WPCe [vzH`Bu=#wzHz-k"g?ܶW&n/Z-[8%&y1VwTy2O9ݷ3v$R>yZxa59_/)2ݪ,HM3vN9#H*;w''WwuaѽI /Ƀ$+S:]?K T+~9TCLD9`E YQϳfgHOA$֦o|x2TAeejla]`әQ_ݜ-X!8qBAdFH6}O-9]KKk.cV~IGhgܰwL+b- S 7M~Dztp X-Hr=BP7~aٹMb޶l \at(W"P_d|Y b#\ %% UN+ 0y UN 0O M z@  J ^ w 0D*|4BNVXgEi mkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkb 0uuu BMM 0j D3 D-A 0Knn AS  0 0Dv AHP LaserJet 4250 PCL 5e,,,,0(9 Z6Times New Roman Regular(`$.8dd8    ("  Z6Times New Roman Regular(|3$ !.8Qdd8      C )   _   C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt @ R͛$      1    _TheAgreementalsoprovidedthattheChurchwoulddiscontinuethelawnservicesifWifesold,moved,or  leasedherresidenceinadditiontotheothertwoterminatingevents.3 (#$  0  Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5t2:i+003|xU- -(|G2͛$ !.8Qdd8         0    R͛$      2    _AppellantalsoclaimsthatshetookoutaloaninrelianceontheAgreement.However,Appellanttookthisloan  outaftertheChurchstoppedmakingpaymentspursuanttotheagreement.However,asstatedearlier,thetheoryof t promissoryestoppelisinapplicablewhereanindividualactsunreasonablyinrelianceonapromise. Alden ,637S.W.2d 8 at864.A_promisee_Ԁdoesnotactreasonablywhenheorsheactsinrelianceonapromisethathasalreadybeenbreached. N  d(|3$ !.8Qdd8     VVVV'dxd)!dxdx( $ Figure  1  ^_X`YE<<CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3$ !.8Qdd8     ($$   1  X[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8C HKKKK !.8Qdd8     _  Q8 XXdd8  @ \QINTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE  @%ATJACKSON#Q\ #Ԉ &   AUGUST24,2005Session L X XQ #QXX #ANNIEB._COCHRAN_v._ROBINHOOD_ԀLANEBAPTISTCHURCH,etal.X XQ  J @@ DirectAppealfromtheChanceryCourtforShelbyCounty  J @@No.1080142ArnoldB._Goldin_,Chancellor  6 @@*AV) ` dE<` A   @@TTNo.W200401866_COA_ԄR3CVFiledDecember27,_2005_   AV) ` dE<|` A }     X XXX Inthisappeal,weareaskedbytheappellanttodeterminewhetherthechancerycourterredwhenit x  grantedsummaryjudgmenttotheappellees,findingthattherewasnoconsiderationtosupportthe d PastorsSpouseBenefitsagreementbetweenthepartiesandthatthetheoryofpromissoryestoppel P isinapplicableinthiscase.Onappeal,theappellantassertsthatherpresenceasfirstladyofthe < church,herlossofbenefitspreviouslyreceivedfromtheChurch,and/ortherestraintofmarriage (x provisionintheagreementconstitutedlegallyadequateconsiderationfortheAgreement.Inthe d alternative,theappellantassertsthatthedoctrineofpromissoryestoppelisapplicableinthiscase. P Weaffirm. < #X XXX 7##QXX #X XQ+ Tenn.R.App.P.3;AppealasofRight;JudgmentoftheChanceryCourtAffirmed     #QX  #X X.QAlanE._Highers_,J.,deliveredtheopinionofthecourt,inwhichDavidR.Farmer,J.,andHolly  M.Kirby,J.,joined. t ReginaldL._Eskridge_,_Janelle_Ԁ_R.Eskridge_,Memphis,TN,forAppellant L  HerschelL.Rosenberg,Memphis,TN,forAppellees $"t!   OPINION #QXX #X XQ #L# #QX  #X X.Q  X XX @ I.Facts&ProceduralHistory %$!%    OnSeptember18,1981,ReverendEugene_Cochran_Ԁ( Reverend_Cochran_)beganhistenure '"' asPastorof_Robinhood_ԀLaneBaptistChurch(the Church).Thereafter,Reverend_Cochran_ (#( maintainedthepositionofheadpastorattheChurchuntilhisdeathonAugust20,1995.Inreturn )$) forhisservices,theChurchpaidReverend_Cochran_Ԁasalaryaswellasprovidinghimwithcertain p*%* additionalbenefitssuchascellphoneservices,beeperservices,lawnservices,andgasandvehicle \+&+  maintenanceservices.AtReverend_Cochran_srequest,theChurchalsoaccordedthemajorityof H,', thesebenefitsdirectlytoReverend_Cochran_swife,Mrs.Annie_Cochran_Ԁ( Wifeor Appellant).     Beforehisdeath,Reverend_Cochran_ԀspoketoseveraldeaconsoftheChurchrequestingthat  theChurchprovideforWifeiftheChurchwasable.OnSeptember3,1995,theChurchenteredinto t anagreement(the Agreement)withWifewhereintheChurchagreedtoprovideWifewith$783.56 ` onthefirstandthirdSundayeverymonthuntilSeptember5,2010andwouldprovidelawnservices L  forWifesresidence.Pursuanttotheagreement,Wifewouldreceivethesebenefitsuntiloneoftwo 8  terminatingeventsoccurred:(1)herdeath;or(2)sheremarried.   #  1      ׀However,ifsheremarriedwithin $ t fiveyearsoftheinceptionofthecontract,Wifewouldcontinuetoreceivethesebenefitsforfive  ` yearstotal.IfWiferemarriedafterfiveyears,shewouldnolongerreceiveanybenefits.Moreover,  L  theagreementterminatedallbenefitsthatWifepreviouslyreceivedfromtheChurchunderthe  8  ChurchsoralagreementwithReverend_Cochran_Ԁforhisservicesaspastor. $    InMarch1996,theChurchdiscontinuedmakingpaymentstoWife.OnAugust9,1996,   WifefiledsuitagainsttheChurchaswellas_Keiron_ԀC._Cochran_,Kenneth_Mallary_,_Cloyd_ԀScales,   FloydScales,Frank_Tuggle_,Sr.,TommyL.Walker,Sr.,DonaldWilliams,Sr.,andDavidRicks   (collectively,the ChurchBoardofOfficers,Deacons,andTrusteesandcollectivelywiththe p Church,the Defendantsor Appellees)seekinginjunctivereliefand/ordamagesforbreachof \ contractanddeclaratoryjudgment.OnOctober9,1996,Wifeamendedhercomplainttoincludethe H theoryofpromissoryestoppelasajustificationforupholdingthecontract. 4   OnNovember15,2000,theChurchBoardofOfficers,Deacons,andTrustees,withthe  \ exceptionof_Keiron_ԀC._Cochran_,filedamotiontodismissthemasdefendants.OnFebruary27, H 2001,theDefendantsfiledamotionforsummaryjudgment.OnJune24,2004,thechancerycourt 4 grantedthemotionforsummaryjudgmentastotheChurch.Thechancerycourtdidnotentertain   themotiontodismissbecausethemotionwasrenderedmootbythechancerycourtsearlierorder.   OnMay17,2005,thechancerycourtamendeditsordertograntthemotionforsummaryjudgment  astoalloftheDefendants.    II.0 @ IssuesPresented  l    `    Appellanthastimelyfiledanoticeofappealandpresentsthefollowingissuesforreview: 0"  1.Whetherthechancerycourterredwhenitgrantedsummaryjudgementfindingthatthecontract $X" betweenMrs._Cochran_ԀandtheChurchwasnotsupportedbylegallyadequateconsideration;and $D # 2.Whetherthechancerycourterredwhenitgrantedsummaryjudgmentfindingthedoctrineof %0!$ promissoryestoppelwasinapplicable. &"% Forthefollowingreasons,weaffirmthedecisionofthechancerycourt. (#'   III.0 @ 򀀀StandardofReview        Acourtmaygrantsummaryjudgmentwhenamovingpartyestablishes thatthereisno  genuineissueastoanymaterialfactandthatajudgmentmayberenderedasamatteroflaw.Tenn. t R.Civ.P.56.04(2005). Onamotionforsummaryjudgment,thecourtmusttakethestrongest ` legitimateviewoftheevidenceinfavorofthenonmovingparty,allowallreasonableinferencesin L  favorofthatparty,anddiscardallcountervailingevidence. _Calabro_Ԁv._Calabro_ ,15S.W.3d873, 8  875(Tenn.Ct.App.1999)(citing_Bain_Ԁv.Wells,936S.W.2d618,622(Tenn.1997)). Sinceour $ t inquiryinvolvespurelyaquestionoflaw,nopresumptionofcorrectnessattachestothetrialcourts  ` judgment,andourtaskisconfinedtoreviewingtherecordtodeterminewhethertherequirements  L  ofTenn.R.Civ.P.56havebeenmet. _Carvell_Ԁv.Bottoms ,900S.W.2d23,26(Tenn.1995)(citing  8  _Cowden_Ԁv._Sovran_ԀBank/Cent.S.,816S.W.2d741,744(Tenn.1991)). $    IV.0 @ Discussion    &   A.0 @ Consideration   '     Onappeal,Appellantcontendsthatsummaryjudgmentinappropriateinthiscase.Our X analysisinreviewingagrantofamotionforsummaryjudgmentbeginswithdeterminingwhether D thereareanydisputesofmaterialfactsinthiscase. McGeev.Best ,106S.W.3d48,58(Tenn.Ct. 0 App.2000)(citingTenn.R.Civ.P.56).Ifthereareanydisputesastoanygenuineissuesofmaterial l facts,thensummaryjudgmentisinappropriate. Byrdv.Hall ,847S.W.2d208,211(Tenn.1993) X (citing_Poore_Ԁv.MagnavoxCo.,666S.W.2d48,49(Tenn.1984)).Inthiscase,thepartiesdonot D disputeanymaterialfactualissues.Asaresult,ouranalysisturnstowhetherAppelleesareentitled 0 tojudgmentasamatteroflaw.    Wheretheproofisundisputedandwherenoconflictinginferencesmaybedrawn,the  questionofwhetheranactorforbearanceconstitutesconsiderationforacontractisaquestionof  law.   _Bratton_Ԁv._Bratton_ ,136S.W.3d595,601(Tenn.2004)(citing_Applewhite_Ԁv.Allen,27Tenn. | (8Hum.)697,700(Tenn.1848);Estateof_Hordeski_Ԁv.FirstFed._Sav_.&Loan_Assn_ԀofRussell h County,Ala.,827S.W.2d302,304(Tenn.Ct.App.1991)).Thus,summaryjudgmentisappropriate T  iftheconsiderationsupportingtheAgreementisinadequateasamatteroflaw.   @!   Allcontractsinwritingsignedbythepartytobebound,ortheparty'sauthorizedagentand #h! attorney,areprimafacieevidenceofaconsideration._T.C.A._Ԁ4750103(2005).Insuchcase, $T"  [_t]he_Ԁburdenofovercomingthepresumptionofconsiderationinavalidlyexecutedcontractisupon $@ # thepartyassertinglackofconsideration. Longexrel.GeneLangleyFord,Inc.v.Langley ,No. %,!$ W2001-01490-_COA_-R3-CV,2002Tenn.App.LEXIS2865,at*14(Tenn.Ct.App.Apr.23,2002) &"% (citingAtkinsv.Kirkpatrick,823S.W.2d547,552(Tenn.App.1991)). Fortheretobea '#& considerationinacontractbetweenpartiestothecontractitisnotnecessarythatsomethingconcrete (#' andtangiblemovefromonetotheother.Anybenefittooneanddetrimenttotheothermaybea )$( sufficientconsideration. Walkerv.FirstStateBank ,849S.W.2d337,342(Tenn.Ct.App.1992) x*%) (citingPalmerv._Dehn_,198_S.W._Ԁ827,828(Tenn.Ct.App.1946)). d+&*   Onappeal,Appellantcontendsthat(1)AppellantspresenceattheChurchasfirstladyofthe  Church;(2)AppellantslossofbenefitspreviouslyreceivedfromtheChurch;and/or(3)Appellants  restraintofmarriagepursuanttotheAgreementconstitutedlegallyadequateconsiderationforthe  Agreement.Wedisagree. t   First,AppellantcontendsthatthebenefitofherpresenceattheChurchasfirstladyofthe L  Churchwasadequateconsiderationtosupportacontract.However,nowhereinthelimitedrecord 8  onappealdemonstratesthatAppelleesbenefittedfromherpresenceattheChurch.Appellantdid $ t nottakeonanyadditionalresponsibilitieswiththeChurchnorpromisetocontinueheractivities  ` withtheChurch.IfAppellantchosetonolongerattendtheChurchasamember,shewouldstillbe  L  eligibleforthebenefitsconferredtoherpursuanttothetermsoftheAgreement.Accordingly,her  8  merepresenceattheChurchdoesnotconstituteconsideration. $    Second,AppellantassertsthatherlossofbenefitspreviouslyreceivedfromtheChurch   constitutedlegallyadequateconsideration.Inorderforthislosstoconstituteconsideration,   AppellantmusthavehadavestedrighttothesebenefitsatthetimeofexecutionoftheAgreement.   ThebenefitsAppellantassertsthatshegaveupasconsiderationfortheAgreementwereprovided p asaresultofReverend_Cochran_semploymentcontractwiththeChurch(the Employment \ Contract).ForAppellanttohaveavestedrighttothebenefitsconferredtoher,shemusthavebeen H anintendedbeneficiaryoftheEmploymentContract. 4   Toestablishthatsheisanintendedbeneficiaryoftheemploymentagreementbetween  \ Reverend_Cochran_ԀandtheChurch,Appellant mustestablish(1)avalidcontractmadeupon H sufficientconsiderationbetweentheprincipalpartiesand(2)theclearintenttohavethecontract 4 operatefor[her]benefit.... FirstTenn.Bank_Natl_Ԁ_Assn_Ԁv.ThoroughbredMotorCars,Inc. ,   932S.W.2d928,930(Tenn.Ct.App.1996)(citingUnitedAm.BankofMemphisv.Gardner,706   S.W.2d639,641(Tenn.Ct.App.1985)).Inordertoestablishanintenttobenefit,Appellantmust  show anexpressioninthecontractthatthecontractingpartiesintendedtobenefitthethirdparty.  ..orproofthatthe_promisor_sperformancewouldotherwisedischargeadutyowedtoathirdparty  beneficiarybythepromise.... Id. (citingMooreConstr.Co.v.Clarksville_Dept_ԀofElec.,707 l S.W.2d1,9(Tenn.Ct.App.1985)(citingRestatement(Second)ofContracts302(1979))). X    ItisundisputedthattheEmploymentContractwasvalid.Asanoralmodificationofthe D! EmploymentContract,Reverend_Cochran_ԀandtheChurchagreedtoprovideAppellantcertain 0"  amenities,suchascellphoneservices,beeperservices,andgasandcarmaintenanceservicesfor #l! Appellantsautomobile.ThismodificationshowsthatReverend_Cochran_ԀandtheChurchintended $X" todirectlyconferbenefitstoAppellantpursuanttotheEmploymentContract.Thus,ifAppellant $D # stillmaintainedherrightstothesebenefitsatthetimeoftheexecutionoftheAgreement,thisloss %0!$ wouldconstituteconsiderationfortheAgreement. &"%   Acontractforpersonalserviceisterminatedbythedeath,insanity,sickness,orpermanent (#' disabilityofaservant,wherebyheisunabletoperformhiscontract,unlessthepartiescontractedto )$( thecontrary. Am._Natl_ԀIns.Co.v.Jackson ,12Tenn.App.305,30809(1930)(citationsomitted); |*%)  accordJenkinsSubway,Inc.v.Jenkins ,990S.W.2d713,72021(Tenn.Ct.App.1998)(quoting h+&* 17A_C.J.S._ԀContracts465,at623(1963)).Assuch,theagreementmustprovide forits  continuanceafterthedeathofoneoftheparties. JenkinsSubway,Inc. ,990S.W.2dat721  (quoting17A_C.J.S._ԀContracts465,at62728(1963)). [_W]hether_Ԁaparticularcontractsurvives  thedeathofoneofthepartiesimplicatesquestionsoflawbecause,inordertoresolvethisissue,the t courtmustconstruethepartiescontract. Id. (citing_Edelen_ԀTransfer&StorageCo.v.Willis,66 ` S.W.2d214,216(Tenn.Ct.App.1932);Rodgersv.S.Newspapers,Inc.,379S.W.2dat799). L    Applyingtheforegoingprinciples,Appellantdidnothavearighttothebenefitsconferred $ t toherpursuanttotheEmploymentContract.Inherdeposition,Appellantconcedesthatalthough  ` Reverend_Cochran_ԀaskedseveraldeaconsoftheChurchtoassisthiswifeinsomewayafterhisdeath  L  iftheChurchwereable,hedidnotconditionhisemploymentonsuchrequest.Assuch,therewas  8  nooriginalprovisionororalmodificationoftheEmploymentContractthatwouldextendthelifeof $  theEmploymentContractbeyondthedeathofReverend_Cochran_.OncetheEmploymentContract   terminated,allvestedrightswithinthatcontractexpired. Farrellv.Third_Natl_ԀBankinNashville ,   101S.W.2d158,165(Tenn.Ct.App.1936)( [_I]f_Ԁthebeneficiaryacceptsthebenefitsofthecontract,   hetakessubjecttoitsvalidityasbetweentheoriginalpartiesthereto,andsubjecttothetermsand   conditionsoftheoriginalcontract.(quoting4PageonContracts2393,at4217,4218)). p Therefore,sinceAppellanthadnorightstothebenefitsconferredtoher,Appellantssubsequent \ relinquishmentofthosebenefitscannotconstituteconsideration. See 17_C.J.S._ԀContracts90,at H 559(1999). 4   Finally,AppellantassertsthattheprovisionintheAgreementrestrainingherfrommarrying  \ constitutedconsiderationfortheAgreement. Whiletotalrestraintsofmarriagearevoid[generally] H andpartialrestraintsarevalidonlyifreasonable,...[an]absoluterestraintofmarriageisvalidif 4 itisalimitationonthedurationofownershipratherthanaconditionsubsequentrequiringa   forfeitureuponmarriage. Harbinv._Judd_ ,340S.W.2d935,937(Tenn.Ct.App.1960). The   distinctionisthereforeuniversallyrecognizedthatwhileaconditioninabsoluterestraintofmarriage  isinvalid,alimitationuntilmarriageisgood. Id. at938(quoting35Am._Jur_.Marriage258).`    Inthiscase,theprovisionrestrainingAppellantfrommarriageisanabsoluterestraintand l notalimitationuntilmarriage.Thus,thisprovisionisvoidasamatterofpublicpolicyandcannot X  constituteconsideration. D!    B.0 @ PromissoryEstoppel #l!  V   Appellantcontendsonappeal,asshedidattrial,thateveniftheAgreementdidnothave $@ # legallyadequateconsideration,theAgreementshouldbeupheldonatheoryofpromissoryestoppel. %,!$ Wedisagree. &"%   Previouslyoursupremecourthasdefinedpromissoryestoppelasfollows: (#'    Apromisewhichthe_promisor_Ԁshouldreasonablyexpecttoinduce x*%) actionorforbearanceofadefiniteandsubstantialcharacteronthe d+&* partofthe_promisee_Ԁandwhichdoesnotinducesuchactionor  forbearanceisbindingifinjusticecanbeavoidedonlyby  enforcementofthepromise.   W W Aldenv.Presley ,637S.W.2d862,864(Tenn.1982)(quotingRestatementofContracts90). ` Whilebroadinitsdefinition,thetheoryofpromissoryestoppeldoeshaveitslimits.Asoursupreme L  courthaspreviouslynoted,   8    [_d]etrimental_Ԁactionorforbearancebythe_promisee_Ԁinrelianceona  ` gratuitouspromise,withinlimitsconstitutesasubstitutefor  L  consideration,orasufficientreasonforenforcementofthepromise  8  withoutconsideration.Thisdoctrineisknownaspromissory $  estoppel.A_promisor_Ԁwhoinducessubstantialchangeofpositionby   the_promisee_Ԁinrelianceonthepromiseis_estopped_Ԁtodenyits   _enforceability_Ԁaslackingconsideration.Thereasonforthedoctrine   istoavoidanunjustresult,anditsreasondefinesitslimits.No   injusticeresultsinrefusaltoenforceagratuitouspromisewherethe p losssufferedinrelianceisnegligible,norwherethe_promisee_'saction \ inreliancewasunreasonableorunjustifiedbythepromise.The H limitsofpromissoryestoppelare:(1)thedetrimentsufferedin 4 reliancemustbesubstantialinaneconomicsense;(2)thesubstantial  p losstothe_promisee_Ԁinactinginreliancemusthavebeenforeseeable  \ bythe_promisor_;(3)the_promisee_Ԁmusthaveactedreasonablein H justifiablerelianceonthepromiseasmade. 4  3[ %[Ӏ Id. (citingL.Simpson,LawofContracts61(2ded.1965)). However,aclaimofpromissory   estoppelisnotdependentupontheexistenceofanexpressedcontractbetweentheparties. _Calabro_  v._Calabro_ ,15S.W.3d873,879(Tenn.Ct.App.1999)(quoting_Engenius_Ԁ_Entmt_,Inc.v._Herenton_,  971S.W.2d12,19(Tenn.Ct.App.1997)(citationsomitted)).    Fromourreviewoftherecordonappeal,wefindthattherearenodisputedissuesofmaterial X  factastothepromisesofAppelleesandAppellantsactionsinresponsetothepromisesof D! Appellees.ViewingthesefactsinalightmostfavorabletoAppellant,weconcludethatAppellant 0"  hasnotdemonstratedthatshedetrimentallyreliedonthepromisesofAppellees. #l!   Appellantarguesonappealthatsheconductedherlifeinrelianceonthebenefitshereceived $D # fromtheChurch.However,inorderforthetheoryofpromissoryestoppeltoapply,Appellantmust %0!$ showthatthepromisesmadeintheAgreementinducedanactionorforbearancebyAppellanttoher &"% detrimentinrelianceonthosepromisesafterAppelleesmadethosepromises.Appellanthasfailed '#& todemonstratesuchdetrimentalreliance.Theonlyactofforbearanceoractiontakensincethe (#' executionoftheAgreementonthepartofAppellantinrelianceonthepromisesmadebyAppellees )$(  intheAgreementwasthatAppellantdeclinedaproposalofmarriageinordertoadheretothe |*%) conditionsoftheAgreement._S  #  2      _ԀAswehavestatedearlier,thisrestraintofmarriageisvoidasamatter   ofpublicpolicy.SincethisrestraintcannotbeadequateconsiderationfortheAgreement,itis  counterintuitivetoallowthisrestrainttoserveasabasisforupholdingtheAgreementonatheory  ofpromissoryestoppel.Accordingly,thetheoryofpromissoryestoppelisinapplicableinthiscase. t    V.0 @ 򀀀Conclusion L  l   Forthereasonssetforthherein,weaffirmthedecisionofthechancerycourtgranting $ t summaryjudgmenttoAppellee.CostsofthisappealaretaxedtoAppellant,Mrs.AnnieB._Cochran_,  ` andhersurety,forwhichexecutionmayissueifnecessary.#X XXX ##QXX ^ #X XQ  L     `     h     ___________________________________      `     h     ALANE._HIGHERS_,JUDGE