168 U.S. 218
November 29, 1897. [168 U.S. 218, 219] This case comes from the United States court for the Indian Territory on a certificate as to jurisdiction. The amended complaint filed in that court, November 6, 1893, besides stating a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, alleges the following facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction: That the plaintiff is a natural born citizen of the United States of America; has never renounced his allegiance to said government, and has never taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign government of any kind whatever; that he has ever been and is yet a citizen of the United States; that the legislature of the Chickasaw Nation, on October 7, 1876, passed the following act:
That by this act, which was simply a confirmation of a prior statute, passed in 1857, the parties named therein became adopted citizens of the Chickasaw Nation; that he was duly and legally married to one of the parties named therein, to wit, Matilda Bourland, while she was such adopted citizen; that thereafter, and on October 11, 1883, the legislature of the Chickasaw Nation passed another act, as follows:
And that since the passage of the lastnamed act the Chickasaw government, and all the officials thereof, have refused to recognize this plaintiff as a member of the Chickasaw tribe, or a citizen of said Chickasaw Nation, and that the courts of that nation have refused to entertain jurisdiction of any controversy between him and any member of the tribe of Chick- [168 U.S. 218, 220] asaw Indians, and still refuse to entertain jurisdiction of such controversies.
Article 7 of the treaty of June 22, 1855, between the United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes (11 Stat. 612), is as follows:
Article 38 of the treaty with the same tribes, of date April 28, 1866, provides (14 Stat. 779):
Section 6 of the act creating the United States court in the Indian Territory, approved March 1, 1889 (25 Stat. 784), reads:
And in section 31 (26 Stat. 96) it was also provided:
C. L. Herbert, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Justice BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
The condition of the Indians and Indian tribes within the limits of the United States is anomalous. The tribes, though in certain respects regarded as possessing the attributes of nationality, are held to be not foreign, but domestic dependent, nations. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515; Choctaw Nation v. U. S., 119 U.S. 1 , 7 Sup. Ct. 75; Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 , 10 Sup. Ct. 965. While the Indians and the territory which may have been specially set apart for their use are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and congress may pass such laws as it sees fit prescribing the rules governing the [168 U.S. 218, 222] intercourse of the Indians with one another and with citizens of the United States, and also the courts in which all controversies to which an Indian may be a party shall be submitted (U. S. v. Rogers, 4 How. 567; U. S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 , 6 Sup. Ct. 1109; In re Gon-ShayEe, 130 U.S. 343 , 9 Sup. Ct. 542; Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Ry. Co., supra), the mere fact that a citizen of the United States has become a member of an Indian tribe by adoption may not necessarily cancel his citizenship. As said by Chief Justice Taney, in U. S. v. Rogers, 4 How. 573: 'Whatever obligations the prisoner may have taken upon himself by becoming a Cherokee by adoption, his responsibility to the laws of the United States remained unchanged and undiminished.' Indeed, by section 43 of chapter 182 (26 Stat. 99), provision is made for the naturalization of members of the Indian tribes in the Indian Territory, with a proviso 'that the Indians who become citizens of the United States under the provisions of this act do not forfeit or lose any rights or privileges they enjory or are entitled to as members of the tribe or nation to which they belong.'
Now, according to this complaint, plaintiff was a citizen of the United States. Matilda Bourland was not a Chickasaw by blood, but one upon whom the right of Chickasaw citizenship had been conferred by an act of the Chickasaw legislature. The citizenship which the Chickasaw legislature could confer it could withdraw. The only restriction on the power of the Chickasaw Nation to legislate in respect to its internal affairs is that such legislation shall not conflict with the constitution or laws of the United States, and we know of no provision of such constitution or laws which would be set at naught by the action of a political community like this in withdrawing privileges of membership in the community once conferred. The Chickasaw legislature, by the second act, whose meaning is clear, though its phraseology may not be beyond criticism, not only repealed the prior act, but canceled the rights of citizenship granted thereby, and further directed the governor to remover the parties named therein and their descendants beyond the limits of the nation. This act was [168 U.S. 218, 223] not one simply taking effect as of the date of its passage, and then withdrawing rights admitted to have been theretofore legally granted, but was retroactive in its scope, and purported to annul and destroy all that had ever been attempted to be done in respect to the matter. Whether any rights of property could be taken away by such subsequent act need not be considered. It is enough to hold that all personal rights founded on the mere status created by the prior act fell when that status was destroyed. Plaintiff never took any oath of allegiance to the Chickasaw Nation; never in terms relinquished his full rights as a citizen of the United States. Doubtless, by intermarriage with one who was at the time by legislative act a Chickasaw citizen, he acquired the rights and privileges of a member of that tribe or nation, but, when that which was the foundation upon which such acquisition rested was taken away by act of the nation, then all those rights and privileges ceased. The tie which bound him to the nation was his wife's citizenship. That tie the nation destroyed. Its destruction released him. That such was the effect of this legislative act is established by the conduct of the Chickasaw government and all its officials, for they have refused to recognize plaintiff as any longer a member of the Chickasaw Nation, and the courts of that nation have declined to entertain jurisdiction of any suits brought by him against a Chickasaw. The validity of the act withdrawing citizenship from the wife of plaintiff, and the consequent withdrawal from plaintiff of all the rights and privileges of citizenship in the Chickasaw Nation, has been practically determined by the authorities of that nation, and that determination is not subject to correction by any direct appeal from the judgment of the Chickasaw courts. It follows, therefore, that his right as a citizen of the United States to appeal to the federal courts to take jurisdiction of his claims against one of the Chickasaw Nation must be sustained, for it cannot be that a citizen of the United States residing in the Chickasaw Nation can be wronged without an opportunity of redress in some judicial tribunal. We are of opinion therefore, that the plea to the jurisdiction was wrongfully [168 U.S. 218, 224] sustained, and the judgment of the United States court for the Indian Territory will be reversed, and the case remanded, with instructions to overrule the plea to the jurisdiction.