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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
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NELSON O. ROBLES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.No. 01-1662
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY,
MARYLAND; JAMES ROZAR; ANTONIO
DEBARROS,
Defendant-Appellees.
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NELSON O. ROBLES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.No. 01-1728
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY,
MARYLAND; JAMES ROZAR; ANTONIO
DEBARROS,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA-99-31-PJM)
Argued: June 5, 2002
Decided: August 26, 2002
Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, MOTZ, Circuit Judge, and Bobby R. BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opin-
ion. Chief Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz
and Senior Judge Baldock joined.
____________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Christopher Allen Griffiths, ROBERTS & WOOD,
Riverdale, Maryland, for Appellant. William Antoine Snoddy, Asso-
ciate County Attorney, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY OFFICE OF
LAW, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Ter-
rell N. Roberts, III, ROBERTS & WOOD, Riverdale, Maryland, for
Appellant. John A. Bielec, Deputy County Attorney, PRINCE
GEORGE'S COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Upper Marlboro, Mary-
land, for Appellees.
____________________________________________________________
OPINION
WILKINSON, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Nelson Robles claims that police officers Antonio DeBar-
ros and James Rozar violated his state and federal constitutional rights
by tying him to a metal pole in a deserted parking lot and abandoning
him there for approximately 10 minutes. He seeks damages from the
officers and from Prince George's County, Maryland ("PGC") pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as under the Maryland Constitution
and state law for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
district court granted summary judgment to the officers on the federal
claims on the basis of qualified immunity and on the emotional dis-
tress claim as a matter of law. A jury found for Robles on the state
due process claim and awarded compensatory and punitive damages
in the amount of $647,000. The district court granted a remittitur of
the damage awards to $240,000, or in the alternative a new trial.
Robles opted for a new trial limited to the amount of damages and
was awarded $40,000.
On appeal, defendants contend that the brief restraint of plaintiff
was nothing more than a prank that, however misdirected, did not rise
2
to the level of a constitutional violation. Plaintiff contends in turn that
the damages he suffered for this indignity merited far more than the
monies he received. The district court and the jury in its final award
correctly perceived that the justice of the case lay somewhere in
between. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in large part and
remand with directions to modify the judgment only to the extent of
reversing the award of punitive damages against the county because
such damages are impermissible under Maryland law.
I.
At approximately 3:30 a.m. on August 17, 1996, PGC police offi-
cers Antonio DeBarros, Kevin Hodge, and Lt. James Rozar responded
to a disorderly conduct noise complaint at an apartment complex in
Langley Park. Upon obtaining identification from three men found
drinking beer on the premises, the officers arrested Nelson Robles on
an outstanding traffic warrant issued by neighboring Montgomery
County.
After taking Robles into custody, the officers attempted to arrange
a prisoner exchange with Montgomery County's police department.
Formal custody transfers generally require that the arrested individual
be taken to a commissioner in the county where arrested and then
transferred by the sheriff's department to the county that issued the
warrant. Because this procedure is time consuming, officers some-
times arrange informal transfers of arrestees at the county line. Rozar
and DeBarros requested several times that the Montgomery County
dispatcher send someone to meet them for such an exchange, but
these requests were denied. The officers were told that the Montgom-
ery County Police Department was too busy that evening to spare
officers for a transfer.
Skeptical of this explanation, Rozar and DeBarros drove Robles to
the deserted Hillandale Shopping Center parking lot in Montgomery
County. There they tied Robles to a metal pole using three pairs of
flex-cuffs and left a note at his feet explaining that there were out-
standing warrants for him in Montgomery County. The officers then
drove out of sight of Robles and placed a call to the non-emergency
number of the Montgomery Police Department reporting the situation.
They did not identify themselves to the operator or disclose the fact
3
that PGC officers had tied Robles to the pole. Officers from Mont-
gomery County arrived approximately 10 to 15 minutes later to untie
Robles and take him into custody.
On October 26, 1998, Robles filed a nine-count complaint against
Rozar, DeBarros, and PGC alleging violation of his civil rights under
both the Maryland and U.S. Constitutions, as well as intentional
infliction of emotional distress under state law. The case was removed
to federal court in January 1999. The district court then granted defen-
dant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery as to Count IX which
alleged direct liability against the county for the unlawful seizure pur-
suant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to Counts I
through VIII, which the court granted in part and denied in part. Spe-
cifically, the court held that defendants possessed qualified immunity
as to Counts II-IV, which asserted liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
but that Counts V-VIII, alleging violation of Robles' rights under the
Maryland Constitution, survived because Maryland law provides no
official immunity for state constitutional violations. The court also
granted summary judgment to defendants on Count I, the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim, because Robles could not estab-
lish the elements of the tort as a matter of law.
Counts V-VIII were tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in
Robles' favor on the state constitutional due process claim. The jury
awarded Robles $647,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.
Robles filed a motion to alter judgment, or alternatively for a new
trial, arguing that the jury's verdict was contrary to law because it
failed to find, in addition to the state due process violation, that he
had been subject to an unconstitutional seizure under Maryland law.
The court denied the motion following a hearing. Robles also filed a
motion for reconsideration of the court's order granting defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity
with regard to the § 1983 claims. The court denied that motion as
well.
The district court subsequently granted defendants' motion for
remittitur, or in the alternative a new trial, based on excessiveness of
4
the verdict. Robles rejected the court's remittitur of the award to
$240,000. The second trial was limited to the issue of damages for the
violation of Robles' state constitutional right to due process. The jury
awarded Robles $25,000 in compensatory damages against Rozar,
DeBarros, and PGC. It awarded $5,000 in punitive damages against
Rozar and $10,000 in punitive damages against PGC. On May 9,
2001, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal of the Monell claim
against PGC.
Robles filed a motion to recover his attorneys' fees and expenses
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. He argued that in view of the jury award in
his favor, he was the "prevailing party." Defendants responded that
Robles was not the prevailing party for purposes of § 1988 because
he had not succeeded on any of his federal claims. The court agreed
with defendants and denied Robles' motion to award attorney's fees.
Robles appeals.
II.
We begin by considering Robles' federal constitutional claims. In
order to make out a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Robles must
show that (1) the actions of the police officers deprived him of an
actual constitutional right and (2) that the right was clearly established
at the time of the alleged violation. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,
609 (1999). Only if both parts of this inquiry are satisfied can Robles
overcome the defendants' assertion of qualified immunity. Id.
A.
Robles contends that the PGC officers violated his constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable seizures. He asserts that "[b]ecause
there was no legitimate reason to handcuff [him] to a pole and aban-
don him, the manner of his seizure was unreasonable."
The Fourth Amendment "governs claims of excessive force during
the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a per-
son." Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1161 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
However, this court has rejected any concept of a continuing seizure
rule, noting that "the Fourth Amendment . . . applies to the initial
5
decision to detain an accused, not to the conditions of confinement
after that decision has been made." Id. at 1163 (internal citations and
punctuation omitted). Once the single act of detaining an individual
has been accomplished, the Amendment ceases to apply. Id.
Robles acknowledges that the police had probable cause for his
arrest. The officers were acting on the basis of an outstanding warrant
issued by Montgomery County which contained five charges against
Robles stemming from a vehicular hit and run accident the previous
year. Robles also admits that Rozar and DeBarros did not use exces-
sive force when they took custody of him. The officers made clear the
reason for his arrest, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of
a police cruiser without incident.
Thus, by the time Robles was brought to Montgomery County, his
arrest had been completed and the circumstances of that arrest com-
ported with Fourth Amendment safeguards. Robles' status at the time
of this incident was that of a pretrial detainee, and the Fourth Amend-
ment does not extend to such situations.1 Such a detainee may assert
other rights, of course, and it is to those that we now turn.
B.
As a pretrial detainee, Robles' treatment and the conditions of his
restraint are evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Riley, 115 F.3d at 1166. In order to conclude that
Robles' rights under this clause were violated, it is necessary to find
that the officers' actions amounted to punishment and were not
merely "an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose,"
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979), and that the injury resulting
from their actions was more than de minimis.2 Riley, 115 F.3d at
1167.
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1 Robles additionally contends that the court below erred in not grant-
ing his motion to alter judgment on the related state law claim. Because
Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Fourth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution parallel each other, Henderson v. Mary-
land, 597 A.2d 486 (Md. App. 1991), the jury verdict for the defendants
on this claim must stand.
2 Plaintiff would have us dispose of this issue by reference to the
Supreme Court's recent ruling in Hope v. Peltzer, 2002 WL 1378412
6
Defendants contend that their actions cannot amount to punishment
because they "failed to show any expressed intent" to punish and the
"purpose of [their] actions was to insure that the [transfer of] custody"
be effected. In the absence of an actual intent to punish, however, the
due process determination turns on whether the "pretrial detention is
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective" or "if it is
arbitrary or purposeless." Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. An action may be rea-
sonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose if "an alternative
purpose to which [the act] may rationally be connected is assignable
for it" and the action does not appear "excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned." Id. at 538 (internal quotes and citation
omitted).
The police behavior here was not reasonably related - indeed it
was entirely unrelated - to any legitimate law enforcement purpose.
Nothing the officers did served to enhance their own safety or the
safety of others, or to ensure the presence of plaintiff at trial. More-
over, it was hardly necessary to tie someone to a metal pole in a
deserted parking lot, for however brief a time, in order to effect a
transfer of custody. The officers' actions thus served no conceivable
law enforcement purpose, and the defendants in fact decline to justify
their behavior on that basis. Even a so-called prank that fails to serve
any "legitimate governmental objective" can constitute a due process
infraction. Id. at 539. Even if the officers' action here might be seen
as merely immature, it is not any less a constitutional violation.
Lastly, for Robles' rights to have been violated by this arbitrary
and purposeless act, he needs to have suffered more than a de minimis
injury. Riley, 115 F.3d at 1167. Robles testified that he felt frightened,
vulnerable, and humiliated when left alone and immobile in the dark
parking lot. He asserts that in the months following the incident he
had trouble sleeping and was scared to leave his home. Three corrob-
orating witnesses testified to an abrupt change in Robles' daily habits
____________________________________________________________
(U.S.). In that case, the Court found an Eighth Amendment violation
when a prison inmate was tied to a hitching post for extended periods of
time. That case involved a much lengthier detention under painful and
dangerous conditions amounting to cruel and unusual punishment. It is
therefore not dispositive of this claim.
7
immediately following the incident. The defendants respond that
"[b]eing upset or disappointed regarding how one is treated by a
police officer cannot amount to anything more than a de minimis
injury." They argue that their actions caused no more than minor anx-
iety which should not be compensable.
While Robles' injury certainly needs to be "something more than
trifling," Riley, 115 F.3d at 1167, "mental and emotional distress
caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is compensable
under § 1983." Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978). And while
a litany of subjective complaints may not be more than de minimis,
Riley, 115 F.3d at 1167-68, any reasonable person would have been
upset by what happened here. Robles was tied up in a dark and
deserted location in the middle of the night. He did not know when
or if anyone would come to rescue him or who might discover him.
The resulting injury was more than de minimis.
Because the officers' actions were not reasonably related to any
law enforcement purpose and Robles suffered more than a de minimis
injury as a result of these actions, Robles' Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process was violated.
C.
Even though the officers' actions deprived Robles of an actual con-
stitutional right, Rozar and DeBarros may still be entitled to qualified
immunity if that right was not clearly established at the time of the
incident. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. Police officers performing discre-
tionary acts "generally are granted a qualified immunity and are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." Id. (citations omit-
ted). Thus, liability in this case turns on what notice the PGC officers
had that their conduct violated federal constitutional law.
Robles contends that his rights under the Due Process Clause were
clearly established by Bell. He asserts that a "reasonably well trained
officer in the position of the defendants would have known that it was
unconstitutional to subject an individual to conditions amounting to
punishment." However, as the district court recognized, a greater
8
degree of specificity is required to overcome a defense of qualified
immunity. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). Without
such a requirement, "[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of
qualified immunity that [the] cases plainly establish into a rule of vir-
tually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely
abstract rights." Id.
Although notice does not require that the "very action in question
has previously been held unlawful," it does mean that "in the light of
pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Wilson, 526
U.S. at 615 (citation omitted). The cases cited by plaintiff on this
point are inapposite. They involve instances where detainees were
subject to physical abuse or prolonged and inhumane conditions of
detention. See Putnam v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1981) (plain-
tiffs handcuffed together and left in sitting position for 12 hours);
Fisher v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1982)
(plaintiff detained naked in view of members of the opposite sex);
Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1987)
(plaintiff tied to chair for an entire school day). Although the officers'
actions in this instance were foolish and unorthodox, it is also not
clear that at the time they acted they should have reasonably known
that their conduct violated Robles' constitutional rights.
The officers should have known, and indeed did know, that they
were acting inappropriately. But whether they understood their con-
duct violated clearly established federal law is an altogether different
question. The Constitution is not a "font of tort law" to be "superim-
posed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the
States." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). The officers' con-
duct violated police regulations as well as state law and was dealt
with under those provisions. But not every instance of inappropriate
behavior on the part of police rises to the level of a federal constitu-
tional violation. Going forward, officers are now on notice that the
type of Keystone Kop activity that degrades those subject to detention
and that lacks any conceivable law enforcement purpose implicates
federal due process guarantees. Going backward, however, and
imposing retrospective liability would eviscerate the requirement of
notice at the core of the qualified immunity defense.
9
III.
Robles next contends that the district court abused its discretion
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) when it reduced the jury's combined com-
pensatory and punitive damage awards of $647,000 and in the alterna-
tive ordered a new trial. Robles rejected the court's remittitur of
$240,000 and opted for a new trial where the jury awarded him
$40,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.
The decision as to whether damages are excessive and should be
subject to remittitur is "entrusted to the sound discretion of the district
court," and such determinations "will be reversed on appeal only upon
a showing of abuse of discretion." Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, 144 F.3d
294, 305 (4th Cir. 1998). In accordance with this standard, this Court
will "give the benefit of every doubt to the judgment of the trial
judge." Id. (internal citation omitted).
Although Robles asserts that the lower court "did not articulate any
meaningful reason for the reduction" in compensatory damages from
$150,000 to $80,000, the court in fact gave a number of reasons for
its decision. Those factors included the brevity of Robles' detention,
the absence of any physical abuse, and that, although Robles did suf-
fer from emotional distress, no medication or counseling was required
to resolve it. The record amply supports the district court's perspec-
tive. Plaintiff never made any claim for lost wages or medical treat-
ment in connection with this 10 minute incident, nor did he see any
type of doctor about it until three years later on the advice of his law-
yer. Finding the jury's award of $150,000 in compensatory damages
to be excessive lay within the discretion of the district judge.
With respect to the punitive award, Robles contends that the Court
erred in not considering the seven factors listed in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), for assessing the exces-
siveness of punitive awards. However, the Supreme Court in that case
was merely passing judgment on the sufficiency of the factors used
by Alabama courts to safeguard parties' rights, not prescribing a test
to be used by all courts. It is well established that remittitur should
be ordered when the jury award will "result in a miscarriage of jus-
tice." Cline, 144 F.3d at 306. Here, the same underlying factors which
led to the reduction of the compensatory award - the brevity of
10
detention, the total absence of any physical abuse, and the lack of any
treatable mental or emotional condition - also supported the district
court's view that "it would be a miscarriage of justice to impose puni-
tive damages higher than" $160,000. The lower court properly
assessed the punitive award against the Cline standard in finding the
$497,000 award to be excessive.
IV.
We next turn to Robles' claim that the lower court erred in refusing
to award attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Under The Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, "the court, in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs" of bringing a § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
We review the district court's denial of fees for abuse of discretion.
Johnson v. City of Aiken, 278 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2002).
In Johnson, the court considered the case of several plaintiffs who
recovered damages against an individual police officer and the City
of Aiken for an unlawful assault and vehicular search by city police
officers. Most of the plaintiffs' federal claims were dismissed on the
basis of qualified immunity, and they recovered only nominal dam-
ages of 35 cents on the sole surviving federal count. Id. at 336. Even
though plaintiffs received a substantial monetary award on their pen-
dent state law claim, the court found that they were not prevailing
parties entitled to collect attorney's fees under § 1988. Id. at 338.
Robles contends that he is entitled to an award of his attorney's
fees because he prevailed on his state law due process claim. But,
"plaintiffs who do not prevail on their federal claims but achieve suc-
cess on supplemental state law claims are not prevailing parties under
§ 1988, and are therefore not entitled to an award under that statute."
Id. at 336. Robles' Fourth Amendment and Due Process claims were
dismissed on summary judgment. His Monell claim was voluntarily
dismissed, and thus never addressed by the district court. Robles did
not prevail on any federal claims and the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying him attorney's fees.
V.
We now turn to the issues raised by defendants in their cross-
appeal. We first examine defendants' contention that the district court
11
should have dismissed Robles' state constitutional claims. We
believe, however, that the jury was entitled to find defendants violated
Robles' Article 24 right to due process under the Maryland Constitu-
tion.
Article 24 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
are construed as parallel with each other. Williams v. Prince George's
County, 685 A.2d 884, 895 (Md. App. 1996). Since officers Rozar
and DeBarros did violate Robles' due process right under the Four-
teenth Amendment, they likewise violated his state constitutional
right under Article 24. Robles' federal constitutional claim failed
because the officers were entitled to qualified immunity under federal
law. However, "[i]n Maryland, qualified immunity does not apply to
constitutional claims." Id. at 894. Thus, the jury was entitled to find
for Robles on his state due process claim.
VI.
Lastly, we examine defendants' assertion that punitive damages
should not have been allowed against either PGC or the individual
officers.
A.
Robles argues that punitive damages were properly allowed against
PGC. He asserts that the jury found the county liable on a theory of
respondeat superior for a malicious constitutional tort committed by
Rozar and DeBarros. While such an act may subject the officers to
liability for punitive damages, Maryland law disallows any such
assessment of punitive damages against a county. Section 5-303(c)(1)
of the Local Government Tort Claims Act clearly states that "[a] local
government may not be liable for punitive damages." Local Govern-
ment Tort Claims Act ("LGTCA"), Md. Cts & Jud. Proc. Art. § 5-
303(c)(1). Robles contends that the LGTCA applies not to "the Coun-
ty's liability for constitutional torts under the doctrine of respondeat
superior" but only to "its duty to indemnify its employees." The Act
was amended in 2001 however to make clear that "the total liability
of a local government, directly or otherwise, in an action arising from
tortious acts or omissions, may not exceed the limits" set by the
LGTCA. Md. Acts 2001, c. 286, §§ 2, 3. The amending language,
12
together with the explicit prohibition against the imposition of puni-
tive damages on local governments, requires that we reverse the dis-
trict court's determination that such damages should be allowed.
B.
While Maryland law shields local governments from liability for
punitive damages, a similar protection does not exist for individual
officers. Punitive damages are available against individuals upon a
showing of actual malice. Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 710 A.2d 267, 276
(Md. 1998). In Maryland, actual malice means a "sense of conscious
and deliberate wrongdoing, evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure,
ill will, or fraud." Id. (internal citation omitted). Although defendants
contend that Robles did not plead sufficient facts to support a show-
ing of actual malice, Robles alleges that "[t]he officers' conduct was
wanton and malicious" and that the officers openly "laughed and
joked" as they discussed the discomfort they were inflicting on him.
The officers clearly appreciated the wrongfulness of their actions, as
they attempted to disguise their voices while carrying out their plan
and stayed out of sight when the Montgomery police arrived. Addi-
tionally, Rozar and DeBarros have freely admitted that their motive
was unrelated to any legitimate law enforcement function but was
instead a misguided attempt to get back at the Montgomery police
officers for refusing to answer their call. Because these actions show
actual malice on the part of Rozar and DeBarros, punitive damages
against them were proper.
VII.
In this unfortunate case, the district court struck a fortunate bal-
ance. While plaintiff sought to push the case for far more than it was
worth, defendants seemed to believe that characterizing their actions
as adolescent somehow relieved them of all responsibility for them.
The district judge wisely let neither party have its way.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions to
modify the judgment by eliminating the punitive damages award
against the County.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
13