134 U.S. 232
BELL'S GAP R. CO.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA. 1
March 10, 1890
[134 U.S. 232, 233] James W. M. Newlin, Wayne MacVeagh, M. E. Olmsted, and W. B. Lamberton, for plaintiff in error, and other persons having similar cases on the docket.
J. F. Sanderson and W. S. Kirkpatrick, for defendant in error.
Motion is made in this case to revoke the allocatur of the writ of error, and to quash the writ, and, in the alternative, [134 U.S. 232, 234] to affirm the judgment. The first motion is based on the assumption that the writ was improperly allowed by the judge, and questions the propriety of his action. It is probable that the counsel who makes the motion does not intend it in that sense, but is merely unfamiliar with the practice of this court, by which the ordinary proceeding to vacate a writ of error is a motion to dismiss it. In the present case we think that the writ was demandable, and cannot be dismissed, as will more fully appear from the following statement: By the law of Pennsylvania, all moneyed securities are subject to an annual state tax of three mills on the dollar of their actual value, except bonds and other securities issued by corporations, which are taxed at three mills on the dollar of the nominal or par value. If the treasurer of a corporation fails to make return of its loans, as required by law, the auditor general makes out and fie an account against the company, charging it with the tax supposed to be due. This account, if approved by the state treasurer, is served upon the corporation, which must pay the tax within a specified time, or show good cause to the contrary. If it objects to the tax, it is authorized, in common with all others who are dissatisfied with the auditor's stated accounts, to appeal to the court of common pleas of the county where the seat of government is, (at present Dauphin county,) which appeal is served on the auditor general, and by him transmitted to the clerk of said court, to be entered of record, subject to like proceedings as in common suits. A declaration is then filed on the stated account in behalf of the state, and the cause is regularly tried. In the present case, on failure of the company (The Bell's Gap Railroad Company) to make return except under protest, the auditor general made out an account against it, containing the following charge:
Nominal value of scrip, bonds, and certificates of indebtedness owned by residents of Pennsylvania, $539,000, -tax, three mills $1,617 00 [134 U.S. 232, 235] The company thereupon tendered an appeal, which was filed in the court of common pleas of Dauphin county, a declaration was filed on the part of the state, and the cause was tried by the court, a jury being waived. The appeal filed by the corporation (which was the basis of the proceedings in the court) contained eight grounds of objection to the tax. Most of these objections were founded upon the constitution or laws of Pennsylvania, and need not be noticed here. The second objection, which refers to the constitution of the United States, was as follows, to-wit:
On the merits we have no serious doubt.
1. As to the Assessment of the Tax of Three Mills upon the Nominal or Face Value of the Bonds, instead of Assessing it upon the Actual Value. This might have been subject to question under the state laws, but the state courts have upheld the assessment as valid We are to accept it, therefore, as part of the state system of taxation authorized by its constitution and laws. Then, how does it violate any provision of the constitution of the United States? It is contended that it violates the first section of the fourteenth amendment, which forbids a state to withhold from any person the equal protection of the laws. We do not perceive that the assessment in question transgresses this provision. There is no unjust discrimination against any persons or corporations. The presumption is that corporate securities are worth their face value. Besides, the person that holds them is not affected by the tax, unless he receives his interest from which the tax is deducted. So long as the interest is paid the security has to him full productive value; when it is not paid, he pays no tax. [134 U.S. 232, 237] But, be this as it may, the law does not make any discrimination in this regard which the state is not competent to make. All corporate securities are subject to the same regulation. The provision in the fourteenth amendment, that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, was not intended to prevent a state from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at all, such as churches, libraries, and the property of charitable institutions. It may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions, and may vary the rates of excise upon various products; it may tax real estate and personal property in a different manner; it may tax visible property only, and not tax securities for payment of money; it may allow deductions for indebtedness, or not allow them. All such regulations, and those of like character, so long as they proceed within reasonable limits and general usage, are within the discretion of the state legislature, or the people of the state in framing their constitution. But clear and hostile discriminations against particular persons and classes, especially such as are of an unusual character, unknown to the practice of our governments, might be obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition. It would, however, be impracticable and unwise to attempt to lay down any general rule or definition on the subject that would include all cases. They must be decided as they arise. We think that we are safe in saying that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to compel the states to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation. If that were its proper construction, it would not only supersede all those constitutional provisions and laws of some of the states, whose object is to secure equality of taxation, and which are usually accompanied with qualifications deemed material, but it would render nugatory those discriminations which the best interests of society require; which are necessary for the encouragement of needed and useful industries, and the discouragement of intemperance and vice, and which every state, in one form or another, deems it expedient to-adopt. [134 U.S. 232, 238] The general purpose and scope of the fourteenth amendment, and the general qualifications necessary to be applied to it, are well stated in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 , 5 S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 357. Mr Justice FIELD, in delivering the opinion of the court, there said: 'The fourteenth amendment, in declaring that no state 'h all deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, not deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' undoubtedly intended, not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and acquire and enjoy property; that they should have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of any one, except as applied to the same pursuits by others, under like circumstances; that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition; and that in the administration of criminal justice no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like offenses. But neither the amendment,-broad and comprehensive as it is,-nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the state, sometimes termed its 'police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity.' With due regard to these considerations, we are clearly of opinion that the method of assessing the tax in question, on the face value of corporate securities in Pennsylvania, is not violative of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution.
2. As to Want of Notice to the Owners of the Bonds. What notice could they have which the law does not give them? They know that their bonds are to be assessed at their face [134 U.S. 232, 239] value, and that a tax of three mills on the dollar of that value will be imposed, and that they will only be required to pay this tax when and as they receive the interest. If the state may assess the tax upon the face value of the bonds, notice in pais is not necessary. We think that there is nothing in this objection which shows any infraction of the federal constitution. It is urged that it is a taking of the bondholder's property without due process of law. We must confess that we cannot see it in this light. The process of taxation does not require the same kind of notice as is required in a suit at law, or even in proceedings for taking private property under the power of eminent domain. It involves no violation of due process of law when it is executed according to customary forms and established usages, or in subordination to the principles which underlie them. We see nothing in the process of taxation complained of which is obnoxious to constitutional objection on this score. Stockholders in the national banks are taxed in this way, and the method has been sustained by the express decision of this court. Bank v. Com., 9 Wall. 353.
3. That the Corporation is Taxed for Property it Does not Own. This objection is not true in point of fact. The corporation, as the debtor of its bondholders, holding money in its hands for their use, namely, the interest to be paid, is merely required to pay to the commonwealth out of this fund the proper tax due on the security. The tax is on the bondholder, not on the corporation. This plan is adopted as a matter of convenience, and as a secure method of collecting the tax. That is all. It injures no party. It certainly does not infringe the constitution of the United States by making one party pay the debts and support the just burdens of another party, as is implied in the objection. The other objections are embraced in those which we have already considered, and need no further notice. We would say, in conclusion, that there are several decisions of this court which virtually dispose ofm ost of the questions involved in the present case. We refer particularly to Bank v. Com., 9 Wall. 353; [134 U.S. 232, 240] Bank v. U. S., 19 Wall. 227, 240; King v. U. S., 99 U.S. 229 ; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701 , 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 ; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U.S. 578, 581 , 9 S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 192. The motion to dismiss the writ of error is denied, and the judgment of the supreme court of Pennsylvania is affirmed.
[ Footnote 1 ] Affirming 16 Atl. Rep. 593, mem.
[ Footnote 2 ] 16 Atl. Rep. 593, mem.