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PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION of San Diego County, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS of San Diego County et al., Defendants and Respondents.
In October 1995, the San Diego County Public Defender (public defender) transferred his attorneys responsible for misdemeanor matters away from the Municipal Court for the El Cajon Judicial District (El Cajon Municipal Court) and informed the court administrator that the public defender henceforth would be unavailable to represent indigent criminal defendants in prearraignment and arraignment matters. The court accepted that representation without further inquiry and thereafter appointed private counsel under contract with San Diego County (County) in lieu of the public defender in those matters.
Public Defender Association of San Diego County (PDA), an employee organization of attorneys employed by the public defender, challenged these actions by the public defender, El Cajon Municipal Court, and San Diego County Board of Supervisors (Board) (collectively, Respondents) by petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085). The superior court denied the petition, stating the public defender has the discretion to reassign his attorneys for any reason and El Cajon Municipal Court is entitled to rely upon the public defender's representation of future unavailability.
PDA's principal contention on appeal is that the public defender's “unavailability” is illegitimate and the appointment of private counsel in lieu of the public defender in this manner violates Respondents' duties under Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a) and Penal Code section 987.2, subdivisions (d) and (e). We agree. The Legislature created the office of public defender to represent indigent criminal defendants (Gov.Code, § 27706, subd. (a)) and limited the manner in which private counsel can be appointed in lieu of the public defender (Pen.Code, § 987.2, subds.(d) & (e)). These statutes prohibit the privatization of indigent criminal defense representation in the manner done in this case.
During oral argument, counsel advised the court that the public defender has resumed representation of indigent criminal defendants in prearraignment and arraignment matters in El Cajon Municipal Court following the County's determination in March 1999 that representation by private counsel was not cost effective. Although this renders the present appeal technically moot, “this case comes within the well-recognized qualification to the general rule that where, as here, the appeal presents questions of continuing public interest that are likely to recur, resolution of those issues is appropriate.” (John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 301, 307, 187 Cal.Rptr. 472, 654 P.2d 242.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The public defender is appointed by courts to represent indigent criminal defendants pursuant to Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a) and Penal Code section 987.2, subdivisions (d) and (e), in counties that have elected to establish the office of public defender under Government Code section 27700.
Here, the Board sought to reduce the cost of providing indigent criminal defense representation in El Cajon Municipal Court by providing private counsel in lieu of the public defender. The County chief administrative officer was directed to evaluate the proposal and begin to perform a cost comparison. Several months later, the public defender transferred attorneys responsible for misdemeanor matters away from El Cajon Municipal Court and represented to the court administrator that the public defender was no longer available for appointment in those matters. The court thereafter appointed only private counsel.
The Board requested bids from private parties to represent indigent defendants in misdemeanor matters in El Cajon Municipal Court. Based on the bids, the chief administrative officer determined that private counsel was more economical only for prearraignment and arraignment matters. The County contracted with a private firm to represent indigent defendants in those matters, as the contract stated “due to the unavailability of the Public Defender,” while the public defender resumed postarraignment representation. El Cajon Municipal Court continued to appoint private counsel in lieu of the public defender for all prearraignment and arraignment matters.
WRIT OF MANDATE
Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 authorizes courts to issue a writ of mandate to compel the performance of an act that the law specifically requires. Writ relief is available to compel a public officer to perform a mandatory, ministerial act. (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 442, 261 Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610; Sego v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 250, 255, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 68.)
An act that involves the exercise of discretion is legislative, not ministerial. Writ relief is available to correct a legislative act if the public officer failed to exercise his or her discretion or acted so unreasonably or arbitrarily as to indicate an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. (United Assn. of Journeymen v. City and County of San Francisco (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 751, 759, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 280; Sego v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 255, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 68.) Thus, a writ is available to correct a legislative decision that is arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, contrary to established public policy, unlawful, or procedurally unfair. (Mike Moore's 24-Hour Towing v. City of San Diego (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1303, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 355.)
On appeal, we independently determine whether the challenged act is ministerial or legislative. (United Assn. of Journeymen v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 759, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 280.) If the latter, then we independently determine whether the public officer acted so unreasonably or arbitrarily as to indicate an abuse of discretion. (Mike Moore's 24-Hour Towing v. City of San Diego, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1303, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 355.) The trial court's factual findings are conclusive on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S STATUTORY DUTY
PDA contends the public defender violated Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a) by transferring his attorneys away from El Cajon Municipal Court for the purpose of making them unavailable and then representing to the court that the public defender was unavailable for all prearraignment and arraignment matters. Respondents contend the public defender is entitled to assign his attorneys as he deems appropriate, and argue there is no evidence of a specific request for representation or order of the court so as to trigger his duty to serve as counsel under Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a). Respondents do not dispute PDA's contention that the public defender transferred his attorneys for the purpose of making them unavailable, and, indeed, the evidence reveals the County's efforts in conjunction with El Cajon Municipal Court and the public defender to provide for the appointment of private counsel in lieu of the public defender as a cost-saving measure.
We conclude that in transferring his attorneys for the purpose of making them unavailable, the public defender violated his mandatory duties under Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a).
Penal Code section 987.2, subdivisions (d) and (e) obligates county courts to appoint the public defender to represent indigent criminal defendants unless the public defender is “unavailable.” Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a), in turn, obligates the public defender to represent indigent criminal defendants at the defendant's request or upon order of the court:
“The public defender shall perform the following duties:
“(a) Upon request of the defendant or upon order of the court, the public defender shall defend, without expense to the defendant, except as provided by Section 987.8 of the Penal Code, any person who is not financially able to employ counsel and who is charged with the commission of any contempt or offense triable in the superior or municipal courts at all stages of the proceedings, including the preliminary examination․”
This statute creates mandatory duties by its express terms and does not grant the public defender any discretion to decline representation. (Ligda v. Superior Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 811, 827, 85 Cal.Rptr. 744.) Neither the public defender nor the County can diminish these mandatory duties. (Id. at p. 828, 85 Cal.Rptr. 744.)
Accordingly, in counties that have elected to establish the office of public defender pursuant to Government Code section 27700, the public defender has mandatory duties prescribed by Government Code section 27706. Those duties are not optional; they are mandatory. They cannot be diminished or privatized by the Board.
The public defender has no discretion to decline to represent an entire category of indigent criminal defendants. To allow the public defender simply to reassign his attorneys and declare them unavailable to represent such defendants in the future would eviscerate the public defender's mandatory duty. The public defender cannot exercise his general managerial discretion in a manner so as to subvert or defeat his mandatory statutory duty.1
We need not and do not go so far as to hold or suggest that the Board “has absolutely no discretion in overseeing the administration of the duties performed by such office,” as the dissent characterizes our opinion (dis.opn., p. 797). The Board has the responsibility and authority to supervise the official conduct of all County officers (Gov.Code, § 25303), but it has no power to direct the manner in which statutorily prescribed duties are performed. (Hicks v. Board of Supervisors (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 228, 242, 138 Cal.Rptr. 101.) Thus, we do not subscribe to the proposition that a county that has established the office of public defender under Government Code section 27700 has the authority “to establish a defense system best suited for the County” and “to make any discretionary modification to that system” in contravention of the public defender's mandatory duties prescribed by Government Code section 27706 (dis.opn., p. 798). The dissent cites no cognizable authority for this proposition.2
THE MUNICIPAL COURT'S STATUTORY DUTY
PDA contends El Cajon Municipal Court's practice of appointing private counsel in the first instance without determining in each case whether the public defender is available violates its duty under Penal Code section 987.2, subdivisions (d) and (e) to appoint the public defender unless the public defender is unavailable. Respondents contend El Cajon Municipal Court properly deferred to the public defender's representation that his attorneys would be unavailable in the future. We conclude El Cajon Municipal Court violated Penal Code section 987.2, subdivisions (d) and (e).3
The court must appoint the public defender to represent an indigent criminal defendant unless the public defender is unavailable. (Pen.Code, § 987.2, subds.(d) & (e).) “Unavailable” means the public defender cannot be ready for trial and in court on the designated trial date. (Williams v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 320, 330, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 832.) The court must exercise its discretion to determine whether an attorney in fact is unavailable for appointment in a particular matter, based on the representation of counsel and other factors. (Id. at pp. 330-331, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 832; Craig S. v. Superior Court (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 568, 573-575, 157 Cal.Rptr. 285.) The court's discretion in the appointment of counsel under Penal Code section 987.2 cannot be restricted by any fixed policy, such as a policy to appoint particular private counsel in every case, but rather must be based on the facts and circumstances of each case. (People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 346, 161 Cal.Rptr. 762, 605 P.2d 401 [decided under subd. (a) ]; Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 331, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 832 [decided under subd. (e) ].)
El Cajon Municipal Court here failed to exercise its discretion. The fact that the public defender transferred attorneys to another office does not necessarily make those attorneys, or other attorneys, unavailable to discharge the public defender's mandatory duty to represent indigent criminal defendants. The court must determine in each case whether the public defender is available; it cannot defer to a categorical representation of unavailability, and cannot exercise its discretion in a manner so as to subvert or defeat the public defender's mandatory statutory duty.
THE COUNTY'S CONTRACT WITH PRIVATE COUNSEL
PDA contends the Board cannot exercise its general contracting authority in a manner that undermines the public defender's mandatory duties and also contends the Board failed to comply with the County's charter in retaining an independent contractor. Respondents contend and the trial court concluded the decision was a legislative act and was not an abuse of discretion. We conclude PDA has not shown error as to its first contention, and we do not reach its second contention.
Penal Code section 987.2, subdivisions (d) and (e) expressly provides for the appointment of County-contracted private counsel when the public defender is unavailable. The contract here provides for private counsel to represent indigent criminal defendants in prearraignment and arraignment matters in El Cajon Municipal Court “due to the unavailability of the Public Defender”; it does not purport to require the appointment of private counsel in all such matters, and could not so require since the court determines whom to appoint under the statute. Since the contract does not supplant the public defender's mandatory duty, it does not contravene Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a) or Penal Code section 987.2, subdivisions (d) and (e).
In light of the foregoing, we need not and do not reach the issue of whether the Board complied with the County's charter in entering into the contract. The mischief is not the County's contract with private counsel, but rather the public defender's and El Cajon Municipal Court's avoidance of their mandatory statutory duties.
ATTORNEY FEES
PDA contends it is entitled to recover attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 and Government Code section 800. The superior court did not consider this issue due to its ruling in favor of Respondents, and we will not consider the issue in the first instance. The issue must be decided by the superior court on remand.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. As the principal issue is moot, we remand to the superior court to adjudicate only PDA's request for attorney fees. PDA is to recover its costs on appeal.
As the majority correctly notes, the very relief sought in this case has already been provided since the public defender has resumed prearraignment counseling and representation in misdemeanor cases. I agree that the matter should not be deemed moot due to matters of importance to be resolved bearing upon issues which might again be faced by the courts and the parties. However, in my view, the majority has reached an erroneous result in a case that lacks sufficient record to support its conclusions. Even if the record were sufficient, the result reached is incorrect. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The appeal of the Public Defender Association of San Diego County (PDA) presents issues concerning an alleged abuse of discretion by each respondent as follows: The public defender, in transferring his deputies as stated; the El Cajon Municipal Court, in making its finding of the public defender's unavailability for representation; and the County Board of Supervisors (and ostensibly the County's Chief Administrative Officer as well), in awarding the contract to private counsel. The only serious dispute in this case has been over whether the public defender more economically provides these services, and whether he abused his discretion in declaring himself unavailable, as accepted by the court, for these particular assignments for a limited period of time. PDA bases its claims purely on statute: Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a) and Penal Code section 987.2, subdivisions (d) and (e). These statutes, however, provide an inadequate basis for any conclusion that an abuse of discretion occurred in connection with these events.
The trial court made two key evidentiary rulings: PDA had submitted no admissible evidence to support a factual finding that the public defender was directed to effectuate the transfers so as to create an artificial need for private contracting. Also, the trial court ruled that the declaration of the El Cajon court administrator was sufficient to show the unavailability at that time of the public defender's office or the alternate defender. These rulings were correct. The only declarations which support PDA's position that the public defender's actions were an abuse of discretion and were taken solely due to his fear of termination were based upon multiple levels of hearsay. The County objected; the objections were sustained. Absent such evidence, there is nothing in the record to support a finding of abuse of discretion. The court administrator's declaration sufficiently showed the El Cajon court's reasons for concluding the public defender's office was unavailable at that time. Thus, having found no admissible evidence of an abuse of discretion by the public defender, the trial court was not required to inquire further into the reasons for his unavailability. (Ligda v. Superior Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 811, 827-828, 85 Cal.Rptr. 744.)
The statutes PDA relies upon simply do not cover the situation here presented. The majority relies exclusively on Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a), prescribing the general duties of the public defender,1 and Penal Code section 987.2, subdivisions (d) and (e), dealing with issues of compensation of counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases.2 Based on that law, the majority pronounces that the public defender must assume the duties at issue, and under no circumstances can its deputies be replaced by a more economical method of providing indigent defense. Respectfully, neither section controls here.
It was made clear in Ligda v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at page 827, 85 Cal.Rptr. 744, that the public defender has the power to manage and control the assignment of his deputies, in cooperation with the courts in coordinating calendar demands. (Ibid.) Under Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a), the public defender shall undertake the defense of those persons not financially able to employ counsel, who are charged with the commission of any contempt or offense, at all stages of the proceedings. All parties agree this section must be read together with Penal Code section 987.2, subdivisions (d) and (e), relating to the order of assignment of the services of the public defender, or where his office is unavailable, the assignment of a second public defender's office, or a panel of county-contracted attorneys, prior to the assignment of any other private counsel.
The majority denies reliance upon an abuse of discretion by the public defender (maj. opn., ante, p. 793, fn. 1). Yet it somehow finds the public defender must devote staff to every aspect of indigent representation even though the office lacks adequate staff to competently represent all of its clients as a result of such assignment. Not surprisingly, the majority cites no authority for such proposition. Taken to its logical conclusion, the rule declared by the majority will require boards of supervisors to provide additional funds to public defenders who reasonably determine they cannot staff all conceivable court functions involving indigent defendants. The new rule cast by the majority opinion will deprive counties of the ability to explore other economical and efficient alternatives to having the public defender provide all indigent defense services. Such rule requires the counties to either abandon the public defender system or fund whatever needs the public defender reasonably identifies. I find such dramatic shift of fiscal authority to be both unprecedented and unjustified.
Neither of these statutes clearly establishes in the relevant respects any duties of the public defender or the court that were not followed in this context. Nowhere in the language of Penal Code section 987.2 is it set forth that the court must inquire, as apparently the majority would have it do, whether the public defender is available in every misdemeanor case set for arraignment. Of course, there is no such requirement and to impose it would be an undue burden. (Williams v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 320, 327-331, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 832.) Here, the trial court had an adequate basis in the declaration of court administration official Frederick W. Lear to conclude that the El Cajon court was entitled to rely on the representations of the public defender that he was then unavailable for the work at issue. Without more, the court was not required to conduct a further investigation under Penal Code section 987.2. (Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 327-331, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 832.)
Further, although the statutory scheme contemplates that the courts will cooperate with the public defender in making necessary assignments (Ligda v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at p. 827, 85 Cal.Rptr. 744), it is a legislative function to allocate county resources, such as fixing the number of employees, and the courts may not control such legislative functions. (Hicks v. Board of Supervisors (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 228, 235-237, 242-244, 138 Cal.Rptr. 101.) Both sides in this case recognize the broad legislative power of the board to construct a system of indigent defense that meets constitutional requirements in a fashion that is also economical. (Ligda v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at pp. 823-827, 85 Cal.Rptr. 744; see Santa Ana Tustin Community Hospital v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 644, 179 Cal.Rptr. 620.) The Board's challenged acts in entering into the contract were clearly legislative in nature. (United Assn. of Journeymen v. City and County of San Francisco (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 751, 759, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 280.) We should not interfere with such legislative determinations unless there is a clear abuse of discretion demonstrated by the record. (Corona-Norco Unified School Dist. v. City of Corona (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 985, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 803.) Although I agree with the majority that the contract itself was legitimate, I disagree that the public defender could not allocate his staff in the manner that was done here.
Moreover, since the majority relies on Penal Code section 987.2 for its assertion of limitation on the ability of the board of supervisors to replace the public defender in a given set of circumstances, then it must have noted the statute specifically makes provision for counties which do not have such a system of indigent defense. (Pen.Code, § 987.2, subd. (a)(1).) In my view, the majority has assumed that a board of supervisors need not employ a public defender, but once it accepts such a system, it has absolutely no discretion in overseeing the administration of the duties performed by such office. If that is the majority's position-which I am convinced it must be-such position cannot be supported by simple reference to the two cited code sections. It is a significant limitation on the legislative power of the county, and one which is not supported by either case or statute, as discussed, ante.
The majority criticizes the dissent for its view that creation of a public defender system (undisputedly a choice a county can make or reject) does not deprive the county of the flexibility to find more economical or efficient methods of providing some portions of indigent defense. The majority complains my view is not supported by authority. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 793.)
I suppose the most obvious rejoinder is to repeat that which I have already said: It is the majority which lacks authority for its contrary position. I have already attempted to demonstrate the majority's reliance on the two cited statutes provides no support for its new rule. My further response is that I have pointed out the public defender has the power to manage his staff and to make assignments within his discretionary authority. (Ligda v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at p. 827, 85 Cal.Rptr. 744.) I have also noted the allocation of resources by the board of supervisors is a legislative function and the board has the power to construct an appropriate system of indigent defense. (Hicks v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at pp. 235-237, 242-244, 138 Cal.Rptr. 101; Ligda v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 823-827, 85 Cal.Rptr. 744.) Respectfully, it is the majority which has cast a new rule without benefit of either statutory or case authority.
In light of the foregoing, I would submit that the additional issue of whether the County Board of Supervisors complied with the County charter in entering into the contract must also be addressed, as briefed by the parties, and as follows. Under San Diego County Charter sections 703.10 and 916, the County, through its chief administrative officer, must determine before employing an independent contractor whether the services desired can be provided more economically and efficiently by an independent contractor than by a county employee. If so, the County may employ an independent contractor. Where such a finding can be made, the County is not deprived by other law of the power, through its board of supervisors, to establish a defense system best suited for the County, nor can it be deprived of authority to make any discretionary modification to that system. We have been given no reason in law or fact to conclude these public officers acted so unreasonably or arbitrarily in the initial decision to employ a private contractor as to indicate an abuse of discretion. (Mike Moore's 24-Hour Towing v. City of San Diego (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1303, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 355.)
From this statutory framework and the present record, I would find no basis to conclude that either the public defender, the County Board of Supervisors, or the El Cajon court violated any mandatory duties in taking the actions that they did. Given the paucity of the record and the absence of any discussion by the majority opinion of the power of a board of supervisors to establish a defense system best suited for each county, I submit the present opinion errs in its sweeping declaration of the duties of the public defender and its effective removal of authority from the County Board of Supervisors to make any modification to that system. Thus, since I agree with the majority that the appeal need not be dismissed as moot, I would reach the merits and affirm the judgment denying the petition in all respects.
FOOTNOTES
1. We reject PDA's argument that the public defender abused his discretion because he transferred the deputies under threat of his own termination and failed to exercise independent judgment. The court found there was no admissible evidence of a threat, and we agree.
2. We also do not reach the issue raised by the dissent of whether the transfer can be justified by fiscal necessity (dis.opn., p. 796). Respondents do not so contend, and the public defender's transfer of attorneys was not undertaken as part of the Board's formal budgetary process. (See Hicks v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 240, 138 Cal.Rptr. 101; see also Scott v. Common Council (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 684, 690-694, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 161.)
3. El Cajon Municipal Court, not the presiding judge, is the proper party respondent. (Pettie v. Superior Court (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 680, 682, 3 Cal.Rptr. 267; Gresham v. Superior Court (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 664, 666, 112 P.2d 965.)
1. Government Code section 27706, subdivision (a) requires the public defender to perform the following duties: “(a) Upon request of the defendant or upon order of the court, the public defender shall defend, without expense to the defendant, ․ any person who is not financially able to employ counsel and who is charged with the commission of any contempt or offense triable in the superior or municipal courts at all stages of the proceedings, including the preliminary examination․”
2. Penal Code section 987.2, subdivision (d) sets forth a scheme in which the court “first utilize[s] the services of the public defender to provide criminal defense services for indigent defendants.” Then: “In the event that the public defender is unavailable and the county and the courts have contracted with one or more responsible attorneys or with a panel of attorneys to provide criminal defense services for indigent defendants, the court shall utilize the services of the county-contracted attorneys prior to assigning any other private counsel․” Similarly, under Penal Code section 987.2, subdivision (e), the court “first utilize[s] the services of the public defender to provide criminal defense services for indigent defendants.” Then: “In the event that the public defender is unavailable and the county has created a second public defender and contracted with one or more responsible attorneys or with a panel of attorneys to provide criminal defense services for indigent defendants, and if the quality of representation provided by the second public defender is comparable to the quality of representation provided by the public defender, the court shall next utilize the services of the second public defender and then the services of the county-contracted attorneys prior to assigning any other private counsel․”
McINTYRE, J.
NARES, J., concurs.
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Docket No: No. D029798.
Decided: September 17, 1999
Court: Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.
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