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    UTAH FUEL CO. v. NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL COMMISSION, 306 U.S. 56 (1939)

    U.S. Supreme Court

    UTAH FUEL CO. v. NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL COMMISSION, 306 U.S. 56 (1939)

    306 U.S. 56

    UTAH FUEL CO. et al.
    v.
    NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL COMMISSION et al.
    No. 528.

    Argued Jan. 3, 1939.
    Decided Jan. 30, 1939.

    [306 U.S. 56, 57]   Messrs. J. V. Norman and Robert E. Quirk, both of Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

    Robert H. Jackson, Sol. Gen., for respondents.

    Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

    Petitioners are producers-engaged in the business of mining coal, and members of the 'Bituminous Coal Code',-that is 'producers accepting membership in the Code.' The National Bituminous Coal Commission, created by Act April 26, 1937, Ch. 127, 50 Stat. 72, 15 U.S.C.A. 828 et seq., purporting to proceed under section 10(a), 15 U.S.C.A. 840(a), on July 15, 1937 issued Order No. 15 which directed each producer of bituminous coal to file within fifteen days complete report showing for each mine detailed cost of tonnage produced and realization prices derived from sale, during 1936. This notice concluded-

    Approved forms were distributed to producers for returns to the order. They contained the following in bold type-'This report is required under the provisions of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 and is therefore confidential.' Petitioners made returns upon these forms.

    March 30, 1938, the Commission announced that thereafter it would give public notice of a hearing to determine the weighted average of total cost of the tonnage of coal in the calendar year 1936 adjusted, etc. Further, that upon such hearing the information obtained from individual coal producers through Order 15 would be made available for inspection and introduction in evidence; that section 10(a) of the Act was construed to authorize such disclosure.

    Petitioners made formal objection to the March 30 action but the Commission after consideration announced adherence and ordered-

    Deeming this proposed action unauthorized and relying upon section 6( b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 836(b), one of the present petitioners with others asked review in the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia. That court held the challenged action was not reviewable by it and dismissed the petition August 1, 1938. Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 69 App.D.C. 166, 99 F.2d 399. August 31, 1938, the Commission ordered its secretary to make available for inspection to 'interested parties who have [306 U.S. 56, 59]   filed appearances in this proceeding,' petitioners' cost, etc., reports returned under Order 15.

    September 7, 1938 petitioners by bill filed in the District Court, District of Columbia, sought an injunction against the threatened disclosure. This set out the foregoing facts, stated that no adequate relief could be had elsewhere, and that petitioners would sustain immediate and irreparable damage if their reports were publicized. It further averred that the Commission's proposed action was unauthorized, arbitrary, unreasonable, and in flagrant violation of the statute also the promise of privacy inferable from Order 15 and the forms used for returns thereto.

    The trial court held 'the bill of complaint fails to state a cause of action in that the acts of the defendants sought to be enjoined are authorized by and not in violation of the Bituminous Coal Act,' and dismissed it upon motion. The Court of Appeals concluded the District Court had no jurisdiction over the controversy and upon that ground approved the dismissal. The matter is here by certiorari.

    We are unable to accept the view of the Court of Appeals. The District Court correctly ruled that the bill fails to state a cause of action and for that reason properly directed the bill dismissed.

    A question cognate to the one here presented was before us in Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad Co., 305 U.S. 177 , 59 S.Ct. 160, decided December 5, 1938, the date of the Court of Appeals' decision herein. We there declared, although determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission that a railroad was not 'interurban' did not constitute an 'order' reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act of October, 1913,1 nevertheless, in the circumstances disclosed, it could be subjected to judicial review by bill in equity. 'Equity jurisdiction may be invoked when it is [306 U.S. 56, 60]   essential to the protection of the rights asserted, even though the complainant seeks to enjoin the bringing of criminal actions.' (Page 164.)

    Considering the circumstances here alleged, the great and obvious damage which might be suffered, the importance of the rights asserted, and the lack of any other remedy, we think complainants could properly ask relief in equity. The jurisdiction of a District Court is to be 'determined by the allegations of the bill, and usually if the bill or declaration makes a claim that if well founded is within the jurisdiction of the Court it is within that jurisdiction whether well founded or not.' Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange et al., 262 U.S. 271, 273 , 43 S.Ct. 540, 541; also Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., et al., 263 U.S. 291, 305 , 44 S.Ct. 96, 98; United States v. Archibald McNeil & Sons, 267 U.S. 302, 307 , 45 S.Ct. 258, 259.

    By admission, Congress could have authorized the Commission to disclose the details of reports concerning costs, etc. But petitioners insist that the Bituminous Coal Act conferred no such power; on the contrary definitely denies it.

    The Act contains twenty-one sections and a schedule of districts. Section 4-'The provisions of this section shall be promulgated by the Commission as the 'Bituminous Coal Code', and are herein referred to as the code.' 'Part II-Marketing' of this declares-

    Section 10(a)-

    Counsel submit an ingenious argument to show that as petitioners are code members their returns to Order 15 are not within the ambit of section 10 and must be treated as if presented under Section 4, Part II(a) and therefore confidential. Also, that the challenged action of the Board conflicts with the words, spirit and general purposes of the enactment.

    We have examined the argument but cannot conclude that the reasons advanced are adequate to support the point taken.

    The language of section 10(a) applies to all producers and we think allows what the Board proposes. It harmonizes rather than conflicts with the general purposes of the statute to permit action by the Board only upon full information. Obviously publication may be harmful to [306 U.S. 56, 62]   petitioners but as Congress had adequate power to authorize it and has used language adequate thereto we can find here no sufficient basis for an injunction.

    Upon the ground and for the reasons herein stated the decree of the District Court is affirmed.

    AFFIRMED.

    Mr. Justice BLACK, concurring.

    I concur in the affirmance of the decree of the District Court. For reasons stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 101 F.2d 426, I believe that Court properly found the District Court without jurisdiction.

    Footnotes

    [ Footnote 1 ] 38 Stat. 208, 28 U.S.C. 41, 28 U.S.C.A. 41.

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