Filed August 10, 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 99-5527
YVONNE SHELTON,
Appellant
v.
UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE & DENTISTRY OF
NEW JERSEY; JOHN DOE OWNERS, (said name being
fictitious for various owners); MANNY MOE'S CORP, (said
name being fictitious); ABC PARTNERSHIPS, (same name
being fictitious)
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
D.C. Civil Action No. 97-cv-02689
(Honorable William G. Bassler)
Argued March 6, 2000
Before: SCIRICA, ALITO and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 10, 2000)
F. MICHAEL DAILY, JR., ESQUIRE
(ARGUED)
Quinlan, Dunne & Daily
16 North Centre Street
Merchantville, New Jersey
08109-2519
Attorney for Appellant
BARBARA A. BERRESKI, ESQUIRE
(ARGUED)
Office of Attorney General of
New Jersey, Division of Law
P.O. Box 112
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
Attorney for Appellee,
University of Medicine & Dentistry
of New Jersey
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
In this employment discrimination case, the issue on
appeal is whether a state hospital reasonably
accommodated the religious beliefs and practices of a staff
nurse who refused to participate in what she believed to be
abortions. The District Court held it had, and we agree. We
will affirm.
I. Background
Yvonne Shelton worked as a staff nurse in the Labor and
Delivery section of the Hospital at the University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey. The Hospital's Labor
and Delivery section provides patients with routine vaginal
and cesarean-section deliveries. The Labor and Delivery
section does not perform elective abortions.1 On occasion,
Labor and Delivery section patients require emergency
procedures that terminate their pregnancies. Labor and
Delivery section nurses are required to assist in emergency
procedures as part of their job responsibilities.
Shelton is a member of the Pentecostal faith; her faith
forbids her from participating "directly or indirectly in
ending a life." The proscription includes abortions of live
fetuses. Shelton claims she notified the Hospital in writing
_________________________________________________________________
1. The Hospital provides elective abortions on an outpatient basis.
2
about her religious beliefs when she first joined the
Hospital in 1989, and again in 1994. During this time, the
Hospital accommodated Shelton's religious beliefs by
allowing her to trade assignments with other nurses rather
than participate in emergency procedures involving what
Shelton considered to be abortions.
Two events precipitated Shelton's termination. In 1994,
Shelton refused to treat a patient. According to the
Hospital, the patient was pregnant and suffering from a
ruptured membrane (which the Hospital describes as a life-
threatening condition). Shelton learned the Hospital
planned to induce labor by giving the patient oxytocin.
Shelton refused to assist or participate.2
After the incident, Shelton's supervisor asked her to
provide a note from her pastor about her religious beliefs.
Instead, Shelton submitted her own note:
Before the foundations of the earth, God called me to
be Holy. For this cause I must be obedient to the word
of God. From his own mouth he said `Thou shalt not
kill.' Therefore, regardless of the situation, I will not
participate directly or indirectly in ending a life.. . .
In November 1995, Shelton refused to treat another
emergency patient. This patient--who was "standing in a
pool of blood"--was diagnosed with placenta previa. The
attending Labor and Delivery section physician determined
_________________________________________________________________
2. Shelton maintains that she "refused to participate in a procedure that
would end a life." But in support of its summary judgment motion, the
Hospital submitted a January 1996 letter it sent to Shelton
memorializing a discussion between Shelton and Veronica Anokute, the
Nurse Manager of the Labor and Delivery Section, about Shelton's
"previous refusal to participate in the use of oxytocin on a preterm
pregnancy patient because it was in violation of[her] religious beliefs."
In this circuit, hearsay statements can be considered on a motion for
summary judgment if they are capable of admission at trial. See
Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., Inc. , 63 F.3d 1267, 1275
n.17 (3d Cir. 1995). The District Court apparently accepted this proof of
the oxytocin incident. See Shelton v. University of Med. and Dentistry, et
al., No. 97-CIV-2689, 1999 WL 706160, at *1 (D.N.J. June 15, 1999).
Although we see no error in the court's determination, we rely only on
Shelton's admission that she refused to treat the patient.
3
the situation was life-threatening and ordered an
emergency cesarean-section delivery.3 When Shelton arrived
for her shift, she was told to "scrub in" on the procedure.
Because the procedure would terminate the pregnancy,
Shelton refused to assist or participate. Eventually, another
nurse took her place. The Hospital claims Shelton's refusal
to assist delayed the emergency procedure for thirty
minutes.
Two months later, the Hospital informed Shelton she
could no longer work in the Labor and Delivery section
because of her refusal to assist in "medical procedures
necessary to save the life of the mother and/or child." The
Hospital claimed that staffing cuts prevented it from
allowing Shelton to continue to trade assignments when
situations arose she considered would lead to an abortion.
The Hospital believed Shelton's refusals to assist risked
patients' safety.
But the Hospital did not terminate Shelton. Instead, it
offered her a lateral transfer to a staff nurse position in the
Newborn Intensive Care Unit ("Newborn ICU"). The Hospital
also invited Shelton to contact its Human Resources
Department, which would help her identify other available
nursing positions.
Shelton undertook her own investigation of the Newborn
ICU position. She claims she spoke with a nurse (whose
name she does not remember) in that unit, who said that
"extremely compromised" infants who were not expected to
survive would be "set aside" and allowed to die. Shelton did
not attempt to confirm this information with the Hospital.
Nor did she contact the Human Resources Department to
investigate other available positions. Shelton claims she
believed no other positions would be available.
_________________________________________________________________
3. The attending Labor and Delivery section physician considered the
procedure to be an emergency hysterotomy/hysterectomy. After the
incident, the physician submitted a memorandum in which she
explained that the patient was 18 weeks pregnant, had experienced
periods of bleeding during the pregnancy, and had a complete placenta
previa--a condition in which the fetus's placenta completely covers the
mother's cervix, risking blood loss.
4
The Hospital gave Shelton thirty days to accept the
position in Newborn ICU, or to apply for another nursing
position. Shelton did neither. Instead, on the thirtieth day,
she wrote to her supervisor:
. . . The ultimatum given me however, doesn't align
with the response I am unctioned to submit. The
decision is not ours to make but the Lords'. The Living
God is in control of that which concerns my life and
job. "Many are the plans in a mans heart but it's Gods
plan/purpose that will prevail."
On February 15, 1996, the Hospital terminated Shelton.
II. Proceedings
Shelton sued, claiming violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et seq. (Count I), the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5 et seq.
(Count II), and the First Amendment (Count III). The
District Court granted summary judgment for the Hospital
on Shelton's federal claims, concluding the Hospital
reasonably accommodated Shelton by offering to transfer
her to the Newborn ICU and by inviting her to work with its
Human Resources Department to identify other available
positions. The court declined to continue jurisdiction over
Shelton's state law claims. Shelton appealed, claiming the
District Court erred by ignoring material issues of fact and
by failing to consider the New Jersey Conscience Statute,
N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:65A-1, A-2, A-3 (West 1987).
We have jurisdiction over Shelton's appeal under 28
U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of a summary judgment is
plenary. We view all evidence and draw all inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movant,
affirming if no reasonable jury could find for the non-
movant. See Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West
Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1999).
III. Discussion
A. The Title VII Religious Discrimination Claim
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires employers
5
to make reasonable accommodations for their employees'
religious beliefs and practices, unless doing so would result
in "undue hardship" to the employer. 42 U.S.C.SS 2000e-
2(a)(1),4 2000e(j)5 (1982). To establish a prima facie case,
the employee must show:
1. she holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts
with a job requirement;
2. she informed her employer of the conflict; and
3. she was disciplined for failing to comply with the
conflicting requirement.
See Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 133-
34 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). If the employee
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to show that it made good faith efforts to
accommodate, or that the requested accommodation would
work an undue hardship. See United States v. Board of
Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1990) (no Title VII
violation; allowing Muslim teacher to wear religious garb
while teaching, thereby violating state criminal statute,
would impose undue hardship on school district); Getz v.
Pennsylvania, 802 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1986) (no Title VII
violation; employee failed to establish prima facie case
where Commonwealth allowed her to take religious holidays
with pay, but did not allow her to work overtime to earn
extra vacation time).
The approach employed in Protos and Getz is similar to
that employed by many of our sister courts of appeals. See,
e.g., Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 273
(5th Cir. 2000); Wilson v. U.S. West Comm., 58 F.3d 1337,
1340 (8th Cir. 1995); Beadle v. Hillsborough Co. Sheriff 's
_________________________________________________________________
4. It is an unlawful employment practice to "discharge . . . or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of . . . religion."
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
5. "The term `religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate an employee's . . . religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e(j) (1982).
6
Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 592, 592 n.5 (11th Cir. 1994); Heller v.
EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993); EEOC v.
Arlington Transit Mix, Inc., 957 F.2d 219, 221-22 (6th Cir.
1991). Nonetheless, we are mindful that the Supreme Court
has declined to accept or reject any particular prima facie
case or burden-shifting approach to Title VII religious
accommodation cases. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986). In Philbrook, the Court
reviewed a Title VII religious discrimination case in which
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had applied a
prima facie case test virtually identical to that we now
apply (and previously applied in Protos and Getz, both
decided shortly before Philbrook). The Court of Appeals had
held the employee established his prima facie case. See id.
at 66. Then, assuming without discussion the employer's
policy constituted a reasonable accommodation, the court
held that where the employer and employee both propose a
reasonable accommodation, the employer must accept the
employee's proposal unless doing so works an undue
hardship. See id. On this latter point the Supreme Court
reversed, commenting that it found "no basis in either the
statute or its legislative history for requiring an employer to
choose any particular reasonable accommodation." Id. at
68. The Court specifically declined to "establish for religious
accommodation claims a proof scheme analogous to that
developed in other Title VII contexts, delineating the
plaintiff 's prima facie case and shifting production
burdens." Id. at 67. The Court reasoned that because the
matter had been tried on the merits, the prima facie case
issue was not before it. See id. at 67-68. Thus, absent
further guidance from the Supreme Court, we will continue
to apply the prima facie test and burden-shifting approach
used in Protos and Getz.
1. Shelton's Prima Facie Case
The District Court held Shelton established a prima facie
case. We agree. There is no dispute that Shelton's religious
beliefs are sincere, and that the Hospital ultimately
terminated Shelton. Although the parties dispute when
Shelton first notified the Hospital she would not participate
in abortions (Shelton claims she notified the Hospital when
7
she commenced work), they do not dispute the Hospital
was on notice by at least 1994. Although the Hospital
claims Shelton failed to establish notice because she never
provided the requested note from her pastor, we disagree.
Under the facts presented, Shelton provided sufficient
notice.
2. The Burden Shifts: The Hospital Must Establish
A Reasonable Accommodation, or Undue
Hardship
Because Shelton established her prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the Hospital to show either that it offered
Shelton a reasonable accommodation, or that it could not
do so because of a resulting undue hardship. See United
States v. Board of Educ., 911 F.2d at 886-87. The Hospital
claims it satisfied the former.
Title VII does not define what is a "reasonable
accommodation." But the Supreme Court in Philbrook made
clear what it need not be: a sufficient religious
accommodation need not be the "most" reasonable one (in
the employee's view), it need not be the one the employee
suggests or prefers, and it need not be the one that least
burdens the employee. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68-69. In
short, the employer satisfies its Title VII religious
accommodation obligation when it offers any reasonable
accommodation. See id.
On this point, Philbrook provides some guidance.
Philbrook was a high school teacher whose union
agreement allowed him to take three "religious days" a year.
"Religious days" were not charged against paid personal
leave, but paid leave could not be used for extra religious
days. See id. at 63-64. Philbrook's religious practices
caused him to miss approximately six school days a year.
See id. at 62-63. To resolve the issue, Philbrook proposed
that he be allowed either to take additional unpaid personal
leave, or to pay for a substitute teacher (and receive his
own full pay for the day). See id. at 64-65. The school
district declined. The district court held Philbrook failed to
prove any religious discrimination. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding when an
8
employer and employee both propose reasonable
accommodations, the employee's must be accepted unless
shown to work an undue hardship. See id. at 65-66. The
Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the view that an
employer must adopt any particular proposed
accommodation: "[W]here the employer has already
reasonably accommodated the employee's religious needs,
the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not
further show that each of the employee's alternative
accommodations would result in undue hardship." Id. at
68. As to whether the school district's policy in fact
constituted a reasonable accommodation, the Court
remanded. See id. at 70-71. The Court explained that
although the school district's policy seemed to be
reasonable--because it eliminated the religious conflict--it
would not be so if interpreted to allow paid leave for all
purposes except religious ones. See id. at 71. Further fact-
finding was ordered. See id. at 70.
Against this background we analyze the Hospital's
proffered accommodations.
a. The Hospital's Offer to Transfer Shelton to the
Newborn ICU Position
Shelton argues there is a fact issue whether the Hospital
reasonably accommodated her by offering a transfer to the
Newborn ICU. The core of her argument6 is that the
transfer would not have resolved the religious conflict; in
the Newborn ICU she would again be asked to undertake
religiously untenable nursing actions (or inactions).7 The
_________________________________________________________________
6. If we address the conflict as Shelton has primarily characterized it--
her inability to participate in abortions of live fetuses--the inquiry ends,
for Shelton does not dispute that the Newborn ICU does not perform
abortions. But in at least one letter to the Hospital Shelton identified the
conflict as her inability to "participate in ending a life." Therefore, we will
proceed with the analysis.
7. Shelton's assertion is based on inadmissible hearsay and speculation.
As noted, hearsay statements can be considered on a motion for
summary judgment only if they are capable of admission at trial. See
Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., 63 F.3d at 1275 n.17. In this
case, the record demonstrates that the "evidence" on this point was of
doubtful admissibility, because Shelton testified she could not identify
the nurse to whom she spoke.
9
Hospital countered Shelton's claim with testimony that
infants in Newborn ICU are not denied medical treatment.
Carolyn Franklin, the Hospital's Director of Patient Care
Services, testified that she had no knowledge that any baby
in Newborn ICU had been taken off of life support, or
denied nourishment. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
if Shelton worked in the unit, she would be asked to deny
care to any infant. Indeed, Shelton admitted that her
conclusion about what she might be asked to do in the
Newborn ICU was self-drawn.
In sum, Shelton has not established she would face a
religious conflict in the Newborn ICU. The Hospital's offer of
a lateral transfer to that unit thus constituted a reasonable
accommodation. See, e.g., Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers,
911 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1990) (offer of lateral job transfer
constituted reasonable accommodation under state
religious discrimination law akin to Title VII; summary
judgment affirmed). Cf. Heller, 8 F.3d 1433 (employer failed
to offer reasonable accommodation where after it rescinded
previously-granted permission for employee to take day off
to attend his wife's conversion ceremony, it thereafter made
no further accommodation effort before firing him).
b. The Hospital's Invitation to Shelton to Meet
with the Human Resources Department to
Identify Other Available Positions
In another attempt to accommodate Shelton's religious
conflict, the Hospital invited Shelton to meet with its
Human Resources Department to discuss other available
nursing positions. Once the Hospital initiated discussions
with that proposal, Shelton had a duty to cooperate in
determining whether the proposal was a reasonable one.
See, e.g., Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68-69 (employer-employee
cooperation is consistent with Congress's goal offlexibility
in the search for a reasonable accommodation; ". . . courts
have noted that `bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the
search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the
employee's religion and the exigencies of the employer's
business' " (quoting Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671
F.2d 141, 145-46 (5th Cir. 1982)). By refusing to meet with
Human Resources to investigate available positions,
10
Shelton failed to satisfy her duty. See, e.g., Beadle v.
Hillsborough Co. Sheriff 's Dep't, 29 F.3d at 593 (employee
did not make good faith attempt to accommodate his
religious needs through employer's proffered means;
employee declined employer's offer to announce need for
shift swap during roll call or on departmental bulletin
board); Brener, 671 F.2d at 145-46 (no Title VII violation
where employee did not fully explore employer's proposed
religious accommodation).
Shelton does not dispute that at the relevant time, staff
nursing positions may have been available in other
departments.8 But she claims her duty to cooperate in
finding an accommodation never arose because a transfer
to any other department was not a viable option. Not
surprisingly, she does not base this claim on any religious
conflict. Instead, she claims a transfer to any other
department would have required her to "give up eight years
of specialized training and education," and to undertake
retraining.
The District Court found unconvincing Shelton's claim
that a transfer to another staff nurse position would require
her to "give up" all of her years of training and education.
We agree. Shelton has not come forward with any evidence
that a lateral transfer would have affected her salary or
benefits. Indeed, Shelton testified that she did not pursue
a meeting with Human Resources to identify other lateral
transfers because she believed positions were not available.9
She never expressed a concern that she would be forced to
accept a lower salary or benefits. Instead, conceding that a
lateral transfer "may have resulted in no immediate
economic impact," Shelton offered only the generic
_________________________________________________________________
8. The record refers to positions in the Pulmonary and Research
Departments. Because the parties provided us only with excerpts of the
relevant deposition, and failed to identify the deponent, we are unable to
assess further this aspect of the claim.
9. Shelton testified that she did not pursue the proposed meeting with
Human Resources because, in her view, the Hospital had undergone two
layoff periods, a third was "in the wind," and she "didn't see there would
be any positions there . . . [and] the likelihood of [her] having a position
in the hospital was nil."
11
speculation that lateral transfers may result in"long-term
economic consequences as to the employee's career
prospects." Such speculation is insufficient to raise a fact
issue precluding summary judgment.
Although there is evidence that Shelton likely would have
to undergo some retraining if she took a position outside of
the Labor and Delivery section, there is no evidence that
she would lose pay or benefits by accepting a new staff
nurse position. On this point, the Hospital's Nursing
Manager, Edyth Stroud, testified that although a staff
nurse who transferred to another nursing unit would need
some training, the relocation would not be burdensome. We
agree with the District Court that there was no evidence in
this case that a lateral transfer would be unreasonable or
burdensome.
In sum, Shelton's refusal to cooperate in attempting to
find an acceptable religious accommodation was
unjustified. Her unwillingness to pursue an acceptable
alternative nursing position undermines the cooperative
approach to religious accommodation issues that Congress
intended to foster.
In a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, a police officer refused, on religious
grounds, to protect employees of an abortion clinic. See
Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998).
The officer--Rodriguez--asked to be exempted from further
assignments to guard an abortion clinic from protestors.
Although the police department declined formally to exempt
him, it did allow informal accommodations: Rodriguez's
captain avoided assigning him to clinic duty, and Rodriguez
took vacation time on the days when clinic patrol was most
likely to be assigned. See id. at 773-774. Eventually,
Rodriguez was assigned to clinic patrol. When he again
requested exemption, the on-duty sergeant told him he
could not refuse an assignment. Rodriguez took the
assignment under protest, then sued under Title VII. The
district court granted the police department's motion for
summary judgment. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, holding the police department had
reasonably accommodated Rodriguez by providing him the
opportunity, through a collective bargaining agreement, to
12
transfer to another district, at the same pay and benefit
levels. See id. at 775. The accommodation was not
unreasonable simply because it would have required
Rodriguez to forfeit the right to stay in his district of choice.
It would seem unremarkable that public protectors such
as police and firefighters must be neutral in providing their
services. We would include public health care providers
among such public protectors. Although we do not interpret
Title VII to require a presumption of undue burden, we
believe public trust and confidence requires that a public
hospital's health care practitioners--with professional
ethical obligations to care for the sick and injured--will
provide treatment in time of emergency.
Shelton refused the Hospital's efforts to accommodate her
religious beliefs and practices. Having done so, she cannot
successfully challenge those efforts as legally inadequate.
B. The New Jersey Conscience Statute
Shelton contends her refusals to participate in certain
procedures were protected in the first instance by the New
Jersey Conscience Statute. That statute provides in part:
A-1. No person shall be required to perform or assist
in the performance of an abortion or sterilization.
. . .
A-3. The refusal to perform, assist in the performance
of, or provide abortion services or sterilization
procedures shall not constitute grounds for civil or
criminal liability, disciplinary action or discriminatory
treatment.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:65A-1, A-2, A-3 (West 1987). Shelton
claims the Hospital's actions violated the Conscience
Statute. But Shelton did not plead that claim in her
complaint.10 Accordingly, that issue was not before the
_________________________________________________________________
10. Although Shelton points out that in her brief opposing summary
judgment she discussed the statute and its "effect," she cannot
circumvent her failure to plead the alleged statutory violation in the first
instance (or to thereafter have sought to do so), especially where she
appears to have argued only that the statute was to be given effect "in
claims based upon" the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. Under
the circumstances, we believe Shelton waived the issue
13
District Court (which made no mention of the statute in its
Opinion), and is not now before us.11
C. First Amendment Claim
Shelton also alleges the Hospital violated Shelton's First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion by engaging in
improper viewpoint discrimination. Specifically, she claims
the Hospital fired her because its viewpoint on abortion
conflicted with hers. In support of this argument Shelton
cites Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia,
515 U.S. 819 (1995). We fail to see how Rosenberger--or
Shelton's viewpoint argument--applies here. Rosenberger
dealt with whether a public university violated students'
First Amendment free speech rights by providing funds to
non-religious student publications, but denying funds to a
religious publication. The alleged viewpoint discrimination
comprised the university's different treatment of two
student publications that espoused different views. Here,
Shelton has not attempted to establish that the Hospital
treated her differently from any other staff nurse who
refused to participate in procedures. Nor does it appear
that she could, for the evidence was to the contrary: one of
the Hospital's representatives12 testified that when nurses
developed sensitivities to latex gloves and could not perform
work in their unit, the Hospital "was able to accommodate
some of those situations." Thus, it appears that the
Hospital has dealt consistently with nurses who could not
or would not refuse to perform their nursing duties,
regardless of reason.
In sum, Shelton has failed to establish that the Hospital
was anything but neutral with respect to religion. Thus we
_________________________________________________________________
11. Even had Shelton properly pled the statutory violation, it appears
doubtful from the record that she could have established her claim,
given the evidence that her termination was caused by her refusals to
cooperate with the Hospital. We note, but do not reach, the broader
issue of whether the Statute applies to the Hospital in view of the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Assoc., Inc.,
366 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1976) (Conscience Statute does not apply to
defendant non-sectarian non-profit hospital, which Court considered to
be a quasi-public institution).
12. The parties did not identify the deponent.
14
see no error in the District Court's grant of summary
judgment to the Hospital on Shelton's First Amendment
claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
15