ÿWPCj8 ®š!)ã9%¥1Z°­.…1Q”Tw"×Åû^€4ú‘†ÒB¯ÓI¸ºÙb¢£÷Zdai=¸DRŠBÙ6ØŠa»ù…j °äÐ8YTÞì¯ m 5´7´eoþÇÊÓ싺nžkM¶#$]Ü,aÑOMݱJ_…©àC_gDÞ.!ˆ‡¸&Ä/´“ê^1òÊ¢õž7%Õ®À2vùƒCL¾ñ_‚þ9c^¿V_h—WܱP¬¥òR- OŠbÙ¯Fv: S.½ÉÚ!æVHó¿¥çÆÕ÷úaª_3xÓç¹?ÔÀŽ¡ö5#ÙJ"^³­«A&~DÐnʼnL]þ·ÂtI|“½}²!Y"(XÆÅÈnqtjUþMG•XM§™h¢!õ¤zÖ¾.•ÿt32³VçÌÖóΘÛÞ`Ät KðžSiv”*Â!Òã˲ʸhíÀÔ`¥üðÿÀ'¼PjK¬ùç0»wï~PλoS®‰ŒÁ»KêN•ÖD1…¶A]ÐúWŒè­UØ;ãä¶ôáÞ주—å……”‚üãªvÖA7+är-ZW‘´¯6üe“ö›êžÙy2W,…æ’J&³ß—zÎ ~ó¸þ;ÚÀ…S AbM}+‘ðõC(#!0UNQ %Ÿ 0q¥w@4Vjy m{Æ’ 0eXXª½ 0 µg 0 D®`=b KÇW‹© 1m±ã  0c((Ïd(A3/3/Ùt1t1t1t1t1t1t1t1t1t1 BM8˜HP LaserJet 5MP,ð,,,,,ð0wÎáA Z‹6Times New Roman Regular‹(ILJ$¡¡Ó  ÓÓÓÔ€X24XXXÔÑ  Ñ ""‘"’"“"”"•"–"E—"N˜"«Mq)x3|x˜"1ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀA, B,Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 54#)N2Quick A.Úƒ ÚÚ  Ú.à0 àÛ€ Û  Ý ƒÿ´$ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹æ{‹‹‹Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›The€circuit€court€reasoned€as€follows:Ð ° ÐÐ °   Ðà8  àà ` à"THE€COURT:€€I€am€torn€as€to€what€to€do.€€In€my€heart€of€hearts,€IÏbelieve€that€the€Workers'€Compensation€statute€would€bar€the€claim€of€theÏplaintiff€against€Suburban€Hospital.€€I€think€it€is€clear€that€the€principle€of€lawÏthat€the€plaintiff€was€in€the€hospital€and€that€she€was€receiving€the€care€onÏAugust€13€that€she€was€receiving€as€a€result€of€her€Workers'€Comp€relatedÏinjury€on€August€6th€would€then€bar€her€claim€against€the€hospital.€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"I€am€also€sensitive€to€what€we€have€been€told€repeatedly€by€the€CourtÏof€Appeals;€that€if€there€is€an€issue€of€material€fact€in€dispute,€that€a€jury€mustÏreceive€it.€€I€have€a€difficult€time€with€the€material€facts€that€have€been€allegedÏto€be€in€dispute€by€the€plaintiff€given€the€sequence€of€events,€the€timing.€ÏThere€may€be€facts€in€dispute,€but€I€am€not€sure€if€they€are€material€facts€thatÏare€in€dispute.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"But€the€extent€of€the€ð"ð€the€nature€of€the€affidavit,€the€extent€of€theÏaffidavits€and€the€facts€that€the€plaintiff€has€set€forth€as€being€in€dispute,€atÏleast€at€this€point,€I€am€going€to€reluctantly€allow€them€to€go€for€a€jury'sÏconsideration."€(e(3?‹$¤¤Ý ƒLJ!ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹f-‹‹‹ÔÑ  ÑÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ¤Ý ƒÿ´$ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹æ{‹‹‹Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›Although€they€were€not€admitted€at€trial,€Suburban€proffered€the€Commission€awardÐ ° Ðand€the€ledger€of€compensation€and€medical€payments.€€We€incorporate€the€proffer€in€theÏfacts€in€this€opinion€because€the€proffered€facts€are€the€basis€for€the€principal€questionÏpresented. 3Ý ƒÿ´$ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹æ{‹‹‹Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›The€continued€viability€of€the€dual€capacity€doctrine€has€come€into€question€inÐ ° ÐCalifornia€since€the€enactment€of€Cal.€Lab.€Code€ðð€3602€(West€1989€&€Supp.€2000)€whichÏis€aimed€at€limiting€or€prohibiting€the€use€of€dual€capacity€to€avoid€exclusivity.€€SinceÏenactment€of€the€statute,€the€results€reached€in€workers'€compensation€cases€beforeÏCalifornia's€intermediate€appellate€courts€have€been€inconsistent.€€òòCompareóó€Lake€v.Ð ° ÐLakewood€Chiropractic€Ctr.,€20€Cal.€App.€4th€47,€24€Cal.€Rptr.€2d€358,€361„62€(1993)Ï(stating€that€ðð€3602€applied€to€bar€the€malpractice€case€against€the€employer€but€actuallyÏholding€that€the€doctrines€of€res€judicata€€and€election€of€remedies€prevented€plaintiff€fromÏpursuing€a€medical€malpractice€action€against€her€employer€after€she€already€receivedÏworkers'€compensation€benefits€for€the€injury)€òòwithóó€Sturtevant€v.€County€of€Monterey,€228Ð °  ÐCal.€App.€3d€758,€279€Cal.€Rptr.€161,€164„67€(1991)€(holding€that€ðð€3602€applies€where€theÏemployer€manufactures€a€product€sold€to€the€public€that€injures€an€employee€but€holding€thatÏthe€legislature€did€not€intend€to€bar€use€of€the€dual€capacity€theory€in€medical€malpracticeÏcases€brought€against€an€employer)€and€Weinstein€v.€St.€Mary's€Med.€Ctr.,€58€Cal.€App.€4thÏ1223,€68€Cal.€Rptr.€2d€461,€465„66€(1997)€(invoking€dual€capacity€to€allow€premisesÏliability€suit€by€hospital€employee€against€employer).- ù - ½Ý ƒÿ´$ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹æ{‹‹‹Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›Smith€testified€that€she€had€no€recollection€of€assisting€Kirson€to€get€out€of€bed,€butÐ ° Ðadmitted€that€it€was€possible€that€she€had.€€Smith€made€a€notation€in€Kirson's€chart€reading,Ï"Out€of€bed€to€bedside€commode,"€but€testified€that€the€notation€€might€have€been€based€onÏinformation€received.€€ Ý ƒÿ´$ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹æ{‹‹‹Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›Even€though€there€is€no€appellate€issue€concerning€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidenceÐ ° Ðof€negligence€on€the€part€of€Paul,€and€even€though€Suburban€does€not€question€its€vicariousÏliability€for€that€negligence,€absent€an€exclusivity€defense,€Kirson€advised€the€circuit€courtÏthat€the€issue€of€the€negligence€of€Smith€or€of€Anderson€was€not€academic.€€KirsonÏrepresented€to€the€circuit€court€her€concern€that€Suburban€would€deny€coverage€for€Paul€whoÏwas€represented€throughout€by€separate€counsel. # e37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a) Ù Ý ƒÿ´$ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹æ{‹‹‹Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›Ritchie€v.€Bridgestone/Firestone,€Inc.,€621€So.€2d€288,€289€(Ala.€1993)€(productsÐ ° Ðliability€suit€barred€by€exclusivity€provision);€State€v.€Purdy,€601€P.2d€258,€260€(AlaskaÏ1979)€(rejecting€dual€capacity€exception€for€state's€alleged€failure€to€properly€maintainÏhighway€and€expressing€concern€that€the€dual€capacity€exception€would€extensivelyÏundermine€the€workers'€compensation€scheme€because€of€the€endlessly€imaginable€situationsÏin€which€it€could€be€used€to€avoid€the€exclusivity€provision);€Ark.€Code€Ann.€ðð11-9-105Ï(Lexis€1996)€(rejecting€dual€capacity€by€statute);€Cal.€Lab.€Code€ðð€3602€(West€1989€&ÏSupp.€2000)€(same);€Dugger€v.€Miller€Brewing€Co.,€199€Ga.€App.€850,€406€S.E.2d€484,€487Ï(1991)€(reiterating€Georgia's€rejection€of€the€dual€capacity€doctrine);€Estate€of€Coates€v.ÏPacific€Eng'g,€71€Haw.€358,€791€P.2d€1257,€1260€(1990)€(stating€that€"[¢t]here£€are€soundÏsocial€and€economic€policy€reasons€which€support€the€exclusivity€of€the€Workers'ÏCompensation€Act,€and€it€remains€for€the€legislature€to€reexamine€those€reasons€in€light€ofÏcontemporary€circumstances€and€to€amend€the€Act€if€it€chooses€to€do€so");€Rhodes€v.ÏSunshine€Mining€Co.,€113€Idaho€162,€742€P.2d€417,€423€(1987)€(rejecting€dual€capacityÏdoctrine);€Needham€v.€Fred's€Frozen€Foods,€Inc.,€171€Ind.€App.€671,€359€N.E.2d€544,€545Ï(1977)€(products€liability€claim€barred€by€exclusivity€provision);€Borman€v.€Interlake,€Inc.,Ï623€S.W.2d€912,€913€(Ky.€Ct.€App.€1981)€(exclusivity€provisions€barred€products€liabilityÏclaim€against€employer);€La.€Rev.€Stat.€Ann.€ðð€23:1032€(West€2000)€(rejecting€dual€capacityÏdoctrine€by€statute);€Longever€v.€Revere€Copper€&€Brass€Inc.,€381€Mass.€221,€408€N.E.2dÏ857,€859„60€(1980)€(rejecting€products€liability€claim€against€employer€and€stating€thatÏimplicit€in€the€dual€capacity€argument€is€a€dissatisfaction€with€the€workers'€compensationÏscheme€which€is€properly€addressed€to€the€legislature€and€not€the€courts);€Herron€v.€Pack€&ÏCo.,€217€Mont.€429,€705€P.2d€587,€588„89€(1985)€(holding€employee's€sole€remedy€forÏinjuries€resulting€from€employer's€failure€to€properly€maintain€vehicle's€braking€system€wasÐ °  Ðunder€the€workers'€compensation€law);€Pendergrass€v.€Card€Care€Inc.,€333€N.C.€233,€424ÏS.E.2d€391,€395€(1993)€(stating€dual€capacity€doctrine€might€exist€in€North€Carolina€butÏrefusing€to€apply€dual€capacity€doctrine€on€facts€before€court);€Quinn€v.€National€GypsumÏCo.,€124€N.H.€418,€469€A.2d€1368,€1369„70€(1983)€(per€curiam)€(rejecting€products€liabilityÏclaim€against€employer);€Schlenk€v.€Aerial€Contractors,€Inc.,€268€N.W.2d€466,€474€(N.D.Ï1978)€(stating€"the€North€Dakota€Workmen's€Compensation€Act€does€not€permit€theÏapplication€of€the€dual€capacity€theory");€VerBouwens€v.€Hamm€Wood€Prods.,€334€N.W.2dÏ874,€876€(S.D.€1983)€(refusing€to€apply€dual€capacity€theory€against€employer€as€theÏdesigner€and€manufacturer€of€an€allegedly€dangerous€saw);€Hunsaker€v.€State,€870€P.2d€893,Ï899€(Utah€1993)€(refusing€to€apply€dual€capacity€but€stating€it€is€a€possibility€that€some€formÏof€the€dual€capacity€doctrine€might€be€able€to€coexist€with€the€Utah€workers'€compensationÏscheme).(;³´$´´Ô2 eÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à ÅÝ ƒÿ´$ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹æ{‹‹‹Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›The€separate€document,€beneath€the€caption€of€the€action,€should€in€substance€read:Ð ° ÐÌà@\\ìà"Judgment€on€Jury€VerdictˆÌÌà8  àà ` à"This€action€having€come€on€for€trial€before€the€Court€and€a€jury,€theÏundersigned€judge€presiding,€and€the€issues€having€been€duly€tried€and€theÏjury€having€duly€rendered€its€special€verdict,Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"It€is€Ordered€and€Adjudged:Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"That€the€plaintiff,€Phyllis€R.€Kirson,€recover€of€the€defendants,ÏSuburban€Hospital,€Inc.,€Mary€Beth€Smith,€Mary€Anderson,€and€AparangiÐ °   ÐPaul,€jointly€and€severally,€the€sum€of€$130,500,€with€interest€and€costs;€andÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"That€the€plaintiff€take€nothing€against€the€defendant,€Carol€Stephens,Ïthat€the€action€be€dismissed€on€the€merits€as€to€said€defendant,€and€that€theÏdefendant,€Carol€Stephens,€recover€of€the€plaintiff,€Phyllis€R.€Kirson,€herÏcosts.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€€€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€/s/€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ x  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à€€€€€€€JudgeÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€€€__________________________Ìà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à€€€€€€(Date)"ÌÌThe€above€is€patterned€on€Federal€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure,€Form€31. 7Ý ƒÿ´$ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹æ{‹‹‹Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›Indeed,€when€the€irregularity€was€brought€to€the€attention€of€the€parties€by€the€ClerkÐ ° Ðof€this€Court,€they€cooperated€in€attempting€to€correct€the€deficiency,€first€by€having€theÏclerk€of€the€Circuit€Court€for€Montgomery€County€supplement€the€record€with€a€notice€ofÏjudgment,€which€was€not€signed€by€the€judge,€and€then€by€having€the€trial€judge€"approve"Ïand€sign€the€special€verdict€sheet,€which€was€not€a€judgment. ÏÝ ƒÿ´$ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹æ{‹‹‹Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›Kirson€makes€three€additional€submissions€designed€to€prevent€review€in€this€caseÐ ° Ðof€the€question€of€law€concerning€the€dual€capacity€theory.€€First,€she€contends€thatÏemployer's€immunity€should€have€been€pleaded€specially,€but€it€is€not€an€affirmative€defenseÏenumerated€in€Md.€Rule€2„323(g).€€òòSeeóó€Ben€Lewis€Plumbing,€Heating€&€Air€Conditioning,Ð ° ÐInc.€v.€Liberty€Mut.€Ins.€Co.,€354€Md.€452,€463„67,€731€A.2d€904,€911„13€(1999).€€ÌÐ °   Ðà  àKirson€also€contends€that€counsel€for€Suburban€waived€the€employer's€immunity€atÏa€hearing€on€a€discovery€dispute€held€when€Kirson€was€attempting€to€identify€potentialÏdefendants€in€order€to€amend€the€complaint€before€the€statute€of€limitations€had€run.€€InÏcolloquy€with€the€court€Suburban's€counsel€said:€€"I€mean,€there€are€people€who€had€variousÏlayers€of€responsibility.€€To€the€extent€that,€of€those€people€[who]€were€negligent,€we€willÏstipulate€that€Suburban€Hospital€was€liable€for€their€negligence."€€In€context,€the€statementÏcannot€be€related€to€employer's€immunity€and€there€is€no€voluntary€waiver€of€a€known€right.€ÏIndeed,€the€circuit€court€instructed€the€jury€that€Suburban€would€be€vicariously€liable€if€theÏjury€found€any€of€the€individual€employee€defendants€liable.€ÌÌà  àKirson's€remaining€preliminary€contention€is€that€Suburban€did€not€seek€to€haveÏemployer€immunity€submitted€to€the€jury.€€The€contention€is€patently€frivolous.€€The€circuitÏcourt€made€plain,€as€reviewed€in€Part€I,€òòsupraóó,€that€the€exclusivity€defense€did€not€involveÐ x  Ðthe€jury. dÝ ƒLJ!ÝÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€‹f-‹‹‹ÔÑ  ÑÝ  Ý›òòSuburban€Hospital,€Inc.€et€al€v.€Phyllis€R.€¢Kirson£óó,€No.€2,€September€Term,€2000.Ð ° ÐÌÓÓÌ[Civil€Procedure€„€Appeals;€Torts€„€Workers'€Compensation€Exclusivity€Defense.€ÏRequirement€under€Rule€2„601€for€entry€of€judgment€on€separate€document,€signed€byÏjudge,€following€special€jury€verdict,€held:€€waived.€€Tort€action€by€hospital€employeeÏagainst€employer€for€malpractice€in€treatment€of€work„related€injury€held:€€barred€byÏemployer's€immunity.€€"Dual€capacity"€doctrine€rejected.]ÌÓÓÌÌÐ  ° ÐÑ  ÑÔ‡ˆÆ]ˆ‹‹f-ÔòòCircuit€Court€for€Montgomery€CountyÐ ° ÐCase€No.€Civil€154534óóÐ |Ì ÐÒ„°ÒÒÀ°ÒòòIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€MARYLANDóóÐ H˜ ÐÌà@——8ŠàNo.€2ˆÌÌà@££0ŠàSeptember€Term,€2000ˆÌ_________________________________________ÌÌà@ýý/ŠàSUBURBAN€HOSPITAL,€INC.ˆÌà@¸¸7Šàet€al.ˆÌÌà@889Šàv.ˆÌÌà@——2ŠàPHYLLIS€R.€KIRSONˆÌ_________________________________________ÌÌà  àBell,€C.J.Ìà  àEldridgeÌ€€€€€€€€€*RodowskyÌà  àRakerÌà  àWilnerÌà  àCathellÌà  àHarrell,€ÌÌà  àà p àà È àJJ.€ÌÌ_________________________________________ÌÌà@77/ŠàOpinion€by€Rodowsky,€J.ˆÌ________________________________________ÌÌà  àFiled:ñ˜"ñ€€€December€8,€2000ñ˜"ñÌÌÔ#†‹f-‹ˆˆ¦#ÔÔ‡Šf-‹‹‹f-Ô*Rodowsky,€J.,€now€retired,€participated€in€theÐ H&˜!" Ðhearing€and€conference€of€this€case€while€an€activeÏmember€of€this€Court;€after€being€recalled€pursuantÏto€the€Constitution,€Article€IV,€Section€3A,€he€alsoÏparticipated€in€the€decision€and€adoption€of€thisÏopinion.Ô#†‹f-‹‹Šf-/#ÔÔ‡ˆˆ‹‹f-ÔÐ  H+˜&' ÐÒ°ÀÒÒ°„ÒÑ€ÑÑ8€f-‹d‹‹d8ÑØØÑ = ÑÔ#†‹f-‹ˆˆŒ#ÔÓÓà  àMaryland€Code€(1991),€Title€9€of€the€Labor€and€Employment€Article€(LE)€is€theÐ ° ÐMaryland€Workers'€Compensation€Act€(the€Act).€€LE€ðð€9„509€in€part€provides:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"(a)à ¸ àòòEmployersóó.„„Except€as€otherwise€provided€in€this€title,€theÐ ° Ðliability€of€an€employer€under€this€title€is€exclusive.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"(b)à ¸ àòòCovered€employees€and€dependentsóó.„„Except€as€otherwiseÐ °  Ðprovided€in€this€title,€the€compensation€provided€under€this€title€to€a€coveredÏemployee€or€the€dependents€of€a€covered€employee€is€in€place€of€any€right€ofÏaction€against€any€person."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓ3 ÓWe€granted€certiorari€in€this€action€primarily€to€determine€whether€an€employer„hospitalÏenjoys€the€exclusivity€defense€under€ðð€9„509€where€the€employer€is€sued€by€an€employee€forÏtort€damages€for€personal€injuries€resulting€from€the€negligent€medical€treatment€of€a€work„¼related€injury.€€The€Court€of€Special€Appeals,€applying€the€"dual€capacity"€theory,€deniedÏthe€defense.€€òòSuburban€Hosp.€v.€Kirsonóó,€128€Md.€App.€533,€552,€739€A.2d€875,€885€(1999).€Ð ° ÐThat€court€viewed€the€employer€"in€its€capacity€as€an€employer€and€...€in€its€capacity€as€aÏhealth€care€provider€as€discrete€legal€entities€with€no€necessary€relationship€to€each€other."€ÏòòId.óó€at€547,€739€A.2d€at€882.Ð ° Ðà  àIn€addition€to€the€above€issue€of€substantive€law,€the€record€in€this€case€also€revealsÏa€failure€to€comply€with€the€separate€document€requirement€for€the€entry€of€judgment€under€ÏMd.€Rule€2„601.€€Nevertheless,€we€shall€hold€in€Part€II,€òòinfraóó,€that€there€is€appellateÐ °$  Ðjurisdiction.€€With€respect€to€the€merits€of€the€principal€question,€we€shall€hold€in€Part€IV.C,Ð °&"" Ðòòinfraóó,€that€workers'€compensation€is€the€employee's€exclusive€remedy€against€the€employer„Ð °($$ Ðâ âhospital€for€the€negligent€care.€€Ð °*&&=T Ðà@ÈÈ*ìàÔ&  Ôâ âIˆÌà  àThe€employer,€Suburban€Hospital,€Inc.€(Suburban),€Ô'xºÔis€a€petitioner€and€cross„¼respondent€in€this€Court.€€The€employee,€Phyllis€R.€Kirson€(Kirson),€is€the€respondent€andÏcross„petitioner.€€Kirson€fractured€her€right€femur€when,€on€August€6,€1993,€she€slipped€andÏfell€in€the€operating€room€at€Suburban€while€she€was€working€as€a€nurse.€€She€wasÏimmediately€taken€to€the€Suburban€emergency€room€and€then€admitted€to€that€hospital.€€TheÏnext€day€Kirson€underwent€surgical€repair€which€involved€the€insertion€of€a€metal€plate€andÏscrews€at€the€break€point,€just€above€the€total€prosthesis€that€had€replaced€Kirson's€right€kneeÏin€1991.€Ìà  àOn€August€13,€1993,€Kirson,€while€recuperating€from€the€August€7€surgery,€fell€inÏher€hospital€room€at€Suburban.€€It€is€undisputed€before€us€that€the€immediate€cause€of€theÏfall€of€August€13€was€the€negligence€of€Aparangi€Paul€(Paul),€a€patient€care€technician€whoÏis€a€petitioner€in€this€Court.€€Nor€is€there€any€dispute€over€Suburban's€vicarious€liability€forÏthe€negligence€of€Paul€if€Suburban€does€not€enjoy€the€exclusivity€defense.€€At€the€time€ofÏthe€August€13€fall€one€of€the€cross„respondents,€Mary€Beth€Smith€(Smith),€was€the€nurseÏassigned€to€Kirson,€and€the€remaining€cross„respondent,€Mary€Anderson€(Anderson),€wasÏthe€charge€nurse€on€duty.€€Their€tort€liability€is€disputed.€€Ìà  àMany€complications€followed€Kirson's€falls.€€Suburban,€a€self„insurer€for€workers'Ïcompensation,€paid€Kirson€temporary€total€disability€compensation€from€August€7,€1993,Ïto€May€10,€1995.€€Following€a€hearing,€the€Workers'€Compensation€Commission€(theÐ x,&& ÐCommission),€by€an€order€dated€November€29,€1996,€found€that€Kirson€had€sustained€anÏaccidental€injury€arising€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€her€employment€on€August€6,€1993.€€TheÏCommission€ordered€that€Suburban€pay€129€weeks€of€permanent€partial€disabilityÏcompensation€and€that€the€Subsequent€Injury€Fund€then€pay€146€weeks.€€The€CommissionÏordered€Suburban€to€pay€all€medical€expenses.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Рx Ðà  àThe€present€tort€action€was€filed€on€July€11,€1996,€accompanied€by€a€waiver€ofÏarbitration€under€the€Health€Claims€Arbitration€Act.€€It€is€sufficient€for€present€purposes€toÏconsider€that€the€defendants,€as€named€in€an€amended€complaint€filed€on€August€6,€1996,Ïwere€Suburban,€Anderson,€Smith,€Paul,€and€one€Carol€Stephens€(Stephens)€who€is€not€aÏparty€to€this€appeal.Ìà  àSuburban€first€raised€the€exclusivity€defense€in€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€filedÏsixteen€months€before€trial.€€Anderson€and€Smith€joined€in€the€motion,€contending€that€theyÏwere€entitled€to€the€defense€because€of€their€supervisory€positions.€€In€opposition€KirsonÏargued€the€possible€lack€of€a€causal€connection€between€the€August€6€and€August€13€falls,Ïand€she€also€argued€the€dual€capacity€doctrine.€€The€circuit€court,€uncertain€whether€anyÏfacts€that€might€be€in€dispute€were€material,€denied€the€motion.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð x$ Ðà  àAbout€two€weeks€before€trial€Suburban€renewed€its€motion€for€summary€judgmentÏon€exclusivity€grounds.€€In€essence€it€contended€that€the€general€facts€that€we€have€set€forthÏabove€were€the€only€material€facts.€€Kirson€again€argued€the€absence€of€a€causal€connectionÏbetween€the€fall€of€the€thirteenth€and€that€of€the€sixth,€and€she€again€argued€dual€capacity.€ÏIn€colloquy€with€counsel€at€that€hearing€the€court,€in€part,€observed:€€ÌÓÓà8  à"The€injury€that€[Kirson]€suffered€on€August€13,€it€is€clear€to€me,€is€a€directÏresult„„I€mean,€she€is€there€being€treated€for€the€injury€that€occurred€on€AugustÏ6th.€€So,€therefore,€Suburban€Hospital,€as€the€employer„„not€as€the€hospital,Ïbut€as€the€employer„„benefits€from€the€exclusivity€provision€of€the€[Act]."€Ð Ð Ð  Ðâ âÐ x ÐÓÓObserving€that€"even€though€[it€had]€a€difficult€time€finding€a€material€fact€that€would€allowÏthe€hospital€to€remain€in€this€lawsuit,"€the€circuit€court€denied€the€motion,€saying,€"I€amÏgoing€to€let€it€go€to€the€jury€or€at€least€we€will€start€the€jury€trial€with€everybody€in€it."€Ìâ âà  àAt€that€same€hearing€Kirson€moved€òòin€limineóó€to€prevent€any€mention€of€workers'Ð x  Ðcompensation,€opening€her€argument€by€saying,€"If€they€are€going€to€defend€this€on€theÏexclusivity€doctrine„„."€€The€court,€however,€interrupted€and€ruled,€"That€is€a€legal€issue;€thatÏis€not€something€that€should€be€before€the€jury."€€When€Suburban€then€argued€that€it€shouldÏbe€entitled€to€demonstrate€that€it€had€paid€$186,000€in€compensation,€the€court€ruled€that€thisÏevidence€was€barred€by€the€collateral€source€rule.€€The€court€stated,€"I€am€not€going€toÏpermit€anything€before€the€jury€as€to€the€amount€of€compensation€that€has€been€paid€throughÏthe€[Act]."€Ìà  àAccordingly,€the€action€went€to€trial€before€the€jury€as€one€involving€a€claim€ofÏnegligently€inflicted€injury€(August€13)€superimposed€on€a€pre„existing€condition€(the€breakÏin€the€femur€of€August€6).€€Ìà  àAt€trial€Kirson€gave€the€following€description€of€the€fall€of€August€13.€€Shortly€afterÏbreakfast€Paul€and€a€nurse,€whom€Kirson€believed€to€be€Smith,€responded€to€Kirson's€callÏbutton.€€Kirson€wanted€to€use€the€bedside€commode.€€As€she€sat€up€at€the€edge€of€her€bed,ÏKirson€told€the€two€caregivers€that€she€was€"'a€little€light„headed.'"€€The€two€assisted€KirsonÏto€the€commode€and€told€Kirson€to€push€the€button€when€she€was€ready€to€return€to€bed€andÏsomeone€would€return€to€assist€her.€€After€using€the€commode,€Kirson€again€pushed€the€callÐ x,&& Ðbutton,€and€only€Paul€responded.€€Before€Kirson€stood€up€she€told€Paul,€"'I€still€feel€a€littleÏdizzy.'"€€Paul€told€Kirson€to€"'wait€a€minute.'"€€From€a€corner€of€the€hospital€room€PaulÏobtained€a€walker€that€had€not€been€adjusted€for€Kirson's€use.€€Paul€placed€the€walkerÏdirectly€in€front€of€Kirson€so€that€she€could€stand€while€using€the€walker€for€support.€€WhenÏKirson€stood,€Paul€took€the€container€out€of€the€commode€and€started€toward€the€bathroomÏto€empty€the€container's€contents.€€When€Paul€was€about€six€feet€from€Kirson,€the€latterÏexclaimed,€"'Oh,€I€feel€dizzy.'"€€Kirson€stated€that€she€then€reached€for€the€walker,€"but€itÏwas€too€high€to€...€support€and€it€toppled,€and€I€went€and€it€went,€and€I€began€to€scream€...."€Ìà  àKirson's€principal€orthopedic€surgeon,€Dr.€Antoni€B.€Goral,€testified€as€her€medicalÏexpert.€€In€the€days€following€the€fall€of€August€13€he€had€noted€a€progressive€loss€ofÏfixation€of€the€plate€that€had€been€inserted€to€mend€the€broken€femur€sustained€in€the€AugustÏ6€fall.€€In€order€to€correct€this€condition,€that€in€his€opinion€was€caused€by€the€fall€of€AugustÏ13,€€revision€surgery€was€required.€€On€August€26€the€surgeon€entered€through€the€sameÏincision€line€made€in€the€open€reduction€of€the€broken€femur.€€Dr.€Goral€moved€the€existingÏplate€lower,€toward€the€replacement€knee,€and€drilled€three€new€holes€for€screws.€€ThisÏprocedure€involved€a€risk€of€bursitis,€but€the€risk€was€unavoidable.€€Kirson€was€dischargedÏfrom€Suburban€on€October€8,€1993.Ìà  àIn€February€1994€she€was€diagnosed€with€implant€related€bursitis.€€In€Dr.€Goral'sÏopinion€the€bursitis€was€caused€by€dropping€the€plate€down€close€to€the€femur€prominenceÏwhich€caused€soft€tissue€to€rub€on€the€plate.€€He€recommended€removal€of€certain€screwsÐ x,&& Ðfrom€the€plate€which€was€done€on€March€18,€1994.€€Cultures€taken€at€that€time€from€the€siteÏof€the€surgery€were€negative€for€any€infection.€€Ìà  àIn€September€1994€Dr.€Goral€again€operated€on€Kirson€to€replace€the€artificial€rightÏknee€in€order€to€lessen€an€outward€bowing.€€While€removing€the€artificial€knee€he€found€anÏinfection,€later€identified€as€a€staph€epidemitis€infection.€€Dr.€Goral€could€not€proceed€withÏinserting€a€new€replacement€knee.€€He€filled€the€knee€cavity€with€antibiotic€cement€andÏplaced€Kirson€on€a€program€of€antibiotics€to€clear€the€infection.€€When€that€wasÏaccomplished€a€new€replacement€knee€was€inserted€on€October€24,€1994.€€Kirson€wasÏdischarged€from€the€hospital€in€November.€€In€Dr.€Goral's€opinion€the€infection€resultedÏfrom€the€operation€of€March€18,€1994,€which€was€required€by€the€bursitis€caused€by€theÏAugust€26,€1993€operation,€which,€in€turn,€was€necessitated€by€the€August€13,€1993€fall.Ìà  àDr.€Goral€opined€that,€but€for€the€August€13€fall,€€Kirson€could€have€returned€to€workÏas€an€operating€room€nurse€in€six€to€nine€months€after€the€August€6,€1993€fall,€and€that€aÏreasonable€period€of€physical€therapy€for€the€broken€femur€suffered€on€August€6€would€haveÏbeen€three€months€from€that€date.€Ìà  àBased€on€this€evidence€Kirson€argued€to€the€jury€that€damages€by€way€of€lost€incomeÏshould€be€measured€from€the€time€when€Kirson€could€have€returned€to€work,€had€the€fall€ofÏAugust€13€not€occurred,€to€the€time€when€she€actually€did€return.€€Kirson€also€submitted€thatÏâ âher€medical€expenses€should€be€measured€by€the€cost€of€services€rendered€after€August€13,Ð x*$$ Ð1993,€less€the€cost€of€such€services€that€would€have€been€rendered€in€any€event€in€order€toÏtreat€the€injuries€from€the€fall€on€August€6.Ìâ âà  àThe€action€was€submitted€to€the€jury€on€special€interrogatories.€€Instructions€to€theÏjury€included€a€direction€to€find€against€Suburban€if€any€individual€defendant€were€foundÏto€be€negligent.€€The€jury€found€for€Kirson€against€all€of€the€defendants,€other€than€Stephens,Ïand€awarded€Kirson€past€medical€expenses,€past€loss€of€earnings,€and€non„economicÏdamages€totaling€$130,500.€Ìà  àThe€defendants€filed€a€number€of€post„judgment€motions€that€are€relevant€to€thisÏcertiorari€review.€€Suburban,€Anderson,€and€Smith€moved€for€judgment€notwithstanding€theÏverdict€(JNwV)€based€on€exclusivity.€€The€latter€two€also€sought€a€JNwV€for€insufficiencyÏof€the€evidence.€€Suburban,€joined€by€Paul,€alternatively€argued€that€the€verdict€should€beÏreduced€by€the€amount€paid€to€Kirson€under€the€Act.€€The€circuit€court€granted€Anderson'sÏJNwV€motion€and€denied€all€other€defense€motions.€€Suburban,€Smith,€and€Paul€appealedÏto€the€Court€of€Special€Appeals€from€the€judgment€against€them,€and€Kirson€cross€appealedÏfrom€the€judgment€in€favor€of€Anderson.Ìà  àThe€Court€of€Special€Appeals€affirmed€as€to€Suburban,€Paul,€and€Anderson€andÏreversed€as€to€Smith,€òòi.e.óó,€Suburban€and€Paul€were€liable€and€Anderson€and€Smith€were€notÐ x&  Ðliable.€€With€respect€to€Suburban's€exclusivity€defense,€the€court€held€that€LE€ðð€9„509Ïapplied€only€to€the€work„related€accidental€injury€of€August€6.€€òòSuburban€Hosp.óó,€128€Md.Ð x*$$ ÐApp.€at€544,€739€A.2d€at€881.€€The€court€stated€that€Ð x,&& ÐÓÓà8  à"Suburban€Hospital€cannot€remotely€claim€that€it€was€a€matter€of€undisputedÏfact€that€the€hospital€fall€of€August€13€and€all€of€its€sequellae€were€nothing€Ïbut€an€aggravation€of€the€work„related€injury€of€August€6.€€Except€for€theÏlogical€fallacy€of€'òòPost€hoc,€ergo€propter€hocóó,'€there€was€no€indication€of€anyÐ x  Ðsuch€connection.€€There€was,€moreover,€extensive€evidence€to€the€contrary."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€545,€739€A.2d€at€881.Ð x  Ðà  àDiscussing€the€dual€capacity€theory€the€court€principally€cited€cases€from€California,ÏOhio,€and€Illinois.€€The€court€concluded:ÌÓÓà8  à"[Suburban]€was€involved€in€an€employer„employee€relationship€with€KirsonÏas€far€as€any€workers'€compensation€claim€for€the€August€6€fall€wasÏconcerned.€€It€was€involved€in€a€very€different€hospital„patient€relationshipÏwith€Kirson€as€far€as€the€August€13€fall€was€concerned."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€552,€739€A.2d€at€885.€€The€court€also€rejected€Suburban's€(and€Paul's)€"remittitur"Ð x Ðargument,€reasoning€that,€under€the€dual€capacity€theory,€two€separate€events€had€occurredÏand€the€judgment€against€Suburban€in€one€capacity€could€not€be€reduced€by€payments€madeÏby€Suburban€in€a€different€capacity.€€òòId.óó€at€558„60,€739€A.2d€at€888„89.Ð x Ðà  àReviewing€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€as€to€the€negligence€of€Smith,€the€CourtÏof€Special€Appeals€concluded€that€a€JNwV€should€have€been€granted€in€her€favor.€€òòId.óó€atÐ x! Ð553„54,€739€A.2d€at€885„86.€€On€Kirson's€cross€appeal,€the€judgment€in€favor€of€AndersonÏwas€affirmed.€€òòId.óó€at€564„67,€739€A.2d€at€892„93.€€Additional€facts€with€respect€to€the€roleÐ x% Ðof€these€two€nurses€will€be€addressed€in€Parts€V€and€VI,€òòinfraóó.Ð x'!! Ðà  àSuburban€petitioned€this€Court€for€a€writ€of€certiorari€asserting€the€exclusivity€defenseÏand,€alternatively,€the€right€to€setoff€against€any€judgment€the€amount€of€compensation€andÏmedicals€paid€under€the€Act.€€Paul€has€petitioned€us€asserting€that€she€is€entitled€to€aÐ x-'' Ð"remittitur."€€Kirson€has€cross€petitioned€challenging€the€judgments€in€favor€of€AndersonÏand€Smith.€€We€granted€all€of€these€petitions.Ìà  àOn€the€merits€Suburban€contends€that€it€was€obligated€under€the€Act€to€payÏcompensation€for€the€injuries€flowing€from€the€fall€of€August€13€because€those€injuriesÏresulted€from€malpractice€in€the€treatment€of€the€injury€sustained€in€the€August€6€fall.€ÏKirson€counters€that€the€rule€relied€on€by€Suburban€applies€only€if€there€is€causation€in€factÏand€that€there€is€a€dispute€of€material€fact€whether€the€August€13€fall€was€physically€causedÏby€the€injuries€of€August€6.Ìà  àIf€Suburban€is€obligated€to€pay€compensation€for€injuries€resulting€from€the€negligentÏtreatment€of€a€work„related€accidental€injury,€then€Suburban€contends€that€it€enjoys€theÏexclusivity€defense.€€Kirson,€on€the€other€hand,€asserts€that€the€dual€capacity€theoryÏnevertheless€permits€the€tort€action.Ìà  àIf€Suburban€enjoys€no€exclusivity€defense€as€to€injuries€resulting€from€the€negligentÏtreatment€of€the€work„related€accidental€injury€of€August€6,€then€Suburban€contends€that€itÏis€entitled€to€a€reduction€in€the€verdict€by€the€amount€of€compensation€and€medical€benefitsÏthat€it€paid€under€the€Act.€€Kirson€contends€that€the€August€13€fall€is€a€separate€accidentÏwhich€does€not€give€rise€to€a€lien€or€subrogation€claim€for€compensation€paid€for€the€AugustÏâ â6€fall.€€Under€our€holdings€in€Parts€III€and€¢IV.C£,€òòinfraóó,€we€do€not€reach€the€latter€issues.€€Ð x("" Ðà  àFinally,€Kirson€contends€that€Smith€and€Anderson€were€proven€to€be€negligent€byÏlegally€sufficient€evidence.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð x Ðâ âà@¤¤)ìàÔ&  ÔIIˆÌà  àThe€question€of€appellate€jurisdiction€arises€out€Ô'KÔof€the€following€facts.€€As€amendedÏeffective€October€1,€1997,€Maryland€Rule€2„601(a)€requires€that€"[¢e]ach£€judgment€shall€beÏset€forth€on€a€separate€document."€€Where,€as€here,€the€action€is€tried€to€a€jury€which€rendersÏa€special€verdict,€"the€court€shall€promptly€review€the€form€of€the€judgment€presented€and,Ïif€approved,€sign€it,€and€the€clerk€shall€forthwith€enter€the€judgment€as€approved€andÏsigned."€€òòId.óó€€Accordingly,€we€would€expect€to€find€a€separate€document€substantially€in€theÐ x Ðform€set€forth€in€the€margin,€but€we€do€not.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð x Ðà  àThe€October€1997€changes€to€Rule€2„601€were€made€at€the€request€of€this€Court€toÏthe€Rules€Committee€that€the€Maryland€rule€be€patterned€on€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€58.€€TheÏlanguage€of€Md.€Rule€2„602(a),€as€adopted,€is€borrowed,€with€style€changes,€from€Fed.€R.ÏCiv.€P.€58.€€òòByrum€v.€Horningóó,€360€Md.€23,€25„26,€756€A.2d€560,€561€(2000).€€The€purposeÐ x  Ðof€the€federal€rule,€according€to€the€notes€of€the€Advisory€Committee€on€the€Federal€RulesÏof€Civil€Procedure,€was€to€eliminate€uncertainty€as€to€when€a€purported€entry€of€judgmentÏwas€effective.€€òòId.óó€at€26„27,€756€A.2d€at€561.Ð x  Ðà  àThe€law€that€has€developed€in€the€federal€courts€under€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€58€hasÏestablished€clearly€that€an€appellate€court,€in€order€to€preserve€the€right€of€appeal,€mayÏconsider€the€separate€document€requirement€to€have€been€waived.€€òòSeeóó€òòBankers€Trust€Co.Ð x Ðv.€Mallisóó,€435€U.S.€381,€387„88,€98€S.€Ct.€1117,€1121,€55€L.€Ed.€2d€357,€363€(1978)€(perÐ x Ðcuriam).€€There€the€action€apparently€had€been€dismissed€by€the€district€court,€but€it€failedÐ x Ðto€create€"'any€document€that€¢look[ed£]€like€a€judgment.'"€€òòId.óó€at€382,€98€S.€Ct.€at€1119,€55Ð x ÐL.€Ed.€2d€at€360€(quoting€òòMallis€v.€Federal€Deposit€Ins.€Corp.óó,€568€F.2d€824,€827€n.4€(2dÐ x ÐCir.€1977)).€€The€Supreme€Court€assumed,€without€deciding,€that€the€separate€documentÏrequirement€must€be€met€in€order€for€an€appellate€court€to€have€jurisdiction€over€the€matter.€ÏBut,€the€Court€continued€by€stating,€"We€nonetheless€conclude€that€it€could€not€have€beenÏintended€that€the€separate„document€requirement€of€Rule€58€be€such€a€categorical€imperativeÏthat€the€parties€are€not€free€to€waive€it."€€òòId.óó€at€384,€98€S.€Ct.€at€1119„20,€55€L.€Ed.€2d€at€361.€Ð x  ÐThe€Court€continued€by€stating€the€following:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"The€separate„document€requirement€was€thus€intended€to€avoid€theÏinequities€that€were€inherent€when€a€party€appealed€from€a€document€orÏdocket€entry€that€appeared€to€be€a€final€judgment€of€the€district€court€only€toÏhave€the€appellate€court€announce€later€that€an€earlier€document€or€entry€hadÏbeen€the€judgment€and€dismiss€the€appeal€as€untimely.€€The€1963€amendmentÏto€Rule€58€made€clear€that€a€party€need€not€file€a€notice€of€appeal€until€aÏseparate€judgment€has€been€filed€and€entered.€€See€òòUnited€States€v.Ð x ÐIndrelunasóó,€411€U.S.€216,€220„222,€93€S.€Ct.€1562,€1564„1565,€36€L.€Ed.€2dÐ x Ð202,€[206]€(1973)€[(per€curiam)].€€Certainty€as€to€timeliness,€however,€is€notÏadvanced€by€holding€that€appellate€jurisdiction€does€not€exist€absent€a€separateÏjudgment.€€If,€by€error,€a€separate€judgment€is€not€filed€before€a€party€appeals,Ïnothing€but€delay€would€flow€from€requiring€the€court€of€appeals€to€dismissÏthe€appeal.€€Upon€dismissal,€the€district€court€would€simply€file€and€enter€theÏseparate€judgment,€from€which€a€timely€appeal€would€then€be€taken.€€WheelsÏwould€spin€for€no€practical€purpose."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€385,€98€S.€Ct.€at€1120,€55€L.€Ed.€2d€at€361„62€(footnotes€omitted).€€The€Court€held€thatÐ x&  Ðthe€federal€court€of€appeals€properly€could€proceed€with€the€appeal€because€the€district€courtÏclearly€evinced€its€intent€that€the€opinion€and€order€from€which€the€appeal€was€takenÏconstituted€the€final€decision€in€the€case,€a€judgment€of€dismissal€was€recorded€on€the€clerk'sÐ x,&& Ðdocket,€and€neither€party€objected€to€the€taking€of€the€appeal€in€the€absence€of€a€separateÏdocument.€€òòId.óó€at€387„88,€98€S.€Ct.€at€1121,€55€L.€Ed.€2d€at€363.€€Appellate€jurisdiction€overÐ x Ðthe€matter€existed,€and€the€parties€had€waived€the€separate€document€requirement.€€òòId.óóÐ x  Ðà  àThe€federal€courts€of€appeals€uniformly€have€held€that€the€separate€documentÏrequirement€has€been€waived€where€the€district€court€clearly€intended€its€order€to€be€the€finalÏjudgment€in€the€matter,€the€appellee€has€not€objected€to€the€failure€to€comply€with€theÏseparate€document€rule,€and€the€clerk€of€the€district€court€made€an€entry€of€judgment€on€theÏdocket.€€òòSeeóó€òòCooper€v.€Salomon€Bros.€Inc.óó,€1€F.3d€82,€86€(2d€Cir.€1993);€òòSmith€v.Ð x ÐMassachusetts€Dep't€of€Correctionóó,€936€F.2d€1390,€1395€(1st€Cir.€1991);€òòSanders€v.€ClemcoÐ x ÐIndus.óó,€863€F.2d€161,€166„67€(8th€Cir.€1988);€òòSimon€v.€City€of€Cluteóó,€825€F.2d€940,€942€(5thÐ x ÐCir.€1987);€òòVernon€v.€Heckleróó,€811€F.2d€1274,€1276„77€(9th€Cir.€1987);€òòDiamond€v.Ð x ÐMcKenzieóó,€770€F.2d€225,€231€(D.C.€Cir.€1985);€òòHanson€v.€Town€of€Flower€Moundóó,€679€F.2dÐ x Ð497,€501€(5th€Cir.€1982).Ìà  àWe€hold€that€the€separate€document€requirement€may€be€waived€under€Maryland€RuleÏ2„601.€€Without€undertaking€to€set€the€outer€limits€of€the€availability€of€waiver€of€theÏseparate€document€requirement€in€order€to€preserve€an€appeal€in€Maryland,€we€hold€thatÏthere€has€been€a€waiver€in€the€instant€matter€in€which€the€Circuit€Court€for€MontgomeryÏâ âCounty€clearly€intended€the€docket€entries€made€by€that€court's€clerk,€based€upon€the€juryÐ x("" Ðverdict,€to€be€a€final€judgment€and€where€no€party€has€objected€to€the€absence€of€a€separateÏdocument.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð x Ðâ âà  àThis€holding€was€foreshadowed€by€our€decision€in€òòByrumóó,€360€Md.€23,€756€A.2dÐ x  Ð560,€which€presented€the€converse€of€the€appellate€jurisdiction€issue€present€in€this€case.€ÏIn€òòByrumóó,€the€appellee€attempted€to€use€waiver€to€eliminate€the€separate€documentÐ x Ðrequirement€and,€thereby,€to€defeat€the€appeal€by€having€a€docket€entry€serve€as€the€entry€ofÏjudgment€so€that€the€notice€of€appeal€would€not€have€been€timely€filed.€€òòId.óó€at€32,€756€A.2dÐ x  Ðat€564.€€There€we€said:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"We€need€not€decide€in€the€instant€matter€whether€òòBankers€Trustóó€hasÐ x Ðany€application€under€Maryland€Rule€2„601€...€inasmuch€as€òòBankers€Trustóó€isÐ x Ðdistinguishable€from€the€case€at€hand.€€òòBankers€Trustóó€applied€what€[aÐ x Ðrespondent]€calls€'waiver'€òòin€order€to€preserve€the€appealóó.€€Here,€[thatÐ x Ðrespondent]€argues€waiver€in€an€effort€to€eliminate€the€requirement€of€aÏseparate€document€and€thereby€òòto€defeat€the€appealóó€by€having€the€docketÐ x Ðentries€of€July€15€serve€as€the€entry€of€judgment.€€With€respect€toÏcircumstances€analogous€to€those€before€us,€the€Court€in€òòBankers€TrustóóÐ x Ðexpressly€reaffirmed€the€rule€of€òòUnited€States€v.€Indrelunasóó,€411€U.S.€216,€93Ð x ÐS.€Ct.€1562,€36€L.€Ed.€2d€202€(1973)€(per€curiam),€according€to€which€'theÏseparate„document€rule€must€be€"mechanically€applied"€in€determiningÏwhether€an€appeal€is€timely.'€€òòBankers€Trustóó,€435€U.S.€at€386,€98€S.€Ct.€atÐ x! Ð1120,€55€L.€Ed.€2d€at€362.€€Mechanical€application€of€the€separate€documentÏrule€makes€the€Byrums'€appeal€timely."Ð Ð Ð  Ðâ âÐ x$ ÐÓÓòòId.óó€at€32,€756€A.2d€at€564„65€(emphasis€added).€€Use€of€the€waiver€doctrine€in€the€case€òòsubÐ x Ðâ âjudiceóó€fits€squarely€within€the€rationale€of€òòBankers€Trustóó€as€it€preserves€the€right€to€appealÐ x Ðwhere€no€objection€has€been€made€and€the€trial€court€clearly€intended€for€the€docket€entriesÏto€constitute€a€final€judgment.Ìà@€€)ìàÔ&  ÔIIIˆÌà  àIt€is€firmly€established€in€Maryland€law€that€Ô'x¶lÔthe€employer€must€pay€compensationÏunder€the€Act€for€the€aggravation€of€a€claimant's€medical€condition€due€to€medicalÏmalpractice€in€the€treatment€of€a€workplace€injury.€€òòMackin€&€Assocs.€v.€Harrisóó,€342€Md.Ð x Ð1,€5,€672€A.2d€1110,€1112€(1996)€("[¢C]omplications£€flowing€directly€from€treatment€of€aÏcompensable€injury€are€covered€by€the€Act,€even€if€the€complications€result€from€negligentÏmedical€treatment.");€òòYoung€v.€Hartford€Accident€&€Indem.€Co.óó,€303€Md.€182,€192,€492Ð x ÐA.2d€1270,€1275€(1985);€òòSterry€v.€Bethlehem€Steel€Corp.óó,€64€Md.€App.€175,€190„91,€494Ð x ÐA.2d€748,€756€(1985)€(Wilner,€J.,€dissenting);€òòNazario€v.€Washington€Adventist€Hosp.,€Inc.óó,Ð x Ð45€Md.€App.€243,€246,€412€A.2d€1271,€1273,€òòcert.€deniedóó,€288€Md.€740€(1980)€("[¢I]t£€isÐ x  Ðuniversally€held€that€a€[Workers']€Compensation€award€includes€any€aggravation€of€an€injuryÏwhich€may€have€occurred€through€a€physician's€or€hospital's€negligence.").Ìà  àIn€the€instant€matter€the€undisputed€medical€evidence€is€that€the€August€13€fallÏaggravated€the€injury€of€August€6€in€that€the€later€fall€loosened€the€metal€plate€that€had€beenÏinserted€above€Kirson's€right€knee.€€This,€as€described€in€the€testimony€of€Dr.€Goral,€causedÏfurther€aggravations€and€complications.€€Under€the€above€cases,€the€negligent€care€in€theÐ x,&& Ðtreatment€of€the€August€6€injury€makes€the€subsequent€aggravations€and€complications,Ïunder€the€evidence,€compensable€under€the€Act€as€results€of€the€August€6€accident€that€aroseÏout€of€and€in€the€course€of€Kirson's€employment.Ìà  àKirson,€relying€on€cases€that€do€not€involve€medical€malpractice€in€the€treatment€ofÏa€compensable€injury,€argues€that€there€must€be€causation€in€fact€between€the€two€accidentsÏfor€the€later€one€to€be€compensable.€€For€example,€in€òòMackinóó€the€claimant€had€suffered€aÐ x  Ðcompensable€injury€while€in€the€employ€of€the€respondent,€but€had€left€that€employment€byÏthe€time€of€a€second€accident€that€formed€the€basis€for€the€compensation€claim€that€was€theÏsubject€of€the€reported€case.€€The€second€accident€occurred€when€the€claimant€slipped€on€iceÏand€fell€while€walking€to€get€a€physical€therapy€treatment€for€the€original€injury.€€We€heldÏthat€there€was€"no€legally€sufficient€nexus€between€the€claimant's€occupational€injury€inÏ1989€and€his€subsequent€fall€in€1993."€€òòMackinóó,€342€Md.€at€11,€672€A.2d€at€1115.€€WeÐ x Ðannounced€"general€agreement€with€the€basic€rule€advocated€by€Professor€Larson€[1€Larson,Ð x ÐòòThe€Law€of€Workmen's€Compensationóó€ðð€13.13€¢nn£.41-47€(1993)]„„that€a€subsequent€injuryÐ x  Ðis€compensable€if€it€is€the€direct€and€material€result€of€a€compensable€primary€injury."€€òòId.óóÐ x" Ðat€7,€672€A.2d€at€1113.€€òòSee€also€Unger€&€Mahon,€Inc.€v.€Lidstonóó,€177€Md.€265,€268,€9€A.2dÐ x$ Ð604,€605„06€(1939)€(jury€question€presented€as€to€whether€sharp€pain€in€ankle,€previouslyÏinjured€at€work,€caused€claimant€to€fall€from€outside€steps€at€home,€resulting€in€broken€hip).€Ïâ âÐ x*$$ Ðà  àIn€cases€involving€negligent€medical€treatment,€however,€in€order€for€the€subsequentÏâ âinjury€to€be€compensable,€it€is€necessary€only€to€show€that€the€injury€directly€resulted€fromÏimproper€treatment€of€the€original€compensable€injury.€€In€order€to€recover€compensationÏfor€the€subsequent€injury,€it€is€not€necessary,€as€Kirson€contends,€to€split€causation€hairs.€€ÏòòSee€Radermecher€v.€FMC€Corp.óó,€375€N.W.2d€809,€812€(Minn.€1985)€(malignant€melanomasÐ x Ðcompensable€where€causally€related€to€prolonged€exposure€to€ultraviolet€light€used€inÏtreatment€of€dermatitis€resulting€from€working€with€hot€wax€vapors€in€chrome€platingÏprocess);€òòShoemaker€v.€Workmen's€Compensation€Appeal€Bd.óó,€145€Pa.€Cmmw.€667,€604Ð x ÐA.2d€1145,€1146€(1992)€(AIDS€compensable€where€substantial€evidence€supported€findingÏthat€it€resulted€from€blood€transfusions€received€during€surgery€in€treatment€of€fracturedÏpelvis,€knee,€and€left€leg€incurred€in€work„related€motor€vehicle€accident);€òòAmericanÐ x ÐFiltrona€Co.€v.€Hanfordóó,€16€Va.€App.€159,€428€S.E.2d€511,€513€(1993)€(hepatitisÐ x Ðcompensable€if€resulted€from€a€blood€transfusion€necessitated€by€industrial€accident).€ÏKirson's€medical€malpractice€injury€is€sufficiently€connected€to€the€original€compensableÏinjury€because€the€medical€malpractice€injury€arose€during€the€course€of€treatment€of€theÏoriginal€compensable€injury.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð x$ Ðà@yy)ìàÔ&  ÔIVˆÌà@*ìàAˆÌà  àWe€turn€then€to€whether€the€theory€of€dual€capacity,€Ô'ÍÔas€described€and€applied€by€theÏCourt€of€Special€Appeals,€should€be€embraced€as€part€of€Maryland€law.€€The€subject€of€"dualÏcapacity"€seemingly€is€best€to€be€approached€by€a€survey€of€the€legal€landscape€as€seenÏthrough€the€eyes€of€the€authors€of€1€A.€Larson,€òòLarson's€Workers'€Compensation€Lawóó,€Chs.Ð x  Ð112€and€113€(2000€ed.)€(Larson).€€Larson€rejects€the€dual€capacity€theory,€òòeo€nomineóó,Ð x  Ðbecause€it€has€come€to€mean€a€single€legal€person€acting€in€different€capacities€so€that€"a€fewÏcourts€have€stretched€the€doctrine€so€far€as€to€destroy€employer€immunity€whenever€thereÏwas,€not€a€separate€legal€person,€but€merely€a€separate€relationship€or€theory€of€liability."€€Ïâ âLarson€ðð€113.01[2],€at€113„2.€€Larson€states:Ð x ÐÓÓà8  àà ` à"When€one€considers€how€many€such€added€relations€an€employerÏâ âmight€have€in€the€course€of€a€day's€work„„as€landowner,€land€occupier,Ïproducts€manufacturer,€installer,€modifier,€vendor,€bailor,€repairman,€vehicleÏowner,€shipowner,€òòdoctoróó,€òòhospitalóó,€òòhealth€services€provideróó,€self„insurer,Ð x  Ðsafety€inspector„„it€is€plain€enough€that€this€trend€could€go€a€long€way€towardÏdemolishing€the€exclusive€remedy€principle."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€(emphasis€added).Ð x  Ðà  àTo€describe€when€immunity€properly€is€not€available€Larson€substitutes€the€termÏ"dual€persona."€€ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"The€choice€of€the€term€'persona'€...€is€dictated€by€the€literal€languageÏof€the€typical€third„party€statute,€which€usually€defines€a€third€party,€in€the€firstÏinstance,€as€'a€person€other€than€the€employer.'€€This€is€quite€different€from€'aÏperson€acting€in€a€capacity€other€than€that€of€employer.'€€The€question€is€notÏone€of€activity€or€relationship„„it€is€one€of€identity.€€The€Tennessee€SupremeÏCourt€[òòMcAlister€v.€Methodist€Hosp.€of€Memphisóó,€550€S.W.2d€240,€246Ð x Ð(Tenn.€1977)],€brushing€aside€all€the€fictitious€sophistry€of€'dual€capacity,'Ïnailed€down€this€point€with€breathtaking€simplicity.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"'The€employer€is€the€employer;€not€some€person€other€than€theÏemployer.€€It€is€as€simple€as€that.'"Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€113„3€(footnotes€omitted).€€€Illustrative€of€separate€legal€persons€are€(1)€a€naturalÐ x Ðperson€as€an€individual€and€that€same€person€as€a€trustee€or€guardian€and€(2)€a€natural€personÏas€100%€owner€of€a€corporation€and€the€corporation.€€Larson€ðð€113.01[2]„[3],€at€113„4€toÏ113„6.€€Ìà  àThe€line€which€the€authors€would€draw€to€avoid€the€slippery€slope€of€dual€capacityÏis€based€on€duty.ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"If€the€dual€persona€doctrine€is€to€apply,€it€must€be€possible€to€say€thatÏthe€duty€arose€òòsolelyóó€from€the€òònonemployeróó€persona,€rather€than€the€other€wayÐ x,&& Ðaround.€€For€only€in€such€a€case€can€the€second€persona€be€really€distinct€fromÐ x-'' Ðthe€employer€persona.€€In€other€words,€it€is€not€enough€...€that€the€secondÏpersona€impose€òòadditionalóó€duties.€€They€must€be€totally€separate€from€andÐ x Ðunrelated€to€those€of€the€employment."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓLarson€ðð€113.01[4],€at€113„10.Ìà  àAnother€exception€to€the€exclusivity€of€workers'€compensation€arises€where€there€isÏa€single€person€involved€in€two€unrelated€transactions€with€the€employee.€€Larson€calls€thisÏthe€"dual€transaction"€doctrine.€€Larson€ðð€113.08,€at€113„24.1€to€113„26.€€One€illustrationÏis€that€of€the€plaintiff€who€is€a€clerk€in€the€defendant's€store.€€On€a€day€when€the€clerk€is€notÏworking€but€is€shopping€in€the€store,€the€clerk€is€injured€by€the€negligence€of€the€clerk€onÏduty.€€Larson€considers€that€a€€tort€action€against€the€employer€is€maintainable.€€òòId.óó€atÐ x Ð113-25.Ìà  àThe€authors€also€posit€the€following€as€a€second€example:ÌÓÓà8  à"[S]uppose€a€nurse€who€works€for€the€defendant€hospital€happens€to€beÏinvolved€in€a€weekend€accident€while€driving€past€the€hospital,€and€is€rushedÏto€[the]€hospital's€emergency€room,€where€the€alleged€malpractice€occurs.€ÏHere€again,€no€one€would€contend€that€her€suit€is€barred.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"The€facts€are€not€always€this€clear,€but€the€commonest€example€of€thisÏdistinction€is€that€involving€an€employer€who€undertakes€to€treat€an€employeeÏas€a€private€patient.€€When€the€case€involves€a€purely€private€relation€with€noÏemployment€involvement,€suit€is€usually€not€barred.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"The€fact€that€the€nonoccupational€illness€manifests€itself€duringÏworking€hours€does€not€necessarily€change€the€result,€if€it€is€clear,€as€it€was€inÏthe€Pennsylvania€case€of€òòTatraióó€[òòv.€Presbyterian€Univ.€Hosp.óó,€497€Pa.€247,Ð x("" Ð439€A.2d€1162€(1982)]€that€the€employee€is€being€treated€on€exactly€the€sameÏterms€as€any€member€of€the€public€and€is€expected€to€pay€in€the€same€way€forÏthe€service€....Ð Ð Ð  Ðâ âÐ x,&& Ðà8  àà ` à"All€[of]€this€presupposes€the€complete€absence€of€any€employerÏâ âinvolvement€beyond€the€treatment€that€would€have€been€given€to€any€memberÏof€the€public.€€If,€for€example,€it€is€the€employer's€policy€to€provide€first€aidÏor€other€care€for€even€nonoccupational€illnesses€appearing€during€theÏworkday,€the€result€may€be€different."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓLarson€ðð€113.08,€at€113„25€(footnotes€omitted).€€Ìà  àWithin€the€confines€of€the€arguments€made€to€us,€"dual€capacity,"€"dual€persona,"€andÏ"dual€transactions"€cover€the€spectrum€of€theories€which€would€avoid€the€exclusivityÏdefense.€€The€facts€of€the€instant€matter€do€not€fall€within€either€of€Larson's€examples€of€dualÏtransactions€because€Kirson€suffered€an€accidental€injury€at€work.€€Thus,€the€questionsÏpresented,€in€the€terminology€employed€by€Larson,€is€whether€this€Court€should€adopt€theÏdual€capacity€theory,€as€described€by€the€Court€of€Special€Appeals,€and,€if€we€do€not€do€so,Ïwhether€the€facts€of€this€case€satisfy€the€dual€persona€test€proposed€by€Larson,€namely,Ïwhether€the€duty€violated€by€the€employer€which€forms€the€basis€for€the€third„party€actionÏis€"totally€separate€from€and€unrelated€to€those€of€the€employment."€€Larson€ðð€113.01[3]„[4],Ïat€113„10.€€Ìà@££*ìàÔ&  ÔBˆÌà  àIn€cases€in€which€compensation€exclusivity€Ô'x"á™Ôhas€been€asserted€by€a€health€careÏprovider€in€defense€of€a€tort€suit€seeking€damages€for€aggravation€of€a€compensable€injury,Ïthe€decisions€roughly€fall€into€three€classes.€€One€group€applies€the€dual€capacity€theory,€andÏa€second€group€applies€the€defense.€€The€third€class,€represented€by€New€York€cases,€splitsÏthe€baby,€allowing€recovery€against€an€employer€who€provides€health€services€to€the€generalÐ x,&& Ðpublic€but€barring€separate€actions€where€the€aggravating€injury€is€caused€in€a€healthÏprogram€open€only€to€employees.Ìà@µµ*ìàÔ&  Ô1ˆÌà  àThe€seminal€case€applying€dual€capacity,€Ô'x nœÔòòDuprey€v.€Shaneóó,€39€Cal.€2d€781,€249€P.2dÐ x  Ð8€(1952),€was€relied€upon€by€the€Court€of€Special€Appeals.€€òòSuburban€Hosp.óó,€128€Md.€App.Ð x Ðat€548,€739€A.2d€at€883.€€The€California€court€permitted€an€employee€of€a€chiropractor€toÏbring€a€malpractice€action€against€her€employer€whose€treatment€aggravated€the€originalÏcompensable€injury.€€òòDupreyóó,€249€P.2d€at€11„13.€€Set€forth€below€is€the€California€SupremeÐ x ÐCourt's€rationale:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"It€is€our€conclusion€that€when€the€employing€doctor€elected€to€treat€theÏindustrial€injury,€the€doctor€assumed€the€responsibilities€that€any€doctor€wouldÏhave€assumed€had€he€been€called€in€on€the€case.€€As€will€be€pointed€out,€suchÏthird€party€doctor€can€be€sued€for€malpractice€resulting€in€an€aggravation€ofÏan€industrial€injury,€or€a€new€injury.€€It€follows€that€the€employer„doctor€mayÏbe€sued€for€malpractice€when€he€elects€to€treat€the€industrial€injury€....€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"It€is€equally€true,€and€admitted€by€all€here€concerned,€that,€in€tort€casesÏgenerally,€when€a€person€is€injured€by€a€tortious€act€and€this€injury€isÏaggravated€by€the€negligence€of€the€attending€physician,€such€aggravation€ofÏthe€injury€is€within€the€scope€of€the€risk€created€by€the€original€tortious€act.€ÏThis€rule€applies€to€workmen's€compensation€cases."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€13€(citations€omitted).€€That€court€said€that€the€doctor€had€a€"dual€legal€personality,"Ð x% Ðthat€of€a€doctor€and€that€of€an€employer.€€€òòId.óó€at€15.€€Ð x'!! Ðà  àIn€òòD'Angona€v.€County€of€Los€Angelesóó,€27€Cal.€3d€661,€166€Cal.€Rptr.€177,€613€P.2dÐ x)## Ðâ â238€(1980)€(in€bank),€recovery€in€tort€against€the€employer„hospital€was€allowed€forÐ x+%% Ðnegligent€aggravation€of€a€work„related€disease.€€òòD'Angonaóó,€613€P.2d€at€242„44.€€The€courtÐ x Ðstated:Ìâ âÓÓà8  àà ` à"In€treating€plaintiff's€disease€the€county€owed€her€a€duty€separate€andÏdistinct€from€its€duty€as€her€employer,€and€this€was€the€duty€to€provideÏmedical€care€free€of€negligence„„the€same€duty€that€it€owes€to€any€member€ofÏthe€public€who€becomes€a€patient€at€its€hospital.€€The€fact€that€the€countyÏallegedly€breached€this€obligation€by€employing€negligent€doctors€rather€thanÏby€some€other€purportedly€negligent€act€did€not€absolve€it€of€its€responsibilityÏto€assure€that€the€medical€care€which€it€directly€undertook€to€provide€wasÏperformed€without€negligence."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€243„44.œ×ƒ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  כРx  Ðà  àòòD'Angonaóó€is€one€of€the€decisions€by€the€Supreme€Court€of€California€in€which,Ð x Ðaccording€to€Larson,€that€court€"did€much€more€than€its€share€to€extend€the€dual€capacityÏâ âdoctrine€beyond€all€justifiable€limits."€€Larson€ðð€112.02[1][c],€at€112„10€(footnote€omitted).€Ð x ÐThose€authors€submit€that€exclusivity€applied€with€even€greater€force€in€òòD'Angonaóó€than€inÐ x ÐòòDupreyóó€because€of€the€crucial€difference€described€below.€€Ð x Ðâ âÓÓà8  à"The€duty€to€the€employee€which€the€employer€violated€by€allegedlyÏfurnishing€a€negligent€doctor€was€not€the€duty€of€doctor€to€patient,€but€theÏduty€of€òòemployeróó€to€employee€to€furnish€proper€medical€care.€€The€òòpersonaóóÐ x  Ðthat€employed€the€plaintiff€is€the€same€legal€persona€that€owed€plaintiff€theÏduty€to€supply€proper€medical€services.€€Again,€there€is€simply€no€way€twoÏlegal€persons€can€be€constructed€out€of€one€employer€in€this€situation."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓLarson€ðð€112.02[1][c],€at€112„11.ÌÔ‡Šæ{‹‹‹æ{Ôà  àLarson€identifies€Ohio€with€California€as€the€"only€two€states"€in€which€dual€capacityÐ x  Ðhas€"flourished."€€Larson€ðð€113.01[4],€at€113„6.€€Ohio€adopted€the€rationale€of€the€CaliforniaÏcases€in€òòGuy€v.€Arthur€H.€Thomas€Co.óó,€55€Ohio€St.€2d€183,€378€N.E.2d€488,€492€(1978).€Ð x ÐIn€doing€so,€the€Ohio€Supreme€Court€stated,€"We€find€no€compelling€reason€why€an€actionÏ[for€malpractice]€should€be€less€viable€merely€because€the€traditional€obligations€and€dutiesÏof€the€tortfeasor€[hospital]€spring€from€the€extra„relational€capacity€of€the€employer,€ratherÏthan€a€third€party."€€œòòArthur›€H.€Thomas€Co.óó,€378€N.E.2d€at€492.€€Since€that€decision,€the€OhioÐ x Ðcourt€has€declined€to€apply€dual€capacity€in€other€contexts.€€€€òòSee€Freese€v.€Consolidated€RailÐ x! ÐCorp.óó,€4€Ohio€St.€3d€5,€445€N.E.2d€1110,€1114„15€(1983)€(city€police€officer,€injured€whileÐ x# Ðperforming€his€duties€as€a€motorcycle€officer€which€required€him€to€travel€the€city's€streets,Ïbarred€from€suing€city€in€tort€for€failing€to€keep€streets€in€proper€repair);€€òòBakonyi€v.€RalstonÐ x'!! ÐPurina€Co.óó,€17€Ohio€St.€3d€154,€478€N.E.2d€241,€244€(1985)€(holding€employee's€strictÐ x)## Ðliability€action€against€employer€for€workplace€injury€was€barred€by€the€exclusivity€provisionÏof€Ohio's€Workers'€Compensation€Act).€€€€Ô#†‹æ{‹‹Šæ{$¬#Ôà  àÐ x-'' Ðà  àCourts€in€several€other€jurisdictions€have€applied€the€dual€capacity€theory€in€medicalÏmalpractice€cases.€€In€òòWright€v.€District€Court€for€the€County€of€Jeffersonóó,€661€P.2d€1167Ð x Ð(Colo.€1983)€(en€banc),€the€Colorado€Supreme€Court€disallowed€co„employee€immunityÏunder€the€Colorado€workers'€compensation€act€in€a€suit€against€a€doctor€who€was€employedÏby€Adolph€Coors€Company€to€render€medical€services€to€employees.€€The€Colorado€courtÏreasoned€that€the€statute€did€not€require€Coors€to€maintain€a€clinic.€"When€an€employerÏvoluntarily€undertakes€to€directly€render€medical€treatment€to€its€injured€employees,€itÏassumes€a€function€which€is€not€required€by€the€Act€and,€what€is€most€significant,€which€isÏnot€an€integral€part€of€its€business."€€òòIdóó.€at€1169.€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòTatum€v.€Medical€Univ.€of€SouthÐ x ÐCarolinaóó,€517€S.E.2d€706,€712€(S.C.€App.),€òòcert.€grantedóó€(S.C.€Nov.€5,€1999)€(concludingÐ x Ðthat€the€"secondary"€relationship€of€hospital€and€patient€"'created€obligations€to€the€employeeÏindependent€of€its€obligations€as€employer,'€and€the€secondary€relationship€was€soÏ'completely€independent€as€to€create€a€separate€legal€person'");€òòDalton€v.€Community€Gen.Ð x ÐHosp.óó,€275€Ill.€App.€3d€73,€211€Ill.€Dec.€433,€655€N.E.2d€462,€465,€òòcert.€deniedóó€(Ill.€Oct.€13,Ð x  Ð1995)€("In€this€second€capacity€as€a€medical€provider€[treating€a€compensable€injury],€theÏhospital's€duties€were€unrelated€to€those€obligations€flowing€from€its€role€as€plaintiff'sÏemployer").€€òòBut€seeóó€òòMufich€v.€Heisler€Green€Chem.€Co.óó,€121€Ill.€App.€3d€958,€77€Ill.€Dec.Ð x&  Ð426,€460€N.E.2d€482€(1984),€discussed€òòinfraóó;€and€see€òòWeber€v.€Armco,€Inc.óó,€663€P.2d€1221,Ð x("" Ðâ â1226€n.16€(Okla.€1983)€(citing€òòDuprey€v.€Shaneóó,€òòsupraóó,€as€a€case€where€dual„capacity€was€Ð x*$$ Ðappropriately€applied€but€refusing€to€apply€that€theory€to€permit€the€product€liability€suitÏâ âbefore€it).Ìà  àòòJefferson€Med.€College€Hosp.€v.€Savageóó,€7€Pa.€Cmmw.€35,€298€A.2d€694€(1972),€mayÐ x  Ðbe€viewed€as€applying€the€dual€capacity€theory,€although€the€decision€is€equally€explainableÏas€one€drawing€a€distinction€between€the€original€and€the€subsequent€injuries.€€There,€theÏwork„related€injury€was€a€fracture€of€the€left€hip.€€While€the€claimant€was€a€patient€in€theÏemployer's€hospital,€her€left€hip€was€dislocated€from€the€socket,€on€two€occasions,€due€to€theÏnegligence€of€hospital€employees.€€On€each€occasion€the€fracture€was€not€damaged,€and€itÏhealed€completely.€€The€dislocations€"were€new€and€independent€injuries"€that€did€not€occurÏin€the€course€of€employment.€€òòSavageóó,€298€A.2d€at€696.€€The€Commonwealth€Court€viewedÐ x Ðthe€outcome€as€a€natural€extension€of€òò¢Tatrai£óó,€439€A.2d€1162,€in€which€the€Supreme€CourtÐ x Ðof€Pennsylvania€permitted€an€employee€to€sue€her€employer,€a€hospital,€for€injuries€sheÏsustained€as€a€patient€while€being€treated€in€the€employer's€emergency€room€for€a€òònon„workÐ x Ðrelatedóó€illness€that€manifested€itself€during€the€employee's€normal€working€hours.€€òòId.óó€atÐ x  Ð1163.€€Ìà@µµ*ìàÔ&  Ô2ˆÌà  àThe€apparent€numerical€weight€of€authority€among€Ô'x$¿Ôjurisdictions€considering€theÏproblem€holds€that€a€compensation€act€provides€the€exclusive€remedy€for€the€aggravationÏâ âof€a€compensable€injury€by€the€medical€malpractice€of€a€co„employee.€€Typically,€theÐ x*$$ Ðcompensation€act€in€the€cases€reviewed€below€confers€immunity€on€co„employees€as€wellÏas€on€employers.Ìâ âà  àA€review€of€the€law€concerning€the€dual€capacity€theory€in€a€medical€malpracticeÏcontext€was€recently€undertaken€by€the€Texas€Supreme€Court.€€òòPayne€v.€Galen€Hosp.€Corp.óó,Ð x  Ð28€S.W.3d€15€(Tex.€2000).€€In€that€case€the€hospital's€pharmacy€had€negligently€filledÏprescriptions€for€medication€to€treat€the€work„related€back€pain€of€a€nurse€who€wasÏcontinuing€to€work€and€who€was€not€a€patient€admitted€to€the€hospital.€€òòId.óó€at€16„17.€€TheÐ x  Ðpharmacy€did€not€dispense€prescriptions€to€the€general€public,€nor€to€hospital€employees,Ïunless€they€had€been€injured€on€the€job.€€Under€those€facts€the€court€held€that€dual€capacityÏcould€not€apply.€€The€court€concluded€that€"[d]rugs€prescribed€for€on„the„job€injuries€areÏconsidered€part€of€an€employee's€treatment€under€the€Act"€so€that€compensation€was€theÏexclusive€remedy.€€òòId.óó€at€18.€€In€a€footnote€supported€by€many€citations,€and€after€stating€thatÐ x Ðthe€intermediate€appellate€courts€in€Texas€had€rejected€dual€capacity,€the€court€observed:€€ÌÓÓà8  à"The€majority€of€other€jurisdictions€considering€the€dual„capacity€doctrineÏhave€rejected€it€as€well.€€Most€states€have€simply€rejected€the€dual„capacityÏdoctrine€outright."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€20€n.4.Ð x$ Ðà  àA€leading€case€sustaining€the€exclusivity€defense€is€òòMcAlister€v.€Methodist€Hosp.€ofÐ x&  ÐMemphisóó,€550€S.W.2d€240€(Tenn.€1977).€€There€the€employee€argued€that€the€hospital€actedÐ x("" Ðin€two€capacities:€€"as€an€employer€and€as€a€hospital,"€and€that,€had€she€been€treated€atÏanother€hospital,€she€could€have€maintained€a€tort€action.€€òòId.óó€at€243.€€The€TennesseeÐ x,&& ÐSupreme€Court€held€that,€as€a€matter€of€law,€the€initial€compensable€injury€is€the€cause€ofÏany€aggravation€or€additional€injuries€received€during€the€course€of€treating€the€originalÏcompensable€injury.€€òòId.óó€at€245.€€The€court€succinctly€stated:Ð x  ÐÓÓà8  àà ` à"Nothing€in€[the€Tennessee€act]€may€be€construed€to€evince€aÏlegislative€intent€that€an€employer€may€ever€be€classified€as€a€'third€person,'Ïwithout€doing€violence€to€the€plain€language€which€permits€common€law€suitsÏagainst€'some€person€other€than€the€employer.'€€òòThe€employer€is€the€employer;Ð x  Ðnot€some€person€other€than€the€employeróó.€€It€is€that€simple.€€The€injuredÐ x  Ðworkman€is€confined€to€the€benefits€provided€by€the€Workmen'sÏCompensation€Act€and€may€not€sue€his€employer€in€tort."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€246€(emphasis€added).Ð x Ðà  àIn€òòMufichóó,€460€N.E.2d€482,€an€Illinois€intermediate€appellate€court€gave€the€followingÐ x Ðexplanation€for€applying€the€exclusivity€defense.ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"In€the€case€at€bar,€[the€hospital]€was€only€fulfilling€the€statutoryÏrequirement€that€it€had€as€an€employer€to€provide€and€pay€for€medical€servicesÏwhich€are€necessary€in€case€of€an€industrial€accident.€€It€was€acting€in€itsÏcapacity€as€employer€rather€than€in€an€unrelated€capacity.€€The€fortuitousÏcircumstance€that€it€was€itself€a€hospital€with€complete€medical€facilitiesÏcannot€change€that€fact.€€To€require€it,€in€order€to€be€protected€by€theÏexclusive€remedy€provision€of€the€Compensation€Act,€to€set€up€a€separateÏfacility€or€to€hire€doctors€to€render€medical€attention€to€its€employees€injuredÏin€the€course€of€their€employment,€would€be€to€require€it€to€do€something€itÏwas€already€equipped€to€do€without€those€unnecessary€steps."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€485.Ð x% Ðà  àCases€from€other€jurisdictions€that€have€specifically€refused€to€apply€the€dual€capacityÏdoctrine€to€claims€of€employer€medical€malpractice€in€the€treatment€of€work„related€injuryÏinclude:€€òòLindsay€v.€George€Washington€Univ.óó,€279€F.2d€819,€820„21€(D.C.€Cir.€1960)Ð x+%% Ð(negligent€injection€of€a€tetanus€antitoxin;€employer„hospital€immune€because€compensationÐ x-'' Ðobligation€extended€to€all€"legitimate"€consequences€of€original€injury);€òòDiaz€v.€MagmaÐ x ÐCopper€Co.óó,€190€Ariz.€544,€950€P.2d€1165,€1173€(Ct.€App.€1997)€(negligent€first€aidÐ x Ðtreatment€of€mine€worker;€federal€and€state€laws€required€the€employer€to€provideÏemergency€medical€assistance€to€injured€employees);€òòPanaro€v.€Electrolux€Corp.óó,€208€Conn.Ð x  Ð589,€545€A.2d€1086,€1087„88€(1988)€(negligence€of€full„time€company€nurse€in€treatingÏcompensable€stroke€suffered€by€employee€at€work;€creation€of€exception€to€co„employeeÏimmunity€rejected);€òòRay€v.€District€of€Columbiaóó,€535€A.2d€868,€871€(D.C.€1987)€(negligenceÐ x  Ðof€physicians€employed€by€administrative€board€in€treatment€of€service€connected€injuryÏcompensable€under€police€officers€and€firefighters€disability€act;€applying€òòLindsayóó,€279€F.2dÐ x Ð819);€òòWarwick€v.€Hudson€Pulp€&€Paper€Co.óó,€303€So.€2d€701,€702€(Fla.€Dist.€Ct.€App.€1974),Ð x Ðòòcert.€deniedóó,€314€So.€2d€776€(1975)€(negligence€by€company€nurse€at€employer's€clinic;Ð x Ðrecognizing€employer€liable€for€compensation€for€aggravation€and€applying€tradeoff€ofÏimmunity€for€no€fault€compensation);€òòMcCormick€v.€Caterpillar€Tractor€Co.óó,€85€Ill.€2d€352,Ð x Ð53€Ill.€Dec.€207,€423€N.E.2d€876,€877„79€(1981)€(negligence€by€company€doctors€inÏperforming€duty€imposed€on€employer€by€compensation€statute;€that€employer€usedÏemployees€and€not€independent€contractors€to€carry€out€duty€did€not€alter€fact€that€medicalÏservices€were€rendered€in€its€capacity€as€an€employer);€òòTrotter€v.€Litton€Sys.óó,€370€So.€2d€244,Ð x&  Ð247€(Miss.€1979)€(negligence€of€attendant€at€first€aid€station;€agreeing€with€analysis€ofÏTennessee€court€in€òòMcAlisteróó,€550€S.W.2d€240);€òòBurns€v.€Employer€Health€Servs.óó,€976Ð x*$$ ÐS.W.2d€639,€643€(Mo.€Ct.€App.€1998)€(negligent€selection€of€the€type€of€treatment€byÐ x,&& Ðindependent€agent€engaged€by€employer€to€manage€medical€aspects€of€compensation€claims;Ïreasoning€that€selection€was€part€of€employer's€duty€to€provide€care€reasonably€required);Ð x ÐòòDeller€v.€Naymickóó,€176€W.€Va.€108,€342€S.E.2d€73,€78€(1985)€(applying€plain€language€ofÐ x  Ðstatute€in€holding€that€full„time€company€doctor€has€only€one€capacity).Ìà  àIn€addition€to€the€preceding€cases,€which€reject€the€dual€capacity€doctrine€in€theÏspecific€context€of€medical€malpractice€actions,€the€majority€of€jurisdictions€have€flatlyÏrefused€to€apply€the€dual€capacity€doctrine€in€a€variety€of€other€factual€contexts.¢×ƒ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ףРx  Ðà@µµ*ìàÔ&  Ô3ˆÌà  àThe€New€York€cases€distinguish€between€a€health€Ô')ÜÔclinic€open€solely€to€employees€andÏone€furnishing€health€services€to€the€general€public.€€In€the€former€context,€an€employee'sÏexclusive€remedy€for€medical€malpractice€is€compensation,€òòsee€Garcia€v.€Isersonóó,€33€N.Y.2dÐ x  Ð421,€309€N.E.2d€420,€422€(1974),€while€in€the€latter€context€a€tort€action€lies.€€òòSeeÐ x ÐMilashouskas€v.€Mercy€Hosp.óó,€64€A.D.2d€978,€408€N.Y.S.2d€808,€809€(1978).€€TheÐ x  Ðfollowing€quote€summarizes€the€New€York€distinction:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"Where€an€employee€of€a€hospital€is€admitted€as€a€patient€[to€treat€anÏinjury€compensable€under€the€workers'€compensation€law],€and€is€negligentlyÏtreated€at€that€hospital,€the€injuries€which€result€have€been€held€not€to€arise€outÏof€the€injured€person's€employment,€so€that€an€action€at€law€to€recover€forÏsuch€injuries€may€be€brought€(òòsee€Sivertsen€v.€State€of€New€Yorkóó,€19€N.Y.2dÐ x Ð698,€278€N.Y.S.2d€886,€225€N.E.2d€572[,€573€(1967)];€òòVolk€v.€City€of€NewÐ x ÐYorkóó,€284€N.Y.€279,€30€N.E.2d€596[,€597€(1940)];€òòMilashouskas€v.€MercyÐ x ÐHosp.óó,€64€A.2d€978,€408€N.Y.S.2d€808[,€809€(1978)];€òòStevens€v.€County€ofÐ x ÐNassauóó,€56€A.D.2d€866,€392€N.Y.S.2d€332[,€333€(1977)]).€€These€cases€areÐ x Ðto€be€distinguished€from€those€in€which€malpractice€is€committed€by€aÏcoemployee€of€the€plaintiff,€and€where€the€medical€services€rendered€by€thatÐ x Ðcoemployee€were€not€available€to€the€public,€but€were€exclusively€availableÏto€coemployees,€so€that€a€nexus€exists€between€the€plaintiff's€employment€andÏthe€occurrence€of€the€malpractice€(òòsee,€Golini€v.€Nachtigallóó,€38€N.Y.2d€745,Ð x Ð381€N.Y.S.2d€45,€343€N.E.2d€762[,€763€(1975),€overruled,€in€part,€byÏòòBotwinick€v.€Ogdenóó,€59€N.Y.2d€909,€466€N.Y.S.2d€291,€453€N.E.2d€520Ð x  Ð(1983)];€òòGarcia€v.€Isersonóó,€33€N.Y.2d€421,€353€N.Y.S.2d€955,€309€N.E.2dÐ x  Ð420[,€433€(1974)])."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòFirestein€v.€Kingsbrook€Jewish€Med.€Ctr.óó,€137€A.D.2d€34,€528€N.Y.S.2d€85,€88€(1988).Ð x Ðà  àIt€appears€that€Pennsylvania€law,€as€it€has€evolved,€makes€the€same€distinction.€ÏòòCompare€¢Tatrai£óó,€439€A.2d€at€1166€(applying€California€rationale€of€duty€to€public€whereÐ x  Ðemployee's€injury€was€not€work€related)€òòwith€Budzichowski€v.€Bell€Telephone€Co.óó,€503€Pa.Ð x Ð160,€469€A.2d€111,€115€(1983)€(holding€employer€immune€from€suit€for€negligent€treatmentÏof€compensable€injury€received€at€employer's€medical€dispensary,€a€facility€not€open€to€theÏgeneral€public),€òòandóó€òòSnyder€v.€Pocono€Med.€Ctr.óó,€440€Pa.€Super.€606,€656€A.2d€534,€536„38Ð x Ð(1995),€òòaff'd€by€an€equally€divided€courtóó,€547€Pa.€415,€690€A.2d€1152€(1997)€(holding€thatÐ x Ðtort€suit€against€employer€hospital€was€barred€by€exclusivity€provisions€of€the€workers'Ïcompensation€act€where€nurse,€as€part€of€hospital's€employee€health€program,€failed€toÏdiagnose€plaintiff's€tuberculosis).Ìà@££*ìàÔ&  ÔCˆÌà  àFor€the€reasons€set€forth€below,€dual€capacity€Ô'x$ôèÔis€not€compatible€with€Maryland€law.€ÏAccordingly,€we€hold€that€the€exclusivity€defense€applies€to€Suburban€in€the€case€at€hand.€Ìà  àThe€dual€capacity€theory€cannot€be€applied€under€the€Act€without€doing€considerableÏviolence€to€the€language€employed€by€the€General€Assembly.€€LE€ðð€9„509€states:€€"ExceptÐ x,&& Ðas€otherwise€provided€in€this€title,€the€compensation€provided€under€this€title€to€a€coveredÏemployee€...€is€in€place€of€any€right€of€action€against€any€person."€€The€only€exceptions€inÏthe€Labor€and€Employment€title€permitting€a€right€of€action€against€the€employer€deal€withÏthe€failure€to€secure€compensation,€LE€ðð€9„509(c),€and€deliberate€acts€by€the€employer.€€LEÏðð9„509(d).€€Ìà  àA€further€statutory€exception€to€the€rule€in€LE€ðð€9„509(b)€under€which€compensationÏ"is€in€place€of€any€right€of€action€against€any€person"€is€the€authorization€for€œthird„party›Ïactions€in€LE€ðð€9„901.€€It€reads:€€"When€a€person€òòother€than€an€employeróó€is€liable€for€theÐ x Ðinjury€...€of€a€covered€employee€for€which€compensation€is€payable€under€this€title,€theÏcovered€employee€...€may€...€bring€an€action€for€damages€against€the€person€liable€for€theÏinjury."€€(Emphasis€added).€€Here,€Kirson€asserts€a€œthird„party›€claim€against€Suburban,€butÏSuburban€is€not€a€"person€other€than"€Suburban.€€Ìà  àAs€we€explained€in€òòKnoche€v.€Coxóó,€282€Md.€447,€385€A.2d€1179€(1978):Ð x ÐÓÓà8  àà ` à"This€Court,€long€past€and€to€the€present€day,€has€uniformly€said€that,Ïaside€from€the€exceptions€created€by€the€Act€itself,€the€operation€of€the€law€isÏexclusive€of€all€other€remedy€and€liability,€as€to€both€the€employer€andÏemployee€who€come€within€the€purview€of€the€Act,€with€respect€to€all€injuryÏarising€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€employment."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€452„53,€385€A.2d€at€1181„82.€€òòSee€also€Great€Atl.€&€Pac.€Tea€Co.€v.€Imbraguglioóó,€346Ð x&  ÐMd.€573,€582,€697€A.2d€885,€889€(1997);€òòBrady€v.€Ralph€Parsons€Co.óó,€308€Md.€486,€498,Ð x("" Ðâ â520€A.2d€717,€726€(1987).€€€€Ð x*$$ Ðà  àFurther,€even€if€we€assume€that€Larson's€"dual€persona"€theory€is€available€under€theÏâ âAct,€that€theory€is€not€available€under€the€facts€of€this€case.€€For€the€dual€persona€theory€toÏapply€"it€must€be€possible€to€say€that€the€duty€arose€òòsolelyóó€from€the€òònonemployeróó€persona."€Ð x  ÐLarson€ðð€113.01[4],€at€113„10.€€The€duties€of€the€second€persona€"must€be€totally€separateÏfrom€and€unrelated€to€those€of€the€employment."€€òòId.óó€€Here€Suburban's€duties€to€Kirson€asÐ x Ðthe€provider€of€medical€services€in€treatment€of€the€injuries€sustained€in€the€work„related€fallÏof€€August€6,€1993,€are€not€totally€separate€from€Suburban's€duties€as€employer.€€Ìà  àSection€9„660€of€the€Act€imposes€a€duty€upon€employers€to€provide€medical€servicesÏto€an€employee€who€has€suffered€an€accidental€personal€injury.€€The€statute€in€relevant€partÏreads:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"(a)à ¸ àòòIn€generalóó.€„„€In€addition€to€the€compensation€provided€underÐ x Ðthis€subtitle,€if€a€covered€employee€has€suffered€an€accidental€personal€injuryÏ...€the€employer€or€its€insurer€promptly€shall€provide€to€the€covered€employee,Ïas€the€Commission€may€require:Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ à"(1)à  àmedical,€surgical,€or€other€attendance€or€treatment;ÐxÐ Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ à"(2)à  àhospital€and€nursing€services;ÐxÐ Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ à"(3)à  àmedicine;Ðx Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ à"(4)à  àcrutches€and€other€apparatus;€and€Ðx!Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ à"(5)à  àartificial€arms,€feet,€hands,€and€legs€and€other€prostheticÐ x" Ðdevices."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓConsequently,€when€Kirson€suffered€an€aggravation€of€the€injury€of€August€6€due€toÏnegligence€of€one€or€more€co„employees€of€Kirson,€those€co„employees€were€performingÏSuburban's€duty€to€"provide€to€the€covered€employee€...€hospital€and€nursing€services."€Ïâ âThus,€Suburban€was€not€acting€as€a€person€totally€separate€from€the€employer€when€it€wasÐ x+%% Ðproviding€the€hospital€and€nursing€services€on€August€13,€and€Suburban€continued€to€enjoyÏthe€exclusivity€defense.€€Ìâ âà  àReinforcing€the€construction€of€the€Act€set€forth€above€is€LE€ðð€9„902.€€It€confers€on,Ð x  Ðòòinter€aliaóó,€a€self„insured€employer,€the€right,€exercisable€within€two€months€after€theÐ x  ÐCommission€makes€an€award,€to€bring€an€"action€for€damages€against€the€third€party€whoÏis€liable€for€the€injury€or€death€of€the€covered€employee."€€LE€ðð€9„902(a).€€In€the€case€of€aÏself„insured€employer,€such€as€Suburban,€the€dual€capacity€theory,€under€which€SuburbanÏwould€be€considered€to€be€a€third€party,€encounters€the€anomaly€of€the€General€Assembly'sÏhaving€authorized€Suburban€to€sue€itself,€initially€to€the€exclusion€of€any€suit€by€Kirson.€€Ìà  àApplying€the€dual€capacity€theory€under€the€facts€of€this€case€is€also€inconsistent€withÏthe€manner€in€which€this€Court€has€applied€employer's€immunity.€€In€òòFlood€v.€MerchantsÐ x ÐMut.€Ins.€Co.óó,€230€Md.€373,€187€A.2d€320€(1963),€the€employee€brought€a€tort€action€againstÐ x Ðthe€workers'€compensation€insurer€of€the€employer€on€the€theory€that€the€insurer€had€beenÏnegligent€in€the€selection€of€a€physician€whose€negligence€had€exacerbated€the€claimant'sÏoriginal€work„related€injury.€€We€held€that,€under€those€circumstances,€the€insurer€enjoyedÏthe€exclusivity€defense€provided€to€the€employer€by€the€Act.€€òòId.óó€at€379,€187€A.2d€at€323.€Ð x$ ÐòòSee€also€Great€Atl.€&€Pac.€Tea€Co.óó,€346€Md.€587,€697€A.2d€885.€€Similar€to€òòFloodóó€is€òòYoungÐ x&  Ðv.€Hartford€Accident€&€Indem.€Co.óó,€303€Md.€182,€492€A.2d€1270€(1985).€€The€claimant„Ð x("" Ðplaintiff€in€òòYoungóó€alleged€that€her€emotional€disability,€which€included€an€attempted€suicide,Ð x*$$ Ðhad€been€negligently€caused€by€the€compensation€insurer's€insistence€on€an€independentÐ x,&& Ðpsychiatric€examination€when€the€insurer€was€on€notice€that€such€an€examination€would€beÏhighly€detrimental€to€€the€claimant's€condition.€€We€held€that€the€complaint€failed€to€allegeÏa€claim€because€its€legal€sufficiency€was€controlled€by€òòFloodóó.€€òòId.óó€at€193,€492€A.2d€atÐ x  М1275ñ–"ñ„ñ–"ññ—"ñ-ñ—"ñ76.›€€Ìà  àThus,€the€Maryland€cases€have€in€some€circumstances€expanded€the€immunity€beyondÏthe€employer€and€certain€co„employees.€€See€Part€V.B,€òòinfraóó.€€Kirson,€on€the€other€hand,Ð x  Ðseeks€to€withdraw€immunity€from€the€employer€itself€by€having€this€Court€adopt€the€dualÏcapacity€theory.€€Adopting€that€theory€would€require€overruling€the€òòFloodóó€and€òòYoungóó€cases.€Ð x ÐIndeed,€were€we€to€adopt€the€dual€capacity€theory€and€hold€that,€as€to€the€August€13Ïaccident,€Suburban€and€Kirson€were€hospital€and€patient€and€no€longer€employer€andÏemployee,€then€we€know€of€no€principled€basis€on€which€to€limit€dual€capacity€to€theÏprovision€of€health€care€services.€€Adoption€of€dual€capacity€here€would€seem€inexorablyÏto€lead€to€the€abolition€of€the€employer's€immunity€in€product€and€premises€liability€cases.Ìà  àFundamentally,€Kirson's€argument€attacks€the€social€contract€on€which€workers'Ïcompensation€is€based.€€Suburban€is€obliged€to€pay€compensation€by€way€of€disabilityÏbenefits€and€medical€expenses€for€the€injuries€sustained€on€August€6€and€for€the€injuriesÏresulting€from€malpractice€in€the€treatment€of€the€August€6€injuries.€€See€Part€III,€òòsupraóó.€Ð x&  ÐHaving€received€compensation,€Kirson€wants€the€right€to€sue€Suburban€to€recover€damagesÏwhich,€hopefully€from€the€plaintiff's€standpoint,€would€exceed€the€amount€of€compensationÏpaid.€€We€hold,€however,€that,€in€exchange€for€the€imposition€of€no€fault€limited€liability€forÐ x,&& Ðworkplace€accidents,€Suburban€bought€peace€from€being€considered€as€a€third€party€whenÏrendering€hospital€services€to€Kirson€in€fulfillment€of€its€obligation€under€the€Act€toÏ"provide"€medical€care.€€LE€ðð€9„660(a).Ìà@*ìàÔ&  ÔDˆÌà  àThe€factual€predicate€of€the€foregoing€holding€is€Ô'x â ÔSuburban's€proffer€concerningÏcompensation€payments€made€by€it€or€for€its€benefit.€€Kirson€has€raised€questions€concerningÏdetails€of€the€evidence€proffered.€€Those€questions€were€not€addressed€by€the€trial€court€inÏlight€of€its€ultimate€legal€ruling€that€employer€immunity€did€not€apply.€€Those€questions,Ïhowever,€may€not€have€any€continued€practical€relevance€in€view€of€our€holding€in€Part€V,Ð x Ðòòinfraóó,€that€there€was€sufficient€evidence€to€take€the€claim€against€Smith€to€the€jury.€Ð x ÐNevertheless,€in€order€to€give€Kirson€an€opportunity€to€be€heard,€we€shall€remand€as€toÏSuburban€for€further€proceedings,€consistent€with€this€opinion,€including,€particularly,Ïconsistency€with€the€causation€holding€in€Part€III,€òòsupraóó.€€Ð x Ðà@*ìàÔ&  ÔVˆÌà@*ìàAˆÌà  àKirson€contends€that€the€Court€of€Special€Appeals€Ô'x oÔerred€in€concluding€that€Smith'sÏJNwV€motion€should€have€been€granted.€€We€find€that€there€was€sufficient€evidence€ofÏnegligence€on€the€part€of€Smith€to€submit€the€claim€against€her€to€the€jury.€€When€one€cutsÏâ âthrough€the€conflicting€evidence€and€recognizes€that€impeaching€evidence€was€for€the€juryÐ x*$$ Ðto€evaluate,€the€evidence€most€favorable€to€Kirson€is€found€in€her€testimony€and€that€of€Dr.ÏGoral.€Ìâ âà  àSmith€is€a€registered€nurse€to€whom€Kirson€had€been€assigned€for€patient€care€for€theÏfirst€time€on€August€13,€1993.€€Paul€was€a€patient€care€technician.€€The€latter€perform€basicÏnursing€tasks€which€are€assigned€to€them€by€the€RNs.€€Illustrative€of€these€tasks€are€takingÏvital€signs,€helping€to€feed€patients,€helping€to€transfer€patients,€ambulating€patients,Ïtoileting€patients,€and€providing€for€their€baths€and€their€oral€hygiene.€€That€morning€SmithÏand€Paul€assisted€Kirson€to€the€commode,€and€both€would€have€heard€Kirson's€complaintsÏof€lightheadedness.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Dr.€Goral€opined€that€Smith€deviated€from€the€standard€of€care€byÐ x Ðfailing€properly€to€supervise€Paul.€€He€recognized€that€it€would€be€an€inefficient€use€ofÏpersonnel€for€Smith€to€be€present€in€Kirson's€room€during€the€entire€period€while€Kirson€wasÏusing€the€commode.€€It€was€his€opinion,€however,€that€Smith,€as€the€more€senior€person,Ïshould€have€instructed€Paul€that€the€patient€needed€two„person€assistance€on€the€returnÏtransfer€from€the€commode€to€the€bed,€inasmuch€as€two€persons€"had€to€get€her€up€standingÏout€of€bed€initially."€Ìâ âà  àAccordingly,€our€mandate€will€reinstate€the€judgment€against€Smith.Ð x$ Ðà@££*ìàÔ&  Ôâ âBˆÌà  àSmith€alternatively€asserts€that€she€enjoys€the€same€Ô'xàÔimmunity€that€applies€toÏSuburban.€€Although€this€alternative€defense€was€not€raised€by€a€cross€petition€for€certiorari,Ïwe€shall€exercise€our€discretion€under€Md.€Rule€8„131(a)€to€consider€it€in€this€Court,Ïinasmuch€as€the€issue€has€been€briefed€and€argued€here,€and€our€direct€consideration€of€theÏdefense€will€eliminate€the€necessity€for€a€remand€to€the€Court€of€Special€Appeals€where€theÏissue€was€raised€but€not€decided.Ìà  àIn€Maryland,€a€co„employee,€as€such,€does€not€partake€of€the€employer's€immunityÏunder€the€Act.€€òòSee€Hastings€v.€Mechalskeóó,€336€Md.€663,€673,€650€A.2d€274,€279€€(1994);Ð x ÐòòBishop€v.€Twifordóó,€317€Md.€170,€171,€562€A.2d€1238,€1239€(1989);€òòAthas€v.€Hillóó,€300€Md.Ð x Ð133,€137,€476€A.2d€710,€712€(1984);€òòHauch€v.€Connoróó,€295€Md.€120,€121,€453€A.2d€1207,Ð x Ð1208€(1983);€òòLeonard€v.€Sav„A„Stop€Servs.,€Inc.óó,€289€Md.€204,€208,€424€A.2d€336,€337Ð x Ð(1981);€òòHutzell€v.€Boyeróó,€252€Md.€227,€232,€249€A.2d€449,€452€(1969).€€There€are,€however,Ð x Ðcertain€circumstances€under€which€a€supervisory€co„employee€is€not€suable€as€a€third€partyÏbecause€the€supervisory€co„employee€enjoys€the€employer's€immunity.€€òòSee€Athasóó,€300€Md.Ð x" Ðat€148,€476€A.2d€at€718;€òòHastingsóó,€336€Md.€at€685,€650€A.2d€at€285.€€In€the€latter€case€weÐ x$ Ðsummarized€the€rule€by€saying:ÌÓÓà8  à"[W]e€hold€that€a€supervisory€coemployee€is€entitled€to€immunity€under€theÏAct€if,€at€the€time€of€the€accident:€€(1)€he€or€she€is€performing€a€nondelegableÏduty€of€the€employer;€and€(2)€he€or€she€performed€that€duty€during€the€courseÏof€his€or€her€employment."Ð Ð Ð  Ðâ âÐ x,&& ÐÓÓòòId.óó€at€685,€650€A.2d€at€285.€€This€rule€does€not€apply€to€Smith€because€she€was€not€at€theÐ x Ðâ âsupervisory€level€that€is€within€the€rule€and€because€the€duty€involved€here€is€delegable.€Ìà  àWhen€Smith€presented€this€defense€to€the€circuit€court€on€summary€judgment,€oneÏof€the€exhibits€was€a€document€entitled€"Nursing€Organization€Principles„„ProfessionalÏNursing€Staff„„Suburban€Hospital."€€It€reveals€that€the€Department€of€Nursing€at€SuburbanÏis€headed€by€a€Vice€President€for€Patient€Care€Services€who€reports€to€the€Chief€ExecutiveÏOfficer.€€Accountable€to€the€Vice€President€for€Patient€Care€Services€are€four€AdministrativeÏDirectors€of€Nursing.€€Two€of€these€administrative€directors€have€primary€responsibilitiesÏwith€respect€to€clinical€services,€each€being€responsible€for€specific€nursing€units€assignedÏrespectively€to€them.€€The€third€administrative€director€oversees€development€and€trainingÏwhile€the€fourth€is€responsible€for€fiscal€matters€and€informational€systems.€€In€every€unitÏwithin€the€Department€of€Nursing€there€is€a€designated€Patient€Care€Manager.€€The€PatientÏCare€Manager€"maintains€twenty„four€hour€accountability€for€the€total€operation€of€his/herÏparticular€unit€(units)."€€These€managers€report€to€one€of€the€Administrative€Directors€ofÏNursing€for€clinical€services.€€The€nursing€organization€principles€then€read:€€"The€directÏcaregivers€on€each€nursing€unit€are€an€appropriate€mix€of€Registered€Nurses,€LicensedÏPractical€Nurses,€and€Patient€Care€Technicians."Ìà  àThe€employer's€duty€with€which€we€are€concerned€here€is€that€of€providing€reasonableÏmedical€care€for€Kirson's€work„related€accidental€injury.€€That€care€had€to€be€providedÏtwenty„four€hours€a€day€while€Kirson€was€a€patient€at€Suburban.€€Under€the€nursingÐ x,&& Ðorganization€principles€the€supervisor€lowest€on€the€table€of€organization€to€whom€theÏemployer€can€be€said€to€have€delegated€that€duty€would€be€the€Patient€Care€Manager€forÏnursing€services€in€the€orthopedic€unit.€€Smith€was€simply€one€of€the€"appropriate€mix"€ofÏcaregivers€on€a€given€shift.€€Even€though€Smith€could€delegate€duties€to€Paul,€underÏsupervision,€that€is€not€the€type€of€supervision€or€supervisory€capacity€that€falls€within€the€ÏòòHastings„¢Athas£óó€line€of€cases.€€Ð x  Ðà  àFurther,€Suburban's€duty,€from€a€tort€standpoint,€was€delegable.€€A€nondelegable€dutyÏis€a€duty€which€the€employer€is€"'primarily€and€absolutely'€obliged€to€perform€properly."€ÏòòHastingsóó,€336€Md.€at€676,€650€A.2d€at€280.€€It€is€one€as€to€which€the€employer€remainsÐ x Ðliable,€"regardless€of€the€acts€or€omissions€of€the€person€entrusted€to€perform€it."€€òòId.óó€at€676,Ð x Ð650€A.2d€at€281.€€The€nondelegable€obligations€and€liabilities€referred€to€in€the€òòHastings„Ð x ÐAthasóó€rule€are€those€that€were€imposed€on€an€employer€at€common€law.€€They€could€be€theÐ x Ðbasis€for€an€employee's€negligence€action€against€the€employer,€but€that€action€was€subjectÏto€the€defenses€of€assumption€of€the€risk,€contributory€negligence,€and€fellow€servant.€€W.P.ÏKeeton,€òòProsser€&€Keeton€on€the€Law€of€Tortsóó€(5th€ed.€1984)€(Prosser),€lists€fiveÐ x" Ðnondelegable€duties€of€an€employer€at€common€law.€€They€were:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"1.à ¸ àThe€duty€to€provide€a€safe€place€to€work.Ðx& Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"2.à ¸ àThe€duty€to€provide€safe€appliances,€tools,€and€equipment€for€theÐ x("" Ðwork.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à"3.à ¸ àThe€duty€to€give€warning€of€dangers€of€which€the€employeeÐ x+%% Ðmight€reasonably€be€expected€to€remain€in€ignorance.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÐ x-'' Ðà8  àà ` à"4.à ¸ àThe€duty€to€provide€a€sufficient€number€of€suitable€fellowÐ x Ðservants.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"5à ¸ àThe€duty€to€promulgate€and€enforce€rules€for€the€conduct€ofÐ x  Ðemployees€which€would€make€the€work€safe."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€ðð€80,€at€569€(footnotes€omitted).€€Also,€at€common€law,€the€rule€that€an€employer€was€notÐ x  Ðliable€to€an€employee€for€injuries€inflicted€by€the€negligence€of€a€fellow€servant€was€subjectÏto€an€exception€where€the€negligence€of€the€fellow€servant€lay€in€the€performance€or€failureÏto€perform€one€of€the€limited€duties€owed€by€the€employer.€€Inasmuch€as€the€employerÏremained€liable€for€the€breach€of€such€a€duty€which€had€been€delegated€to€the€fellow€servantÏ(sometimes€called€a€"vice„principal"),€the€duty€was€said€to€be€nondelegable.€€òòSee€Wood€v.Ð x ÐAbellóó,€268€Md.€214,€237„39,€300€A.2d€665,€677„78€(1973);€Prosser€ðð€80,€at€571„72.€€Thus,Ð x Ðwhen€the€Act€is€superimposed€on€the€common€law,€those€co„employees€of€the€compensationÏclaimant€who€were€charged€at€common€law€with€performing€the€nondelegable€duties€of€theÏemployer€ordinarily€are€not€persons€"other€than€the€employer"€and€are€not€subject€to€a€third„¼party€action.€€Ìà  àThe€foregoing€analysis€is€intended€only€to€demonstrate€that€the€reference€toÏnondelegable€duties,€and€liabilities€resulting€from€breach€thereof,€in€the€òòHastings„Athasóó€ruleÐ x$ Ðis€a€reference€to€liability€for€tort€damages€and€not€to€an€obligation€imposed€under€the€ActÏresulting€in€liability€for€workers'€compensation.€Ìà  àSuburban's€duty€to€furnish€reasonable€medical€care€for€Kirson's€work„related€injuryÏof€August€6€was€a€delegable€duty.€€It€is€imposed€by€the€Act€and€did€not€exist€at€common€law.€Ð x,&& ÐHad€Suburban€simply€paid€the€charges€of€some€other€health€care€provider€to€treat€Kirson'sÏwork„related€injury,€Suburban€would€have€no€liability€in€tort€to€pay€damages€for€malpracticeÏin€that€treatment,€inasmuch€as€Suburban€could€not€be€a€tortfeasor€as€to€the€original€injury,Ïdue€to€its€employer's€immunity.€€òòCompare€Morgan€v.€Cohenóó,€309€Md.€304,€310,€523€A.2dÐ x  Ð1003,€1005„06€(1987)€(tortfeasor€liable€for€aggravation€of€tortiously€inflicted€injury€causedÏby€negligent€medical€treatment).€€Suburban's€sole€liability€for€negligent€care€in€the€treatmentÏof€the€August€6€injury€was€to€pay€compensation€under€the€Act.€€See€Parts€III€and€IV,€òòsupraóó.€Ð x  ÐAccordingly,€because€Smith€was€not€performing€a€nondelegable€duty,€she€does€not€partakeÏof€the€employer's€immunity€under€the€òòHastings„Athasóó€rule.€€She€is€subject€to€suit€in€tort€asÐ x Ða€person€"other€than€the€employer."Ìà@yy)ìàÔ&  ÔVIˆÌà  àKirson€also€appeals€from€the€JNwV€Ô'x¹7Ôthat€was€entered€in€favor€of€Anderson€andÏaffirmed€by€the€Court€of€Special€Appeals.€€The€fact„driven€finding€of€duty€and€breach€thatÏsupports€the€jury's€verdict€against€Smith€is€not€applicable€to€Anderson€who€was€the€chargeÏnurse€in€the€orthopedic€unit€at€Suburban€on€August€13,€1993,€on€the€shift€when€Kirson€fell.€Ìà  àKirson's€expert€witness€from€the€nursing€profession€was€Nancy€Lenaghan.€€WithÏrespect€to€Anderson€she€testified€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"Qà ¸ àAm€I€correct€that€you€can't€say,€based€upon€the€material€that€youÐ x("" Ðreviewed€that€Mary€Anderson€did€...€anything€that€departed€from€the€standardÏof€care?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"Aà ¸ àMary€Anderson?Ðx,&&Ð Ð  ÐÐ x-'' Ðà8  àà ` à"Qà ¸ àYes.ÐxÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"Aà ¸ àOnly€insofar€as€when€there€is€negligence€at€the€bedside,€thatÐ x Ðresponsibility€passes€up€the€chain€of€command€and€that€is€a€pretty€wellÏrecognized€principle€in€nursing.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"Qà ¸ àSo€if€anything€happens€by€any€of€the€RNs€on€the€unit€whileÐ x  ÐMary€Anderson€is€the€charge€nurse,€she€is€responsible,€is€that€correct?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"Aà ¸ àThat€is€correct.Ðx Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"Qà ¸ àAnd€that€is€your€only€criticism€of€Mary€Anderson?Ðx Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"Aà ¸ àRight."€Ðx Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓDr.€Goral€likewise€testified€that€his€only€criticism€of€œAnderson›€had€to€do€with€responsibilityÏgoing€up€the€nursing€chain€of€command.€€This€testimony€does€not€attribute€to€Anderson€anyÏact€or€failure€to€act€that€fell€below€the€standard€of€care.€€Rather,€the€testimony€embraces€aÏlegal€theory€and€assumes€that,€in€the€nursing€profession,€a€superior€is€liable€for€tort€damagesÏfor€the€negligence€of€those€holding€inferior€positions€on€a€table€of€organization.€€That€theoryÏis,€of€course,€a€question€of€law€ultimately€for€this€Court€to€decide.Ìà  àKirson€submits€that€the€statutes€and€regulations€relating€to€the€nursing€professionÏproduce€that€legal€result.€€Maryland€Code€(1981,€2000€Repl.€Vol.),€ðððð€8„101€through€8-802Ïof€the€Health€Occupations€Article€(HO)€regulate€the€nursing€profession.€€There€is€a€stateÏBoard€of€Nursing€in€the€Department€of€Health€and€Mental€Hygiene€(the€Board).€€HO€ððÏ8-201.€€The€Board€has€the€exclusive€power€within€the€Department€to€adopt€rules€andÏâ âregulations€to€determine,€òòinter€aliaóó:Ð x+%% ÐÓÓà8  àà ` à"(i)à ¸ àIndividuals€to€whom€any€act€of€the€practice€of€registered€nursingÐ x Ðâ âand€licensed€practical€nursing€may€be€delegated;€andÐ Ð Ð  ЀÌà8  àà ` à"(ii)à ¸ àThe€acts€that€may€be€delegated€safely."Ðx Ð Ð  ÐÌÓ¡BÓHO€ðð€8„205(c).€€Ìà  àIn€the€Code€of€Maryland€Regulations€(COMAR),€Title€10,€"Department€of€Health€andÏMental€Hygiene,"€Subtitle€27,€"Board€of€Nursing,"€chapter€11€deals€with€"Delegation€ofÏNursing€Functions."€€COMAR€ðð€10.27.11.03,€setting€forth€"Criteria€for€Delegation,"€readsÏin€relevant€part€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à"A.à ¸ àThe€nurse€may€delegate€the€responsibility€to€perform€a€nursingÐ x Ðtask€to€an€unlicensed€individual.€€The€delegating€nurse€retains€theÏaccountability€for€the€nursing€task.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"B.à ¸ àNursing€tasks€delegated€by€the€nurse€shall:ÐxÐ Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ àœ"(1)›à  àBe€within€the€area€of€responsibility€of€the€nurseÐ x Ðdelegating€the€act;Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ àœ"(2)›à  àBe€such€that,€in€the€judgment€of€the€nurse,€it€can€beÐ x Ðproperly€and€safely€performed€by€the€unlicensed€individual€withoutÏjeopardizing€the€client€welfare;Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ àœ"(3)›à  àBe€a€task€that€a€reasonable€and€prudent€nurse€would€findÐ x Ðis€within€the€scope€of€sound€nursing€judgment.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"C.à ¸ àA€nursing€task€delegated€by€the€nurse€may€not€require€theÐ x" Ðunlicensed€individual€to€exercise€nursing€judgment€or€intervention€except€inÏan€emergency€situation.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"D.à ¸ àWhen€delegating€a€nursing€task€to€an€unlicensed€individual€theÐ x&  Ðnurse€shall:Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ àœñŽ"ñ"ñŽ"ñ(1)›à  àMake€an€assessment€of€the€patient's€nursing€care€needsÐ x("" Ðbefore€delegating€the€task;Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ àœñ"ñ"ñ"ñ(2)›à  àEither€instruct€the€unlicensed€person€in€the€delegated€taskÐ x*$$ Ðor€verify€the€unlicensed€person's€competency€to€perform€the€nursing€task;Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ àœñ"ñ"ñ"ñ(3)›à  àSupervise€the€performance€of€the€delegated€nursing€taskÐ x,&& Ðin€accordance€with€Regulation€.04€of€this€chapter;Ðx-''Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ àñ‘"ñ"ñ‘"ñ(4)à  àBe€accountable€and€responsible€for€the€delegated€task;ÐxÐ Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ àñ’"ñ"ñ’"ñ(5)à  àEvaluate€the€performance€of€the€delegated€nursing€task;Ð x ÐandÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àà ¸ àñ“"ñ"ñ“"ñ(6)à  àBe€responsible€for€assuring€accurate€documentation€ofÐ x  Ðoutcomes€on€the€nursing€record."€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓKirson's€submission€is€that€under€ðð€10.27.11.03.D(4)€Anderson€is€"responsible€for€theÏdelegated€task."€€The€argument€is€a€mere€play€on€words.€€Ìà  àPreliminarily,€we€note€that€Anderson€did€not€delegate€the€nursing€task€to€Paul„„SmithÏdid.€€More€substantively,€the€definition€section€of€ðð€10.27.11.02.B(7)€definesÏ"'[¢r]esponsibility£'"€to€mean€"the€charge€to€do€something."€€The€term€"responsible"€is€alsoÏused€in€ðð€10.27.11.03.D(6)€relating€to€"assuring€accurate€documentation."€€These€uses€of€theÏterm€"responsible"€do€not€impose€on€a€supervisor€nurse,€who€is€not€personally€negligent,€aÏform€of€respondeat€superior€liability€for€tort€damages€derived€from€the€negligence€of€one€orÏmore€persons€who€report€to€the€supervisor.€€Ìà  àAt€least€one€purpose€for€the€regulation's€stating€that€the€delegating€nurse€isÏ"responsible€for€the€delegated€task"€is€to€make€the€delegating€nurse€subject€to€possibleÏdisciplinary€action€by€the€Board€because€of€the€act€or€omission€of€the€delegatee.€€TheÏdisciplinary€provisions€in€the€statute,€however,€make€plain€that€the€General€Assembly€neverÏintended€for€the€Board€to€impose€discipline€or€liability€without€fault€on€registered€nurses.€ÏHO€ðð€8„316(a)€lists€thirty„three€grounds€on€which€the€Board€may€impose€professionalÏdiscipline.€€These€include:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à€"(9)à ¸ àIs€grossly€negligent€in€the€practice€of€registered€nursing€...ñ”"ñ;ñ”"ñÐx,&&Ð Ð  ÐÐ x-'' Ðà8  àà ` à....Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"(22)à ¸ àDelegates€nursing€acts€or€responsibilities€to€an€individual€thatÐ x Ðthe€applicant€or€licensee€knows€or€has€reason€to€know€lacks€the€ability€orÏknowledge€to€performñ•"ñ;ñ•"ñÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à....Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à"(24)à ¸ àFails€to€properly€supervise€individuals€to€whom€nursing€acts€orÐ x Ðresponsibilities€have€been€delegated[.]"Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓà  àIt€is€inconsistent€with€the€statute€as€a€whole€to€read€subsection€(24)€as€authorizing€theÏBoard,€by€regulation,€to€create€respondeat€superior€liability€on€supervising€registered€nursesÏwhen€subsection€(22)€requires€actual€negligence€in€the€act€of€delegating€and€subsection€(9)Ïrefers€to€gross€negligence€as€a€ground€for€imposing€discipline.€€Under€these€circumstancesÏthe€failure€"properly"€to€supervise€that€is€sanctionable€under€HO€ðð€8„316(a)(24)€means,€atÏa€minimum,€a€negligent€failure.Ìà  àFor€these€reasons,€the€judgment€in€favor€of€Anderson€will€be€affirmed.Ìà@UU)ìàVIIˆÌà  àThe€sole€point€raised€by€Paul's€petition€for€certiorari€is€her€claimed€entitlement€toÏcredit€against€the€judgment€for€the€amount€of€compensation€paid€to€Kirson.€€Paul€is€not€soÏentitled.€€She€was€not€the€employer€and€did€not€pay€any€compensation.€€See€LE€ðð€9„902.ÌÓÓà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àòòJUDGMENT€OF€THE€COURT€OF€SPECIALÐ x'!! ÐAPPEALS€IN€FAVOR€OF€THE€CROSS„¼PETITIONER€AND€RESPONDENT,€PHYLLISÏR.€KIRSON,€AND€AGAINST€THEÏPETITIONER€AND€CROSS„RESPONDENT,ÏSUBURBAN€HOSPITAL,€INC.,€VACATED,ÏAND€CASE€REMANDED€TO€THAT€COURTÐ x-'' ÐWITH€INSTRUCTIONS€TO€REMAND€THATÏCLAIM€TO€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FORÏMONTGOMERY€COUNTY€FOR€FURTHERÏPROCEEDINGS€CONSISTENT€WITH€THISÏOPINION.Ð À(#À(# ÐÌà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àJUDGMENT€OF€THE€COURT€OF€SPECIALÏAPPEALS€IN€FAVOR€OF€THE€CROSS„¼RESPONDENT,€MARY€ANDERSON,ÏAFFIRMED.Ð À(#À(# ÐÌà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àJUDGMENT€OF€THE€COURT€OF€SPECIALÏAPPEALS€IN€FAVOR€OF€THE€CROSS„¼RESPONDENT,€MARY€BETH€SMITH,ÏREVERSED.€€THAT€CLAIM€IS€REMANDEDÏTO€THE€COURT€OF€SPECIAL€APPEALSÏWITH€INSTRUCTIONS€TO€AFFIRM€THEÏJUDGMENT€OF€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FORÏMONTGOMERY€COUNTY€IN€FAVOR€OFÏPHYLLIS€R.€KIRSON€AGAINST€MARYÏBETH€SMITH.Ð À(#À(# ÐÌà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àJUDGMENT€OF€THE€COURT€OF€SPECIALÏAPPEALS€IN€FAVOR€OF€THEÏRESPONDENT,€PHYLLIS€R.€KIRSON,ÏAGAINST€THE€PETITIONER,€APARANGIÏPAUL,€AFFIRMED.€€Ð À(#À(# ÐÌà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àCOSTS€IN€THIS€COURT€AND€IN€THEÏCOURT€OF€SPECIAL€APPEALS€TO€BE€PAIDÏONE„HALF€BY€THE€CROSS„PETITIONER,ÏPHYLLIS€R.€KIRSON,€ONE„QUARTER€BYÏTHE€CROSS„RESPONDENT,€MARY€BETHÏSMITH,€AND€ONE„QUARTER€BY€THEÏPETITIONER,€APARANGI€PAUL.Ð À(#À(# Ðóó