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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
------------------------------------------------*
JANE HOLMES DIXON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL L. EDWARDS; THE VESTRY OF
ST. JOHN'S PARISH,
Defendants-Appellants.
JACK LEO IKER, Right Reverend,
Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of
Fort Worth; ROBERT DUNCAN, Right
Reverend, Bishop of the Episcopal
Diocese of Pittsburgh; PETER JAMES
LEE, Right Reverend, Bishop of the
Episcopal Diocese of Virginia; NEFF
POWELL, Right Reverend, Bishop ofNo. 01-2337
the Diocese of Southwestern
Virginia; ROBERT W. IHLOFF, Right
Reverend, Bishop of the Diocese of
Maryland; JOHN RABB, Right
Reverend, Suffragan Bishop of the
Diocese of Maryland; CLIFTON
DANIEL, 3RD, Right Reverend,
Bishop of the Diocese of East
Carolina; MICHAEL B. CURRY, Right
Reverend, Bishop of the Diocese of
North Carolina; J. GARY GLOSTER,
Right Reverend, Suffragan Bishop
of the Diocese of North Carolina;
JAMES A. KELSEY, Right Reverend,
Bishop of the Diocese of Northern
Michigan; CAROLYN TANNER IRISH,
------------------------------------------------*
------------------------------------------------*
Right Reverend, Bishop of the
Diocese of Utah; ORRIS G. WALKER,
JR., Right Reverend, Bishop of the
Diocese of Long Island; CHARLES E.
BENNISON, JR., Right Reverend,
Bishop of the Diocese of
Pennsylvania; WILLIAM E. SWING,
Right Reverend, Bishop of the
Diocese of California; J. JON BRUNO,
Right Reverend, Bishop of the
Diocese of Los Angeles; CHESTER L.
TALTON, Right Reverend, Suffragan
Bishop of the Diocese of Los
Angeles; ROBERT M. ANDERSON,
Right Reverend, Bishop Assistant of
the Diocese of Los Angeles; ROBERT
L. LADEHOFF, Right Reverend,
Bishop of the Diocese of Oregon;
WILLIAM OTIS GREGG, Right
Reverend, Bishop of the Diocese of
Eastern Oregon; VINCENT W.
WARNER, Right Reverend, Bishop of
the Diocese of Olympia; JAMES
EDWARD WAGGONER, Right
Reverend, Bishop of the Diocese of
Spokane; HARRY B. BAINBRIDGE, III,
Right Reverend, Bishop of the
Diocese of Idaho; KATHARINE
JEFFERTS SCHORI, Right Reverend,
Bishop of the Diocese of Nevada;
RICHARD S.O. CHANG, Right
Reverend, Bishop of the Diocese of
Hawaii; ALLEN L. BARTLETT, JR.,
Right Reverend, Bishop of the
Diocese of Pennsylvania (retired);
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2
------------------------------------------------*
JAMES W. MONTGOMERY, Right
Reverend, Bishop of the Diocese of
Chicago (retired); THEODORE
EASTMAN, Right Reverend, Bishop
of the Diocese of Maryland
(retired); RONALD H. HAINES, Right
Reverend, Bishop of the Diocese of
Washington (retired),
Amici Curiae.
------------------------------------------------*
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA-01-1838-PJM)
Argued: January 24, 2002
Decided: May 22, 2002
Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________________________
Affirmed and remanded by published opinion. Judge King wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Gregory joined.
____________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Charles Hart Nalls, DEKIEFFER & HORGAN, Wash-
ington, D.C., for Appellants. David Martin Schnorrenberg, CRO-
WELL & MORING, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Michael G. Van Arsdall, CROWELL & MORING, L.L.P.,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Kenneth R. Matticks, Dallas, Texas,
for Amici Curiae Iker and Duncan. Russell V. Palmore, Jr., George
A. Somerville, TROUTMAN, SANDERS, MAYS & VALENTINE,
L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for Amici Curiae Lee, et al.
3
OPINION
KING, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Jane Holmes Dixon is the Bishop Pro Tempore of the Dio-
cese of Washington, one of approximately a hundred such entities
constituting the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States of
America (the "Episcopal Church" or "the Church"). Defendant Sam-
uel L. Edwards is an ordained Priest of the Church who claims entitle-
ment to the office of Rector of St. John's Parish in Accokeek,
Maryland, a parish within the Diocese of Washington ("St. John's" or
"the Parish"). In June 2001, Bishop Dixon sued Father Edwards and
the Vestry of St. John's (the "Vestry") in the District of Maryland,
seeking, inter alia, a declaration that Father Edwards is not the Rector
of St. John's. The court granted summary judgment to Bishop Dixon,
and it awarded her both declaratory and injunctive relief. For the rea-
sons explained below, we affirm the district court, but we remand on
a limited aspect of the injunction.
I.
In December 2000, the Vestry selected Father Edwards to be its
Rector. Bishop Dixon, however, as the Ecclesiastical Authority for St.
John's, declined to license Father Edwards to officiate within the Dio-
cese of Washington.1 Despite Bishop Dixon's refusal to approve his
selection, Father Edwards moved from Texas to Maryland and began
to act as Rector of St. John's. When Bishop Dixon visited the Parish
and sought to officiate there on May 27, 2001, the Vestry and Father
Edwards (collectively, the "Defendants") refused to permit her to
enter the church building.2
____________________________________________________________
1 An ecclesiastical authority is the responsible individual or body in a
church institution. In a diocese of the Episcopal Church, such authority
rests with the diocesan bishop. In the absence of a bishop, such authority
falls to whomever the diocese designates as the substitute ecclesiastical
authority. See Canon IV.15.
2 St. John's Parish has two separate houses of worship: Christ Church,
located in Accokeek, Maryland, and the Pomonkey Chapel, located
nearby in Pomonkey, Maryland. The visitation of Bishop Dixon on May
27, 2001, occurred at Christ Church, but Father Edwards claims rector-
ship of the entire Parish.
4
Bishop Dixon promptly filed this civil action, asserting diversity
jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. By her
complaint, she sought, inter alia, a declaration (1) of her rights as
Bishop of the Diocese, (2) that the Vestry's use of Parish property
was unlawful, and (3) that the purported contract between Father
Edwards and the Vestry was null and void. The Bishop requested the
court to enjoin the Defendants from interfering with the performance
of her duties at St. John's. She also sought to enjoin Father Edwards
from (1) officiating at religious services on or near the grounds of St.
John's, (2) acting as Rector of the Parish, and (3) using or occupying
the buildings or grounds of St. John's.
On October 29, 2001, the district court filed its Opinion and related
Order awarding summary judgment, along with corresponding declar-
atory and injunctive relief, to Bishop Dixon. Dixon v. Edwards, 172
F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2001). The court thereafter, on November
21, 2001, slightly modified the permanent injunction awarded by its
earlier Opinion and Order. On appeal, the Defendants seek reversal
of the district court on multiple grounds. After first reviewing the rel-
evant structure of the Church and the factual underpinnings of this
dispute, we will address each of their issues.
II.
A.
In order to properly consider the issues in this appeal, we must first
understand certain elementary aspects of the structure of the Church.
As a predicate proposition, the Episcopal Church is a national church
governed by its Constitution, its Canons, and its Book of Common
Prayer. Constitution & Canons, Together with the Rules of Order, For
the Government of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United
States of America Otherwise Known as The Episcopal Church,
adopted in General Conventions 1789-2000, as revised by the 2000
Convention (Church Publ'g Inc. 2000); The Book of Common Prayer
and Administration of the Sacraments and Other Rites and Ceremo-
nies of the Church, Together with the Psalter or Psalms of David,
According to the Use of the Episcopal Church (Church Hymnal Corp.
1979) (the "BCP"). The Constitution of the Church creates a bicam-
eral government made up of a House of Bishops and a House of Dep-
5
uties, which together comprise the General Convention of the
Episcopal Church. The General Convention elects the Church's Pre-
siding Bishop.
The Episcopal Church is geographically divided into approxi-
mately a hundred dioceses. This controversy arose in the Diocese of
Washington, which consists of the District of Columbia and the
Maryland counties of Charles, St. Mary's, Prince George's, and
Montgomery. Each diocese of the Church is presided over by a dioce-
san bishop, and each diocese is empowered to adopt rules for the
choice of its bishop. A diocese is also authorized to elect two suffra-
gan, or assisting, bishops.3 When a bishop resigns or dies, the diocese
may place a suffragan bishop in charge, as its interim ecclesiastical
authority, until a new bishop is chosen and consecrated. From January
2001 to the present, Bishop Dixon has served the Diocese of Wash-
ington as such a "temporary bishop," denominated as its Bishop Pro
Tempore.
Within each diocese of the Church, various parishes are formed by
smaller subdivisions of churches or congregations. A parish is gov-
erned by its vestry, i.e., its elected lay leaders. The vestry is the agent
and legal representative of the parish in all matters concerning parish
property and in all matters concerning the relationship of the parish
to its clergy. The vestry of each parish elects a priest to serve as its
rector. A rector possesses authority over and responsibility for the
conduct of worship services, and the rector has spiritual jurisdiction
over the parish "subject to the Rubrics of the Book of Common
Prayer, the Constitution and Canons of the Church, and the pastoral
direction of the Bishop." Canon III.14.1. The rector, who is a member
of the vestry, presides at its meetings.4
When a parish has no rector, the bishop of the diocese serves as
rector ex officio while the parish conducts a search for a priest to elect
as its rector. The procedures for installing a rector are established by
____________________________________________________________
3 The Canons of the Diocese of Washington provide for a single suffra-
gan bishop.
4 In the absence of a rector (and when the bishop is not present) a ves-
try is presided over by the senior warden of the parish, who is a lay mem-
ber elected by the parish members.
6
Canon III.17, and they include the requirement that a vestry commu-
nicate its choice of rector to the bishop, who is granted "sufficient
time, not exceeding thirty days . . . to communicate with the Vestry
thereon." Moreover, the ecclesiastical authority is obligated to for-
ward the notice of election to the General Convention when she is
"satisfied that the person so chosen [as rector] is a duly qualified Priest."5
With this basic understanding of the structure of the Episcopal
Church, we turn to the relevant facts underlying the dispute in this
case.
B.
On November 19, 1992, Bishop Dixon was elected and consecrated
as the Suffragan Bishop of the Diocese of Washington. The then-
incumbent Diocesan Bishop, the Right Reverend Ronald H. Haines,
retired from office on December 31, 2000. On January 1, 2001,
Bishop Dixon assumed the position of Bishop Pro Tempore and
became the Ecclesiastical Authority of the Diocese. The Constitution
of the Diocese provides that, in these circumstances, the Suffragan
Bishop becomes the Ecclesiastical Authority, and Bishop Dixon
thereby became Bishop Pro Tempore of the Diocese.
St. John's is one of ninety-five parishes within the Diocese of
Washington, and its rectorship became vacant sometime in 1998. On
____________________________________________________________
5 Canon III.17, entitled "Of the Calling of a Rector," provides in perti-
nent part as follows:
Sec. 2. No election of a Rector shall be held until the name
of the Priest whom it is proposed to elect has been made known
to the Bishop, if there be one, and sufficient time, not exceeding
thirty days, has been given to the Bishop to communicate with
the Vestry thereon . . . .
Sec. 3. Written notice of the election, signed by the War-
dens, shall be sent to the Ecclesiastical Authority of the Diocese.
If the Ecclesiastical Authority be satisfied that the person so cho-
sen is a duly qualified Priest and that the Priest has accepted the
office, the notice shall be sent to the Secretary of the Conven-
tion, who shall record it.
(emphasis added).
7
December 13, 2000, its Vestry selected Father Edwards, a canonical
resident of the Diocese of Fort Worth, in the State of Texas, as Rector
of the Parish.6 The Vestry advised Bishop Haines of its selection of
Father Edwards by letter of its Senior Warden.
Before Bishop Dixon assumed her position as the Ecclesiastical
Authority of the Diocese of Washington on January 1, 2001, she
advised the Senior Warden of St. John's that she could not approve
Father Edwards, as contemplated by Canon III.17, supra note 5, until
she had completed a standard satisfactory background investigation of
him. In conjunction with this investigation, she scheduled a meeting
with Father Edwards, to be held on January 10, 2001. On January 3,
2001, however, Father Edwards requested that Bishop Dixon re-
schedule this meeting for sometime after January 13, 2001. Bishop
Dixon's administrative assistant then informed Father Edwards that
"prior to the Bishop's issuing of the call [. . . to the rectorship] and
the negotiation of a contract, she must have access to all your paper-
work, including a background check, and she must meet with you in
person."
On January 9, 2001, Bishop Dixon's administrative assistant
informed the Vestry that Father Edwards had cancelled his scheduled
meeting with Bishop Dixon. She further informed it that the back-
ground investigation and meeting relating to Father Edwards's selec-
tion as Rector of St. John's were "required prior to the Bishop's
issuance of a call to ministry." She advised the Vestry that "we cannot
move forward without these two pieces having been completed."
Despite this advice, the Vestry, on January 22, 2001, notified Bishop
Dixon of its intent to enter into an employment contract with Father
Edwards. On February 6, 2001, Father Edwards and the Vestry signed
such an employment contract, naming Father Edwards as Rector of
St. John's.7 The meeting between Bishop Dixon and Father Edwards,
____________________________________________________________
6 A bishop, priest, or deacon of the Episcopal Church is canonically
resident within a diocese when he or she (1) has been ordained there, or
(2) has been canonically received into the diocese by the ecclesiastical
authority thereof by acceptance of what are called letters dimissory.
Members of the clergy serving under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
authority of a diocese are canonically resident in that diocese.
7 The Vestry, however, did not consider the contract to be final and
binding, but rather as being subject to Bishop Dixon's approval. The
8
initially scheduled for January 10, 2001, was rescheduled and eventu-
ally held on February 26, 2001. On March 6, 2001, Bishop Dixon
orally advised Father Edwards that she did not find him "duly quali-
fied," and that she would not license him as Rector of St. John's. By
a detailed letter of March 8, 2001, Bishop Dixon notified the Vestry
of her decision.8 Father Edwards nonetheless moved from Texas to
Maryland, and he began officiating at St. John's on March 25, 2001.
Pursuant to the Canons of the Church, a priest is permitted to offi-
ciate for two months within a diocese in which he is not canonically
resident without a license from the ecclesiastical authority of that dio-
cese. Canon III.16.2. On March 28, 2001, within the two-month win-
dow, Bishop Dixon attended a meeting of the Vestry and advised it
that, in accordance with canonical provisions, she intended to preside,
due to the absence of a Rector. The Defendants, however, refused to
permit the Bishop to preside, asserting that Father Edwards was the
Rector of St. John's. Father Edwards then presided over the Vestry
meeting of March 28, 2001, and members of the Vestry indicated to
Bishop Dixon that they considered Father Edwards to be the Rector
of St. John's. On May 15, 2001, five Bishops of the Episcopal Church
met with the Church's Presiding Bishop, the Most Reverend Frank T.
Griswold, but they were unable to resolve the conflict existing at St.
____________________________________________________________
minutes of the Vestry meeting of February 15, 2001, reflect that the
Senior Warden "reported that Father Edwards will be meeting with the
Bishop on February 26, 2001 . . . . Following some discussion, it was felt
that the Vestry should not spend money on moving [expenses for Father
Edwards] until the new Rector meets with the Bishop and we get final
approval."
8 In her correspondence to the Vestry of March 8, 2001, Bishop Dixon
explained her refusal to license Father Edwards, and in so doing cited
derogatory remarks he had made about the Episcopal Church, including
that "the machinery of the Church is hell-bound," and his teaching the
importance of "gumming up the works of the Church." Opinion at 10;
172 F. Supp. 2d at 708. Furthermore, Father Edwards had advised her
that his obedience to her, "as a woman bishop, would be limited; . . . he
would not guarantee that he would obey her instructions regarding her
visitation to Christ Church . . . and he would not guarantee her that he
would not attempt to lead Christ Church out of the Church or attempt to
take Church property as part of that effort." Id.
9
John's. On May 22, 2001, the Vestry of St. John's requested the Right
Reverend Jack Leo Iker, Bishop of the Diocese of Fort Worth, to
place St. John's under his "episcopal protection. "9
Having been denied a license to officiate within the Diocese of
Washington, Father Edwards, pursuant to the two-month window pro-
vided by Canon III.16.2, could not properly officiate at St. John's
after May 25, 2001. Shortly thereafter, on May 27, 2001, Bishop
Dixon visited Christ Church for the purpose of presiding over the
Eucharist, a prerogative granted her by The Book of Common Prayer.10
On that occasion, however, members of the Vestry informed Bishop
Dixon that, while she could enter Christ Church to worship, she was
not entitled to preside over the Eucharist. As a result, Bishop Dixon
conducted an alternate religious service on an outdoor basketball
court on the grounds of Christ Church. At the outdoor service, a
retired Bishop read aloud a letter from Bishop Iker, of the Diocese of
Fort Worth, granting St. John's his "episcopal protection." Certain
individuals then sought to interfere with Bishop Dixon's alternate ser-
vice, and members of the Vestry threatened to sue Bishop Dixon and
to have her arrested for trespassing.
On May 27, 2001, Bishop Dixon designated former Bishop Haines
to act as priest-in-charge of St. John's until a new rector could be
selected. Each Sunday in the weeks thereafter, alternate services were
conducted at a community center near Christ Church for those St.
John's parishioners who preferred not to receive the sacraments from
Father Edwards. On May 29, 2001, fifteen members of the clergy
filed three ecclesiastical charges against Father Edwards with the Dio-
____________________________________________________________
9 It is unclear what the term "episcopal protection" signifies. According
to the Canons, however, Bishop Iker possessed no power to usurp Bishop
Dixon's authority within her jurisdiction, and Bishop Dixon did not cede
to him any of her authority as Bishop of the Diocese of Washington. See
Canon III.24.2 ("No Bishop shall perform episcopal acts . . . in a Diocese
other than that in which the Bishop is canonically resident, without per-
mission or a license to perform occasional public services from the
Ecclesiastical Authority of the Diocese in which the Bishop desires to
officiate.").
10 The Eucharist is "the sacrament of the Holy Communion." Webster's
Unabridged Dict. 667 (2d ed. 1998).
10
cese of Washington, alleging his breach of the Canons of the Church.
Because Father Edwards was canonically resident within the Diocese
of Fort Worth, these charges were transferred to that Diocese. On
December 17, 2001, the Standing Committee of the Episcopal Dio-
cese of Fort Worth issued a Presentment against Father Edwards on
one of the three charges, dismissing another charge and noting that
the third charge had been withdrawn.11 The Presentment was then
referred for trial to the Ecclesiastical Trial Court of the Diocese of
Fort Worth.12
On July 13, 2001, two separate sets of ecclesiastical charges were
filed against Bishop Dixon with the Presiding Bishop's Review Com-
mittee of Bishops for the Episcopal Church (the "Review Committee").13
They alleged, inter alia, that Bishop Dixon had "consistently and
intentionally acted contrary to the spirit and letter of the Constitution
and Canons of the General Convention, by exceeding the thirty (30)
day limit for objecting to the call of a rector by a parish and . . .
rebuk[ing] and recant[ing] several reconciliation efforts by the Parish
prayerfully undertaken . . . ." These charges, one made by three Bish-
ops and the other made by certain members of the clergy and laity,
requested the Review Committee to determine whether Bishop Dixon
was entitled, under the Constitution and Canons of the Church, to
veto the selection of a Rector chosen in accordance with the Canons.
On September 5, 2001, the Review Committee dismissed the eccle-
siastical charges against Bishop Dixon, unanimously concluding that
"no offense has occurred under Title IV of the Canons of the Episco-
pal Church" and that Bishop Dixon's actions were "not contrary to
definitive canonical authority." Acknowledging that the complainants
and Bishop Dixon adhered to conflicting views of the relevant Can-
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11 A Presentment is a charging document, specifying an alleged offense
by a priest, deacon, or bishop, that is subject to an ecclesiastical trial.
12 The record does not reflect whether a final decision has been made
on the Presentment against Father Edwards.
13 Title IV of the Canons, which deals with ecclesiastical discipline,
creates this Review Committee for the Church, which functions to inves-
tigate charges filed against bishops. Canon IV.3.27. Title IV also creates
a diocesan review committee in each diocese to examine allegations of
misconduct leveled against priests and deacons. Canon IV.3.1.
11
ons, the Review Committee concluded that "[b]oth parties apparently
hold these views in good faith and with the support of their advisors
and canonical commentators." In the Matter of the Right Rev'd Jane
Holmes Dixon, Report of the Title IV Review Committee of the Epis-
copal Church (Sept. 5, 2001).
C.
During this process, Bishop Dixon's lawsuit, filed against the
Defendants on June 5, 2001, was proceeding through the court sys-
tem. In early July 2001, prior to the filing of the ecclesiastical charges
against Bishop Dixon, the Defendants sought dismissal of her lawsuit.
They asserted that she lacked standing, that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion over her claims, and that the complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Bishop Dixon, on her part, sought
summary judgment against the Defendants. Among her submissions
in support thereof was the report of the Review Committee, conclud-
ing that she had committed no offense under the Canons.
Thereafter, the district court, on October 29, 2001, filed its initial
Opinion and related Order, granting summary judgment to Bishop
Dixon, and declaring that:
a) Bishop Dixon or her delegate has a right to be present
in the buildings and on the grounds of St. John's Parish
in Accokeek, Maryland and to perform duties as Bishop
and Rector Ex Officio there, and her actions on May 27,
2001 did not, and similar future actions by her or her
delegate will not, constitute trespass;
b) Bishop Dixon has the right to preside at meetings of the
Vestry and Parish of St. John's;
c) The purported contract between the Vestry of St. John's
Parish and Father Edwards engaging him as Rector of
the St. John's Parish is invalid, null and void, unen-
forceable and without effect;
d) The acts of the Vestry of St. John's Parish in contract-
ing with Father Edwards to be and holding him out as
12
rector of the Parish and in preventing Bishop Dixon
from presiding at vestry meetings and performing other
acts as Rector Ex Officio are ultra vires and of no force
and effect;
e) Under Maryland Vestry Act, 1976 Laws of Md. Ch. 96,
§ 312J, Defendant Edwards is not the Rector of Christ
Church, St. John's Parish; and
f) Under Maryland Vestry Act, 1976 Laws of Md. Ch.
96, § 312G, Father Edwards is unlawfully using and
occupying buildings and property of St. John's Parish.
Order at 1-2; 172 F. Supp. 2d at 720-21. Furthermore, the court, by
its initial Order, enjoined Father Edwards and the Vestry as follows:
a) [They] shall take no actions, directly or indirectly, to
prevent Bishop Dixon or her delegate from performing
her duties at St. John's Parish, including officiating at
services and ministering to its congregation, and presid-
ing at the meetings of the Vestry and Parish of St.
John's;
b) Father Edwards shall not officiate at religious services
on or near the grounds of St. John's Parish;
c) Father Edwards shall take no actions as Rector of St.
John's Parish, including, but not limited to, presiding at
meetings of the Vestry or officiating at services of St.
John's Parish;
d) Father Edwards shall not use or occupy the building or
grounds of St. John's Parish;
e) Except for his vacating of the rectory at St. John's Par-
ish, which Father Edwards may take up to ten (10) days
to accomplish, this injunction shall take effect immedi-
ately.
Order at 3; 172 F. Supp. 2d at 721.
13
On November 2, 2001, the Defendants noticed their appeal to this
Court, and they also filed with the district court a motion for a stay
of judgment pending appeal. On November 21, 2001, the court denied
the motion, with the exception of a limited modification of its injunc-
tion.14 Dixon v. Edwards, Opinion, Civ. No. PJM 01 CV 1838 (D.
Md. Nov. 21, 2001) (the "Modification Opinion" and the "Modifica-
tion Order"). By its Modification Order, it provided that "Father
Edwards shall be permitted to conduct religious services at least 300
feet distant from the perimeter of Christ Church, St. John's Parish in
Accokeek, Maryland."15 The court also imposed an additional restric-
tion, ordering that "[i]n conducting such services, Father Edwards
shall not in any way hold himself out as being licensed by the Ecclesi-
astical Authority of the Episcopal Diocese of Washington."
Father Edwards and the Vestry have appealed the district court's
rulings to this Court, requesting that we reverse the Order and the
Modification Order and remand the case with instructions that it be
dismissed. Primarily, they assert that we lack subject matter jurisdic-
tion due to pending ecclesiastical proceedings in the Diocese of Fort
Worth.16 They also maintain that we lack subject matter jurisdiction
because Bishop Dixon does not possess standing to sue, and because
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14 As a general proposition, the timely filing of a notice of appeal con-
fers jurisdiction in the court of appeals "and divests the district court of
its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Griggs
v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). In this sit-
uation, however, the district court retained authority to act as it did
because, even after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, a "district court
does not lose jurisdiction to proceed as to matters in aid of the appeal."
Lytle v. Griffith, 240 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and quota-
tion omitted). The court did exactly that; it "aided in this appeal by
relieving us from considering the substance of an issue begotten merely
from imprecise wording in the injunction." Id.
15 The Modification Opinion of November 21, 2001, and its related
Order, contain some differences in their provisions, particularly with
respect to Paragraph (b) of the injunction. These differences, and their
potential significance, are discussed more fully infra at Part VI.
16 At oral argument and in supplemental briefing, the Defendants ques-
tioned whether Bishop Dixon, a resident of the District of Columbia, sat-
isfied the prerequisite of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, upon which jurisdiction is
predicated, that more than $75,000 is in controversy.
14
the Diocese is a necessary, though non-diverse, party. Its joinder
would therefore destroy diversity, and consequently our basis for
jurisdiction. Finally, they contend that the injunction should be
vacated for multiple reasons, including the claim that it contravenes
the First Amendment rights of Father Edwards.
III.
We review an award of summary judgment de novo, employing the
same standards as the district court. Hartsell v. Duplex Prods. Inc.,
123 F.3d 766, 771 (4th Cir. 1997). At the summary judgment stage,
we view the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va.,
Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 928 (4th Cir. 1995). Because this is a diversity case,
we apply to it the same substantive principles a state civil court would
utilize, but we adhere to federal procedural principles. See Hottle v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1995). We review
a district court's award of equitable relief for abuse of discretion,
accepting the court's factual findings absent clear error, while exam-
ining issues of law de novo. Id.; Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 84
F.3d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1996). When a district court grants an injunc-
tion, the scope of such relief rests within its sound discretion. Virginia
Soc. for Human Life, Inc. v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 263 F.3d 379, 392
(4th Cir. 2001). Similarly, we must sustain a district court's determi-
nation of whether a party is "necessary," pursuant to Rule 19 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless the court abused its discre-
tion in making such a finding. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid,
210 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 2000).
IV.
Our first task, of course, is to satisfy ourselves that we possess
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648,
654 (4th Cir. 1999). During oral argument and in supplemental brief-
ing, the parties disagreed on whether Bishop Dixon's claim against
the Defendants satisfied the "amount in controversy" requirement of
28 U.S.C. § 1332, and they also disagree on whether Bishop Dixon
possesses standing to pursue relief in this proceeding. Before consid-
ering any issues concerning pending ecclesiastical proceedings or the
15
First Amendment, we must examine the predicate jurisdictional and
standing issues.
A.
In this circuit, it is settled that the test for determining the amount
in controversy in a diversity proceeding is "the pecuniary result to
either party which [a] judgment would produce." Gov't Employees
Ins. Co. v. Lally, 327 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir. 1964). The complaint
of Bishop Dixon seeks, inter alia, a declaration that the actions of the
Vestry and Father Edwards are ultra vires and that the contract
between them is null and void.17 Under the "either-party" rule, as
explained by our Judge Bell in Lally, Bishop Dixon has placed Father
Edwards's employment contract and its monetary value in issue.
Indeed, the Defendants concede in their submissions that, "if the con-
tract is invalidated, Rev. Edwards loses compensation worth more
than $75,000 and the Vestry is deprived of services it has valued at
that amount." Appellants' Supp. Reply Br. at 6. Therefore, as the Ves-
try acknowledges, the injunction will cause Father Edwards to lose in
excess of $75,000, and the Vestry will be denied his services, which
it has valued at more than that sum. It is thereby clear that Bishop
Dixon satisfies the monetary requirement for diversity jurisdiction.18
B.
The Defendants also maintain that Bishop Dixon lacks standing to
pursue her claims, and that the Diocese of Washington is a "neces-
____________________________________________________________
17 In support of this assertion, Bishop Dixon observes that as of Febru-
ary 15, 2001, the Vestry considered her approval of its selection of rector
to be a condition precedent to formation of a contract with Father
Edwards. See supra n.7; Foster & Kleiser v. Baltimore Co., 470 A.2d
1322, 1325-26 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (finding that an offer is not
binding, and no contract formed, if something more than the seller's
assent, e.g., approval by a higher authority, is required).
18 Because the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied, we need
not address Bishop Dixon's alternate rationales: that the value of the free
exercise of her religion exceeds the jurisdictional sum of $75,000, and
that her subjective valuation of access to the Parish property exceeds
$75,000.
16
sary" party to the proceeding. With respect to the standing question,
the Supreme Court, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, has carefully
explained the "irreducible constitutional minimum" required. 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston
Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
First, Bishop Dixon must have suffered an injury in fact, i.e., "an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and par-
ticularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypotheti-
cal." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal citations and quotations
omitted). Second, her injuries must be fairly traceable to the actions
of the Defendants, rather than the result of actions by some indepen-
dent third party not before the court. Id. at 560-61. Third, it must be
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that her injuries will be
redressed by a favorable decision. Id.
1.
a.
Bishop Dixon plainly possesses, consistent with the first prong of
Lujan, a legally protectable interest in the authority of her office. In
her complaint, she seeks, inter alia, to enforce her right as Bishop of
the Diocese to preside at St. John's as Rector ex officio and as Presi-
dent of the Vestry in the absence of a Rector, and she also seeks a
declaration that Father Edwards is not the Rector of St. John's. She
alleges no claims as Jane Holmes Dixon, an individual, but she
instead pursues claims only in her capacity as Bishop of the Diocese
of Washington.
With regard to those claims, we observe that Jane Holmes Dixon,
individually, would possess no right or authority to, e.g., preside at
meetings of the Vestry or to celebrate the Eucharist upon visitation to
a parish of the Diocese. However, as Bishop of the Diocese of Wash-
ington, she has alleged and factually supported her possession of such
authority. While the Diocese itself has no right to preside at meetings
of the Vestry in the absence of a Rector, Bishop Dixon, by virtue of
her office, is plainly vested with such a right. The Diocese possesses
no right to celebrate the Eucharist upon visitation, nor any right of
visitation. On the other hand, Bishop Dixon, by virtue of her office,
clearly holds and possesses such rights, under the "hierarchical frame-
17
work of the Episcopal Church," to "minister to the congregation of St.
John's." Complaint ¶ 23. While the Diocese may be injured if one of
its parishes flouts the Constitution and Canons of the Church, such an
injury would be different from those that Bishop Dixon alleges she
has suffered.19
To remedy the encroachment upon her authority by Father
Edwards and the Vestry, Bishop Dixon is entitled in these circum-
stances to turn to the civil courts. See Protestant Episcopal Church
v. Graves, 391 A.2d 563 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978) (granting declaratory
and injunctive relief to bishop regarding control of parish property);
Fiske v. Beaty, 201 N.Y.S. 441 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922) (enjoining pur-
ported rector from conducting religious services or occupying rectory,
and prohibiting use of property in violation of rules of the church,
upon action of bishop against vestry of parish and alleged rector).
Because Bishop Dixon possesses rights that are legally enforceable,
we must next assess whether she has alleged a sufficient injury in fact
to her rights as Bishop.
b.
The first prong of Lujan also requires that the invasion of the
legally protected right be both concrete and actual, rather than merely
hypothetical. With regard to Bishop Dixon's right to be present on
Parish property, it is undisputed that certain members of the Vestry,
as well as others, threatened her with criminal prosecution and suit for
trespass when she attempted to conduct services at St. John's on May
27, 2001.20 The Defendants maintain, however, that Bishop Dixon
____________________________________________________________
19 For these reasons, Bishop Dixon satisfies the prudential standing
requirement that she assert her own legal rights and not those of third
parties. See Valley Forge Christian Coll v. Ams. United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) ("[T]he plaintiff
generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest
his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.") (cita-
tion and quotations omitted).
20 In their submissions in this appeal, the Defendants maintain that they
are contemplating a counterclaim against Bishop Dixon for interference
with the employment contract between Father Edwards and the Vestry.
Appellants' Br. at 32.
18
was not, on that occasion, threatened for being on the property of St.
John's as an individual, but instead for the improper attempt to exert
power by virtue of her office. It is significant that, even when acting
in her official capacity, Bishop Dixon may be subject to personal lia-
bility for the tort of trespass. Fletcher v. Havre de Grace Fireworks
Co., 177 A.2d 908, 910 (Md. 1962). In this regard, she sought a decla-
ration that she could not be liable for trespass, in order that she could
conduct her ministry without threat of personal liability. See Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454-55 (1974). A threat of liability for civil
or criminal trespass constitutes the type of injury that, in the language
of the Court, is both "concrete and particularized," and "actual or
imminent." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. Under her allegations, and on
this record, concrete and actual harm was inflicted by the Defendants
upon Bishop Dixon, rather than upon the Diocese.
Additionally, Bishop Dixon was in fact injured when the Defen-
dants denied her the right to act as Bishop of the Diocese of Washing-
ton. In Raines v. Byrd, certain members of the United States Senate
asserted the loss of prestige and power of their institution as an injury
in fact, and the Supreme Court concluded that they lacked standing
to remedy such an "institutional" injury. 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997).
On the other hand, when a claimant asserts the right to an office, or
if an officeholder asserts rights held by virtue of his office, he pos-
sesses standing to sue for denial of those rights. See Raines, 521 U.S.
at 821 ("[A]ppellees' claim of standing is based on a loss of political
power, not loss of any private right, which would make the injury
more concrete."); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). It is also significant
that Bishop Dixon does not claim that the Church itself has been
injured in its power or prestige by the Defendants. Rather, she asserts
that Father Edwards and the Vestry have interfered with the exercise
of the authority she possesses as Bishop of the Diocese. In such a cir-
cumstance, she has alleged a sufficient injury in fact.
2.
It is also clear that Bishop Dixon satisfies the second and third
prongs of the Lujan test. With regard to the second prong, Bishop
Dixon's injury is fairly traceable to the Defendants. Finally, under the
third prong of Lujan, the district court is fully capable of redressing
19
Bishop Dixon's injuries with a decision in her favor. See Sims v.
Greene, 160 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1947) (allowing action for injunction
by bishop of African Methodist Episcopal Church against another
bishop, where church was not a party). Indeed, the Defendants make
no contention that Bishop Dixon was not afforded full relief on her
claims by the Order and Modification Order of the district court. As
such, under the Lujan principles of standing, Bishop Dixon may pur-
sue her claims against these Defendants.
3.
Because Bishop Dixon possesses standing to sue to enforce her
rights as bishop, our inquiry into whether the Diocese is a "necessary
party" in this proceeding is simplified. See Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1998) ("Once it is determined that a par-
ticular plaintiff is harmed by the defendant, and that the harm will
likely be redressed by a favorable decision, that plaintiff has standing
- regardless of whether there are others who would also have stand-
ing to sue.").
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires joinder of
a party when "in the person's absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties." The Defendants suggest that,
in order to resolve this lawsuit, the court was required to decide who
owned the Parish property. We are unable to agree, because the
injunction entered by the district court in fact gave Bishop Dixon
complete relief. The injunction does not concern property ownership,
but only the rights of access and control over the Parish property -
that is, the question of who is in charge, not who owns the land.
Therefore, this facet of the Rule 19 contention must fail.
The Defendants also assert that the Diocese is necessary under
Rule 19(b)(2), which requires joinder when failure to do so would
"leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk
of . . . inconsistent obligations." Although the Diocese claims an inter-
est in the Parish property, no substantial risk of inconsistent judg-
ments is presented. First, the relief granted does not, as explained
above, implicate the ownership of the Parish property. Second, both
the Standing Committee and the Diocesan Council support Bishop
Dixon's decision to pursue relief in her capacity as Bishop, and they
20
advised the district court that she adequately represents any overlap-
ping interests of the Diocese. See Declaration of David Thomas
Andrews, President of the Standing Committee of the Diocese of
Washington, Dixon v. Edwards, Civ. No. PJM 01 CV 1838 (D. Md.
July 28, 2001); Declaration of David B. Maglott, Moderator of the
Diocesan Council of the Diocese of Washington, Dixon v. Edwards,
Civ. No. PJM 01 CV 1838 (D. Md. July 30, 2001). There is no sub-
stantial risk of inconsistent judgments when potential plaintiffs agree
that one of them will litigate and represent the interests of the other.
Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc., 635 F.2d 1102, 1103 n.3
(4th Cir. 1980); see also Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158, 1167
(9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in concluding that the Diocese of Washington is not a necessary
party in this proceeding.
V.
We now turn to the primary contention raised on appeal by the
Defendants, that we lack subject matter jurisdiction because the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment pre-
clude any involvement by a civil court in this dispute.21 The Defen-
dants assert that pending ecclesiastical proceedings against Father
Edwards in the Diocese of Fort Worth are material to this case and
should be permitted to proceed, and they maintain that the district
court, in accepting jurisdiction and ruling against them, unconstitu-
tionally acted as an arbiter of the religious doctrine of the Episcopal
Church.
As we explain below, the civil courts of our country are obliged to
play a limited role in resolving church disputes. This limited role is
premised on First Amendment principles that preclude a court from
deciding issues of religious doctrine and practice, or from interfering
with internal church government. When a civil dispute merely
involves a church as a party, however, and when it can be decided
without resolving an ecclesiastical controversy, a civil court may
____________________________________________________________
21 The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amend-
ment provide that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const.
amend. I.
21
properly exercise jurisdiction. The courts must avoid any religious
inquiry, however, and they may do so by deferring to the highest
authority within the church.
A.
1.
It is axiomatic that the civil courts lack any authority to resolve dis-
putes arising under religious law and polity, and they must defer to
the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a hierarchical church apply-
ing its religious law. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the United
States & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976). More
than a hundred years ago, the Supreme Court succinctly observed:
whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesi-
astical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest
of the[ ] church judicatories to which the matter has been
carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as
final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case
before them.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). Under the constraints
of the First Amendment, when a subordinate in a church hierarchy
disputes a decision of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal, the civil
courts may not constitutionally intervene.
The Court has consistently recognized that First Amendment val-
ues are jeopardized when church litigation turns on the resolution by
civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. See
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709-10. As Justice Brennan observed,
"`[t]he First Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide
church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies
over religious doctrine.' This principle applies with equal force to
church disputes over church polity and church administration." Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
In assessing whether to exercise jurisdiction in a civil proceeding
involving a church, it is important to determine whether the church
22
is of a "hierarchical" nature. If the church is hierarchical, a civil court
should defer to the final authority within its hierarchy, declining even
to determine whether an ecclesiastical decision is arbitrary, i.e.,
whether it has complied with church laws and regulations. Id. In fact,
it is clear that "a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions
of church tribunals as it finds them," "on matters of discipline, faith,
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law." Id.
2.
The Defendants provide two separate bases for their contention that
we owe no deference to the decision of Bishop Dixon declining to
license Father Edwards in the Diocese of Washington. First, they
maintain that the Episcopal Church is not hierarchical, and second,
they contend that Bishop Dixon is not the final ecclesiastical decision-
maker on Father Edwards's licensure in the Diocese. We address each
of these contentions in turn.
The Defendants first maintain that the Episcopal Church is not a
"hierarchical" church, but, to the contrary, it is a church that is "con-
stitutional, collegial, and conciliar." In its Milivojevich decision in
1976, the Court noted several factors that "confirmed" its conclusion
that the Serbian Orthodox Church is hierarchical. 426 U.S. at 715-16
& n.9. The district court utilized the Milivojevich factors in its analy-
sis, appropriately summarizing them into five elements which, if met,
support the conclusion that a church is hierarchical. The five elements
spelled out by the district court are as follows:
1) The corporations in question are organized under the
state religious corporations act governing the incorporation
of religious societies that are subordinate parts of larger
church organizations.
2) Resolutions of the subordinate entity acknowledge
the superiority of the superior entity.
3) By-laws of the lower authority have been submitted
to the higher for approval.
23
4) The priest takes an oath to be obedient to the higher
authority.
5) Provisions in the constitutions and by-laws of both
the superior and subordinate levels suggest a hierarchical
relationship.
Opinion at 26-27; 172 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
Our examination of this record, and our study of the organization
and operation of the Episcopal Church, compels the determination
that the court was correct in both its analysis and in its conclusion:
The Episcopal Church is hierarchical. Specifically, but by way of
example only: (1) the Bylaws of St. John's were adopted pursuant to
the Canons of the Episcopal Church of the Diocese of Washington
together with the Maryland Vestry Act; (2) The Maryland Vestry Act
provides for the "full power and authority" of a vestry to choose a
new minister or reader, "[p]rovided, however, that no action shall be
taken hereunder contrary to provisions, consonant with public law, or
the Constitution and Canons of the Protestant Episcopal Church, or
of the Diocese of said Church wherein the parish is located," 1976
Md. Laws Ch. 96, § 312J; and (3) every Episcopal priest, upon ordi-
nation, takes an oath to be obedient to the Church, the Diocese, and
his or her Bishop.22 In sum, we agree with the district court that "each
and every characteristic mentioned by the Supreme Court in Milivo-
____________________________________________________________
22 The ceremony for ordination of a priest in the Episcopal Church,
where the priest takes an oath of obedience, includes the following ritual
exchanges:
The Bishop says to the ordinand
. . . . And will you, in accordance with the canons of this Church,
obey your bishop and other ministers who may have authority
over you and your work?
Answer
I am willing and ready to do so. . . . I do solemnly engage to con-
form to the doctrine, discipline, and worship of The Episcopal
Church.
. . . .
Bishop Will you respect and be guided by the pastoral direc-
tion and leadership of your bishop?
Answer I will.
BCP, The Ordination of a Priest (emphasis added).
24
jevich as establishing the hierarchical nature of a church is indisputa-
bly present here." Opinion at 28; 172 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
In their appeal, the Defendants implicitly concede that the Church
is hierarchical. Indeed, the Vestry does not contend that it alone,
rather than Bishop Dixon, possesses the final word on the selection
of its Rector; it acknowledges that Bishop Dixon had a period of
thirty days, under Canon III.17, within which to object to the selection
of Father Edwards. This concession recognizes that the Vestry's
choice of a Rector is subject to the Bishop's approval and that the
Vestry is subject to the rulings of a hierarchy. And the Vestry could
not in good faith contend otherwise, in view of Canon III.17 and the
canonical provisions forbidding a vestry from discharging a rector
without the approval of the proper bishop. Canon III.21. As the dis-
trict court observed, the very word "bishop" derives from roots mean-
ing "overseer." Opinion at 30; 172 F. Supp. 2d at 718. "Episcopalism"
is said to mean "the theory that in church government supreme
authority resides in a body of bishops and not in any one individual."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dict. 765 (1976). And the Canons of the
Episcopal Church clearly establish that it is a hierarchy. See, e.g.,
Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 744 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Mass.
Ct. App. 2001 ("It is undisputed that the Episcopal Church is hierar-
chical in structure; there are no judicial holdings to the contrary.").23
____________________________________________________________
23 Other decisions considering this question and concluding that the
Episcopal Church is hierarchical include: Trustees of the Diocese of
Albany v. Trinity Episcopal Church, 684 N.Y.S.2d 76, 78 n.2 (N.Y. App.
1999) ("The Protestant Episcopal Church is a hierarchical form of church
government in which local parishes are subject to the constitution, can-
ons, rules and decisions of their dioceses, which, in turn, are presided
over by a bishop . . . ."); Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal
Diocese of Mass., 688 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Mass. 1997) ("[T]he First and
Fourteenth Amendments require that we accept as binding the interpreta-
tion of the constitution and canons of PECUSA and the Diocese by the
bishop, the highest ecclesiastical authority for adjudicating these
issues."); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 327 (Colo. 1993)
(en banc) ("[A] priest is not independent of the [Episcopal] Diocese but
is controlled by the Diocese and the bishop."); Bjorkman v. Protestant
Episcopal Church, 759 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Ky. 1988) ("In this case the
church organization is hierarchical."); Bennison v. Sharp, 329 N.W.2d
25
3.
Because the Episcopal Church is hierarchical, we must next assess
whether Bishop Dixon, in the context of this dispute, is its highest
ecclesiastical authority -- i.e., whether her decision with respect to
Father Edwards and the Vestry is binding upon us. In arguing to the
contrary, the Defendants contend that disciplinary proceedings are
pending against Father Edwards in the Diocese of Fort Worth con-
cerning the events at St. John's, and that until those proceedings con-
clude, no "final authority" has spoken. In order for the ecclesiastical
proceedings in Fort Worth to have relevance here, however, they must
have some capacity to affect the situation at St. John's. And on this
point the Defendants have been entirely unable, in either their written
or oral presentations, to raise any genuine question concerning
whether the tribunal in Fort Worth can establish Father Edwards as
the Rector of St. John's Parish.
The Fort Worth Presentment is an entirely separate proceeding
from this case; it is only concerned with the disciplinary charge
against Father Edwards, and it focuses on his conduct alone. What-
ever its outcome, it cannot determine the validity of Bishop Dixon's
decisions in the Diocese of Washington. If Father Edwards is vindi-
cated in Fort Worth, he will not be subject to church discipline there.
In no event, however, will he thereby be established as Rector of St.
John's in Maryland. In this circumstance, the Fort Worth disciplinary
proceeding against Father Edwards is irrelevant to the dispute before
us. See Hiles, 744 N.E.2d at 1122 (observing that ecclesiastical disci-
plinary proceedings did not implicate controversy before the court).
____________________________________________________________
466, 472 (Mich. 1983) ("[T]he undisputed facts show the Protestant
Episcopal Church to be hierarchical with regard to property, as well as
spiritual matters."); Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 610 P.2d 182,
184 (Nev. 1982) (finding no error in district court's conclusion that
church was hierarchical); Protestant Episcopal Church v. Graves, 417
A.2d 19, 24 (N.J. 1980) ("The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United
States of America is a hierarchically structured organization which by
virtue of its constitution and canons exercises pervasive control over its
constituent parishes . . . .").
26
In the Episcopal Church, the priests and the laity of a diocese are
subject to the authority of their bishop. While the dispute between
Bishop Dixon and the Vestry of St. John's may concern St. John's
control of its own affairs, the Canons of the Church fail to provide a
vestry or a parish congregation with final authority over all church
matters. Most significantly, the Review Committee of the Church has
already determined that Bishop Dixon did not violate its Canons, and
the Canons provide for no further appeal or review of her decision.
Therefore, Bishop Dixon is the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of the
Church for the purposes of this dispute.24
B.
Stripped to its essence, the dispute between Bishop Dixon and
Father Edwards concerns whether the principles governing the Epis-
copal Church authorize the Bishop to refuse Father Edwards a license.
The Defendants maintain that a "duly qualified" priest is merely one
in good standing; Bishop Dixon, on the other hand, maintains that a
"duly qualified" priest is one whose views are not inconsistent with
her ministry. The resolution of this disagreement is beyond our com-
petence as a civil court, because "it is the function of the church
authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of [clergy]
are and whether the candidate possesses them." Gonzalez v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).25 In any event,
the Review Committee has already decided that Bishop Dixon made
a reasonable good-faith interpretation of the Canons, and it has
declined to discipline her for her actions.
____________________________________________________________
24 There may be an issue, under the Constitution and Canons, whether
the Review Committee possessed the authority to overturn Bishop
Dixon's decision on the licensing of Father Edwards, or whether it
merely possessed the ability to sanction her if the decision was improper.
Because the Review Committee declined to proceed against Bishop
Dixon, that issue is not before us.
25 While the Defendants' amici assert that the district court erred in fail-
ing to interpret Canon III.17 to limit Bishop Dixon to thirty calendar
days in which to object, and that it erred by impermissibly expanding the
definition of a "duly qualified" priest, the court commendably refused to
address these issues. Such interpretations of the Canons of the Episcopal
Church are beyond the province of a civil court.
27
In the final analysis, it was for the Episcopal Church to determine
whether Bishop Dixon was acting within the bounds of her role as
Bishop Pro Tempore of the Diocese of Washington. When the
Review Committee found that she did not act improperly, it dismissed
the charges against her. The issue of her authority has not thereafter
been questioned in any pending church adjudication. Her decision is
therefore final and binding, and it must be recognized as such by a
civil court.
VI.
Finally, we turn to the Defendants' challenge to the permanent
injunction entered by the district court. As a general matter, when the
scope of an injunction is challenged, we review its terms for an abuse
of discretion. Tuttle v. Arlington City School Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 703
(4th Cir. 1999). In so doing, we review the court's underlying factual
findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Virginia
Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 263 F.3d
379, 392 (4th Cir. 2001). Of course, a mistake of law by a district
court is per se an abuse of discretion. Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bak-
ery, 281 F.3d 144, 150 (4th Cir. 2002).
In addressing Bishop Dixon's request for injunctive relief, the dis-
trict court found, inter alia, that the Defendants had denied her access
to Christ Church. It also found that they had barred her from celebrat-
ing the Eucharist with her parishioners at St. John's, and that she was
compelled to utilize a basketball court outside the church building for
an alternate religious service. Moreover, Bishop Dixon's alternate ser-
vice was disrupted, and she was threatened with charges of criminal
trespass. And after the expiration of the sixty-day window, when
Father Edwards was no longer authorized to officiate within the Dio-
cese of Washington, he continued to occupy the rectory and hold him-
self out as the Rector of St. John's.
Because of this activity and the Defendants' related acts of defi-
ance of Bishop Dixon, the court, on October 29, 2001, entered its
injunction. It enjoined Father Edwards from, inter alia, acting as Rec-
tor of St. John's, and also from officiating at religious services "on or
near" the grounds of St. John's. On November 2, 2001, when the
Defendants noticed their appeal to this Court, they contemporane-
28
ously sought a stay of judgment pending appeal, asserting, among
other things, that the "on or near" provision in the injunction's Para-
graph (b) infringed upon the First Amendment rights of Father
Edwards. In response to this contention, the court entered its Novem-
ber 21, 2001, Modification Order, and it thereby superseded the chal-
lenged "on or near" provision with an amended injunction permitting
Father Edwards to "conduct religious services at least 300 feet distant
from the perimeter of Christ Church, St. John's Parish." Modification
Order at 6. The Defendants, however, did not thereafter object in the
district court to the terms of the Modification Order, nor did they seek
to vacate or modify its terms and conditions.
On appeal, the Defendants continue to maintain that the "on or
near" provision unconstitutionally restricts Father Edwards's freedom
of religion and expression. Their contention on this point is moot,
however, because that provision has been superseded by the Modifi-
cation Order. They otherwise challenge the injunction in two respects,
contending that (1) it prevents Father Edwards from conducting ser-
vices generally, and (2) because the Vestry owns the Parish property
in fee simple, it cannot be enjoined from inviting Father Edwards to
perform services thereon. Neither of these contentions has merit.
First of all, Father Edwards is not prohibited from conducting ser-
vices generally; the injunction simply prohibits him from holding
himself out as licensed by the Ecclesiastical Authority of the Diocese
of Washington and, in certain respects, from officiating in connection
with St. John's Parish and Christ Church. The court placed no restric-
tions on his ability to believe in or practice his religion outside speci-
fied boundaries. On the second point, concerning the use of Parish
property, the Vestry, under the Parish Bylaws and the Maryland Ves-
try Act, is already precluded from acting in violation of the Constitu-
tion and Canons of the Episcopal Church. Because the highest
ecclesiastical authority of the Diocese, Bishop Dixon, has determined
that the Vestry's interpretation of the Canons is incorrect, this chal-
lenge to the injunction is without merit.
On the other hand, we see the "buffer zone" aspect of the injunc-
tion, as set forth in the Modification Order, as troublesome. While the
Defendants' challenge to the buffer zone may have some merit, it is
significant that Father Edwards and the Vestry failed to challenge the
29
Modification Order in the district court. We should not, unless an
error is plain, or unless our refusal to address an appeal would result
in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, ordinarily consider an issue
which is first raised on appeal. Karpel v. Inova Health Sys. Servs.,
134 F.3d 1222, 1227 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Taylor v. Virginia
Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 239-40 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that error
not raised below in civil proceedings is reviewed, at minimum, for
plain error). Because of the compelling importance of preserving First
Amendment principles, however, see Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967), and based upon the prudential consider-
ation of according the district court a full opportunity to first consider
a challenge to its Modification Order, we will remand for further con-
sideration of the buffer zone issue. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City &
County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirm-
ing but remanding for consideration of issue initially raised on
appeal).
In connection with our remand, we make the following explanatory
observations. While the Modification Order prohibits Father Edwards
from officiating at religious services within 300 feet of the "perimeter
of Christ Church," the Modification Opinion provides that the injunc-
tion is being modified to create a 300-foot buffer zone "from the
perimeter of the property of Christ Church." Modification Opinion at
3 (emphasis added). Although the language of the Modification Order
is controlling, because courts speak through their orders, New Hori-
zon of NY LLC v. Jacobs, 231 F.3d 143, 152 (4th Cir. 2000), this sig-
nificant discrepancy between the Modification Opinion and the
Modification Order makes it difficult to ascertain the proper bounda-
ries of the buffer zone where Father Edwards is not to officiate.26 To
the extent the buffer zone extends beyond the boundaries of the Christ
Church property -- and those boundaries are not in the record
before us -- its existence may be constitutionally problematic. See
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 775 (U.S. 1994)
____________________________________________________________
26 For example, does the 300 foot buffer zone run from the edge of the
church building at Christ Church, or does it run from the property line
of the real estate on which the church building sits? We also note that,
whether intended or not, the Modification Order applies only to Christ
Church, and that this aspect of the injunction is inapplicable to
Pomonkey Chapel, the other church in St. John's Parish.
30
(striking down 36-foot buffer zone insofar as it encroached on private
property and 300-foot buffer zone around residences as unconstitu-
tional); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997)
(striking down fifteen-foot floating buffer zone around patrons enter-
ing abortion clinic, but upholding fixed buffer zones around door-
ways, driveways, and driveway entrances as warranted in
circumstances).
VII.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's award of
declaratory and injunctive relief to Bishop Dixon. We remand, how-
ever, for further proceedings concerning the buffer zone created by
the injunction.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
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