COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ v CERVANTES, 9915441
U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ v CERVANTES
9915441
In re: RAYMOND CERVANTES.
Debtor.
No. 99-15441
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, BAP No.
NC-97-1822-
Appellant,
RyKMe
v.
OPINION
RAYMOND CERVANTES,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Ryan, Klein, and Meyers, Judges, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
March 13, 2000--San Francisco, California
Filed July 18, 2000
Before: Henry A. Politz,1 Stephen Reinhardt, and
Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Hawkins
SUMMARY
The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court,
is copyrighted C 2000 by West Group.
_________________________________________________________________
Bankrupcty/Dischargeability of Debts
The court of appeals reversed a decision of the Bankrupcty
Appellate Panel. The court held that an absent parent who
owes money to the County for child support payments made
by the County prior to the entry of a child support order can-
not discharge that debt in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings.
Appellee Ray Cervantes fathered a child with Monica
Samudio. In March 1993, Samudio applied to the County of
Santa Cruz for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC). As a condition for receiving AFDC, she was
required under state and federal law to assign to the County
any accrued rights to support from the child's father.
In October 1994, the County obtained a judgment against
Cervantes in state court, ordering Cervantes to pay child sup-
port and to reimburse the County for AFDC payments made
to Samudio from March 1993 to October 1994. Cervantes
never paid the monthly amounts or the reimbursement, and in
September 1996 he filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.
Cervantes filed a complaint to determine whether his debt
to the County was dischargeable. A Chapter 13 debtor who
has completed all payments under the bankruptcy plan is enti-
tled to a discharge of prior debts, with exceptions. A debtor
is not entitled to discharge any debt to a spouse or child for
support in connection with a court order under 11 U.S.C.
S 523(a)(5). But such a debt can be discharged if it was
assigned to another entity, unless the assignment was pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. S 602(a)(26), the provision under which Samu-
dio assigned her support rights to the County in exchange for
AFDC.
The Ninth Circuit has held that S 602(a)(26) requires an
applicant for AFDC to assign support rights which have
accrued at the time such assignment is executed; thus, under
California law, a custodial parent does not have a right to sup-
port absent a court judgment. The Ninth Circuit concluded
that prior to the entry of a court judgment, a custodial parent
has no accrued rights that can be assigned pursuant to
S 602(a)(26); an absent parent is entitled to discharge debts
owed to the county for pre-judgment AFDC payments.
Cervantes moved for summary judgment in the bankruptcy
court, arguing that the debt owed to the County for pre-
judgment AFDC payments was dischargeable.
The County pointed to two Welfare Reform Act provisions.
The first provision, U.S.C. S 523(a)(18), stated that a debtor
is not entitled to discharge any debt owed under State law to
a State or municipality that is (A) in the nature of support, and
(B) enforceable under part D of title IV of the Social Security
Act. The second provision, 42 U.S.C. S 656(b), stated that a
debt owed under State law to a State or municipality that is
in the nature of support and that is enforceable under this part
is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy under Title 11.
The County argued that because these two provisions did
not refer to an assignment pursuant to section 602(a)(26), they
created a new exception to the general discharge rule. The
County maintained that S 656(b) applied to Cervantes' case
because it referred to discharges generally under Title 11, and
S 1328(a) is part of Title 11.
The bankruptcy court reasoned that the first provision had
been added to the bankruptcy code to effectuate the second
provision, which had been added to the codified version of the
Social Security Act, and concluded that an amendment to the
Social Security Act could not by itself change the bankruptcy
law and that Congress had only inserted the second provision
to reflect the change made by the first provision.
The County appealed, arguing that S 656(b) provides an
independent basis upon which to find a child-support debt
non-dischargeable. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP)
ruled that as the County had not made this argument to the
bankruptcy court, the argument was waived. The BAP
affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision.
The County appealed.
[1] The County did not waive its S 656(b) argument.
[2] Section 523(a) lists certain types of debt that Congress
has declared to be non-dischargeable in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, providing that a discharge under section 727, 1141,
1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) does not discharge an individual
debtor from debt under S 523(a)(5) or S 523(a)(18).
[3] Section 523(a) does not apply to discharges under sec-
tion 1328(a). Although S 1328(a) is not covered by the excep-
tions in section 523(a), it specifically incorporates several of
those exceptions. Section 1328(a) incorporates section
523(a)(5), but does not incorporate section 523(a)(18). When
Congress passed the Welfare Reform Act, it did not amend
section 1328(a) to include section 523(a)(18) in its list of
exceptions.
[4] Section 656(b), as amended by the Welfare Reform Act,
does not refer to an assignment under S 602(a)(26). Whereas
the discharge exceptions of sections 523(a) and 1328(a) apply
only to discharges under certain sections of the bankruptcy
code, the discharge exception of section 656(b) applies to any
bankruptcy case.
[5] The statutory scheme was inconsistent.
[6] The plain language of S 656(b) made clear that it
applied to all bankruptcy cases, not just certain ones. The
plain language of a statute is ignored only when a literal inter-
pretation would thwart the purpose of the over-all statutory
scheme or lead to an absurd result. Holding thatS 656(b)
applied to cases under S 1328(a) would not thwart the overall
statutory purpose or lead to an absurd result.
[7] There was a moderate inconsistency in the statutory
scheme, but the conflicting sections were capable of co-
existence, and there was no positive repugnancy between
them. Section 656(b) provided an independent basis upon
which to find a child support debt nondischargeable in any
bankruptcy proceeding under Title 11.
[8] Section 656(b) prohibits the discharge of a debt (1)
owed under state law to a state or municipality, (2) that is in
the nature of support, and (3) that is enforceable under part D
of Title IV of the Social Security Act.
[9] Cervantes' debt to the County for pre-judgment AFDC
payments was not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Philip L. Strauss (argued) and Mary A. Roth, Office of the
State Attorney General, San Francisco, California, for the
appellant.
Andrew Lauderdale, Lauderdale Law Offices, Monterey, Cal-
ifornia, for the appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:
May an absent parent who owes money to the County for
child support payments made by the County prior to the entry
of a child support order have that debt discharged in a Chapter
13 bankruptcy proceeding? We recently held, in the context
of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, that an absent parent is not entitled
to discharge such a debt. See In re Leibowitz , No. 99-55503,
2000 WL 890467 (9th Cir. July 6, 2000). This conclusion was
based on recent changes to the bankruptcy and welfare laws.
The absent parent in this case claims those changes only apply
to bankruptcy filings under Chapter 7, not Chapter 13. We
disagree and hold that the new discharge provisions apply to
any bankruptcy filing under Title 11.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ray Cervantes fathered a child with his girlfriend, Monica
Samudio. On March 18, 1993, shortly after the child was
born, Samudio applied to the County of Santa Cruz for Aid
to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"). As a condi-
tion for receiving AFDC, she was required under state and
federal law to assign to the County any "accrued " rights to
support from the child's father. See 42 U.S.C. S 602(a)
(26)(A); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code S 11477(a). 2
In October 1994, the County obtained a judgment against
Cervantes in state court pursuant to California Welfare and
Institutions Code S 11350.3 The judgment ordered Cervantes
to pay $219 per month in child support and to reimburse the
County $4,161 for AFDC payments made to Samudio from
March 1993 to October 1994. Cervantes never paid the
monthly amounts or the reimbursement, and in September
1996 he filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.
While his bankruptcy petition was pending, Cervantes filed
a complaint to determine whether the debts he owed to the
County were dischargeable. Under 11 U.S.C. S 1328(a), a
Chapter 13 debtor who has completed all payments under the
bankruptcy plan is entitled to a discharge of prior debts, with
certain exceptions. For instance, a debtor is not entitled to dis-
charge any debt to a spouse or child for support in connection
with a court order. See 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(5) (incorporated by
reference into 11 U.S.C. S 1328(a)). But such a debt can be
discharged if it was assigned to another entity, unless the
assignment was pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 602(a)(26), which is
the provision under which Samudio was required to assign her
support rights to the County in exchange for AFDC.
In this case, Cervantes owed a debt to Samudio for child
support that was in connection with a court order. The debt
had been assigned to another entity -- the County -- but that
assignment had been made pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
S 602(a)(26), so it would have seemed that his debt was not
dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(5).
The issue was more complicated, however. In Ramirez v.
County of Santa Clara, 795 F.2d 1494, 1497 (9th Cir. 1986),
we parsed the language of section 602(a)(26) and noted that
it requires an applicant for AFDC to assign support rights
"which have accrued at the time such assignment is execut-
ed." (emphasis added). We then noted that under California
law, a custodial parent does not have a right to support absent
a court judgment. See id. Putting these two pieces together,
we concluded that prior to the entry of a court judgment, a
custodial parent has no accrued rights that can be assigned
pursuant to section 602(a)(26). See id. And because a child
support debt assigned to the county was only excepted from
discharge if assigned pursuant to section 602(a)(26), we held
that an absent parent was entitled to discharge debts owed to
the county for pre-judgment AFDC payments. See id. We
reaffirmed this holding nine years later in Visness v. Contra
Costa County, 57 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 1995).
Relying on these two cases, Cervantes moved for summary
judgment in the bankruptcy court. He argued that the $4,161
owed to the County for pre-judgment AFDC payments was dis-
chargeable.4 The County cross-moved for summary judgment.
Although it acknowledged that Ramirez and Visness allowed
the discharge of pre-judgment debts, it maintained that subse-
quent legislation had circumvented the effect of those cases.
The County pointed to two provisions contained in the
Welfare Reform Act of 1996.5 The first provision was added
to the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(18) and states
that a debtor is not entitled to discharge any debt "owed under
State law to a State or municipality that is (A) in the nature
of support, and (B) enforceable under part D of title IV of the
Social Security Act." The second provision was added to the
Social Security Act at 42 U.S.C. S 656(b) and is nearly identi-
cal to the first provision. It states that "[a ] debt . . . owed
under State law to a State . . . or municipality . .. that is in
the nature of support and that is enforceable under this part is
not released by a discharge in bankruptcy under Title 11."
The County argued that because these two provisions did
not refer to an assignment pursuant to section 602(a)(26), they
created a new exception to the general discharge rule that was
not affected by this court's decisions in Ramirez and Visness.
The County conceded that the first provision, section
523(a)(18), did not apply to discharges under 11 U.S.C
S 1328(a) -- which is the provision under which Cervantes
had sought a discharge -- because section 523(a)(18) is part
of a larger provision that does not relate to section 1328(a)
proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. S 523(a). 6 The County also con-
ceded that Congress had not changed section 1328(a) to spe-
cifically incorporate the discharge exception of section
523(a)(18), the way section 1328(a) incorporates the dis-
charge exception of section 523(a)(5).7 But the County main-
tained that the second provision, at 42 U.S.C. S 656(b),
applied to Cervantes' case because it refers to discharges gen-
erally under Title 11, and section 1328(a) is part of Title 11.
The bankruptcy court rejected the County's argument.
Because the two new provisions contained such similar lan-
guage, the bankruptcy court reasoned that the first provision
had been added to the bankruptcy code to effectuate the sec-
ond provision, which had been added to the codified version
of the Social Security Act. Although the bankruptcy court did
not elaborate, it apparently concluded that an amendment to
the Social Security Act could not by itself change the bank-
ruptcy law and that Congress had only inserted the second
provision to reflect the change made by the first provision.
The County appealed, arguing that section 656(b) provides
an independent basis upon which to find a child-support debt
non-dischargeable. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP")
ruled that the County had not made this argument to the bank-
ruptcy court and that the argument was therefore waived. The
BAP then affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, and the
County filed this timely appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. S 158(d).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a decision of the bankruptcy court is on appeal from
the BAP, we independently review the bankruptcy court's
decision. See In re Michael, 163 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir.
1998). The bankruptcy court's interpretation of the Bank-
ruptcy Code is reviewed de novo. See In re Been , 153 F.3d
1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 1998).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Waiver
We must first address the BAP's finding that the County
waived its argument concerning section 656(b). In making
this determination, the BAP acknowledged that the County
cited section 656(b) along with 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(18) to the
bankruptcy court. But, the BAP concluded, the County did not
assert that section 656(b) alone could support its claim that
Cervantes' debt for child support was non-dischargeable. As
a result, it held, the County waived this argument.
We disagree. In its motion for summary judgment before
the bankruptcy court, the County cited both sections 656(b)
and 523(a)(18) for the proposition that Congress had altered
the law of dischargeability. That the County did not go one
step further and assert that each provision, by itself, was suffi-
cient to change the law is unimportant. The bankruptcy court
was advised of the changes to section 656(b) and had suffi-
cient information to assess the independent effect of that pro-
vision.
In fact, the bankruptcy court appears to have done just that.
In its grant of summary judgment to Cervantes, the court
stated that "[b]y adding S 523(a)(18) to the Bankruptcy Code,
Congress effectuated in bankruptcy cases the dischargeability
provision found at 42 U.S.C. S 656(b)." It then stated that if
Congress had intended for that change to apply to section
1328(a) cases, "it would have added S 523(a)(18) as an excep-
tion . . . under S 1328(a), as it did, for example, with
S 523(a)(5)." Thus, the bankruptcy court apparently consid-
ered whether section 656(b) provided an independent basis for
non-dischargeability. And based on Congress' failure to
amend section 1328(a), the court concluded that section
656(b) had no independent effect; it simply reflected the
change in law made by section 523(a)(18).
[1] Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the
County waived its argument concerning section 656(b). We
therefore proceed to the merits of the County's claim.
B. The effect of section 656(b)
[2] To understand the bankruptcy court's conclusion that
section 656(b) does not have independent effect, it is impor-
tant to have a clear picture of the complex statutory scheme
governing discharges. Ordinarily, a debtor who successfully
navigates the bankruptcy process is entitled to a discharge of
all pre-petition debts. See Visness, 57 F.3d at 776. There are
certain types of debt, however, that Congress has declared to
be non-dischargeable. See id. The main list of these debts is
found in the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. S 523(a). That
section provides that "[a] discharge under section 727, 1141,
1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge
an individual debtor from any debt" of the following kind. It
then lists several kinds of debt that cannot be discharged,
including those under section 523(a)(5), which was the focus
of Ramirez and Visness, and those under section 523(a)(18),
which was added by the Welfare Reform Act.
[3] By its terms, section 523(a) covers discharges under
five sections of the bankruptcy code. But it does not apply to
discharges under section 1328(a). That section contains its
own list of exceptions, which reads as follows:
[T]he court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all
debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under
section 502 of this title, except any debt --
(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5)
of this title;
(2) of the kind specified in paragraph (5),
(8), or (9) of section 523(a) of this title; or
(3) for restitution, or a criminal fine,
included in a sentence on the debtor's con-
viction of a crime.
11 U.S.C. 1328(a) (emphasis added). Thus, although section
1328(a) is not covered by the exceptions to discharge listed in
section 523(a), it specifically incorporates several of those
exceptions. Of particular importance, section 1328(a) incorpo-
rates section 523(a)(5). But section 1328(a) does not incorpo-
rate section 523(a)(18). When Congress passed the Welfare
Reform Act, it did not amend section 1328(a) to include sec-
tion 523(a)(18) in its list of exceptions.
[4] The final provision that refers to discharge exceptions
(and that is relevant to this case) is found not in the bank-
ruptcy code, but in the Social Security Act, at 42 U.S.C.
S 656(b). Before the Welfare Reform Act, that section pro-
vided that "[a] debt which is a child support obligation
assigned to a State under section 602(a)(26) . . . is not
released by a discharge in bankruptcy." After the Welfare
Reform Act, section 656(b) provides as follows:
(b) Nondischargeability. A debt (as defined in sec-
tion 101 of title 11 of the United States Code) owed
under State law to a State (as defined in such sec-
tion) or municipality (as defined in such section) that
is in the nature of support and that is enforceable
under this part is not released by a discharge in bank-
ruptcy under title 11 of the United States Code.
Two things are important here. First, unlike the old section,
the new section 656(b) does not refer to an assignment under
section 602(a)(26). Second, whereas the discharge exceptions
of sections 523(a) and 1328(a) apply only to discharges under
certain sections of the bankruptcy code, the discharge excep-
tion of section 656(b) applies to any discharge under Title 11
-- in other words, to any bankruptcy case.
[5] Looking at the statutory scheme as a whole, then, an
inconsistency is apparent. Section 523(a)(18) applies the new
discharge exception to discharges under sections 727, 1141,
1228(a), 1228(b), and 1328(b), while section 656(b) applies
the new exception to any discharge in bankruptcy. Yet section
1328(a) does not incorporate the new provision into its list of
exceptions.
The bankruptcy court resolved this conflict by ruling that
section 523(a)(18) effectuated section 656(b) and that section
656(b) did not have independent effect. Had Congress
intended for the new discharge exception to apply to section
1328(a) cases, the court reasoned, it would have added the
new exception to section 1328(a) directly.
[6] Although this resolution makes some sense, we reject
it for several reasons. First, the plain language of section
656(b) makes clear that it applies to all cases under Title 11,
not just certain ones. And while the plain language of a statute
is not always conclusive, we ignore plain language only when
a "literal interpretation would thwart the purpose of the over-
all statutory scheme or lead to an absurd result. " Wilshire
Westwood Assoc. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801,
804 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted); see also
Flores-Arellano v. INS, 5 F.3d 360, 364 (9th Cir. 1993) (Rein-
hardt, J., specially concurring) ("in order to disregard the
plain meaning of the statute, I would be required to conclude
that the result is absurd"). In this case, holding that section
656(b) applies to cases under section 1328(a) would not
thwart the overall statutory purpose or lead to an absurd
result.
Second, the bankruptcy court's interpretation runs counter
to "the rule that statutes should not be construed in a manner
which robs specific provisions of independent effect." Davis
v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1551
(9th Cir. 1992) (opinion vacated on other grounds). We have
consistently invoked this rule to reject interpretations that
would render a statutory provision surplusage or a nullity.
See, e.g., Wilshire Westwood, 881 F.2d at 804-05; United
States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989).
When we have accepted such interpretations, there has
been strong evidence that Congress did not intend for the pro-
vision to have a certain effect. See Eastport Associates v. City
of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 1991). Here,
the bankruptcy court pointed to no evidence of legislative
intent. It relied instead on the assumption that Congress would
not have created a new discharge exception for section
1328(a) without listing that exception specifically in section
1328(a). The court's faith in the precision of legislative drafts-
manship is admirable, but perhaps not realistic, especially in
the complex area of bankruptcy law.
Cervantes argues that legislative history does support the
bankruptcy court's interpretation. He points out that when
section 656(b) was initially introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives, it provided that "[a] debt . . . to a State . . . or
municipality . . . for assistance provided by such State or
municipality under a State program funded under section 403
is not dischargeable under section 727, 1141, 1228(a),
1228(b), or 1328(b) of title 11 of the United States Code . . . ."
142 Cong. Rec. H7907, H7947. The underlined portion was
later changed to "is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy
under title 11 of the United States Code," but Cervantes main-
tains that the early version is evidence of Congress' intent to
limit the scope of section 656(b).
This argument cuts both ways, however. One could just as
easily conclude that the earlier version was purposefully
rejected by Congress and that the new language was inserted
to ensure that section 656(b) would apply to any bankruptcy
case. Without further evidence of legislative intent, we are
reluctant to draw any conclusions from this change of statu-
tory language.
The bankruptcy court's interpretation is also undermined
by prior decisions concerning the effect of section 656(b). In
In re Leach, 15 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981), a parent
argued that he was entitled to discharge a child support debt
he owed to the county. The Leach court found that the dis-
charge exception of section 523(a)(5) did not apply to the case
because the section at that time only covered debts "in con-
nection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or prop-
erty settlement agreement," and there was no evidence that
the debt in question arose from any of those sources. None-
theless, the Leach court held that section 656(b) created an
independent basis upon which to find the debt nondischarge-
able. See id. at 1008. The court acknowledged that section
656(b) was not part of the bankruptcy code, but stated that
"Congress need not write every law affecting discharge into
Title 11 of the United States Code." Id. at 1008, n.8.
In In Re Richards, 45 B.R. 811 (D. Or. 1984), the question
arose again whether section 656(b) could be relied upon when
section 523(a)(5) was inapplicable to the facts of the case.
The bankruptcy court declined to apply section 656(b), assert-
ing that "[i]t was the intent of Congress that all matters relat-
ing to dischargeability and the discharge of debtors be found
in the Bankruptcy Code and not in isolated provisions in non-
bankruptcy codes." Id. at 813. But the district court rejected
this argument. "However logical the bankruptcy court's struc-
tural analysis, it is contrary to the plain meaning of the stat-
utes as well as to what little legislative history is available.
The bankruptcy court may not ignore section [656(b)] simply
because it is not part of the Bankruptcy code." Id. at 814.
[7] Neither Leach nor Richards are binding upon this court,
but both reflect the general proposition that when two statutes
are capable of co-existence, we should regard each as effec-
tive. See Resource Investments, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 151 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Con-
necticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)
("[S]o long as there is no positive repugnancy between two
laws, a court must give effect to both."). In this case, there is
a moderate inconsistency in the statutory scheme, but the con-
flicting sections are capable of co-existence, and there is no
positive repugnancy between them. Therefore, we conclude
that section 656(b) provides an independent basis upon which
to find a child support debt nondischargeable in any bank-
ruptcy proceeding under Title 11.
C. Application of section 656(b) to this case
[8] Having determined that section 656(b) has independent
effect, we must determine whether it prohibits Cervantes from
discharging the $4,161 he owes to the County for pre-
judgment AFDC payments. Section 656(b) prohibits the dis-
charge of a debt (1) owed under state law to a state or munici-
pality, (2) that is "in the nature of support, " and (3) that is
enforceable under part D of Title IV of the Social Security
Act.
[9] There is no dispute that Cervantes' debt is owed under
state law and that it is owed to a municipality. In addition, we
recently held that a debt for child support to a county is both
"in the nature of support" and enforceable under Title IV-D
of the Social Security Act. See In re Leibowitz , 2000 WL
890467, at *1. Therefore, Cervantes' debt to the County for
pre-judgment AFDC payments meets all three criteria under
section 656(b) and is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.8
The decision of the BAP is REVERSED.
_______________________________________________________________
FOOTNOTES
1 The Honorable Henry A. Politz, Senior Circuit Judge for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, sitting by designation.
2 At the time Samudio applied for AFDC, Section 602(a)(26)(A) man-
dated that, as a condition of eligibility for aid, an applicant would be
required
(A) to assign the State any rights to support from any other per-
son such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of
any other family member for whom the applicant is applying for
or receiving aid, and (ii) which have accrued at the time such
assignment is executed.
42 U.S.C. S 602(a)(26)(A). Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code S 11477(a), which
implements the federal directive of section 602(a)(26)(A), contained
nearly identical language.
3 Section 11350 authorizes a county to seek reimbursement from a non-
custodial parent for assistance payments made to a custodial parent.
4 Cervantes also argued that he was entitled to a discharge of the money
he owed for post-judgment child support payments. However, he has since
abandoned that argument, and the current dispute concerns only the
$4,161 owed for AFDC payments prior to entry of the judgment.
5 The official name of the Act is the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2105 (Aug. 22, 1996).
6 11 U.S.C. 523(a) states: "A discharge under section 727, 1141,
1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt . . ." It then lists several types of debt that cannot
be discharged. Although section 523(a) refers to discharges under five
provisions of the bankruptcy code, it does not refer to a discharge under
section 1328(a).
7 11 U.S.C. S 1328(a) provides for the discharge of all debts, "except any
debt --
(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) of this title;
(2) of the kind specified in paragraph (5) or (8) or section
523(a) or 523(a)(9) of this title; or
(3) for restitution included in a sentence on the debtor's convic-
tion of a crime."8 Because we conclude that Cervantes' debt is non-dischargeable under
section 656(b), we need not address the County's arguments that changes
to California Welfare and Institutions Code section 11350 render our deci-
sions in Ramirez and Visness moot.