Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Central District of CaliforniaJames M. Ideman, District Judge, PresidingArgued and SubmittedApril 9, 1998--Pasadena, CaliforniaFiled May 5, 1998Before: Jerome Farris, Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, andFerdinand F. Fernandez, Circuit Judges.Opinion by Judge Fernandez
_____________________________COUNSEL Gary Kurtz, Sherman & Kurtz, Los Angeles, California, forthe plaintiffs-appellants.John C. Morland and Maurice A. Ross, Federal Home LoanMortgage Corporation, McLean, Virginia, for the defendants-appellees.
_____________________________OPINION FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge:Larry M. Siegel appeals the district court's grant of sum-mary judgment in favor of Federal Home Loan MortgageCorp. ("Freddie Mac") in his tort and breach of contractaction regarding foreclosures upon two properties referred toas the "Windbell property" and the "Dalton Place property."Siegel claims that the district court erred when it concludedthat this action is barred by res judicata, and when it awardedFreddie Mac attorney's fees incurred in defending the action.1We affirm both the district court's grant of summary judg-ment and its award of attorney's fees.BACKGROUNDOn November 22, 1989, Siegel and Gerber, his partner,executed and delivered a Multifamily note (the Windbellnote) in which they promised to pay the J. I. Kislak MortgageCorporation (Kislak) the principal sum of $840,000 inmonthly installments. The note was secured by a Deed ofTrust, Assignment of Rents and Security Agreements, and bya Collateral Assignment of Leases. On November 27, 1989,Siegel and Gerber executed and delivered another Multi-family note (the Dalton Place note) in which they promised topay Kislak the principal sum of $900,000. That note was alsosecured by a Multifamily Deed of Trust, Assignment of Rentsand Security Agreements, and a Collateral Assignment ofLeases. The rider to the Dalton Place deed of trust providedthat the borrower could sell or transfer his interest in the prop-erty without acceleration of the entire debt provided that "thetransferee's creditworthiness and management ability are sat-isfactory to Lender and the transferee has executed . . . a writ-ten assumption agreement." Kislak subsequently sold andassigned the notes and deeds of trust to Freddie Mac.Siegel and Gerber experienced constant financial difficultyin maintaining the Dalton Place property. By the end of 1991,they attempted to sell the property. Two parties submittedoffers -- Andrew Hansen and Cunningham Capital Corpora-tion. Freddie Mac determined that Hansen was an unaccept-able buyer because of his lack of managerial experience, thecondition of his other properties, and his limited financialresources. The second offer from Cunningham Capital Corpo-ration was withdrawn before Freddie Mac acted on it.In December 1992, Siegel and Gerber defaulted on theirobligations under the Windbell loan, and Freddie Mac fore-closed on that property. Seeking a deficiency judgment, Fred-die Mac filed an action in federal district court in the NorthernDistrict of Texas. Prior to trial, Siegel declared bankruptcy.Siegel and Gerber also defaulted on the loan on the DaltonPlace property.Freddie Mac filed two proofs of claim against Siegel in thebankruptcy proceeding. One related to the Windbell propertyand the other to the Dalton Place property. Siegel did not fileobjections to those proofs of claim. Nor did the bankruptcytrustee. In March 1994, the bankruptcy court granted FreddieMac relief from the stay so that it could foreclose on the Dal-ton Place property. On June 10, 1994, Siegel was dischargedfrom bankruptcy, and that matter was closed on June 30,1994. On August 2, 1994, Freddie Mac foreclosed on the Dal-ton Place property.However, in April of 1994, Siegel and Gerber had alreadybrought this action in the Superior Court of the State of Cali-fornia for the County of Los Angeles. Freddie Mac removedthe action to the Federal District Court for the Central Districtof California in October, 1994. Freddie Mac then moved forsummary judgment against Siegel on all claims because, itsaid, Siegel's action was barred by the res judicata effect ofthe bankruptcy proceeding.2 The district court granted FreddieMac's motion. After the district court granted the motion,Freddie Mac moved to recover attorney's fees incurred indefending against Siegel's claims. The district court grantedthat motion and denied Siegel's subsequent motion for recon-sideration. Siegel appealed.JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEWThe district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 12 U.S.C.S 1452(f). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291.We review the district court's grant of summary judgmentde novo. See Trustees of Cal. State Univ. v. Riley, 74 F.3d960, 963 (9th Cir. 1996). In reviewing a grant of summaryjudgment, we must determine, viewing the evidence in thelight most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there isany genuine issue of material fact and whether the districtcourt correctly applied the relevant substantive law. SeeCovey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834(9th Cir.), amended by 125 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1997). The"preclusive effect of a prior judgment is a question of lawsubject to de novo review." FDIC v. Jenson (In re Jenson),980 F.2d 1254, 1256 (9th Cir. 1992). In general, we reviewa district court's award of attorney's fees for an abuse of dis-cretion. See Wind v. Asarco Inc., 114 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir.1997). However, we decide whether the district court appliedthe correct legal standard de novo. See Velarde v. PACEMembership Warehouse, Inc., 105 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.1997). And, we review any element of legal analysis and stat-utory interpretation, which figures in the district court's deci-sion regarding attorney's fees, de novo. See Corder v. Gates,104 F.3d 247, 249 (9th Cir. 1996).DISCUSSIONA. Res JudicataWhen Freddie Mac filed its claims in bankruptcy eitherSiegel or the trustee could have raised objections. They didnot. Instead, in this separate case Siegel attempted to attackFreddie Mac's right to foreclose and its other actions underthe contract. The district court declared that he was barred byres judicata. He dubs that error; we disagree.[1] The "doctrine of res judicata bars a party from bringinga claim if a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered afinal judgment on the merits of the claim in a previous actioninvolving the same parties or their privies." Robertson v.Isomedix, Inc. (In re INTL Nutronics), 28 F.3d 965, 969 (9thCir. 1994). Thus, " `[r]es judicata bars all grounds for recov-ery that could have been asserted, whether they were or not,in a prior suit between the same parties on the same cause ofaction.' " Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Thatapplies to matters decided in bankruptcy. See id.[2] In United States v. Coast Wineries, Inc., 131 F.2d 643,648 (9th Cir. 1942), we held that the allowance or disallow-ance of "a claim in bankruptcy is binding and conclusive onall parties or their privies, and being in the nature of a finaljudgment, furnishes a basis for a plea of res judicata." As wesaid, it " `may also be conceded that the allowance or disal-lowance of a claim in bankruptcy should be given like effectas any other judgment of a competent court, in a subsequentsuit against the bankrupt or any one in privity with him.' " Id.(citation omitted). Similarly, in In re INTL Nutronics, 28 F.3dat 969, we stated that where a "claim could have beenasserted at the time of the proceeding confirming sale [inbankruptcy] . . . this opportunity is sufficient to satisfy [the]requirement[s] of the doctrine of res judicata." (Emphasisadded). See also Trulis v. Barton, 107 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir.1997) ("Since the plaintiffs never appealed the bankruptcycourt's confirmation order, the order is a final judgment andplaintiffs cannot challenge the bankruptcy court's jurisdictionover the subject matter."); Bank of Lafayette v. Baudoin (In reBaudoin), 981 F.2d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that abankruptcy order allowing a proof of claim is a final judgmentto be given res judicata effect).[3] In In re INTL Nutronics, 28 F.3d at 970, we had todecide whether a bankruptcy court's earlier determination(confirmation of a sale) precluded the trustee in bankruptcyfrom bringing a subsequent antitrust action (based on allegedcollusive bidding at the sale). We asked whether the samecause of action was involved and applied the following four-factor test: (1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether sub- stantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringe- ment of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.Id. We see no reason not to apply that test here.[4] Application of the test indicates that the district courtcorrectly concluded that Siegel's claims were barred by resjudicata. Freddie Mac filed two proofs of claim (Windbell andDalton Place) in Siegel's bankruptcy proceeding. No objec-tion was filed to the claims in the bankruptcy action.3 Siegel'spresent suit against Freddie Mac in contract and tort states avariety of causes of action all of which are premised on Fred-die Mac's failure to finance repair projects on the Windbelland Dalton Place properties, and its failure to approve the saleand transfer of the Dalton Place property. The gravamen isthat Freddie Mac violated its duties under the notes and deedsof trust and, among other things, should not have been ableto proceed against Siegel due to its own defaults and wrong-doing. Clearly, Freddie Mac's right to recover on its proofs ofclaim in the bankruptcy court could have been attacked onthat basis. Just as clearly, its rights established in the bank-ruptcy would be affected by resolution of the present action.Similarly, the present suit and the proofs of claim stem fromthe same nucleus of facts, and involve similar evidence, i.e.,the loan documentation and the surrounding circumstances.Again, the interests at stake in both actions involve FreddieMac's right to recovery under the loan agreements. As such,the district court correctly concluded that res judicata barsSiegel's claims in the present action.[5] Siegel, however, argues that the proofs of claim filed byFreddie Mac are not final judgments giving rise to res judi-cata. Surely the claims themselves are not, but his argumentignores the fact that we have held that a bankruptcy court'sallowance or disallowance of a claim is a final judgment. SeeCoast Wineries, Inc., 131 F.2d at 648. Similarly, other circuitshave assumed that allowance of a proof of claim in a bank-ruptcy proceeding should be treated as a final judgment forres judicata purposes. See, e.g., In re Baudoin, 981 F.2d at742 ("[O]ur prior holdings . . . establish that an order allowinga proof of claim is, likewise, a final judgment."); Giles WorldMktg., Inc. v. Boekamp Mfg., Inc. (In re Giles World Mktg.),787 F.2d 746, 747-48 (1st Cir. 1986) (assuming in dicta thata valid proof of claim granted by the district court is a finaljudgment).We recognize that in the cases we have cited there has beenan actual separate order of some kind regarding the claim inquestion. We have not found significant authority addressingthe necessity for a separate order before res judicata canattach. One case has indicated that "the filing and subsequentallowance of a proof of claim is a final judgment " even ifthere is no formal order, but that case has been reversed,albeit on other grounds. DePaolo v. United States (In reDePaolo), 165 B.R. 491, 493 (D. Wyo. 1994), rev'd on othergrounds, 45 F.3d 373 (10th Cir. 1995); see also ColoradoLivestock Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Schwab (In re Schwab), 613F.2d 1279, 1283 (5th Cir. 1980). Still, the lack of a separateorder is a distinction without a difference."A claim . . ., proof of which is filed under section 501 ofthis title [Title 11], is deemed allowed, unless a party in inter-est . . . objects." 11 U.S.C. S 502(a) (emphasis added). If thereis an objection, the court must hold a hearing and then it"shall allow" the claim to the extent proper. 11 U.S.C.S 502(b) (emphasis added). Of course, if the court formallyactually allows the claim, there can be little doubt about theultimate res judicata effect of that allowance. But it is equallyclear that when a claim is "deemed allowed" it has the sameeffect. Consider: what else can "deemed allowed " mean? Itmust mean deemed allowed by the court. In other words, it isdeemed that the court has acted on the claim and orderedallowance. Congress has relieved the court of the task of actu-ally endorsing its allowance of the claim on that document oron a separate form of order. It has saved the court from thatburdensome and almost ministerial task when no interestedparty demands it. It would be most peculiar if the effect wasthat uncontested and allowed claims had less dignity for resjudicata purposes than a claim which at least one party ininterest thought was invalid or contestable in whole or in part.We see no reason to embrace that rather peculiar result.Rather, we see S 502(a) as a recognition of the fact that peo-ple can raise objections and litigate them, if they see some-thing wrong with a claim, but if they do not, the claim will betreated in all respects as a claim allowed by the court itself.In short, the validity of the claim has been determined on themerits, and attacks upon it that "could have been asserted"cannot be raised in later proceedings. In re INTL Nutronics,28 F.3d at 969.We do, of course, recognize that the Fourth Circuit hasexpressed doubt about this form of analysis. See County FuelCo., Inc. v. Equitable Bank Corp., 832 F.2d 290, 292 (4th Cir.1987). It has indicated that it considers it "doubtful that instrict contemplation" the concept of res judicata should beapplied. Id. However, a number of things should be notedabout the court's opinion. Its doubts were expressed becauseat the time of deemed allowance that allowance was not truly"final" and could be contested at a later time. See id. But, thecourt also stated that its doubts extended to claims based onspecific court orders allowing claims because they too couldstill be contested at a later time. See id. To that extent, thecourt's analysis appears to disagree with the other cases wehave already cited, and even those doubts should dissipatewhere, as here, the debtor has received his discharge and thebankruptcy has closed. By then any lingering doubts aboutfinality would surely have been assuaged. Finally, in CountyFuel, the court determined that, on the facts before it, the doc-trine of waiver barred the subsequent action anyway. Thosefacts included a lift-stay proceeding, and a later proceeding atwhich the debtor objected to attorney's fees and for those pur-poses conceded the validity of the claim, which had alreadybeen paid in full once the stay was lifted. See id. at 293. Sie-gel never made a concession, so part of the County Fuelanalysis does not apply here. But, again, County Fuel did notactually decide the res judicata issue. It just expressed doubts,and it did not ultimately have to face the consequences ofthose doubts. Instead, it found a waiver with which to pre-clude an action that would basically nullify the previousdetermination that the creditor's claim "was a valid one enti-tling it to immediate payment." Id. at 294. While we under-stand the basis for the Fourth Circuit's doubts, we, with alldue respect, conclude that it is better to see the debtor's attackfor what it is -- an attempt to undercut the order of a bank-ruptcy court, deemed or otherwise, which allowed a creditor'sclaims and achieved finality for the debtor and the creditor bygranting the former's discharge and release and by barring thelatter from further pursuit of the claims. Thus, the districtcourt did not err when it treated the bankruptcy court's allow-ance of Freddie Mac's claims as a final judgment.[6] But, Siegel says, he should not be penalized by thebankruptcy trustee's failure to pursue an action against Fred-die Mac. This argument is without merit, and misunderstandsthe nature of the bankruptcy proceeding. Again, any party ininterest can object. See 11 U.S.C. S 502(a). Although thetrustee in Siegel's bankruptcy could have objected to FreddieMac's proofs of claim, Siegel could have objected as well.See Lawrence v. Steinford Holding B.V. (In re Dominelli),820 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that under 11U.S.C. S 502(a) a party in interest, including the trustee, canobject to a proof of claim); see also IRS v. Taylor (In re Tay-lor), 132 F.3d 256, 261 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Once a proof ofclaim is filed, the debt is considered allowed unless the debtoror another party in interest files an objection to the proof ofclaim."); FDIC v. Union Entities (In re Be-Mac Transp.), 83F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 1996) ("In order to disallow theclaim, the debtor or another party in interest must object andrequest a determination of the lien's validity."); 4 Collier onBankruptcy P 502.02[2][a]-[c ] (1997) (the trustee may objectbut the debtor may also have standing). As it was, Siegel evenhad good reason to exert himself, if he wished to. The natureof his assertions and demands indicates that he could havebenefitted, and could even have come out solidly solvent hadhe prevailed. In fact, he asserts that it was Freddie Mac thatforced him into bankruptcy. Thus, its claims and his asserteddefenses and counterclaims were the heart and soul of thebankruptcy. His failure to object and his choosing to file thisaction even before his bankruptcy closed was an interestingtactic by which he hoped to accomplish a discharge of hisobligations to Freddie Mac (and others), while keeping hisown claims against it. Interesting but ineffective. In fine, Sie-gel offers no persuasive reason why he should not be boundfor res judicata purposes.B. Award of Attorney's Fees to Freddie Mac[7] Despite the fact that Freddie Mac's rights under thenotes and deeds of trust had been decided in the bankruptcycourt and Freddie Mac's claims had been discharged there,Siegel chose to sue on the theory that Freddie Mac hadbreached the deeds of trust's promises. Unfortunately for him,the deeds of trust provide for attorney's fees if the lender ispursuing its rights under them. There is no dispute that theprovision was valid under state law and would apply here ifthe bankruptcy proceedings did not, somehow, affect it. Forpurposes of this action, it was not affected by those proceed-ings.[8] In the first place, the mere fact that Siegel obtained abankruptcy discharge did not eliminate the provision. That is,it cannot be said that the whole contract merged into thatjudgment. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Johnson v.Home State Bank,
501 U.S. 78, 83
, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2153, 115L. Ed. 2d 66 (1991), a discharge in bankruptcy "extinguishesonly `the personal liability of the debtor.' " (Citation omitted).Thus, the Court found that a "creditor's right to foreclose onthe mortgage survives or passes through the bankruptcy." Id.Similarly, as the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has held, a dis-charge in bankruptcy does not end a party's obligation, butmerely prevents one method of collection. See Cortez v.American Wheel, Inc. (In re Cortez), 191 B.R. 174, 178(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); see also Hall v. National Gypsum Co.,105 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus, Siegel's dischargein bankruptcy did not extinguish the contractual attorney's feeprovision. The provision itself may have fallen dormant, butit was reviviscible.[9] But, Siegel argues, the bankruptcy court's June 10,1994, discharge of his obligations must have included FreddieMac's claim for attorney fees. Under 11 U.S.C. S 727(b), adebtor is discharged "from all debts that arose before the dateof the order for relief under [Chapter 7]. " Thus, whether Fred-die Mac's claim for attorney's fees was discharged in bank-ruptcy will depend on when the attorney's fee debt arose. SeeCalifornia Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re Jensen),995 F.2d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that inquiryregarding whether debt is discharged depends on when claimarose); In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Theanswer to [the discharge] question depends upon when the . . .debt arose."). Both parties agree that the contract provisionfor attorney's fees was executed prior to Siegel's filing bank-ruptcy. Similarly, the parties do not dispute that for our pur-poses Siegel's acts which gave rise to Freddie Mac's awardoccurred post-discharge.[10] The question of when a debt arises under the bank-ruptcy code is governed by federal law. See In re Jensen, 995F.2d at 930 n.5 (" `The determination of when a claim arisesfor purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federalbankruptcy law . . . .' "); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan),197 B.R. 892, 896 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding thatdetermination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcycode should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147(9th Cir. 1997); Cohen v. North Park Parkside CommunityAss'n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.1991) ("However, federal bankruptcy law, rather than Califor-nia state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes ofdetermining dischargeability."); see also Employees' Retire-ment Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9thCir. 1982) (applying federal law to determine when partieshad obligations under indemnification agreement). The Codedefines a debt as "liability on a claim." 11 U.S.C. S 101(12).The term debt "is therefore coextensive with[the definition ofa] `claim'." Daghighfekr v. Mekhail (In re Daghighfekr), 161B.R. 685, 687 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993).[11] Pursuant to section 101(5)(A), a claim is a "right topayment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured orunsecured." (emphasis added). "This `broadest possible defi-nition' of `claim' is designed to ensure that`all legal obliga-tions of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, willbe able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.' " In re Jen-sen, 995 F.2d at 929 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266; S. Rep.No. 95-598, at 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.5787, 5808) (alteration in original). Thus, we must askwhether the claim for attorney's fees was contingent andtherefore discharged in its entirety. We think not.[12] A contingent claim is " `one which the debtor will becalled upon to pay only upon the occurrence or happening ofan extrinsic event which will trigger the liability of the debtorto the alleged creditor.' " Fostvedt v. Dow (In re Fostvedt),823 F.2d 305, 306 (9th Cir. 1987); see also In re Dill, 30 B.R.546, 548 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 731 F.2d 629 (9th Cir.1984) (defining contingent claim as "a claim that has notaccrued and which is dependent upon a future event"). Anydoubts regarding the dischargeability of a claim "should beresolved in favor of finding that a contingent claim existed."In re THC, 686 F.2d at 802. Siegel asks us to read those prin-ciples in an unreflective way, and to decide that the attorney'sfee provision was contingent because it could not take effectunless Siegel did something. No doubt the future is alwayscontingent, but that does not mean that a bankrupt is dis-charged regarding everything he might do in the future. Noneof our authorities are to the contrary. Not surprisingly, anunreflective reading is the wrong reading.In In re THC, 686 F.2d at 803-04, we did hold that a con-tractual claim for indemnification based on events thatoccurred post-petition was provable in bankruptcy becausethe contractual provision was a contingent claim entered pre-petition. As such, the plaintiff's claim for indemnification,which was wholly contingent and unmatured at the time whencreditors could file proofs of claim, was time barred. See id.at 801. In reaching that conclusion, we accepted the bank-ruptcy court's rationale that the creditor's claim arose whenthe indemnification agreement was executed, not when thecontingency took place. See id. at 802. Similarly, in ChristianLife Ctr. Litig. Defense Comm. v. Silva (In re Christian Life),821 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987), we denied an attorney'sfee claim for legal fees as an administrative expense in abankruptcy proceeding. Administrative expenses are givenpriority in bankruptcy " `in order to secure goods and servicesnecessary to an orderly and economical administration of theestate after the petition is filed.' " Id. at 1373 (citation omit-ted). Thus, "[c]laims that arise from a creditor's pre-petitionservices to the debtor are not entitled to administrativeexpense treatment." Id. at 1373-74. Although the legal feesexpended in defending a corporate officer in In re ChristianLife were actually incurred post-petition, we held that theclaim arose pre-petition because the corporation's obligationto indemnify the officer arose from pre-petition services, i.e.,it was a form of compensation. See id. at 1374. In reachingthat conclusion, we emphasized that "[i]t makes no differencethat the duty to indemnify [the officer] for litigation expenses. . . did not accrue until after the petition was filed when [theofficer] incurred those expenses; the critical fact is that theclaim for indemnity arose from pre-petition services[the offi-cer] provided the corporation." Id.[13] Those cases did not specifically deal with attorney'sfees provisions in a contract, but there is nothing about attor-ney's fees provisions that would render them unprovable. Wehave held as much. See, e.g., Highlands Ins. Co. v. Bozzo (Inre Bozzo), 693 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1982); Toys "R" Us, Inc.v. Esgro, Inc. (In re Esgro, Inc.), 645 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir.1981); Hartman v. Utley, 335 F.2d 558, 559 (9th Cir. 1964).But In re THC and In re Christian Life did deal with situa-tions where the possibility of a claim against the debtor wasfixed and entirely out of his hands before he entered bank-ruptcy. In other words, he had a possible liability, andwhether actual liability would attach to him was contingentupon what others might do. Were he not discharged, that veryreal threat would stay with him and remain a millstone aroundhis economic neck as he attempted a fresh start. The very pur-pose of bankruptcy proceedings would be cut away. Indeed,a person with enormous possible indemnification liabilitycould never effectively obtain a fresh start. That is decidedlynot a proper result, but it is also not the case at hand.This is a case where the debtor, Siegel, had been freed fromthe untoward effects of contracts he had entered into. FreddieMac could not pursue him further, nor could anyone else. He,however, chose to return to the fray and to use the contract asa weapon. It is perfectly just, and within the purposes of bank-ruptcy, to allow the same weapon to be used against him.[14] Other courts, which have considered the issue havereached the same conclusion. Thus, in Shure v. Vermont (Inre Sure-Snap), 983 F.2d 1015, 1018 (11th Cir. 1993), thedebtor chose to sue on an agreement which provided for attor-ney's fees, and then sought to avoid the effect of that provi-sion. The court said: The confirmation of Sure-Snap's Chapter 11 plan discharged its pre-confirmation liabilities under the Agreement. The attorney fees Bradford seeks were incurred by Bradford in defending a post- confirmation appeal initiated by Sure-Snap. Sure- Snap voluntarily continued to litigate the validity of the Agreement after confirmation of its Chapter 11 plan. Bradford had no choice but to defend. By choosing to appeal the validity of the Agreement after confirmation, Sure-Snap did so at the risk of incurring post-confirmation costs involved in its acts. "[B]ankruptcy was intended to protect the debtor from the continuing costs of pre-bankruptcy acts but not to insulate the debtor from the costs of post-bankruptcy acts."Id. at 1018 (citation omitted); see also Irmas Family Trust v.Madden (In re Madden), 185 B.R. 815, 819 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.1995); Danzig Claimants v. Grynberg (In re Grynberg), 113B.R. 709, 713 (Bank. D. Colo. 1990), aff'd, 966 F.2d 570(10th Cir. 1992); In re Hadden, 57 B.R. 187, 190 (Bankr.W.D. Wis. 1986). In fine, Siegel's decision to pursue a wholenew course of litigation made him subject to the strictures ofthe attorney's fee provision. In other words, while his bank-ruptcy did protect him from the results of his past acts, includ-ing attorney's fees associated with those acts, it did not givehim carte blanche to go out and commence new litigationabout the contract without consequences. Thus, we affirm thedistrict court's award of attorney's fees in favor of FreddieMac.Freddie Mac is also entitled to attorney's fees on appealpursuant to the underlying deeds of trust. We will remand tothe district court for further proceedings on this issue. See 9thCir. Rule 39-1.8.CONCLUSION Not entirely unlike Dr. Pangloss,4 Siegel thought that forhim this was the best of all possible worlds. He thought thathe could use bankruptcy to discharge all of his obligationsunder his contracts with Freddie Mac and still personallyretain all of his rights arising out of those contracts. That pic-ture of the world was a mere eidolon. Any claims Siegelmight have had against Freddie Mac came to an end when itsclaim in Siegel's bankruptcy went unchallenged and becamerecognized. And any right to avoid the attorney's fees provi-sion of his contract fell short of protecting him when he vol-untarily undertook this post-bankruptcy action against FreddieMac.AFFIRMED and REMANDED. the end
___________________________FOOTNOTES 1 Selwyn Gerber also appealed. We dispose of the issues raised by himin a separate memorandum disposition.2 It asserted other grounds also, which we need not consider here.3 Similarly, no objection was filed to Freddie Mac's motion for relieffrom the automatic stay so that it could foreclose on the Dalton Placeproperty.4 See Voltaire, Candide (W.W. Norton & Co. 1966).