ÿWPCê j©Nªû¤t>x×@‹ç†®ð°­ËÃí?þúOt `4 &Xû>¬3èsÕü7~X¼Ó¡žé…¤Ë¶¸‰}ŠØçq•§vAk4~À*˜ º¶é‘…'¸òw yóÝKY5tyã ´?Wùr)njÕ —ð);—º,k«Td1Þõ÷¹œ¼r§s=¨3}_sêö%ØzM'GÁGåäfŸ¯Y‡¦è¥Üc zÒ=â×Îf«åÝÆº“p±‘JˆKBý­-g:³ÂïSce”Ý2¢¶àPRÊ@­b̺‚‘#!ùHUëƒF!bkñ¹Ò+CdªŒ¡h9;a©Z Óãö2+Ô‚˜™0éªãý·ëAt¼]V/’pf¼Y»†•Ö/a±3j²Û¥žšâÜ­lr#$™ú¾ˆ%½B¦wˆ* vžñ[×~%¼·Í*mhPgøïU±ª”S)6¾-–Âãÿ4•¤»a÷$͈B?ÿFœoÖá0ÖD·FG¼Õ÷±ëBy¦}éŒs´¤ã íE«íœ£)ÕMñ€¤[ƒ<5Wv|h总ÏG²Š“üÁšÉ’e±¯Ùœ™8âÄ(®‚Lež³¹—)ðŒ,ÚñîÍóâªīȹy  ä(#!0UNQ %Ÿ 0q¥w@4Vjy m{Æ’ 0eX3½üð 0µì 0D¡¡¡b åÔññÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ B͘HP LaserJet 5MP,ð,,,,,ð0wÎáA Z‹6Times New Roman Regular‹(ILJ$¡¡Ó  ÓÓÓÔ€X24XXXÔÑ  Ñ  E  DE«Mq)x3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀA, B,Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 54#)N2Quick A.Úƒ ÚÚ  Ú.à0 àÛ€ Û )Ý ƒ¿†$ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹FI‹‹‹Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›MRPC€8.5(a)€provides€that€"[a]€lawyer€admitted€by€the€Court€of€Appeals€to€practiceÐ ° Ðin€this€State€is€subject€to€the€disciplinary€authority€of€this€State€for€a€violation€of€these€rulesÏin€this€or€any€other€jurisdiction."€€ÌÌà  àRule€1.8(a)€of€the€District€of€Columbia€Rules€of€Professional€Conduct€reads€asÏfollows:ÌÌà8  àà ` à"(a)à ¸ àA€lawyer€shall€not€enter€into€a€business€transaction€with€a€clientÐ °  Ðor€knowingly€acquire€an€ownership,€possessory,€security€or€other€pecuniaryÏinterest€adverse€to€a€client€unless:Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à"(1)à ¸ àThe€transaction€and€terms€on€which€the€lawyer€acquires€theÐ °  Ðinterest€are€fair€and€reasonable€to€the€client€and€are€fully€disclosed€andÏtransmitted€in€writing€to€the€client€in€a€manner€which€can€be€reasonablyÏunderstood€by€the€client;Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à"(2)à ¸ àThe€client€is€given€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€seek€the€adviceÐ ° Ðof€independent€counsel€in€the€transaction;€andÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à"(3)à ¸ àThe€client€consents€in€writing€thereto." òÝ ƒ¿†$ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹FI‹‹‹Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›The€judge€of€the€Circuit€Court€for€Montgomery€County€to€whom€this€matter€wasÐ ° Ðreferred€for€hearing€found€from€the€two€District€of€Columbia€opinions,€the€pleadings€in€thisÏaction,€and€the€memoranda€of€the€parties€that€there€was€no€dispute€that€the€legal€workÏdescribed€below€had€been€done€(numerals€identify€paragraphs€in€the€circuit€court€judge'sÏfindings€of€fact):ÌÌà8  à"7.à0` Ð Ð àMaxwell€&€Bear€represented€Mr.€Gallagher€regarding€threatened€legalÐ °  Ðaction€from€Merrill€Lynch€for€recruitment€of€its€sales€agents,€aÏcomplaint€lodged€with€a€realty€board,€a€fee€dispute,€and€a€dispute€withÏMerrill€Lynch€regarding€unpaid€commissions.Ð ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à"8.à0` Ð Ð àMaxwell€&€Bear€represented€Mr.€Pollard€concerning€the€dispute€withÐ °   ÐMerrill€Lynch€over€the€unpaid€commissions,€a€criminal€investigationÏand€grand€jury€proceedings€involving€one€of€Mr.€Pollard's€previousÏemployers,€a€civil€proceeding€involving€a€Florida€bank,€and€theÏrefinancing€of€Mr.€Pollard's€home.Ð ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à"9.à0` Ð Ð àMaxwell€&€Bear€represented€Mr.€O'Lone€in€the€unpaid€commissionsÐ x  Ðdispute€with€Merrill€Lynch.Ð ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8  àÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  à"10.à0` Ð Ð àMaxwell€&€Bear€represented€Gallagher€&€Company€regarding€theÐ x Ðdispute€with€Merrill€Lynch,€a€lease€for€property€on€East„WestÏHighway,€a€commission€and€fee€dispute€involving€two€Gallagher€&ÏCompany€sales€agents,€and€the€negotiation€of€a€lease€for€property€onÏArlington€Road€for€new€office€space."(e(3?‹$¤¤Ý ƒLJ!ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹f-‹‹‹ÔÑ  ÑÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù - ÊÝ ƒ¿†$ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹FI‹‹‹Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›Maryland€Rule€5„201(g)€reads:Ð ° ÐÌà8  à"The€court€shall€instruct€the€jury€to€accept€as€conclusive€any€fact€judiciallyÏnoticed,€except€that€in€a€criminal€action,€the€court€shall€instruct€the€jury€thatÏit€may,€but€is€not€required€to,€accept€as€conclusive€any€judicially€noticed€factÏadverse€to€the€accused."  dÝ ƒLJ!ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹f-‹‹‹ÔÑ  ÑÝ  Ý›òòAttorney€Grievance€Commission€ññof€ññññññ¢ññññññMarylaññññññdn£€ññññññnd€ññv.€Robert€Harley€Bearóó,€Misc.€Docket€AG€No.Ð ° Ð32,€September€Term,€1999.ÌÌÓÓÌ[Attorney€Discipline.€€Where€Bar€Counsel's€case€rested€entirely€on€judgment€and€findingsÏof€fact€in€civil€case€that€were€adverse€to€attorney,€held:€€because€higher€standard€of€proofÏthan€preponderance€is€required€in€attorney€discipline€cases,€issue€preclusion€not€applicañ ñbñ ññ ññ ñeñ ññ ññ ñleñ ññ ñtionñ ñ.€ÏFurther,€findings€not€admissible€under€Rule€5„201.]ÌÓÓÌÌÐ  ° ÐÑ  ÑòòÔ‡ˆ†ˆ ‹f-ÔCircuit€Court€for€Montgomery€CountyÐ ° ÐMisc.€Petition€No.€14086ÌóóÒ„°ÒÒÀ°ÒÌÌà@ÞÞ)ŠàòòIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€MARYLANDóóˆÐ H˜ ÐÌà@LL/ŠàMisc.€Docket€AG€No.€32ˆÌÌà@««0ŠàSeptember€Term,€1999ˆÌ_________________________________________ÌÌà@ìì,ŠàATTORNEY€GRIEVANCE€COMMISSIONˆÌà@uu5ŠàOF€MARYLANDˆÌÌà@999Šàv.ˆÌÌà@ÔÔ1ŠàROBERT€HARLEY€BEARˆÌ_________________________________________ÌÌà  àBell,€C.J.Ìà  àEldridgeÌ€€€€€€€€€€*RodowskyÌà  àRakerÌà  àWilnerÌà  àCathellÌà  àHarrell,€ÌÌà  àà p àà È àJJ.€ÌÌ_________________________________________ÌÌà@CC/ŠàOpinion€by€Rodowsky,€J.ˆÌ________________________________________ÌÌà  àFiled:ññ€ññññDecember€8,€2000ññÌññ€ññÌÔ#†‹¦ ‹ˆˆI#ÔÔ‡Š¦ ‹‹‹¦ Ô*¢Rodowsky£,€J.,€now€retired,€participated€in€theÐ H(˜#$ Ðhearing€and€conference€of€this€case€while€an€activeÏmember€of€this€Court;€after€being€recalled€pursuantÏto€the€Constitution,€Article€IV,€Section€3A,€he€alsoÏparticipated€in€the€decision€and€adoption€of€thisÏopinion.Ô#†‹¦ ‹‹Š¦ À#ÔÔ‡ˆIˆ‹‹¦ ÔÐ  H-˜() ÐÒ°ÀÒÒ°„ÒÑ€ÑÑ8€¦ ‹d‹‹d8ÑØØÑ = ÑÔ#†‹¦ ‹ˆˆI#ÔÓÓà  àIn€this€attorney€grievance€matter€Bar€Counsel's€entire€case€consisted€of€introducingÐ ° Ðinto€evidence€the€opinion€by€the€Superior€Court€of€the€District€of€Columbia€(the€SuperiorÏCourt)€in€òòMaxwell€v.€Gallagheróó,€Civil€Action€No.€88„10687,€and€the€opinion€by€the€DistrictÐ ° Ðof€Columbia€Court€of€Appeals€in€òòMaxwell€v.€Gallagheróó,€709€A.2d€100€(D.C.€1998).€€TheÐ °  Ðlatter€affirmed€that€part€of€the€judgment€of€the€Superior€Court€which€ordered,€based€onÏconflict€of€interests,€rescission€against€two€attorneys€of€a€corporate€stock€issuance.€€TheÏprincipal€question€presented€here€is€whether€Bar€Counsel€may€make€offensive€use€ofÏnonmutual€collateral€estoppel€where€the€original€findings€of€fact€to€which€preclusive€effectÏis€sought€to€be€given€were€made€under€a€less€stringent€standard€of€proof€than€is€required€inÏan€attorney€disciplinary€action.€€As€explained€below€we€shall€hold€that€collateral€estoppel,Ð ° Ðòòi.e.óó,€issue€preclusion,€may€not€be€based€on€the€Superior€Court€judgment.€€Further,€we€shallÐ ° Ðhold€that€the€opinions€of€the€District€of€Columbia€courts€were€not€admissible€in€evidence,Ïon€the€ground€on€which€they€were€admitted€over€objection,€to€prove€the€facts€which€theÏSuperior€Court€found€based€on€disputed€testimony.€€Ìà  àòòMaxwellóó€in€the€caption€of€the€Superior€Court€action€is€James€S.€Maxwell€(Maxwell).€Ð °  ÐAt€the€time€of€the€events€with€which€we€are€concerned€here,€Maxwell€and€the€respondent,ÏRobert€H.€Bear€(Bear),€were€partners€in€the€practice€of€law€in€the€District€of€Columbia.€€BothÏwere€also€admitted€to€the€bar€of€this€Court.€€Bar€Counsel€brought€charges€against€both,Ïarising€out€of€their€firm's€having€acquired€eleven€of€the€one€hundred€outstanding€shares€ofÏthe€stock€of€Gallagher€&€Company,€a€District€of€Columbia€corporation€that€was€engaged€inÏthe€real€estate€brokerage€business.€€Ð °,((=H Ðà  àViolation€of€Maryland€Rule€of€Professional€Conduct€(MRPC)€1.8(a)€was€the€principalÏcharge€brought€by€Bar€Counsel€against€Maxwell€and€Bear.€€MRPC€1.8(a)€states:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"A€lawyer€shall€not€enter€into€a€business,€financial€or€propertyÏtransaction€with€a€client€unless:€€Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à"(1)à ¸ àThe€transaction€is€fair€and€equitable€to€the€client;€andÐx Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à"(2)à ¸ àThe€client€is€advised€to€seek€the€advice€of€independent€counselÐ x  Ðin€the€transaction€and€is€given€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€do€so."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓNo€disciplinary€proceedings€have€been€brought€in€the€District€of€Columbia€based€on€theÏtransaction€that€is€the€subject€of€the€Maryland€charges.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð x  Ðà  àOur€tale€begins€in€1984€when€Eugene€Gallagher€(Gallagher),€a€real€estate€broker€thenÏemployed€at€Merrill€Lynch,€and€Maxwell€met€in€connection€with€the€latter's€purchase€ofÏinvestment€properties.€€In€1986€they€formed,€but€never€funded,€a€corporation€that€was€toÏserve€as€the€general€partner€in€limited€partnerships€created€to€buy€and€sell€apartmentÐ x Ðbuildings.€€Gallagher€subsequently€decided€to€set€up€his€own€real€estate€brokerage€business,Ïand€in€July€1986€he,€Maxwell,€and€Bear€leased€offices€on€McKinley€Street€in€the€District€ofÏColumbia€for€the€real€estate€business€and€for€the€law€practice.€€The€law€firm€anticipatedÏbeing€engaged€to€handle€legal€work€generated€by€the€real€estate€transactions.€€Ìà  àGallagher€&€Company€was€incorporated€in€October€1986€with€Gallagher,€Maxwell,Ïand€Bear€serving€as€the€interim€directors,€pending€the€organizational€meeting€ofÏshareholders.€€That€meeting€was€not€formally€held€until€March€23,€1988.€Ìà  àIn€the€interim,€two€real€estate€brokers,€Daniel€O'Lone€(O'Lone)€and€William€PollardÏ(Pollard),€left€Merrill€Lynch€and€joined€Gallagher€&€Company.€€Each€expected€to€becomeÏa€shareholder€in€Gallagher€&€Company.€€Pollard€had€legal€troubles€of€a€civil€and€potentiallyÏcriminal€nature.€€Also€during€this€period€Maxwell€and€Bear,€either€individually€or€throughÏtheir€partnership,€represented€Gallagher€&€Company,€Gallagher€individually,€O'Lone,€andÏPollard€in€various€legal€matters.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð x Ðà  àWith€respect€to€the€stock,€Maxwell€arranged€for€a€meeting€attended€by€Gallagher,ÏPollard,€O'Lone,€Maxwell,€and€Bear€on€December€18,€1987.€€Gallagher€was€under€theÏimpression€that€the€purpose€of€the€meeting€was€to€discuss€one€or€more€disputes€with€MerrillÏLynch€concerning€commissions€in€which€the€law€firm€was€representing€Gallagher€&ÏCompany.€€The€meeting€actually€involved€the€division€of€ownership€in€Gallagher€&ÏCompany,€and€discussions€at€the€meeting€became€very€heated.€€The€Superior€Court€foundÏthat€"Mr.€Bear€asked€Mr.€Maxwell€why€their€presence€at€the€meeting€was€necessary,€toÏwhich€Mr.€Maxwell€replied€that€they€were€there€to€ensure€that€the€law€firm€got€business."€ÏThe€Superior€Court€also€found€an€absence€of€any€"evidence€that€the€option€of€securing€newÏand€independent€counsel€was€discussed€to€protect€the€interest€of€the€named€persons€andÏcorporate€entity."€€It€was€Maxwell,€in€the€view€of€the€Superior€Court,€who€was€"the€moreÏactive€partner€in€this€scenario€and€throughout€the€events€which€[gave]€rise€to€[the]€action."€Ð x ÐFurther€describing€these€events€the€Superior€Court€said€that€"[¢t]o£€insure€its€relative€positionÏin€the€corporation,€the€law€firm,€more€specifically,€Mr.€Maxwell,€helped€to€draw€the€battleÏlines€between€Mr.€Gallagher€and€Messrs.€Pollard€and€O'Lone."€Ìà  àOn€January€28,€1988,€the€five€individuals€again€met€and€signed€a€document€dividingÏthe€stock€in€Gallagher€&€Company€as€follows:€€Gallagher,€forty„nine€shares;€Pollard,€twentyÏshares;€O'Lone,€twenty€shares;€Maxwell€&€Bear,€eleven€shares.€€O'Lone€and€Pollard€eachÏpaid€between€$10,000€and€$11,000€for€their€stock.€€Although€the€law€firm€took€the€positionÏin€the€Superior€Court€that€its€stock€was€issued€in€payment€for€legal€services,€neither€thoseÏservices€nor€the€stock€were€ever€valued.Ìà  àThe€District€of€Columbia€Court€of€Appeals€selected€for€inclusion€in€its€opinion€whatÏthe€Superior€Court€had€found€to€be€"one€of€'the€most€blatant€examples'"€of€breach€ofÏfiduciary€duty€in€these€relationships.€€òòMaxwellóó,€709€A.2d€at€103€n.6.€€It€"was€Maxwell's€firstÐ x Ð'¢advis[ing£]€Mr.€Gallagher€that€resolution€of€Mr.€Pollard's€ownership€interest€...€should€awaitÏresolution€of€[Mr.€Pollard's]€legal€difficulties,'€then€'in€an€about€face'€providing€'contraryÏadvice€to€Mr.€Pollard€to€move€with€dispatch€in€obtaining€an€interest€in€the€corporation'€byÏwhich€Pollard€became€beholden€to€Mr.€Maxwell."€€òòId.óó€€Ð x$ Ðà  àStock€in€Gallagher€&€Company€was€issued€in€March€1988€in€the€proportions€that€hadÏbeen€agreed€upon€in€January.€€The€Superior€Court€found€that€thereafter,€"Mr.€MaxwellÏbelatedly€advised€Mr.€Gallagher€in€late€March€1988€that€[ñññMr.€œñññGallagher]›€should€acquireÏindependent€legal€counsel."€€The€District€of€Columbia€trial€court€also€found€that€MaxwellÐ x,&& Ðtold€O'Lone€that€Maxwell€had€recommended€a€specific€attorney€to€Gallagher€becauseÏMaxwell€could€control€that€attorney.€€Ìà  àIn€May€1988,€Pollard's€legal€difficulties€led€to€the€sale€of€his€stock€in€Gallagher€&ÏCompany€to€O'Lone€for€$35,000.€€The€purchase€money€was€obtained€by€a€bank€loan€toÏGallagher€&€Company€which€was€personally€guaranteed€by€Gallagher€and€O'Lone.€ÏGallagher€&€Company€then€loaned€that€money€to€O'Lone€to€enable€him€to€purchase€Pollard'sÏstock.€€Following€the€sale,€Gallagher€held€forty„nine€percent€of€the€corporation,€O'Lone€heldÏforty€percent,€and€the€firm€of€Maxwell€ñòñ&€ñòññóñand›€ñóñBear€held€eleven€percent.€€The€Superior€CourtÏfound€that€"Mr.€Maxwell€told€Mr.€O'Lone€that€they€were€now€in€control€of€the€company€andÏhad€the€necessary€voting€power€to€block€any€effort€of€Gallagher€&€Company€to€recover€fromÏMr.€O'Lone€if€he€did€not€pay€back€the€money€he€owed€to€the€company€for€the€purchase€ofÏMr.€Pollard's€stock."€Ìà  àIn€October€1988€Gallagher€&€Company€demanded€the€return€of€the€stock€issued€toÏMaxwell€&€Bear.€€This€prompted€Maxwell€and€the€law€firm€to€file€a€declaratory€judgmentÏaction€in€the€Superior€Court€seeking€confirmation€of€the€law€firm's€right€to€retain€ownershipÏof€the€shares€issued€to€it.€€Gallagher€&€Company,€Gallagher,€and€O'Lone€counterclaimed,Ï"adding€Bear€as€a€counter„defendant."€€òòMaxwellóó,€709€A.2d€at€101.€€Ð x&  Ðà  àThe€Superior€Court€filed€a€sixty„one€page€opinion€in€the€action€containing€fifty„sixÏparagraphs€of€fact„findings.€€That€court€ordered€that€the€"defendant/counter„plaintiffs€areÏentitled€to€the€return€of€the€eleven€(11)€shares€of€stock"€and€that€they€"may€by€this€Order€takeÐ x,&& Ðthe€steps€necessary€to€void€the€stock€certificates€issued€to€the€law€firm."€€The€Superior€CourtÏfurther€concluded€that€there€were€no€compensatory€damages,€but€it€awarded€punitiveÏdamages€against€Maxwell,€Bear,€and€the€law€firm€in€the€amount€of€$75,000.€€In€a€footnoteÏto€the€conclusions€of€law€portion€of€its€opinion,€the€Superior€Court€said€with€respect€to€Bear:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"Throughout€the€events€which€are€the€subject€of€this€action,€Mr.ÏMaxwell€was€the€primary€actor;€however,€his€acts€are€imputed€to€the€law€firmÏand€the€remaining€partner,€Mr.€Bear.€€The€evidence€of€record€furtherÏdemonstrates€that€Mr.€Bear€had€knowledge€of€the€activities€of€Mr.€Maxwell,Ïand€even€on€one€(1)€occasion€questioned€the€presence€and€participation€of€theÏfirm€in€the€stock€distribution€discussions;€however,€he€neither€withdrew€fromÏthe€fracas€nor€required€that€the€firm€adhere€to€the€mandatory€requirements€ofÏthe€Code€of€Professional€Responsibility€as€discussed€herein."€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓà  àThe€District€of€Columbia€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed€that€portion€of€the€judgmentÏvoiding€the€stock€issuance€to€Maxwell€ñôñ&€œñôññõñand›€ñõñBear›€based€on€breach€of€the€duty€of€loyalty,€butÏthe€appellate€court€reversed€the€punitive€damages€award.€€òòMaxwellóó,€709€A.2d€at€101.€€Ð x Ðà  àThereafter€Bar€Counsel€brought€the€instant€disciplinary€proceeding€against€MaxwellÏand€against€Bear.€€Maxwell€consented€to€a€reprimand€so€that€this€action€continues€only€asÏto€Bear.€€We€referred€the€matter€for€hearing€to€Judge€D.€Warren€Donohue€of€the€CircuitÏCourt€for€Montgomery€County€before€whom€Bar€Counsel€introduced€the€two€opinions€ofÏthe€District€of€Columbia€courts€and€rested.€€Bear€produced€no€evidence.€€Ìà  àBefore€Judge€Donohue,€and€in€this€Court,€Bar€Counsel€contended€that€the€portion€ofÏthe€judgment€of€the€Superior€Court€voiding€the€stock€issuance€to€the€law€firm€precludedÏBear€from€contesting€any€of€the€fact„findings€of€the€Superior€Court€that€were€necessary€toÏthat€judgment.€€It€is€Bar€Counsel's€position€that€the€Superior€Court's€findings€of€fact€areÐ x-'' Ðconclusive€on€Bear€so€that€all€that€remains€for€this€Court€to€do€is€to€determine€whether€thoseÏfacts€establish€a€violation€of€the€Maryland€Rules€of€Professional€Conduct.€€Bar€CounselÏraised€this€issue€by€a€motion€òòin€limineóó€which€Judge€Donohue€denied.€€After€holding€that€theÐ x  ÐSuperior€Court€fact„findings€were€not€conclusive€on€Bear,€Judge€Donohue€admitted€the€twoÏopinions€into€evidence,€accepting€Bar€Counsel's€argument€that€the€opinions€could€be€takenÏas€evidence€of€the€facts€found€therein€under€Maryland€Rule€5„201,€dealing€with€judicialÏnotice€of€adjudicative€facts.€€Ìà  àIn€view€of€his€holding€that€issue€preclusion€did€not€apply,€Judge€Donohue€weighedÏthe€evidence€and€concluded€that€Bar€Counsel€had€failed€to€establish€by€clear€and€convincingÏevidence€that€Bear€was€representing€both€himself€and€one€or€more€of€Gallagher€&€Company,ÏGallagher,€O'Lone,€and/or€Pollard€in€the€discussions€culminating€in€the€acquisition€by€theÏlaw€firm€of€stock€in€Gallagher€&€Company.€€Accordingly,€Judge€Donohue€found€noÏviolation€of€MRPC€1.8€or€of€the€companion€rule,€MRPC€1.7.€€Of€the€other€rules€ofÏprofessional€conduct€charged€to€have€been€violated,€Judge€Donohue€found€only€a€violationÏof€MRPC€1.5€"by€charging€a€fee€for€services€rendered€to€Gallagher€&€Company€and€Mr.ÏGallagher€that€were€never€itemized€or€particularized."€€Both€parties€filed€exceptions€which,Ïto€the€extent€necessary,€are€hereinafter€described.Ìà@ÈÈ*ìàÔ&  ÔIˆÌà  àBar€Counsel's€principal€argument€is€that€the€opinions€of€Ô'x(>:Ôthe€two€District€of€ColumbiaÏcourts€are€admissible€because€they€evidence€judgments€and€the€factual€basis€for€thoseÐ x,&& Ðjudgments.€€The€judgments€are€said€by€Bar€Counsel€to€be€relevant€to€the€instant€disciplinaryÏproceeding€because€they€form€the€basis€for€applying€the€doctrine€of€issue€preclusion€againstÏBear.€€We€hold€that€issue€preclusion€does€not€apply€under€the€circumstances€presented€in€thisÏcase.€€Ìà  àMaryland€Rule€16„710(d)€requires€that€Bar€Counsel€must€prove€attorney€misconductÏby€clear€and€convincing€evidence€before€an€attorney€may€be€disciplined.€€òòAttorney€GrievanceÐ x  ÐComm'n€v.€Jamesóó,€355€Md.€465,€483,€735€A.2d€1027,€1037€(1999);€òòAttorney€GrievanceÐ x  ÐComm'n€v.€Whiteóó,€354€Md.€346,€354,€731€A.2d€447,€452€(1999);€òòAttorney€GrievanceÐ x ÐComm'n€v.€Glennóó,€341€Md.€448,€470,€671€A.2d€463,€474€(1996);€òò€Attorney€GrievanceÐ x ÐComm'n€v.€Kempóó,€335€Md.€1,€9,€641€A.2d€510,€514€(1994).€€The€clear€and€convincingÐ x Ðstandard€places€a€burden€of€persuasion€upon€Bar€Counsel€that€is€greater€than€theÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€standard€typically€used€in€civil€cases,€such€as€the€action€inÏthe€Superior€Court.€€òòAttorney€Grievance€Comm'n€v.€Mooneyóó,€359€Md.€56,€79,€753€A.2d€17,Ð x Ð29€(2000)ñöñ.ñöññ÷ñ€(citing€òòBerkey€v.€Deliaóó,€287€Md.€302,€320,€413€A.2d€170,€178€(1980)).ñ÷ñÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"'The€requirement€of€'clear€and€convincing'€or€'satisfactory'€evidenceÏdoes€not€call€for€'unanswerable'€or€'conclusive'€evidence.€€The€quality€of€proof,Ïto€be€clear€and€convincing,€has€also€been€said€to€be€somewhere€between€theÏrule€in€ordinary€civil€cases€and€the€requirement€of€criminal€procedure„„that€is,Ïit€must€be€more€than€a€mere€preponderance€but€not€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€ÏIt€has€also€been€said€that€the€term€'clear€and€convincing'€evidence€means€thatÏthe€witness€to€a€fact€must€be€found€to€be€credible,€and€that€the€facts€to€whichÏthey€have€testified€are€distinctly€remembered€and€the€details€thereof€narratedÏexactly€and€in€due€order,€so€as€to€enable€the€trier€of€the€facts€to€come€to€a€clearÏconviction,€without€hesitancy,€of€the€truth€of€the€precise€facts€in€issue.€Ïâ âWhether€evidence€is€clear€and€convincing€requires€weighing,€comparing,Ð x,&& Ðtesting,€and€judging€its€worth€when€considered€in€connection€with€all€the€factsÏand€circumstances€in€evidence.'"Ð Ð Ð  Ðâ âÌÓO@ÓòòId.óó€ñþññýñ€ñýññþññýñ(ñýññÿñquoñÿññññýñciñýññññýñting€òò¢Berkey£€v.€Deliaóó,€287€Md.€302,€320,€413€A.2d€170,€178€(1980)).ñýñÐ x  Ðà  àHere,€Bar€Counsel€seeks€to€make€offensive€use€of€nonmutual€collateral€estoppel,€asÏdistinguished€from€defensive€use.€€We€explained€the€difference€in€òòWelsh€v.€Gerber€Prods.,Ð x  ÐInc.óó,€315€Md.€510,€555€A.2d€486€(1989).Ð x  ÐÓÓà8  àà ` à"Offensive€use€of€nonmutual€collateral€estoppel€occurs€when€a€plaintiffÏseeks€to€foreclose€a€defendant€from€relitigating€an€issue€the€defendant€hasÏpreviously€litigated€unsuccessfully€in€another€action€against€a€different€party.€ÏDefensive€use€of€nonmutual€collateral€estoppel€occurs€when€a€defendant€seeksÏto€prevent€a€plaintiff€from€relitigating€an€issue€the€plaintiff€has€previouslyÏlitigated€unsuccessfully€in€another€action€against€a€different€party."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€517„18€n.6,€555€A.2d€at€489„90€n.6€(quoting€òòUnited€States€v.€Mendozaóó,€464€U.S.€154,Ð x Ð159€n.4,€104€S.€Ct.€568,€571„72€n.4,€78€L.€Ed.€2d€379,€384€n.4€(1984)).Ìà  àThe€Restatement€(Second)€of€Judgments€(1982)€(Restatement)€expressly€rejectsÏoffensive€use€of€collateral€estoppel€where€the€burdens€of€proof€differ€in€the€mannerÏpresented€here.€€The€Restatement's€position€is€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8  àññà ` àññ"Although€an€issue€is€actually€litigated€and€determined€by€a€valid€and€finalÏjudgment,€and€the€determination€is€essential€to€the€judgment,€relitigation€ofÏthe€issue€in€a€subsequent€action€between€the€parties€is€not€precluded€in€theÏfollowing€circumstancesññ€ññññ:Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà  à....ññññ...ññÌÌà8  àññà ` àññ"(4)€The€party€against€whom€preclusion€is€sought€had€a€significantly€heavierÏburden€of€persuasion€with€respect€to€the€issue€in€the€initial€action€than€in€theÏsubsequent€action;€the€burden€has€shifted€to€his€adversary;€or€òòthe€adversaryÐ x+%% Ðhas€a€significantly€heavier€burden€than€he€had€in€the€first€actionóóññ[ññ.ññ]ññ"Ðx,&&Ð Ð  ÐÐ x-'' ÐÓÓRestatement€ðð€28,€at€273€(emphasis€added).€€The€comments€to€this€section€explain€theÏrationale€underlying€this€exception.€ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"To€apply€issue€preclusion€in€the€cases€described€in€Subsection€(4)Ïwould€be€to€hold,€in€effect,€that€the€losing€party€in€the€first€action€would€alsoÏhave€lost€had€a€significantly€different€burden€been€imposed.€€While€there€mayÏbe€occasions€when€such€a€holding€would€be€correct,€òòthere€are€many€others€inÐ x  Ðwhich€the€allocation€and€weight€of€the€burden€of€persuasion€(or€burden€ofÏproof,€as€it€is€called€in€many€jurisdictions)€are€critical€in€determining€whoÏshould€prevailóó."Ðx Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓRestatement€ðð€28,€cmt.€f,€at€281€(emphasis€added).€€Ìà  àThe€Restatement's€position€seems€to€be€generally€accepted€by€federal€and€state€courts.ÏòòSee,€e.g.,€United€States€v.€Bostianóó,€59€F.3d€474,€480€(4th€Cir.€1995),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€516€U.S.Ð x Ð1121,€116€S.€Ct.€929,€133€L.€Ed.€2d€857€(1996)€("As€a€general€rule,€evidence€of€aÏdetermination€made€in€a€civil€action€where€the€party€with€the€burden€of€persuasion€mustÏestablish€facts€only€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€not€admissible€to€prove€an€elementÏof€a€criminal€prosecution€where€the€government€must€establish€elements€of€the€chargedÏoffense€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt");€òòUnited€States€v.€Meza„Soriaóó,€935€F.2d€166,€169€(9thÐ x  ÐCir.€1991)€("By€parity€of€reasoning,€the€difference€in€standards€of€proof€must€preclude€theÏuse€of€civil€proceeding€findings€to€establish€facts€in€a€criminal€case");òò€Colorado€DogÐ x$ ÐFanciers€v.€Denveróó,€820€P.2d€644,€649€(Colo.€1991)€(en€banc)€("[W]e€hold€that€no€...Ð x&  Ðdetermination€made€for€regulatory€purposes,€where€the€applicable€burden€of€proof€is€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence,€may€be€used€to€support€a€subsequent€criminal€charge");òò€StateÐ x*$$ Ðv.€Yellióó,€247€Neb.€785,€530€N.W.2d€250,€254,€òòcert.€deniedóó,€516€U.S.€915,€116€S.€Ct.€304,€133Ð x,&& ÐL.€Ed.€2d.€209€(1995)€("[A]€party€who€has€carried€the€burden€of€establishing€an€issue€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€is€not€entitled€to€assert€preclusion€in€a€later€action€thatÏrequires€proof€of€the€same€issue€by€a€higher€standard").€€The€result€reached€by€these€courtsÏand€adopted€by€the€Restatement€comports€with€the€views€of€the€major€treatises€on€federalÏcivil€procedure.€€18€C.A.€Wright,€A.R.€Miller€&€E.H.€Cooper,€òòFederal€Practice€andÐ x ÐProcedureóó€ðð€4422,€at€214€(1981)€(footnote€omitted)€("[A]€party€who€has€carried€the€burdenÐ x  Ðof€establishing€an€issue€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€not€entitled€to€assertÏpreclusion€in€a€later€action€that€requires€proof€of€the€same€issue€by€a€higher€standard");€18ÏœJ.W.›€Moore,€òòMoore's€Federal€Practiceóó€ðð€132.02[4][e],€at€132„62€(3d€ed.€2000)€(footnoteÐ x Ðomitted)€("The€doctrine€of€issue€preclusion€does€not€apply€when€the€party€seeking€to€benefitÏfrom€preclusion€has€a€significantly€heavier€burden€in€the€subsequent€action€than€in€the€priorÏaction").€Ìà  àJurisdictions€that€have€dealt€with€the€precise€issue€presented€by€this€case€almostÏuniformly€refuse€to€give€preclusive€effect€to€issues€decided€in€a€civil€case€under€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€standard€in€a€subsequent€attorney€discipline€proceeding.€ÏStated€otherwise,€the€other€jurisdictions€which€have€encountered€this€issue€have€refused€toÏapply€offensive€collateral€estoppel€in€an€attorney€discipline€proceeding€unless€the€burden€ofÏproof€in€the€prior€proceeding€equaled€or€exceeded€the€clear€and€convincing€burden€whichÏgoverns€disciplinary€proceedings.€€òòSee,€e.g.,€In€re€Levineóó,€174€Ariz.€146,€847€P.2d€1093,Ð x*$$ Ð1103,€òòsupplemented€byóó€176€Ariz.€535,€863€P.2d€254€(1993)€("We€find€no€error€[in€theÐ x,&& Ðadmission€of€prior€judicial€rulings€which€accompanied€the€full€documentary€history€of€thoseÏcivil€cases]€because€neither€the€committee€nor€the€commission€gave€these€rulings€preclusiveÏeffect€....");òò€Rosenthal€v.€State€Bar€of€Californiaóó,€43€Cal.€3d€612,€238€Cal.€Rptr.€377,€738Ð x  ÐP.2d€723,€738€(1987),€òòappeal€dismissedóó,€488€U.S.€805,€109€S.€Ct.€35,€102€L.€Ed.€2d€15Ð x  Ð(1988)€("[No€error€in€admitting]€civil€findings,€conclusions€and€judgments€[because€they]Ïwere€not€judicially€noticed€for€their€truth€or€given€preclusive€effect€....");€òòIn€re€Egbuneóó,€971Ð x  ÐP.2d€1065,€1067€(Colo.),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€526€U.S.€1115,€119€S.€Ct.€1762,€143€L.€Ed.€2d€793Ð x  Ð(1999)€(issue€preclusion€held€not€to€apply€"because€the€burden€of€proof€in€a€civil€action€isÏa€preponderance€of€the€evidence€[but]€in€a€lawyer€discipline€proceeding€proof€is€by€clear€andÏconvincing€evidence");€òòFlorida€Bar€v.€Bennettóó,€276€So.€2d€481,€482€(Fla.€1973)€(per€curiam)Ð x Ð("The€results€of€such€a€civil€suit€are€not€necessarily€conclusive€of€disciplinary€action");òò€IowaÐ x ÐSupreme€Court€Board€of€Professional€Ethics€&€Conduct€v.€D.J.I.óó,€545€N.W.2d€866,€872€n.5Ð x Ð(Iowa€1996),€òòamended€byóó€1996€Iowa€Supp.€LEXIS€79€(Apr.€17,€1996)€(citing€Iowa€Sup.€Ct.Ð x ÐR.€118.7)€("[¢C]ourt£€rule€118.7€requires€that€the€burden€of€proof€in€the€prior€civil€actionÏsought€to€have€preclusive€effect€in€the€subsequent€disciplinary€action€must€be€greater€thanÏa€mere€preponderance€of€the€evidence");€òòIn€re€Kottsóó,€364€N.W.2d€400,€405€(Minn.€1985)Ð x$ Ð("[W]e€note€that€the€standard€of€proof€in€the€bankruptcy€proceedings€was€a€fairÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence,€while€the€Director€in€these€disciplinary€proceedings€mustÏprove€the€allegations€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence");òò€Nebraska€State€Bar€Ass'n€v.Ð x*$$ ÐGudmundsenóó,€145€Neb.€324,€16€N.W.2d€474,€476€(1944)€("[¢T]he£€finding€in€a€civil€actionÐ x,&& Ðthat€an€attorney€at€law€has€been€guilty€of€conduct€justifying€disbarment€is€not€conclusive€onÏthe€same€question€when€presented€for€determination€in€an€action€for€disbarment");òò€In€reÐ x ÐBruzgaóó,€142€N.H.€743,€712€A.2d€1078,€1079€(1998)€("We€hold€that€the€doctrine€of€offensiveÐ x  Ðcollateral€estoppel€may€be€applied€in€attorney€discipline€proceedings€when€a€priorÏproceeding€was€subject€to€a€burden€of€proof€equaling€or€exceeding€the€clear€and€convincingÏburden€governing€disciplinary€proceedings");€òòIn€re€Gygióó,€273€Or.€443,€541€P.2d€1392,€1395Ð x  Ð(1975)€(in€banc)€(per€curiam)€("[¢T]here£€is€a€higher€standard€of€proof€in€disciplinary€actionsÏthan€...€in€...€federal€securities€[cases€and,€¢c]ollateral£€estoppel€is€not€applicable€when€theÏstandard€of€proof€in€the€second€proceeding€is€greater€than€that€which€applied€in€the€first").Ìà  àProvision€is€made€in€the€rules€dealing€with€Discipline€and€Inactive€Status€ofÏAttorneys€for€conclusive€proof€in€reciprocal€attorney€discipline€cases€by€Maryland€RuleÏ16-710.e.1.€€That€rule€in€part€provides:ÌÓÓà8  à"A€final€adjudication€in€a€disciplinary€proceeding€by€a€judicial€tribunal€or€aÏdisciplinary€agency€appointed€by€or€acting€at€the€direction€of€a€judicialÏtribunal€that€an€attorney€has€been€guilty€of€misconduct€is€conclusive€proof€ofÏthe€misconduct€in€the€hearing€of€charges€pursuant€to€this€Rule."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòSee€also€Attorney€Grievance€Comm'n€v.€Richardsonóó,€350€Md.€354,€365„66,€712€A.2d€525,Ð x# Ð530„31€(1998)€(citing€numerous€cases€applying€the€rule).Ìà  àHere,€Bar€Counsel€refers€us€to€€òòAttorney€Grievance€Comm'n€v.€Sabghiróó,€350€Md.€67,Ð x'!! Ð710€A.2d€926€(1998),€and€urges€us€to€extend€the€holding€of€that€case€to€the€circumstancesÏat€hand.€€òòSabghiróó€was€a€reciprocal€discipline€action.€€There€we€held,€applying€RuleÐ x+%% Ð16-710.¢e.1£,€that€the€factual€findings€underlying€a€judgment€by€the€Appellate€Division€of€theÐ x-'' ÐSupreme€Court€of€New€York€that€Sabghir€had€committed€ten€violations€of€that€state's€CodeÏof€Professional€Responsibility€would€be€conclusively€applied€against€Sabghir€in€MarylandÏdisciplinary€proceedings,€even€though€New€York's€standard€of€proof€was€a€preponderanceÏof€the€evidence.€€We€noted€that€Sabghir€received€notice€and€the€opportunity€to€be€heard€inÏthe€New€York€State€disbarment€action.€€òòId.óó€at€79,€710€A.2d€at€932.€€Ô‡ŠFI‹‹‹FIÔWe€relied€upon€theÐ x Ðreasoning€in€a€decision€by€the€District€of€Columbia€Court€of€Appeals€that€treated€asÏconclusive€findings€based€on€New€York's€lower€standard€of€proof€because€"'the€potentialÏloss€of€livelihood€through€disbarment€is€more€aptly€categorized€as€only€a€property€right'"€andÏthe€District€of€Columbia's€higher€standard€of€proof€was€not€constitutionally€mandated.€€òòIdóó.Ð x Ðat€82,€710€A.2d€at€933€(quoting€òòIn€re€Benjaminóó,€698€A.2d€434,€440€(D.C.€1997)).€€Also€ofÐ x Ðimportance€was€that€there€was€no€evidence€that€New€York€treated€attorney€discipline€mattersÏ"'less€seriously€or€wholly€inconsistently€with€the€manner€exercised€by€this€Court.'"€€òòSabghiróó,Ð x Ð350€Md.€at€83,€710€A.2d€at€934€(quoting€òòAttorney€Grievance€Comm'n€v.€Gittensóó,€346€Md.Ð x Ð316,€327,€697€A.2d€83,€88€(1997)).€€Ô#†‹FI‹‹ŠFIÆn#ÔÐ x  Ðà  àBar€Counsel's€request€that€we€use€òòSabghiróó€as€a€springboard€is€an€appeal€toÐ x" Ðpracticality.€€The€argument€begins€by€noting€the€variety€of€ways€in€which€information,Ïincluding€reported€judicial€decisions,€concerning€possible€MRPC€violations€comes€to€BarÏCounsel's€attention.€€We€are€asked€to€consider€the€difficulty€and€expense€involved€in€strictlyÏâ âproving€again€facts€that€have€produced€a€judgment€adverse€to€the€attorney€where€those€factsÐ x*$$ Ðconstitute€a€MRPC€violation.€€We€are€unable,€however,€to€adopt€Bar€Counsel's€argument.€ÏòòMaxwell€v.€Gallagheróó€in€the€Superior€Court€was€not€a€disciplinary€proceeding.€€Ð x Ðâ âà  àIn€òòAttorney€Grievance€Comm'n€v.€Milleróó,€310€Md.€163,€528€A.2d€481€(1987),€BarÐ x  ÐCounsel€brought€disciplinary€proceedings€against€Miller€based€on€his€having€beenÏdisciplined€by€the€Interstate€Commerce€Commission€under€the€agency's€code€of€ethicsÏgoverning€the€conduct€of€attorney's€representing€parties€before€that€agency.€€Bar€CounselÏargued€that€"the€opinion€of€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€for€the€District€of€ColumbiaÏCircuit,€affirming€the€Interstate€Commerce€Commission's€decision,€[constituted]€a€'finalÏadjudication€in€a€disciplinary€proceeding€by€a€judicial€tribunal€...€that€an€attorney€has€beenÏguilty€of€misconduct.'"€€òòId.óó€at€170,€528€A.2d€at€485€(quoting€former€Rule€BV10.e.1,€theÐ x Ðpredecessor€to€Rule€16„710.e.1).€€We€held€that€the€federal€appellate€court€was€not€sitting€asÏa€judicial€tribunal€in€a€disciplinary€proceeding€but€was€conducting€a€judicial€review€of€anÏagency€decision.€€òòId.óó€at€172,€528€A.2d€at€485„86.€€Absent€a€rule€similar€to€present€RuleÐ x Ð16-701.¢e.1£,€there€was€no€conclusive€effect€to€either€the€agency€or€the€appellate€courtÏdetermination.€€Ìà  àBar€Counsel€also€relies€upon€òòAttorney€Grievance€Comm'n€v.€Alisonóó,€349€Md.€623,Ð x$ Ð709€A.2d€1212€(1998).€€Collateral€estoppel€was€not€applied€in€that€case€because€an€elementÏnecessary€for€the€application€of€that€doctrine€was€not€met.€€òòId.óó€at€634,€709€A.2d€at€1217.€Ð x("" ÐMoreover,€it€appears€that€the€hearing€judge€in€òòAlisonóó€had€the€entire€record€before€him€fromÐ x*$$ Ðthe€original€action€and€not€just€the€ultimate€conclusions€of€the€trial€court.€€òòId.óó€at€635,€709Ð x,&& ÐA.2d€at€1217€("Judge€Brennan€considered€the€findings€contained€in€Judge€Noel'sÏMemorandum€and€Order,€the€transcript€of€the€proceedings€before€Judge€Noel,€and€theÏopinion€of€the€Court€of€Special€Appeals€....€€A€certified€copy€of€the€docket€sheet€was€alsoÏadmitted€into€evidence.").Ìà  àFor€these€reasons,€the€opinions€of€the€two€District€of€Columbia€courts€were€notÏadmissible€as€the€foundation€for€applying€offensive€nonmutual€collateral€estoppel.Ìà@¤¤)ìàÔ&  ÔIIˆÌà  àBar€Counsel's€fallback€argument€is€that€the€Ô'x~Ôopinions€of€the€District€of€ColumbiaÏcourts€were€properly€admitted€into€evidence€and€that,€absent€any€evidence€by€Bear,€theÏopinions€present€facts€that€required€the€granting€of€a€motion€for€judgment€against€Bear€asÏto€one€or€more€of€the€charges.€€Bar€Counsel€submitted€that€the€opinions€were€admissibleÏunder€Maryland€Rule€5„201€which€in€relevant€part€reads:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"(a)à ¸ àScope€of€Rule.€€This€Rule€governs€only€judicial€notice€ofÐ x Ðadjudicative€facts.€€...Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"(b)à ¸ àKinds€of€facts.€€A€judicially€noticed€fact€must€be€one€not€subjectÐ x! Ðto€reasonable€dispute€in€that€it€is€either€(1)€generally€known€within€theÏterritorial€jurisdiction€of€the€trial€court€or€(2)€capable€of€accurate€and€readyÏdetermination€by€resort€to€sources€whose€accuracy€cannot€reasonably€beÏquestioned."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÈÓà  àBear€objected€to€the€use€of€the€opinions€for€any€purpose.€€After€Judge€DonohueÏrejected€Bar€Counsel's€issue€preclusion€argument,€Rule€5-201€was€the€exclusive€groundÏadvanced€by€Bar€Counsel€before€Judge€Donohue€for€admitting€the€opinions.€€In€this€CourtÏBar€Counsel€does€not€argue€that€the€opinions€were€admissible€on€any€basis€other€than€theÐ x-'' Ðbasis€advanced€before€the€trial€court.€€We€hold€that€Judge€Donohue€erred€in€admitting€theÏopinions€on€the€basis€on€which€they€were€received€into€evidence.€€ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"As€a€general€rule,€a€court€may€not€take€judicial€notice€of€proceedingsÏor€records€in€another€cause€so€as€to€supply,€without€formal€introduction€ofÏevidence,€facts€essential€to€support€a€contention€in€a€cause€then€before€it."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòM/V€American€Queen€v.€San€Diego€Marine€Constr.€Corp.óó,€708€F.2d€1483,€1491€(9th€Cir.Ð x Ð1983).€€Ìà  àSome€United€States€courts€of€appeal€when€applying€Fed.€R.€Ev.€201(b),€from€whichÏMaryland€Rule€5„201€is€derived,€have€stated€that€"were€[it]€permissible€for€a€court€to€takeÏjudicial€notice€of€a€fact€merely€because€it€had€been€found€to€be€true€in€some€other€action,€theÏdoctrine€of€collateral€estoppel€would€be€superfluous."€€òòUnited€States€v.€Jonesóó,€29€F.3d€1549,Ð x Ð1553„54€(11th€Cir.€1994).€€òòSee€also€Liberty€Mut.€Ins.€Co.€v.€Rotches€Port€Packers,€Inc.óó,€969Ð x ÐF.2d€1384,€1388„89€(2d€Cir.€1992);€òòHolloway€v.€Lockhartóó,€813€F.2d€874,€878„79€(8th€Cir.Ð x Ð1987).€€These€cases€recognize€that€under€Fed.€R.€Ev.€201€a€judicially€noticed€fact€isÏconclusive.€€à ` àMaryland€Rule€5„201(g)€also€gives€conclusive€effect€to€a€judicially€noticed€factÐ x  Ðâ âin€a€civil€case.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð x" Ðà  àIn€the€instant€matter€it€is€unnecessary€to€decide€whether,€absent€issue€preclusion€byÏâ âjudgment,€judicial€notice€can€ever€be€taken€of€facts€found€by€a€court€in€another€proceeding.€ÏThis€is€because€"[a]€judicially€noticed€fact€must€be€one€not€subject€to€reasonable€dispute."€ÏMd.€Rule€5„201(b).€€The€same€language€appears€in€Fed.€R.€Ev.€201.€€Thus,€it€has€been€heldÏthat€judicial€notice€could€not€be€taken€of€the€finding€in€an€earlier€action€that€a€corporationÏwas€a€state€actor,€òòTaylor€v.€Charter€Med.€Corp.óó,€162€F.3d€827,€831€(5th€Cir.€1998),€and€that,Ð x  Ðin€an€action€to€set€aside€a€settlement€agreement€in€a€class€action€as€a€fraudulent€transfer,Ïjudicial€notice€could€not€be€taken€of€a€finding€in€anññoññther€action€that€the€settlement€was€fairÏand€reasonable.€€òòGeneral€Elec.€Capital€Corp.€v.€Lease€Resolution€Corp.óó,€128€F.3d€1074,Ð x Ð1081„83€(7th€Cir.€1997).€€Ìà  àIn€the€instant€matter€the€Superior€Court€clearly€recognized€that€Maxwell€was€theÏprincipal€actor€from€the€firm€of€Maxwell€&€Bear€in€the€challenged€transaction.€€Bear€wasÏa€necessary€party€to€the€counterclaim€seeking€to€cancel€the€stock€held€by€the€law€firm.€ÏIndeed,€the€Superior€Court€seems€to€have€supported€its€judgment€against€Bear€either€byÏimputing€liability€to€him€or€by€inferring€sufficient€knowledge€on€his€part,€or€both.€€In€theÏinstant€matter€our€concern€is€the€culpability€of€Bear.€€Under€these€circumstances€the€opinionsÏof€the€District€of€Columbia€courts€do€not€present€facts€that€are€"not€subject€to€reasonableÏdispute"€and€that€are€"capable€of€accurate€and€œreadñ ñññ9ñññ ñy›€determination."€€Rule€5„201(b)(2).€ÏAccordingly,€the€opinions€were€not€admissible€in€evidence€under€Rule€5„201€for€the€purposeÏfor€which€they€were€offered,€and€the€charges€must€be€dismissed.Ð x,&& ÐÓ€Óà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àòòPETITION€FOR€DISCIPLINARY€ACTIONÐ x ÐDISMISSED.€€COSTS€TO€BE€PAID€BY€THEÏATTORNEY€GRIEVANCE€COMMISSION€OFÏMARYLAND.óó