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    RAY v HENDERSON, 9915289

    U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals

    RAY v HENDERSON
    9915289

    WILLIAM J. RAY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                                  No. 99-15289
    
    v.                                                    D.C. No.
    CV-97-01776-GEB
    WILLIAM J. HENDERSON, Postmaster
    General,                                              OPINION
    Defendant-Appellee.
    
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Garland E. Burrell, District Judge, Presiding
    
    Argued and Submitted
    April 26, 2000--San Francisco, California
    
    Filed July 7, 2000
    
    Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Arthur L. Alarcon, and
    Michael Daly Hawkins
    
    Opinion by Judge B. Fletcher
    
    _________________________________________________________________
    
    COUNSEL
    
    Erik A. Rapoport, San Francisco, California, for the plaintiff-
    appellant.
    
    Debora G. Luther, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacra-
    mento, California, for the defendant-appellee.
    
    _________________________________________________________________
    
    OPINION
    
    B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
    
    In this case we are called upon to determine whether Wil-
    liam J. Ray suffered adverse employment actions after com-
    plaining of harassment at his workplace. We hold that in our
    circuit an adverse employment action is adverse treatment that
    is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in pro-
    tected activity. Under this standard, we conclude that Ray suf-
    fered cognizable adverse employment actions when his
    employer, in retaliation for Ray's complaints concerning man-
    agement's treatment of women employees, eliminated
    employee meetings, eliminated its flexible starting time pol-
    icy, instituted a "lockdown" of the workplace, and cut Ray's
    salary. We also hold that Ray has a cognizable claim for retal-
    iation based on his supervisors' creation of a hostile work
    environment.
    
    I
    
    William Ray has been a rural postal carrier in Willits, Cali-
    fornia for over 28 years. In addition to Ray, there are four
    other rural carriers. Ray's immediate supervisor at the Willits
    Post Office is Dale Briggs, and the Postmaster is Dan Carey.
    
    Prior to the events at issue in this case, the rural carriers
    had a flexible start-time. Ray and the other carriers generally
    arrived at work between 6:00 A.M. and 7:00 A.M, and they
    went out on their delivery routes at 9:45 A.M. Because their
    salaries were fixed, arriving early did not affect their incomes,
    however it did give them time to sort mail and do other
    administrative tasks before leaving on their routes.
    
    In 1994, Ray and his co-workers became concerned about
    gender bias and harassment at the post office. Several female
    employees had apparently sought medical advice and trans-
    fers because of harassment by Briggs. The subject of the
    harassment of women first came up at a March 30, 1994
    Employee Involvement meeting.1 At that meeting, a female
    janitorial employee raised her hand and asked to be recog-
    nized to speak. Postmaster Carey "immediately wheeled
    around, swinging his arm, yelled and pointed. He ordered [the
    employee] out of the meeting." After she had left, Ray spoke
    up. He stated his objections to the treatment of women at the
    post office. Postmaster Carey vehemently denied the charges,
    and berated Ray as a "liar."
    
    Ray next made a complaint about the treatment of women
    at an April 7, 1994 Rural Carriers Employee Involvement
    meeting. Carey again angrily denied the charges. After these
    complaints failed to spur any change, Ray and two of his co-
    workers wrote a letter complaining of the harassment of
    women to Lito Sajones, Carey's supervisor.
    
    The letter prompted a meeting, held in the nearby Ukiah
    Post Office on June 15, 1994, regarding the alleged harass-
    ment. At that meeting, Carey stated his displeasure that Ray
    had written the complaint to his supervisor. He said that,
    because of the letter, "I may have to change my whole
    approach to management. I've been a manager for eighteen
    years. I have left you alone. Its called self-management. I may
    have to change that."
    
    Carey did not effectuate that threat until February 1995.
    However, in the meantime Briggs and Carey publicly berated
    Ray on a regular basis. For example, Briggs yelled at Ray at
    a staff meeting on November 10, 1994, after Ray had made
    a suggestion for improving efficiency at the office. On
    December 24, 1994, Postmaster Carey called Ray a "rabble
    rouser" and a "troublemaker," and said he would cancel all
    future Employee Involvement meetings at the post office,
    apparently to avoid further complaints about gender bias and
    harassment. He also stated that "if Bill Ray has so much time
    for talking, maybe he is coming in [to the office ] too early."
    This was another veiled threat to end the "self management"
    policy under which workers set their own starting and finish-
    ing times.
    
    One week later, Ray met with Briggs and Carey to discuss
    employees' rights to communicate with other employees. Ray
    fled the meeting after Carey yelled at him and made physi-
    cally threatening gestures toward him.
    
    One month later, on January 31, 1995, Ray and the union
    shop steward, Bob Daitoku, met with Carey to discuss
    Carey's recent decision to cancel the Employee Involvement
    meetings. Carey stated that "We're not having any E.I. pro-
    gram as long as you're writing letters over my head."
    
    Postmaster Carey made good on his threat to eliminate both
    the Employee Involvement program and the "self-
    management" policy soon after the January meeting. In Feb-
    ruary 1995, Briggs announced that all rural carriers were
    required to come to work at a fixed starting time: 7:00 A.M.
    When the fixed start time was instituted, the postal carriers
    found themselves with less time to sort the mail prior to going
    out on their routes. Ray states that he had the longest route
    and the largest amount of mail to sort; the 7:00 A.M. start
    time forced him to work at top speed, sorting 60 letters per
    minute and 40 magazines per minute, even though the Rural
    Carrier Handbook states that the standard allowable rate for
    sorting mail is 16 letters per minute and 8 magazines per min-
    ute. The 7:00 A.M. start time also forced Ray to work later
    in the afternoon so that he could finish some of the adminis-
    trative tasks that he had previously done in the morning.
    
    In May 1995, Ray's wife became extremely ill. Ray wanted
    to leave work earlier in order to take care of her, and he there-
    fore requested to come to work half an hour early -- at 6:30
    A.M. While Briggs granted the request, he repeatedly threat-
    ened to retract the early start time.
    
    Ray continued to be the target of Briggs and Carey's hostil-
    ity during the summer and fall of 1995. On one occasion, after
    Ray made a suggestion at an office meeting, Briggs yelled at
    him, telling him to "shut up" and "that's a direct order."
    
    Ray was twice falsely charged with misconduct. He was
    accused, and then cleared, of opening a package. He was later
    accused, and then cleared, of knocking down a mailbox on his
    route. Also, a series of pranks were played on Ray during this
    time. For example, someone left a dog biscuit near Ray's
    work space. On another occasion, Ray found a ball bearing in
    his work space.
    
    On October 13, 1995, Ray filed a request for counseling
    with the EEOC, complaining of a hostile work environment.
    He alleged that the management at the Willits Post office
    employed a "singling-out-and-punish method of controlling
    and frightening and eventually demoralizing the workers." In
    his EEOC request he also stated that:
    
           It is because of [management's] conviction they are
           doing the right thing that makes the situation so trou-
           bling and actionable at law. The Joint Statement on
           Violence and Behavior In the Workplace clearly out-
           laws their practices and a continuation of their pat-
           tern will be dire. Four people have said to me the
           SPO should be killed. They were speaking out of
           frustration and pain. But this should show that the
           situation is not isolated to my complaint.
    
    On November 7, 1995, Ray took stress leave from work.
    On November 22, while Ray was still out on stress leave,
    Postmaster Carey received a copy of the EEO complaint. He
    immediately instituted a procedure called "lockdown" at the
    Willits Post Office.2 During lockdown, the doors to the load-
    ing docks were kept locked at all times. Every time Ray (or
    another postal carrier) needed to load his vehicle with mail,
    he would have to unlock the doors, push his mail cart out onto
    the loading dock, go back inside and lock the doors, and then
    exit through a side door to take the mail from the cart into his
    car. To get back inside the post office, he would have to ring
    a bell and wait for another postal employee to open the door.
    The lockdown procedure turned a process that had taken sec-
    onds into one taking several minutes.
    
    Postmaster Carey states that he instituted the lockdown
    because Ray's complaint to the EEO contained a death threat.
    Briggs ordered Ray not to come back to the office, and called
    in a Postal Inspector to determine whether the EEO letter con-
    stituted a threat. The Inspector, Robert Dortch, conducted an
    investigation into the matter. He determined that no death
    threat had been made, and Ray was allowed to return to work.
    Nonetheless, even after the inspector had cleared Ray of
    wrongdoing, a temporary supervisor, Bill Wilber, announced
    to the staff that Ray had made a death threat. The lockdown
    at the Willits Post Office continued until February 1996, when
    it was discontinued without explanation.
    
    Also in response to the supposed death threat, on December
    1, 1995 Postmaster Carey canceled Ray's 6:30 start time,
    requiring him to arrive at work at 7:00 A.M. Carey stated that
    he did not want Ray coming to work early because he "had
    to be supervised at all times."
    
    Ray wrote additional EEO complaint letters on December
    13, 1995, January 15 and 21, 1996, and April 1, 1996. In
    March 1996, Ray's postal route was reduced by 90 boxes,
    causing him to lose approximately $3,000 from his annual sal-
    ary. Although all the postal carriers suffered cuts in their
    routes, Ray's route was cut the most.
    
    Ray's EEO complaint was heard by an Administrative Law
    Judge (ALJ) on May 28, 1997. The ALJ found that the United
    States Postal Service (USPS) had retaliated against Ray after
    he filed his written EEO counseling request, but rejected
    Ray's remaining claims. The USPS rejected the ALJ's finding
    of retaliation and entered a final agency decision rejecting all
    of Ray's claims on August 13, 1997.
    
    Ray then filed suit in federal district court. His First
    Amended Complaint alleged retaliation for engaging in pro-
    tected activity, discrimination, and failure to make accommo-
    dations for Ray to allow him to care for his ill wife. The
    district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on
    all claims. Ray appeals only the grant of summary judgment
    on his retaliation claim.
    
    II
    
    We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    S 1291. We review the district court's decision to grant sum-
    mary judgment de novo. See Robi v. Reed, 173 F.3d 736, 739
    (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 375 (1999). In reviewing an
    order denying or granting summary judgment, we must deter-
    mine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of
    material fact and whether the district court correctly applied
    the substantive law. See id. 
    
    III
    
    [1] Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating
    against an employee because that employee "has opposed any
    practice made an unlawful employment practice by this sub-
    chapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
    or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
    or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C.S 2000e-3(a). A
    postal employee may bring suit under S 2000e-3(a) pursuant
    to 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-16. See Ayon v. Sampson, 547 F.2d 446,
    450 (9th Cir. 1976).
    
    [2] To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, an
    employee must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activ-
    ity; (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse employment
    action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected
    activity and the adverse action. See Steiner v. Showboat Oper-
    ating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994). If a plaintiff
    has asserted a prima facie retaliation claim, the burden shifts
    to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory
    reason for its decision. Id. at 1464-1465. If the defendant
    articulates such a reason, the plaintiff bears the ultimate bur-
    den of demonstrating that the reason was merely a pretext for
    a discriminatory motive. Id.
    
    [3] The parties do not contest that Ray engaged in protected
    activities when he complained of the treatment of women at
    the Willits Post Office both informally and formally with the
    EEOC.3 The heart of this dispute is whether Ray suffered cog-
    nizable adverse employment actions. Ray asserts that he suf-
    fered from changes in workplace policy and pay, as well as
    from a hostile work environment. We first examine the defini-
    tion of an adverse employment action. We then discuss
    whether the changes in workplace policy and pay constitute
    adverse employment actions, and whether Ray has established
    a causal link between his protected activities and those
    adverse employment actions. Finally, we examine whether
    Ray's allegation that he was subjected to a hostile work envi-
    ronment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity is
    cognizable under the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII.
    
    IV
    
    The circuits are currently split as to what constitutes an
    adverse employment action. Although we have yet to articu-
    late a rule defining the contours of an adverse employment
    action, our prior cases situate us with those circuits that define
    adverse employment action broadly. Other circuits that define
    adverse employment action broadly are the First, Seventh,
    Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits. An intermediate position
    is held by the Second and Third Circuits. The most restrictive
    view of adverse employment actions is held by the Fifth and
    Eighth Circuits. Below, we set forth the Ninth Circuit's posi-
    tion within this split, and explain the case law in the other cir-
    cuits. Then, we examine what guidelines we should follow in
    analyzing whether an action constitutes an adverse employ-
    ment action.
    
    [4] We have found that a wide array of disadvantageous
    changes in the workplace constitute adverse employment
    actions. While "mere ostracism" by co-workers does not con-
    stitute an adverse employment action, see Strother v. Southern
    California Permanente Medical Group, 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th
    Cir. 1996), a lateral transfer does. In Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809
    F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987), we held that "[t]ransfers of
    job duties and undeserved performance ratings, if proven,
    would constitute `adverse employment decisions.' " The
    Yartzoff decision was in line with our earlier decision in St.
    John v. Employment Development Dept., 642 F.2d 273, 274
    (9th Cir. 1981), where we held that a transfer to another job
    of the same pay and status may constitute an adverse employ-
    ment action.4
    
    Similarly, in Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th
    Cir. 1997), we found that the dissemination of an unfavorable
    job reference was an adverse employment action "because it
    was a `personnel action' motivated by retaliatory animus."
    We so found even though the defendant proved that the poor
    job reference did not affect the prospective employer's deci-
    sion not to hire the plaintiff: "That this unlawful personnel
    action turned out to be inconsequential goes to the issue of
    damages, not liability." Id.
    
    In Strother, we examined the case of an employee who,
    after complaining of discrimination, was excluded from meet-
    ings, seminars and positions that would have made her eligi-
    ble for salary increases, was denied secretarial support, and
    was given a more burdensome work schedule. 79 F.3d at 869.
    We determined that she had suffered from adverse employ-
    ment actions. Id.
    
    These cases place the Ninth Circuit in accord with the First,
    Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits. These Circuits all
    take an expansive view of the type of actions that can be con-
    sidered adverse employment actions. See Wyatt v. City of Bos-
    ton, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (adverse employment
    actions include "demotions, disadvantageous transfers or
    assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted negative job
    evaluations and toleration of harassment by other employ-
    ees"); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996)
    (employer can be liable for retaliation if it permits "actions
    like moving the person from a spacious, brightly lit office to
    a dingy closet, depriving the person of previously available
    support services . . . or cutting off challenging assignments");
    Corneveaux v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1507
    (10th Cir. 1996) (employee demonstrated adverse employ-
    ment action under the ADEA by showing that her employer
    "required her to go through several hoops in order to obtain
    her severance benefits"); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74
    F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996) (malicious prosecution by for-
    mer employer can be adverse employment action); Wideman
    v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir.
    1998) (adverse employment actions include an employer
    requiring plaintiff to work without lunch break, giving her a
    one-day suspension, soliciting other employees for negative
    statements about her, changing her schedule without notifica-
    tion, making negative comments about her, and needlessly
    delaying authorization for medical treatment); Passer v.
    American Chemical Soc., 935 F.2d 322, 330-331 (D.C. Cir.
    1991) (employer's cancellation of a public event honoring an
    employee can constitute adverse employment action under the
    ADEA, which has an anti-retaliation provision parallel to that
    in Title VII).
    
    The Second and Third circuits hold an intermediate posi-
    tion within the circuit split. They have held that an adverse
    action is something that materially affects the terms and con-
    ditions of employment. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh,
    120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) ("retaliatory conduct must
    be serious and tangible enough to alter an employee's com-
    pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . .
    to constitute [an] `adverse employment action' "); Torres v.
    Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2nd Cir. 1997) (to show an
    adverse employment action employee must demonstrate "a
    materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of
    employment") (quoting McKenney v. New York City Off-
    Track Betting Corp., 903 F. Supp. 619, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
    
    The Fifth and Eighth Circuits, adopting the most restrictive
    test, hold that only "ultimate employment actions " such as
    hiring, firing, promoting and demoting constitute actionable
    adverse employment actions. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak
    Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (only "ultimate
    employment decisions" can be adverse employment deci-
    sions); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir.
    1997) (transfer involving only minor changes in working con-
    ditions and no reduction in pay or benefits is not an adverse
    employment action).
    
    The government urges us to turn from our precedent, and
    to adopt the Fifth and Eighth Circuit rule that only "ultimate
    employment actions" such as hiring, firing, promoting and
    demoting constitute actionable adverse employment actions.5
    But we cannot square such a rule with our prior decisions.
    Actions that we consider adverse employment actions, such as
    the lateral transfers in Yartzoff and St. John, the unfavorable
    reference that had no affect on a prospective employer's hir-
    ing decisions in Hashimoto, and the imposition of a more bur-
    densome work schedule in Strother are not ultimate
    employment actions. Nor, for that matter, does the test
    adopted by the Second and Third Circuits comport with our
    precedent. While some actions that we consider to be adverse
    (such as disadvantageous transfers or changes in work sched-
    ule) do "materially affect the terms and conditions of employ-
    ment," others (such as an unfavorable reference not affecting
    an employee's job prospects) do not.
    
    [5] The EEOC has interpreted "adverse employment
    action" to mean "any adverse treatment that is based on a
    retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charg-
    ing party or others from engaging in protected activity."
    EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8, "Retaliation, " P 8008
    (1998). Although EEOC Guidelines are not binding on the
    courts, they "constitute a body of experience and informed
    judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
    guidance." Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
    (1986) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
    (1944)); see also Gutierrez v. Municipal Court , 838 F.2d
    1031, 1049 (9th Cir. 1988). We find the EEOC test to be con-
    sistent with our prior holdings, and with the holdings in the
    First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits.
    [6] The EEOC test covers lateral transfers, unfavorable job
    references, and changes in work schedules. These actions are
    all reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in pro-
    tected activity. Nonetheless, it does not cover every offensive
    utterance by co-workers, because offensive statements by co-
    workers do not reasonably deter employees from engaging in
    protected activity.
    
    [7] As we stated in Hashimoto, the severity of an action's
    ultimate impact (such as loss of pay or status)"goes to the
    issue of damages, not liability." 118 F.3d at 676. Instead of
    focusing on the ultimate effects of each employment action,
    the EEOC test focuses on the deterrent effects. In so doing,
    it effectuates the letter and the purpose of Title VII. Accord-
    ing to 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-3(a), it is unlawful "for an employer
    to discriminate" against an employee in retaliation for engag-
    ing in protected activity. This provision does not limit what
    type of discrimination is covered, nor does it prescribe a mini-
    mum level of severity for actionable discrimination. See Knox
    93 F.3d at 1334 ("There is nothing in the law of retaliation
    that restricts the type of retaliatory act that might be visited
    upon an employee who seeks to invoke her rights by filing a
    complaint."). We agree with the D.C. Circuit, which noted in
    Passer that:
    
           The statute itself proscribes "discriminat[ion]"
           against those who invoke the Act's protections; the
           statute does not limit its reach only to acts of retalia-
           tion that take the form of cognizable employment
           actions such as discharge, transfer or demotion
           . . . . . "[T]o establish a prima facie case under sec-
           tion 704(a) [42 U.S.C. S 2000e-3(a)], a plaintiff must
           show: 1) that he or she engaged in activity protected
           by the statute; 2) that the employer . . . engaged in
           conduct having an adverse impact on the plaintiff ;
           and 3) that the adverse action was causally related to
           the plaintiff's exercise of protected rights."
    935 F.2d at 331 (emphasis in original) (citing Berger v. Iron
    Workers reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1423
    (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), supplemented on other grounds on
    reh'g, 852 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
    
    [8] Because the EEOC standard is consistent with our prior
    case law and effectuates the language and purpose of Title
    VII, we adopt it, and hold that an action is cognizable as an
    adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter
    employees from engaging in protected activity.6
    
    We now turn to the question of whether the actions alleged
    by Ray constitute adverse employment actions under this
    standard, whether Ray has provided sufficient evidence of a
    causal link between his protected activities and the adverse
    employment actions, and whether he can overcome the USPS'
    proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions.
    
    V
    
    Ray claims that, in retaliation for his complaints, his super-
    visors eliminated the Employee Involvement program, elimi-
    nated the flexible start-time policy, instituted lockdown
    procedures, and reduced his workload -- and his pay -- dis-
    proportionately to the reductions faced by other employees.7
    
    [9] We conclude that all four qualify as adverse employ-
    ment actions. The actions decreased Ray's pay, decreased the
    amount of time that he had to complete the same amount of
    work, and decreased his ability to influence workplace policy,
    and thus were reasonably likely to deter Ray or other employ-
    ees from complaining about discrimination in the workplace.
    [10] We also find that Ray has established a causal link
    between his protected activity and the employment actions by
    demonstrating that each action was implemented close on the
    heels of his complaints. That an employer's actions were
    caused by an employee's engagement in protected activities
    may be inferred from "proximity in time between the pro-
    tected action and the allegedly retaliatory employment deci-
    sion." Yartzoff, 809 F.3d at 1371.
    
    [11] What remains, therefore, is an examination of whether
    Ray has produced sufficient evidence supporting his conten-
    tion that the nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the Postal
    Service are pretexts for retaliation. We find that he has. The
    USPS alleges that Carey and Briggs eliminated flexible start-
    ing times because of an increase in the amount of mail and
    because of later delivery of the mail to the post office. How-
    ever, it is undisputed that Postmaster Carey announced pub-
    licly that he was instituting the fixed start time in response to
    Ray's complaints. Furthermore, the USPS' assertion is belied
    by the fact that even after the policy change several of the
    postal carriers continued to arrive at work early with official
    sanction.
    
    [12] The Postal Service also asserts that Carey instituted
    the lockdown procedures in response to a death threat, not for
    retaliatory reasons. Ray contends that this is false, and points
    to the fact that his supervisors continued the lockdown even
    after the postal inspector had stated definitively that there was
    no death threat. Also, supervisory employees continued to say
    publicly that Ray had made a threat when they knew that that
    was not the case. We are sensitive to the Postal Service's
    desire to protect its employees and customers from violence,
    and nothing should prevent management from taking precau-
    tionary steps. Certainly, locking the doors ensured that unau-
    thorized persons could not enter the building, and thus
    enhanced security. Nonetheless, a lockdown such as that
    implemented by the postal service seems unlikely to prevent
    harm from a disgruntled employee working inside the build-
    ing, nor would the lockdown stop a violent postal employee
    from entering the post office, since an employee would proba-
    bly open the door from inside for any co-worker; indeed, if
    anything, the lockdown ensured that employees would find it
    more difficult to leave. Although the reasons for the lockdown
    present a close question, we conclude that Ray has raised a
    genuine issue of material fact, and that there is sufficient evi-
    dence to survive summary judgment on this claim.
    
    [13] Finally, the USPS claims that the reduction in Ray's
    pay was part of across-the-board cuts, and was nondiscrimina-
    tory. However, Ray has sufficiently rebutted this assertion by
    demonstrating that he suffered the greatest loss in pay.
    
    [14] We therefore hold that, viewing the evidence in the
    light most favorable to Ray, the district court erred in granting
    summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
    
    VI
    
    [15] We now examine whether Ray's allegation that he was
    subjected to a hostile work environment is cognizable under
    the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII. We have not previ-
    ously decided whether a hostile work environment may be the
    basis for a retaliation claim under Title VII. See Gregory v.
    Widnall, 153 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the
    Second, Seventh and Tenth Circuits have held that an
    employer may be liable for a retaliation-based hostile work
    environment. See Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Cor-
    rectional Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2nd Cir. 1999) ("co-
    worker harassment, if sufficiently severe, may constitute
    adverse employment action so as to satisfy the second prong
    of the retaliation prima facie case");  Drake v. Minnesota Min-
    ing & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 886 (7th Cir. 1998)
    ("retaliation can take the form of a hostile work environ-
    ment"); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College , 152 F.3d 1253,
    1264 (10th Cir. 1998) ("co-worker hostility or retaliatory
    harassment, if sufficiently severe, may constitute`adverse
    employment action' for purposes of a retaliation claim").
    
    [16] We agree with our sister circuits. Harassment is obvi-
    ously actionable when based on race and gender. Harassment
    as retaliation for engaging in protected activity should be no
    different -- it is the paradigm of "adverse treatment that is
    based on retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter
    the charging party or others from engaging in protected activi-
    ty." EEOC Compliance Manual P 8008.
    
    [17] Harassment is actionable only if it is "sufficiently
    severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
    employment and create an abusive working environment."
    Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21  (1993). It
    must be both objectively and subjectively offensive. See
    Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787  (1998). To
    determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile, we
    look to the totality of the circumstances, including the "fre-
    quency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
    is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
    utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
    employee's work performance." Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S.
    at 23).
    
    Not every insult or harassing comment will constitute a
    hostile work environment. In Gregory v. Widnall , we rejected
    a claim of a hostile work environment based on "[a] single
    drawing of a monkey on a memo circulated by senior NCO's,
    accompanied by the verbal explanation that it was intended to
    remind officers not to `get the monkey off their back' by pass-
    ing their responsibilities to others." 153 F.3d at 1074-75; see
    also Strother, 79 F.3d at 869 ("mere ostracism in the work-
    place is not enough to show an adverse employment deci-
    sion").
    
    [18] Repeated derogatory or humiliating statements, how-
    ever, can constitute a hostile work environment. In Hacienda
    Hotel, for example, we found that the plaintiffs had demon-
    strated sufficiently "severe or pervasive" harassment by dem-
    onstrating that one supervisor "repeatedly engaged in
    vulgarities, made sexual remarks, and requested sexual
    favors" while another supervisor "frequently witnessed,
    laughed at, or herself made these types of comments. " 881
    F.2d at 1515. And in Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147
    F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998), we found that the appellant's
    allegations that her supervisor had regularly made sexual
    remarks about her throughout her employment, and that he
    laughed at her complaints to him, raised a genuine factual
    issue regarding a hostile work environment.
    
    Here, after Ray made his complaint about the treatment of
    women at the Willits Post Office, he was targeted for verbal
    abuse related to those complaints for a period lasting over one
    and half years. His supervisors regularly yelled at him during
    staff meetings; they called him a "liar," a "troublemaker," and
    a "rabble rouser," and told him to "shut up." Additionally,
    Ray was subjected to a number of pranks, and was falsely
    accused of misconduct.
    
    Not only did his supervisors make it harder for Ray to com-
    plete his own tasks, they made Ray an object lesson about the
    perils of complaining about sexual harassment in the work-
    place. Carey and Briggs made it clear to the other staff mem-
    bers that disadvantageous changes in management style were
    due to Ray's complaints. Carey linked the change to a fixed
    starting time to Ray's letter to Carey's supervisor. He can-
    celed the Employee Involvement meetings in response to
    Ray's complaints. Carey and Briggs also fostered animus in
    other employees whose working conditions were affected.
    Other employees began to distance themselves from Ray, and
    some stopped talking to him. In November of 1995, the diffi-
    culties at work rose to such a level that Ray took stress leave
    from his job.
    
    [19] We conclude that Ray has presented evidence that is,
    for purposes of summary judgment, sufficient to raise a genu-
    ine issue of fact as to whether he was subjected to a hostile
    work environment. We therefore hold that the district court
    erred in granting summary judgment on the hostile work
    environment-based retaliation claim.
    
    VII
    
    For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court
    grant of summary judgment and REMAND for a trial on the
    merits of Ray's retaliation claim./dcs/programs/www/cgi-prod/getfile.sh[51]: rmove:  not found
    /dcs/programs/www/cgi-prod/getfile.sh[52]: rmove:  not found
    /dcs/programs/www/cgi-prod/getfile.sh[53]: rmove:  not found
    
    _______________________________________________________________
    
    FOOTNOTES
    
    1 Employee Involvement meetings are a means for employees to com-
    municate with the management regarding workplace issues.
    2 It is unclear from the record whether lockdown is a standard post office
    procedure. Ray asserts that lockdown procedures had never been instituted
    in the Willits Post Office before November 1995.
    3 As the statutory language quoted above indicates, filing a complaint
    with the EEOC is a protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-3(a). Mak-
    ing an informal complaint to a supervisor is also a protected activity. See
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d
    1504, 1514 (9th Cir. 1989).
    
    Furthermore, an employee's complaints about the treatment of others is
    considered a protected activity, even if the employee is not a member of
    the class that he claims suffered from discrimination, and even if the dis-
    crimination he complained about was not legally cognizable. See Moyo v.
    Gomez, 40 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1994) (prison guard had a claim for retalia-
    tion if he was discharged for complaining about the treatment of black
    inmates and he was acting on a reasonable belief that a Title VII violation
    had occurred, even though the complained-of discrimination was not actu-
    ally a Title VII violation).
    4 The government cites Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co. and Nidds v.
    Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 912 (9th Cir. 1997), for the prop-
    osition that a lateral transfer is not an adverse employment action.
    
    In Steiner, this court stated in dicta and in a footnote that "the transfer
    is just barely -- if at all -- characterizable as an `adverse employment
    action: Steiner was not demoted, or put in a worse job, or given any addi-
    tional responsibilities. In fact, at first she even claimed to enjoy the day
    shift." 25 F.3d at 1465 n.6. The court did not reach the question of whether
    the transfer was an adverse employment action because it found that the
    action was not retaliatory in nature. Id. at 1465. In Nidds, this court, citing
    Steiner, found that the plaintiffs transfer was not an adverse employment
    action. 113 F.3d at 919. However, it conducted no analysis to reach this
    point, merely asserting that "Although we decline to view Nidds' transfer
    to the restoration department as an adverse employment action, his ulti-
    mate termination on July 28, 1992 certainly was. " Id.
    
    Neither Steiner nor Nidds establish that a lateral transfer can never be
    an adverse employment action. Had they done so, they would have had to
    abrogate this court's earlier decisions in Yartzoff and St. John, supra, nei-
    ther of which were cited in the Steiner and Nidds decisions. We therefore
    reject the government's assertion that a lateral transfer cannot be an
    adverse employment action for the purposes of Title VII.
    5 The government relies on Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
    U.S. 742, 761 (1998) for the proposition that only ultimate employment
    actions such as "hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with sig-
    nificantly different responsibilities [and] a decision causing a significant
    change in benefits" constitute adverse employment actions. But the discus-
    sion in Burlington Industries cited by the government concerns the types
    of employment actions which, if taken by a supervisor, would subject the
    employer to vicarious liability for harassment. See 524 U.S. at 760-761.
    Although the Supreme Court cited to circuit-level Title VII cases that
    defined "adverse employment actions," the Court specifically declined to
    adopt the holdings of those cases: "Without endorsing the specific results
    of those decisions, we think it prudent to import the concept of a tangible
    employment action for resolution of the vicarious liability issue we con-
    sider here." Id. at 761. Therefore, we reject the contention that Burlington
    Industries set forth a standard for adverse employment actions in the anti-
    retaliation context.
    6 The first part of the EEOC's definition of adverse employment action,
    which requires that the action be "based on a retaliatory motive," collapses
    into the "causal link" prong of the prima facie test for retaliation.
    7 He also alleges that his supervisors created a hostile work environment
    that constituted an adverse employment action. We discuss the hostile
    work environment claim in the following section.
    

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