JO ANN EUBANKS v GARY LARSON
United States Court of Appeals
for the eighth circuit
_____________
No. 96-2973
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Jo Ann Eubanks, As Administratrix *
of The Estate of Joseph Daniel *
Dehart,Deceased, *
*
Plaintiff - Appellee, * Appeal from the United States
* District Court for the
v. * Eastern District of Arkansas.
*
Gary Lawson, *
*
Defendant - Appellant. *
_____________
Submitted: April 15, 1997
Filed: August 28, 1997
_____________
Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MAGILL, Circuit
Judges.
_____________
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Sheriff Gary Lawson appeals from an order of the district
court(1) denying his motion for summary judgment in Jo Ann Eubanks's
42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit against
him. Lawson argues that the district court erred in using the
wrong legal standard to determine whether he is entitled to
qualified immunity. We affirm.
In the early morning hours of February 28, 1993, several men
attacked Joseph Daniel Dehart and his brother, Carroll Joe Eubanks,
in a rural part of Perry County, Arkansas. In that attack Dehart
was stabbed, and Carroll Joe Eubanks loaded Dehart into his truck
and started for the hospital.
Noise from the attack awoke residents who called the Perry
County Sheriff, and Sheriff Lawson responded to their call. While
driving to the location of the attack, Lawson received a message on
his radio that another officer had spotted Carroll Joe Eubanks's
truck leaving the scene of the attack. Lawson told the officer to
stop the truck. Not long after, Lawson drove to where the officer
had stopped the truck.
Lawson immediately noticed Dehart's injuries and called for an
ambulance. Lawson spoke with Carroll Joe Eubanks about what had
happened. Carroll Joe Eubanks repeatedly asked Lawson to allow him
to take Dehart on to the hospital. Lawson, however, required
everyone to wait for the arrival of the ambulance. After Lawson
talked to Carroll Joe Eubanks, neither Lawson nor any of his later
arriving deputies conducted any further investigation.
Jo Ann Eubanks, who is the mother of Carroll Joe Eubanks and
Dehart, arrived at the scene before the ambulance. Dehart asked
his mother to take him to the hospital. Lawson refused to allow Jo
Ann Eubanks to take her son to the hospital because Lawson had
already decided that everyone should wait for the ambulance.
The ambulance arrived and picked up Dehart. Dehart died later
that morning.
Jo Ann Eubanks as administratrix of Dehart's estate brought
this action claiming that Lawson violated Dehart's Fourth Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment rights
by unreasonably detaining Dehart. Lawson moved for summary
judgment based on his qualified immunity. The district court held
that Lawson was entitled to qualified immunity for stopping the
truck and initially detaining Dehart.(2) The court determined,
however, that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Lawson learned while he detained Dehart that Dehart had not
committed a crime but was only the victim of a crime. The court
concluded that if Lawson continued to detain Dehart after learning
that Dehart was only the victim of a crime, then Lawson's continued
detainment of Dehart was unreasonable and Lawson was not entitled
to qualified immunity for that action. Lawson appeals.
We review the district court's denial of summary judgment de
novo and apply the same standards as the district court. See
Miller v. Citizens Sec. Group, Inc., 116 F.3d 343, 345 (8th Cir.
1997). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine
issues of material fact and Lawson is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See id. We view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to Jo Ann Eubanks, and give her the benefit of all
reasonable inferences. See id. Jo Ann Eubanks can establish a
genuine issue of material fact by presenting evidence that would
permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for her on that issue.
See id.
Qualified immunity shields Sheriff Lawson from liability for
civil damages as long as his conduct did not violate Dehart's
clearly established constitutional rights. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). For a constitutional right
to be clearly established, the contours of that right must be
sufficiently clear and specific that a reasonable law enforcement
officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right.
See Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987). If a
reasonable officer, acting on the information that was available to
Lawson, would have known that
his actions violated clearly established law, then Lawson is not
entitled to qualified immunity. See Hummel-Jones v. Strope, 25
F.3d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1994).
When Lawson detained Dehart it was clearly established under
the Fourth Amendment that an officer of the law could only arrest
someone if the officer had probable cause to arrest that person.
See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 1992). An
officer could stop someone to investigate a crime, but only if the
officer had a reasonable suspicion that that person had committed
or was committing a crime. See id. An investigative stop may only
last so long as is necessary to conduct a reasonable investigation.
See United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1992).
Because an investigative stop is supported by less than probable
cause, an officer must diligently investigate and use the least
intrusive means reasonably available to confirm or dispel his
suspicion in a short period of time. See United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 685-86
(1985). An investigative stop may become an
arrest requiring probable cause if it lasts for an unreasonably
long time. See Miller, 974 F.2d at 956.
Lawson argues that the district court erred in applying the
wrong legal standard to determine if he was entitled to qualified
immunity. Lawson contends that once he stopped the truck in which
Dehart was riding, Dehart became a pretrial detainee. As a
pretrial detainee, Lawson argues Dehart had the clearly established
right that Lawson not be deliberately indifferent to Dehart's
medical needs. Lawson concludes that he was not deliberately
indifferent because he immediately called for an ambulance, and
therefore he is entitled to qualified immunity.
We reject Lawson's argument because it ignores the issue of
whether Lawson detained Dehart longer than the Constitution allows.
Lawson does not argue that he had probable cause to arrest Dehart
during his detention of Dehart, and the record would not support
such an argument. The record shows that initially Lawson's stop of
the truck was a valid investigative stop supported by a reasonable
suspicion that Dehart
and his brother had committed a crime. Once stopped, Dehart had
the clearly established rights that Lawson could only detain him if
Lawson had reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and that Lawson
could not detain him without probable cause for an unreasonably
long time.
There is evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to
whether Lawson violated clearly established law in two different
ways. Lawson may have violated clearly established law by
continuing to detain Dehart after a reasonable officer would have
known that Dehart had not committed a crime. Lawson and Carroll
Joe Eubanks testified that Lawson spoke with Carroll Joe Eubanks
about what had happened. Carroll Joe Eubanks further testified
that what had happened to Dehart was that two men had attacked and
stabbed Dehart.(3) Carroll Joe Eubanks stated that after telling
Lawson what had happened, he asked Lawson to allow him to take
Dehart to the hospital and that Lawson refused to let him do so.
Jo Ann Eubanks also testified that Dehart asked her to take him to
the hospital and Lawson refused to allow her to do so. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Jo Ann Eubanks, we conclude
that Lawson continued to detain Dehart after a reasonable officer
would have known that Dehart had not committed a crime. See Brown
v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 53
(1979). See also United States v. Watts,
7 F.3d 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[A]n investigative stop must
cease once reasonable suspicion or probable cause dissipates."),
cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1078
(1994).
Lawson may also have violated clearly established law by
conducting an unreasonably long investigative stop. The Fourth
Amendment required Lawson to
conduct his investigation quickly and either arrest Dehart based on
probable cause or release Dehart. Lawson investigated by talking
to Carroll Joe Eubanks about what had happened. After speaking
with Carroll Joe Eubanks, Lawson conducted no further
investigation, and yet Lawson continued to detain Dehart without
probable cause to arrest Dehart. Under the Fourth Amendment Lawson
could not constitutionally detain Dehart without probable cause
once he had finished his investigation, and it was a violation of
clearly established law for Lawson to prevent others from taking
Dehart to the hospital when Lawson had no constitutional authority
to continue to detain Dehart.
Even if Lawson continued to investigate after he spoke to
Carroll Joe Eubanks, there is a genuine issue as to whether Lawson
violated clearly established law. The Fourth Amendment requires
that Lawson use the least intrusive means reasonably available to
confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion in a short period of
time. Lawson has not argued that it was reasonably necessary for
him to detain Dehart in order to conduct his investigation, and the
record would not support such an argument. The record suggests
that Lawson could have dispelled his reasonable suspicion by
briefly questioning Carroll Joe Eubanks. Cf. Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 146
(1972) ("A brief stop of a suspicious individual,
in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the
time."). The evidence in the record also suggests that Lawson
detained Dehart for thirty to forty minutes, well beyond the time
reasonably necessary for questioning Carroll Joe Eubanks. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Jo Ann Eubanks, we
conclude that Lawson's detention of Dehart violated clearly
established law by exceeding the permissible scope of an
investigative stop.
We recognize that the United States Supreme Court and this
court have upheld the constitutionality of rather lengthy
investigative stops. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531
(1985); United States v. Bloomfield, 40
F.3d
910 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied,
514 U.S. 1113
(1995).
These decisions do not control this case because it was reasonably
necessary to detain the suspects in those cases for a long period
of time so that the officers could conduct their investigations.
See Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. at 543
-44 (officers held suspect
for sixteen hours waiting for suspect to have bowel movement after
concluding that the suspect had swallowed balloons containing
cocaine); Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 917 (officer held suspect and his
truck for one hour waiting for other officers to bring a drug dog
to sniff suspect's truck for the presence of drugs). Again, Lawson
has not argued that he needed to detain Dehart after he spoke with
Carroll Joe Eubanks so that he could conduct a reasonable
investigation, and the record would not support such an argument.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
**FOOTNOTES**
(1)
The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
(2)
Jo Ann Eubanks does not appeal from the district court's
ruling that Lawson is entitled to qualified immunity from the time
he stopped Dehart to that moment in time when the Constitution
clearly required Lawson to let Dehart go.
(3)
A reasonable officer is not required to believe everything he
is told. See United States v. Hughes, 940 F.2d 1125,1127 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 896
(1991). The record shows,
however, that Lawson and another officer present knew Carroll Joe
Eubanks, Dehart, and their attackers and this evidence has some
bearing on the issue of whether a reasonable officer under the
circumstances would have believed Carroll Joe Eubanks and therefore
known that Dehart had not committed a crime.