In his article "A Constitutional Anomaly in the Czech Republic?" (EECR, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1995), Cass R. Sunstein raises some questions about the status of constitutional rights in the Czech Republic. He is right in stating that in some postcommunist countries "it is far from certain that leaders will deem themselves bound by constitutional provisions that they find inconvenient or that they dislike." In my opinion, this view is correct in general, but it does not characterize the situation in the Czech Republic accurately. On the contrary, this country can be cited as an example of the successful transition to the rule of law. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, adopted by the parliament of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on January 9, 1991, has been a landmark in this process. After the dissolution of the federation in December 1922, the Czech Republic adopted a new constitution. This constitution does not contain any guarantees of basic rights; however Art. 3 provides that the Charter is "a part of the constitutional order of the Czech Republic." Referring to this passage, Cass Sunstein doubts whether the Charter has the same legal quality as the constitution itself. This point finally leads to the question of whether parliament and government are bound by the basic rights included in the Charter. In my opinion these considerations are rather theoretical ones. In the constitutional history of Czechoslovakia, as well as in some European countries like Austria, one can find the category of "constitutional laws." These laws are not a formal part of the constitution itself, but they often share its legal status. Furthermore, the Czech constitution expresses "the respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual and the citizen" in its first article. Basic rights are one of the most important elements of constitutional regulation and even of the constitutional judiciary. If parliament or the executive branch of government exceeds the scope of its powers and violates basic rights, each Czech citizen is entitled to complain against this act in the Constitutional Court. Art. 87.1 of the Constitution literally expresses the right of the Constitutional Court to decide complaints "against interferences with fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution." In some of its decisions, the Czech Constitutional Court rescinded laws because they violated the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. In his article, Cass Sunstein also expresses his critical attitude towards the embodiment of positive rights in the Charter. Indeed, this is a very serious problem. It concerns not only the Czech Republic, but post-communist countries in general. Positive rights have been a typical but not an exclusive feature of communist constitutions. Traditional basic rights protect the individual citizen against the power of state authorities. Positive rights, mostly concerning the social and economic sphere of life, have another function. Obviously, such rights were easy to guarantee under the conditions of a state-run economy, since the state itself owned all the necessary facilities. However, in a liberal state that promotes and requires private initiative and functions in the context of a market economy, this is not the case anymore. Although the ideas of a market economy are deeply rooted in Czech public opinion, positive rights still seem to be fairly popular as well. The second notion is common to all post-communist societies. However, in contrast to the constitutions of other countries (e.g., Russia), the Czech Charter embodies a clear and quite elegant solution. It includes social and economic guarantees (Art. 26 to Art. 35), but Art. 41.1 provides that the enlisted positive rights are effective only under the provisions of specific legal rules. The authors of the Charter made it clear, that they considered social and economic interests, while at the same time coming to terms with the necessities of a market economy and a liberal state. Joachim Lippott University of Cologne