retaliatory conduct and ADA claims against the Church, holding that Ms.Starkman's position as a choir director was within the parameters of this Circuit's FirstAmendment "ministerial exception" to employment discrimination claims. After filing amotion for reconsideration, which was denied, this appeal followed.
ANALYSIS Courts of Appeals review summary judgments de novo , applying the same standard asthe lower court. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d265 (1986). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgments "shall berendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions onfile, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any materialfact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.56(c).
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment (1) bars Ms. Starkman's claims underthe Americans with Disabilities Act and Louisiana employment law. In McClure v. SalvationArmy , 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit first articulated the "ministerialexception" to employment discrimination claims. In McClure , this court held that theapplication of the provisions of Title VII to the employment relationship existing between theplaintiff and her church "would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of religiousfreedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause." 460 F.2dat 560. This court found that only in rare instances where a compelling state interest inregulation of the subject within the state's constitutional power to regulate is shown can a courtuphold a state action which imposes even an incidental burden on the free exercise of religion. Id . at 558; see also Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of the United MethodistChurch , 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (this court's most recent affirmation and discussion ofthe Free Exercise Clause's bar to an employment discrimination claim filed by a church'sspiritual leader).
McClure involved an ordained minister suing the Salvation Army under Title VII aftershe was discharged by the religious organization. In this court's view, Congress did notintend, through nonspecific wording of provisions of the Civil Rights Act relating to equalemployment opportunities, to regulate the employment relationship between church andminister. McClure 460 F.2d at 553. The facts of the present case, however, are somewhatdistinct from those in McClure . First, instead of the plaintiff being an ordained minister as in McClure , here she is a choir director. Second, instead of the plaintiff bringing a Title VIIclaim, here she has complained on the basis of the ADA and the Louisiana retaliatorydischarge statute.
And yet, the "ministerial exception" outlined in McClure should be extended to thecase now before us because, like the ADA and the Louisiana retaliatory discharge statute atissue in the instant case, Title VII is an anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation statute. (2) Furthermore, as we discuss below, Ms. Starkman's position as a choir director required her toperform ministerial functions that warrant the First Amendment's protections against undueinterference with the personnel decisions of churches and religious leaders.
If Ms. Starkman is considered a "minister" and falls under the exception, this Courtmay not inquire into her employment and must dismiss her suit against the Church. On theother hand, if Ms. Starkman's position as a choir director merely required her to "performtasks which are not traditionally ecclesiastical or religious," the Church is not "entitled to McClure -type protection" under the Free Exercise clause. EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist , 651F.2d 277, 285 (5th Cir. 1981). No Fifth Circuit case dealing with the ADA has as yet heldthat a choir director qualifies as a "minister" for purposes of the "ministerial exceptions" under McClure .
To determine whether Ms. Starkman qualifies as a "spiritual leader" for purposes ofthe ministerial exception, this court will examine the employment duties and requirements ofthe plaintiff as well as her actual role at the church. Southwestern Baptist , 651 F.2d at 285. The status of employees as ministers for purposes of McClure remains a legal conclusion forthis court. Id. at 283. EEOC v. Catholic University of America makes it clear that "theministerial exception has not been limited to members of the clergy." EEOC v. CatholicUniversity of America 83 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Rayburn v. GeneralConference of Seventh-Day Adventist , 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)). The "ministerialexception encompasses all employees of a religious institution, whether ordained or not, whoseprimary functions serve its spiritual and pastoral mission." Catholic University , 83 F.3d at463. Furthermore, the defendants are not required to advance a theological or religiousexplanation regarding its allegedly illegal employment actions. See EEOC v. CatholicUniversity of America , 83 F.3d 455, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that the "focus of theministerial exception is on the action taken, not possible motives.").
The question of who qualifies as a minister requires this court to evaluate severalfactors. First, this court must consider whether employment decisions regarding the positionat issue are made "largely on religious criteria," Southwestern Baptist , 651 F.2d at 283. Yet,merely serving as "exemplars of practicing Christians" is insufficient under EEOC v.Mississippi College , 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980). Although Ms. Starkman argues thatshe was hired strictly on the basis of her qualifications as a choir director, it is clear that herjob requirements went above and beyond mere musical issues. To be certified as a Director ofMusic Ministry, she was not only required to have a masters in music, but also extensivecourse work in Church Music in Theory and Practice, Choral Conducting, Worship, ChoralVocal Methods, Hymnology, Bible, Theology, Christian Education, and United MethodistHistory, Doctrine and Polity. The job description for Director of Music, states that "theDirector of Music is responsible for the planning, recruiting, implementing and evaluating ofmusic and congregational participation in all aspects of this ministry at Munholland UnitedMethodist Church." Furthermore, there is no dispute that religious music plays a highlyimportant role in the spiritual mission of the church. Thus, it seems clear that the jobspecifications required Ms. Starkman to be educated in religion and serve as a spiritual leader.
Second, to constitute a minister for purposes of the "ministerial exception," the courtmust consider whether the plaintiff was qualified and authorized to perform the ceremonies ofthe Church. Southwestern Baptist , 651 F.2d at 284. Ms. Starkman had several religiousduties and responsibilities. For example, she was required to plan worship liturgy, coordinatechurch and worship activities relating to the church's Music Ministry, rehearse with choirs andconduct those choirs, hire musicians and lower level music ministry directors, and writearticles about the church's Music Ministry for the weekly church bulletin, introducingliturgical seasons for worship services. Ms. Starkman, in her Answers to Interrogatories, liststwenty-one duties under the category of religious or worship-oriented job duties, compared toonly three entries for nonreligious, nonworship-oriented, or secular duties. She also listsnineteen of the twenty one religious tasks as "essential," while she designates all of her threenonreligious duties as "not essential."
Third, and probably most important, is whether Ms. Starkman "engaged in activitiestraditionally considered ecclesiastical or religious," Southwester Baptist , 651 F.2d at 284,including whether the plaintiff "attends to the religious needs of the faithful," MississippiCollege , 626 F.2d at 485. While Ms. Starkman claims that attending to the "religious needsof the faithful" was not a primary duty," she admits that she was designated to be a"ministerial presence" to ailing parishioners on occasion. She also concedes that, for her andher congregation, music constitutes a form of prayer that is an integral part of worshipservices and Scripture readings.
The evidence, when examined in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, indicates thatMs. Starkman did serve as a spiritual leader and thus properly falls under the rubric of thiscourt's ministerial exception. Admittedly, the facts of this case regarding the question of whoqualifies as a minister are not as strong as those in McClure or Southwestern Baptist . However, neither is the position of the choir director in the instant case as weak as that of thefaculties in Mississippi College , who did not serve the role of "intermediaries between achurch and its congregation," or attend the "religious needs of the faithful," 626 F.2d at 485,nor is it similar to the support staff, who only served mere administrational functions in Southwestern Baptist , 651 F.2d at 284. It is sufficient that Ms. Starkman clearly performedtasks that were "traditionally ecclesiastical or religious." Southwestern Baptist , 651 F.2d at284.
CONCLUSION
Because the evidence shows that Ms. Starkman participated in religious rituals and hadnumerous religious duties, she qualifies as a "minister" for purposes of the First AmendmentFree Exercise Clause exception to employment discrimination claims. While religiousinstitutions are generally bound by the ADA and other employment discrimination laws, (e.g.a church secretary or janitor may advance an ADA claim if he or she is discharged because ofa disability), the facts of this case trigger the Free Exercise Clause's bar against such claims. Therefore, although the district court properly denied the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment as it related to the prescription of Ms. Starkman's state law claims, the districtcourt's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the Church and Mr. Evans wascorrect. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
1.
1
The defendants have not attempted to justify the dismissal of Ms. Starkman onnondiscriminatory or religious grounds. Thus, there has been no intrusion by the state into theinternal governance of the Church, and the district court was correct in holding that theEstablishment Clause cannot bar the plaintiff from proceeding.
See EEOC v. MississippiCollege
, 626 F.2d 477, 487 (5th Cir. 1980).
2.
2