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    BOLDT v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. , 245 U.S. 441 (1918)

    U.S. Supreme Court

    BOLDT v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. , 245 U.S. 441 (1918)

    245 U.S. 441

    No. 62.

    Argued Nov. 16 and 19, 1917.
    Decided Jan. 7, 1918.

    [245 U.S. 441, 442]   Messrs. Henry W. Brush, of Buffalo, N. Y., Rufus S. Day, of Washington, D. C., Frank Gibbons, of Buffalo, N. Y., and Charles W. Dille, of Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff in error.

    Messrs. Frederic D. McKenney and J. S. Flannery, both of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error.

    Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court.

    At Buffalo, N. Y., defendant has a yard where freight trains are made up. Cars under control of a brakeman descend by gravity to desired positions on connecting tracks which lie southward of the 'hump' or high point. A rule forbade employes from going between cars without first taking precautions not observed in the present case. Some evidence tended to show that under longcontinued practice, considered good railroading, cars (in 'strings' or 'cuts') were constantly sent down and purposely allowed to strike others with sufficient force to secure coupling, but not hard enough to injure the equipment, 'regardless of the position the men are in, putting them under obligation to take care of themselves.' [245 U.S. 441, 443]   While between cars, contrary to instructions, and assisting in an effort to adjust a faulty coupler, Edward J. Boldt, an experienced yard conductor, was killed. The coupler was at the south end of a 'string' standing on an inclined switch. Another 'string' moving down from the north hit the standing one violently and drove it against deceased and across a space of 20 feet.

    Suing under the federal Employers' Liability Act, plaintiff maintained that the brakeman in control negligently permitted the moving cars to strike with too great violence; also that the company engligently failed to promulgate and enforce adequate rules to safeguard deceased while occupied about his task; and some evidence tended to support both claims. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment upon verdict for defendant after the trial court had denied motion for new trial based solely upon its refusal to give the charge specially requested by plaintiff and copied below. 218 Fed. 367, 134 C. C. A. 175.

    To the general charge plaintiff made no objection whatever. In the first paragraph it declared:

    Continuing, it explained nature of the accident, relationship, responsibilities, and obligations of parties, definition and effect of contributory negligence, etc.

    Concerning assumption of risk, the court said:

    At defendant's request and without objection, the jury were told:

    Plaintiff then asked a charge that:

    Denying the request the court said:

    This denial is the only error properly assigned here; and the circumstances afford no reason for departing from the general rule which limits our consideration to it.

    Section 1, Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (Comp. St. 1916, 8657), declares:

    That carriers 'shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed,' etc., 'resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employes of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.'

    In cases within the purview of the statute the carrier is no longer shielded by the fellow-servant rule, but must answer for an employes negligence as well as for that of an officer or agent.

    In Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 503 , 34 S. Sup. Ct. 635, 639 (58 L. Ed. 1062, L. R. A. 1915C, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475), we said:

    At common law the rule is well settled that a servant assumes extraordinary risks incident to his employment or risks caused by the master's negligence which are obvious or fully known and appreciated by him. Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (6th Ed.) 208; Bailey, Personal Injuries (2d Ed.) 385. This general doctrine was clearly recognized in Gila Valley Ry. Co. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 101 , 34 S. Sup. Ct. 229; Jacobs v. Southern R. R. Co., supra; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. De Atley, 241 U.S. 310, 313 , 36 S. Sup. Ct. 564; and Erie R. R. Co. v. Purucker, 244 U.S. 320, 324 , 37 S. Sup. Ct. 629. [245 U.S. 441, 446]   The request in question did not accurately state any applicable rule of law and was properly refused. Already the jury had been told that deceased assumed the ordinary risks of his employment-a statement more favorable than plaintiff could properly demand. The risk held to have been assumed in the Horton Case certainly arose from negligence of some officer, agent, or employe; and if the negligence of all these should be excluded in actions under the Employers' Liability Act, it is difficult to see what practical application could ever be given in them to the established doctrine concerning assumption of risk.

    The judgment below is


    Mr. Justice DAY took no part in the consideration or decision of this cause.

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