SINAJINI v SAN JUAN SCHOOL DISTRICT
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
NOV 30 2000
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
JIMMY SINAJINI, BILL JOE SINAJINI, PATRICIA DENNISON, a minor, through
JOE LEE BEGAY, and HERBERT BEGAY,her parents TOM DENNISON and
minors, through their parents ARLENE DENNISON; JIMMY GOODMAN,
and/or guardian, LENA BEGAY; JR. and GILBERT WOODMAN, minors,
CECIL VIJIL, SHIRLEY VIJIL, through their parents and/or
CLARA LAMEMAN, through their guardians, LUCY GOODMAN and
parent and/or guardian, LEONA JIMMY GOODMAN; ELAINE WILLIAMS
VIJIL; HOLLY NEZ, HOWARD NEZ, and LORINDA WILLIAMS, minors,
and HANNAH NEZ, minors, through through their parent and/or
their parent and/or guardian, guardian, MARY ANN WILLIAMS;
MARION NEZ; GILBERT ROCKWELLTHE RED MESA CHAPTER OF THE
and LINDA ROCKWELL, minors, NAVAJO TRIBE; and THE OLJATO
through their parent and/or CHAPTER OF THE NAVAJO TRIBE,
guardian, LENA ROCKWELL; EDITH
BIGMAN, JUANITA BIGMAN, and Plaintiffs _ Appellants,
DOROTHY BIGMAN, minors, through
their parent and/or guardian, and
SETH BIGMAN; ANTHONY DEE, minor,
through his parent and/or guardian, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; NAVAJO
GRAY DEE; HOWARD HOLIDAY and NATION, ANETH CHAPTER; NATASHA
PETER HOLIDAY, minors, through LIVINGSTON; DAWNY CLARK, NATHAN
their parent and/or guardian, CLARK, AND LATOYA CLARK, minors,
TEDDY HOLIDAY; HAROLD VIJIL, through their parent and/or
ALFRED VIJIL, minors, through guardian, SHERRILL CLARK,
their parent and/or guardian,
TULLY VIJIL; FERRELL COLLINS, Plaintiffs_Intervenors,
SHERRIL COLLINS, and ILENE COLLINS,
minors, through their parent v.
and/or guardian, MARTHA COLLINS;
SARAH BILLY and BRENDA BILLY, BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SAN
minors, through their parent JUAN SCHOOL DISTRICT; DAVID
and/or guardian, JOHN BILLY;ADAMS, MAXINE NIELSON, HAROLD
LEROY ATCITTY; LYMAN, TOM HOLIDAY, and ROBERT
BILLIE, all individually and
as members of the Board of Education
of the San Juan
School
District;
KENNETH
MAUGHAN,
individually
and
as
Superintendent
of
the
San
Juan
School
District;
THE
SAN
JUAN
COUNTY
COMMISSION;
DALE
HOLMES, No. 99_4130
individually
and
as
Chairman
of
the
San
Juan
County
Commission;
WILLIAM
G.
DUNOW,
and
CASE
E.
BRODERICK,
individually
and
as
commissioners
of
the
San
Juan
County
Commission;
UTAH
STATE
BOARD
OF
EDUCATION.
Defendants_Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 74_CV_346_S)
Donald J. Winder of Winder & Haslam, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah (Trystan B.
Smith of Winder & Haslam; Eric P. Swenson, Salt Lake City, Utah; and Therese
E. Yanan, DNA People's Legal Services, Inc., Shiprock, New Mexico, with him
on the briefs), for Plaintiffs_Appellants.
Brinton R. Burbidge of Burbidge, Carnahan, Ostler & White, Salt Lake City,
Utah (Randy T. Austin of Kirton & McConkie, Salt Lake City, with him on the
brief), for Defendants_Appellees.
Before LUCERO, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is about the scope and amount of an attorney fee award granted
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The district court determined that Plaintiffs had
partially prevailed in litigating their civil rights claims and awarded a reduced
amount of fees and costs. Plaintiffs appeal, contending that the award was
unreasonably limited.
In 1974, Appellants brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that the San Juan County School District denied equal educational
opportunities to Native Americans on the basis of race. In 1975, the parties
reached agreement and entered a comprehensive consent decree. The decree
imposed various legal duties upon the school district, including obligations to
construct and renovate educational facilities, reimburse parents for travel
expenses, operate bus routes, allocate expenditures fairly, and implement
bilingual_bicultural awareness programs. See Appellees' App. at 7_27.
In 1992, Appellants alleged noncompliance and filed a motion to enforce
the decree. Appellants made additional allegations that called into question the
school district's duty to provide educational services for Native Americans living
on a remote part of the reservation and also the school district's duty to provide
special education programs. The district court limited the immediate proceeding
to the enforcement of the 1975 decree, striking multiple paragraphs from
Appellants' pleadings that were based on facts outside the scope of the decree.
Consequently, in order to litigate all their claims, Appellants maintained this
enforcement proceeding, pursued two separate actions, and prepared to intervene
in a third discrimination action to be filed by the United States.
In the action concerning the education of children living on a remote part
of the reservation, the district court concluded that the school district has a legal
duty to provide educational services. See Meyers v. Bd. of Educ. of San Juan,
905 F. Supp. 1544, 1578 (D. Utah 1995). Respondents assert in their brief that
they agreed to pay $185,000 in fees to Appellants, who "secured essentially the
relief they sought" in that litigation. Appellants' Br. at 7. In the action
concerning discrimination in special education programs, Appellants voluntarily
dismissed their claims because the parties were addressing those issues as part of
their comprehensive dispute resolution efforts. See Chee v. Bd. of Educ. of San
Juan, No. 2:94_CV_0386. The third discrimination action?to be filed by the
United States?was contemplated and prepared by Appellants but never filed.
In 1997, dispute resolution efforts culminated in a formal agreement and
the district court entered a new consent decree that explicitly superseded the 1975
instrument. See Sinajini v. Bd. of Educ. of San Juan, 964 F. Supp. 319, 321 (D.
Utah 1997). Appellants, who view the new agreement as an omnibus resolution
of their multiple and varied claims, filed an application for fees and costs
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The district court, relying primarily on the fact
that the proceedings had been previously limited to the enforcement of the 1975
decree, granted limited fees and costs. See Sinajini v. Bd. of Educ. of San Juan,
47 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1320_21, 1327_28 (D. Utah 1999). This appeal followed.
Appellants contend that the district court erred by refusing to award fees
and costs on multiple claims resolved by the 1997 decree. Title 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b) authorizes reasonable attorney's fees for a prevailing party. "[W]e
review an attorney's fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) for an abuse of
discretion." Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 1998).
In this case, we hold that the district court abused its discretion by limiting the
attorney fee award to issues pled when the court had entered judgment on a
negotiated settlement that was larger in scope than the pleadings had been.
Although the court acknowledged that the resolution of the Chee litigation and
the anticipated action by the United States were both "subjects of the 1997
Agreement," the court limited the scope of the award to allegations contained in
the pleadings and excluded any other issue. Sinajini, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1320_21.
This limitation is unreasonable because it belies the nature of the settlement
process wherein a party might prevail on claims that were previously stricken.
That was the case here.
Although the district court recognized that the Chee case was subject to the
1997 decree, the court instructed Appellants to "file any request for costs and
attorney fees incurred in Chee with the Chee case." Sinajini, 47 F. Supp. 2d at
1320_21. The consent decree that the court entered judgment on, however,
provided for uniform resolution "concerning costs and attorney[] fees in
connection with the Chee and Sinajini litigation and the pending United States'
matters." Appellants' App. at 129 n.4. Because the parties had negotiated this
arrangement and the court had approved it, we direct the district court on remand
to make a uniform resolution on the question of attorney's fees and costs.
In their brief, Appellants suggest that they are entitled to additional fees
for having confirmed the holding of the Meyers case. We reject this argument
summarily because it appears to be made for the first time on appeal and also
because the provision in the 1997 decree that addresses fees and costs does not
address Meyers. We also summarily reject Appellants' assertion that they are
entitled to fees for monitoring the enforcement of the new decree. We have
reviewed the record and conclude that Appellants have failed to meet their
burden of proving that monitoring efforts are necessary. See Joseph A. v. New
Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 28 F.3d 1056, 1060 (10th Cir. 1994).
Whether Appellants prevailed on claims pursued in the enforcement
proceeding, in the Chee litigation, or on issues contained in the anticipated action
by the United States are ultimately mixed questions of law and fact. We review
factual findings for clear error, and we review the application of legal standards
de novo. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d at 1280 (citing Jane L. v.
Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1509 (10th Cir. 1995)). We have reviewed the Order
granting limited attorney fees and costs and conclude that the district court
analyzed whether Appellants prevailed under an erroneous legal standard.
The Supreme Court has articulated the applicable legal standard. "In short,
a plaintiff prevails when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters
the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior
in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111_
12 (1992). Further, as the district court noted, parties "may be considered
`prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant
issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in
bringing suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau
v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278_79 (1st Cir. 1978)). It is well established that a
party may prevail through a settlement embodied in a consent decree. See Maher
v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1979). When correctly analyzed under the
appropriate legal standard, Appellants prevailed to a greater extent than the
district court's Order acknowledged. The court erred when it conflated the Farrar
standard with a more exacting and inapplicable two_part "catalyst test." See
Sinajini, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
The district court stated: "[W]hen there has been no adjudication, the
Tenth Circuit applies a two_part catalyst test." Id. (quotations omitted). That
states the application too broadly. Rather, the Tenth Circuit uses the catalyst test
to determine whether a party prevailed when the relief pursued eventuates but
there is "no final judicial determination." See Foremaster v. City of St. George,
882 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1989); see also Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 945
(10th Cir. 1994) (final judgment had been withdrawn). The purpose of the
catalyst test is to prove a connection between a lawsuit and an eventual change in
a party's conduct in cases where that connection is not proven presumptively by a
final judgment. The catalyst test bridges a gap that does not exist when a
judgment is in effect. A judgment is in effect here, and the catalyst test does not
apply.
Taking the catalyst test out of context, the district court examined whether
Appellants' lawsuit (as pled) was causally linked to the relief obtained and
whether the school district's conduct under the consent decree would be
otherwise required by law.(1) See Sinajini, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1322_27. Using that
test, the court determined that Appellants prevailed on only one claim: "for
expansion, renovation, and improvement of the two secondary schools . . . ." Id.
at 1326. That, however, is not the test articulated in Farrar. On remand, the
(1) We observe that the district court's interpretation of the catalyst test
results in a strict adherence to the language of the pleadings, which interpretation
we do not ratify.
district court must reevaluate whether the 1997 consent decree modified the
school district's behavior in additional ways that benefitted Appellants.
For example, the 1997 decree altered the parties' relationship by creating
committees of experts empowered to make recommendations about school district
programs. See Sinajini, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1326_27. The school district accepted
formal obligations regarding the free exchange of information and accounting
procedures, both of which alter the way the parties conduct business. The school
district agreed to use their best efforts to obtain funding for construction of an
elementary school. Although the school district is not obligated to construct that
facility, the parties' relationship has been altered by imposition of an enforceable
legal standard, "best efforts." See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574
(1984); Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1513 (10th Cir.
1995). Throughout its brief the school district contends that, notwithstanding
such alterations, their behavior is not modified by the decree because they retain
the final decision_making authority on questions of district programs. That
response does not suffice because the district agreed to alter the processes
through which it approaches that decision_making, and such alterations can be
material and of benefit to Appellants.
After reconsidering the extent to which Appellants prevailed, the district
court must reexamine whether Appellants obtained excellent results or only
limited success. When a party has obtained substantial relief, "the fee award
should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every
contention raised in the lawsuit." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. The district court
explained that some claims were "not so related to the successful claim that they
should be compensable . . . ." Sinajini, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1328. The Supreme
Court, however, excluded claims "distinct in all respects from [] successful
claims." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. That less restrictive standard must be utilized
in determining whether certain claims are unrelated to the pursuit of the ultimate
result achieved.
The district court determined that Appellants prevailed on "a significant
claim," but concluded that "it was only one of approximately 21 claims for relief,
so the plaintiffs achieved only limited success in view of the entire litigation."
Sinajini, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1328. However, "[s]uch a lawsuit cannot be viewed
as a series of discrete claims. Instead the district court should focus on the
significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours
reasonably expended on the litigation." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Whether a
party prevails is ultimately an exercise of judgment that is fundamentally
qualitative, not quantitative. See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1511 (10th
Cir. 1995). Having outlined the appropriate legal standards, we leave that
judgment to the district court to exercise in the first instance.
The final step of the analysis requires the district court to determine a
lodestar figure by making a calculation of hours reasonably expended. See Jane
L., 61 F.3d at 1509_1510. The district court did not calculate a lodestar. Instead,
because the district court determined that Appellants had prevailed on one of
twenty_one claims, the court awarded Appellants one twenty_first of the total
hours worked plus any hours actually spent on that claim. Appellant's App. at
154. When recalculating the award, the court must calculate the hours reasonably
expended in light of the results achieved and use that as the lodestar for the final
award.
We REVERSE and REMAND for recalculation of attorney's fees and
costs.