• View enhanced case on Westlaw
  • KeyCite this case on Westlaw
  • http://laws.findlaw.com/3rd/995184.html
    Filed September 7, 2000
    
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    
    No. 99-5184
    
    ALBERT ORAN; TERRY ADOLPHS; PHILIP MORRIS;
    JAMES DOYLE LUPO; PAUL H. MAURER, individually and
    on behalf of a class of others similarly situated,
           Appellants
    
    v.
    
    JOHN R. STAFFORD; ROBERT G. BLOUNT; JOSEPH J.
    CARR; LOUIS L. HOYNES, JR.; WILLIAM J. MURRAY;
    DAVID M. OLIVIER; JOHN R. CONSIDINE;
    PAUL J. JONES; FRED HASSAN; AMERICAN HOME
    PRODUCTS CORPORATION
    
    ON APPEAL FROM THE
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
    
    (Dist. Court No. 97-cv-04513)
    District Court Judge: Nicholas H. Politan
    
    Argued: February 29, 2000
    
    Before: ALITO and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges, and
    POLLAK, District Judge.*
    
    (Opinion Filed: September 7, 2000)
    
    
    
    _________________________________________________________________
    * The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United States
    District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
    designation.
    
    
           MARIAN P. ROSNER (Argued)
           MICHAEL A. SCHWARTZ
           Wolf Popper LLP
           845 Third Avenue
           New York, NY 10022
    
           ALLYN Z. LITE
           JOSEPH J. DEPALMA
           Lite DePalma Greenberg &
            Rivas, LLC
           Two Gateway Center - 12th Floor
           Newark, NJ 07102
    
           Counsel for Appellants
    
           ANTHONY F. PHILLIPS (Argued)
           ELIZABETH S. STRONG
           Willkie Farr & Gallagher
           787 Seventh Avenue
           New York, NY 10019
    
           DONALD A. ROBINSON
           Robinson, Lapidus & Livelli
           Two Penn Plaza East
           Newark, NJ 07105
    
           Counsel for Appellees
    
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    
    ALITO, Circuit Judge:
    
    Plaintiffs brought this securities class action against
    American Home Products Corporation ("AHP") and certain
    of its directors and officers1 after AHP, in response to
    _________________________________________________________________
    
    1. The individual defendants are: (1) John R. Stafford, AHP's Chief
    Executive Officer and President, and Chairman of its Board of Directors;
    (2) Robert J. Blount, a Senior Executive Vice President and Director; (3)
    Joseph J. Carr, a Senior Vice President; (4) Louis L. Hoynes, Jr., General
    Counsel and Senior Vice President; (5) William J. Murray, a Senior Vice
    President; (6) John R. Considine, Vice President of Finance; (7) Paul J.
    Jones, Comptroller and Vice President; and (8) Fred Hassan, a senior
    executive and Director.
    
                                    2
    
    
    reports of serious medical side effects, withdrew its
    prescription weight-loss drugs Pondimin and Redux from
    the market. Stockholder plaintiffs allege that AHP made
    material misrepresentations and omissions regarding the
    safety of the drugs while failing to disclose several studies
    linking the drugs to heart-valve damage. As a result,
    plaintiffs claim, they suffered substantial financial loss
    when AHP's stock prices dropped following public
    disclosure of the withheld information. The District Court
    dismissed all claims on the pleadings for failure to state a
    claim, and we affirm.
    
    I.
    
    Because this is an appeal from the District Court's grant
    of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we accept as
    true all allegations in the complaint and draw all
    reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. See
    Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Portlight, Inc., 188 F.3d 93, 94
    (3d Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs' complaint sets forth the following
    facts.
    
    A. The Heart Valve Reports.
    
    Defendant American Home Products Corporation ("AHP"),
    a Delaware corporation headquartered in New Jersey, is
    engaged in the research, development, manufacture and
    marketing of prescription and over-the-counter
    medications. During the period relevant to this litigation,
    AHP marketed the weight-loss drugs Pondimin
    (fenfluramine) and Redux (dexfenfluramine). Pondimin was
    marketed together with another drug, phentermine, in a
    combination popularly known as "fen-phen." Pondimin was
    approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 1973.
    Redux was recommended for approval by an FDA Advisory
    Committee in November 1995 and approved by the FDA in
    1996.
    
    In February 1994, AHP learned that a Belgian
    cardiologist had documented leaky heart valves in seven
    patients who had been taking diet pills containing
    Pondimin and Redux. By the time the FDA Advisory
    Committee voted to approve Redux in November 1995, AHP
    
                                    3
    
    
    knew of at least 31 cases of heart valve abnormalities in
    European diet-pill users, but had informed the FDA about
    only eight of those cases. During the same time period, AHP
    also received hundreds of adverse reaction reports of
    patients displaying symptoms often associated with heart
    and lung problems. AHP represented to the FDA that these
    symptoms were reactions to the drugs and were not caused
    by any underlying heart condition.
    
    In March 1997, AHP representatives met separately with
    cardiologists from the Mayo Clinic and MeritCare Health
    Systems, who informed AHP that they had documented
    heart-valve abnormalities in a total of 17 fen-phen users.
    Dr. Heidi Connolly, the Mayo cardiologist, informed AHP
    that she had never seen this type of valve damage except in
    patients with rare cancers or in those who had taken
    ergotamine, a migraine drug that, like Redux and
    Pondimin, affects the body's serotonin level. Although AHP
    continued to investigate the Mayo data throughout 1997, it
    did not immediately release the reports to the public.
    
    The Mayo data, which by that time included 24 reports of
    heart-valve abnormalities in fen-phen users, wasfinally
    disclosed to the public on July 8, 1997. On that date, AHP,
    Mayo, MeritCare and the FDA each made a public
    announcement concerning the reports. The Mayo
    announcement noted that the information "raise[d]
    significant concern that this combination of appetite
    suppressants has important implications regarding valvular
    disease." (App. 52-53.) AHP's announcement similarly
    stated that the company was investigating "the potential
    association of valvular heart disorders with the combination
    use of [fen-phen]." (App. 56.) The Mayo, FDA, and AHP
    announcements, however, all emphasized that there was no
    conclusive evidence establishing a causal relationship
    between fen-phen and heart valve disorders and that
    further study was needed before such a link could be
    confirmed. Following these announcements, there was no
    decline in the New York Stock Exchange price of AHP
    common stock.
    
    B. The Withdrawal of Redux and Pondimin
    
    On September 12, 1997, the FDA informed AHP of a
    survey showing that 92 of 291 fen-phen users had
    
                                    4
    
    
    developed heart-valve abnormalities. The next business
    day, September 15, 1997, AHP announced that it was
    withdrawing Pondimin and Redux from the market. The
    same day, AHP issued a press release estimating total lost
    profits of 14 cents per share for 1997 and 1998 as a result
    of lost sales of the two drugs, as well as a one-time product
    withdrawal loss of $200 million to $300 million. On
    September 15, the day of the withdrawal announcement,
    the closing price of AHP common stock fell 3 11/16 points,
    to 73 1/4.
    
    On September 16, 1997, a Wall Street Journal article
    reported that AHP "face[s] lawsuits, including one seeking
    class-action status, from people who claim to have been
    harmed by the drugs. American Home says it is likely it will
    face legal action." (App. 103.) Nevertheless, AHP's stock
    rose slightly for the day. On September 17, 1997, articles in
    the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times reported
    that AHP had known about possible heart-valve
    abnormalities since at least March 1997, and that the
    company faced substantial personal injury liability
    exposure. That day, AHP stock suffered a 4 1/4 point
    decline, to close at 69 15/16.
    
    C. AHP's Public Statements During the Class Period.
    
    Plaintiffs allege that from March 1, 1997, through
    September 16, 1997 (the "Class Period"), AHP made
    material misrepresentations and omissions regarding the
    safety of Pondimin and Redux, as well as AHP's knowledge
    of the heart-valve reports. For example, on March 27, 1997,
    AHP issued its Annual Report, which contained a statement
    that "Redux, the first prescription weight-loss drug to be
    cleared by the FDA in more than 20 years, was one of the
    most successful drug launches ever." (App. 47.) The report
    contained no reference to either the European or the Mayo
    data. On April 21, 1997, AHP issued a press release
    addressing newspaper reports of a death that had been
    mistakenly attributed to Redux by an FDA official. The
    press release noted that "[s]cientific evidence has shown
    Redux to be safe and effective when used as indicated."
    (App. 50.) In addition, in various releases listing Redux and
    
                                    5
    
    
    Pondimin's side effects, AHP omitted any mention of heart-
    valve damage.
    
    Plaintiffs also contend that, following the public
    disclosure of the Mayo data on July 8, 1997, AHP issued
    further misleading statements that were designed to
    minimize the impact of that data. Although AHP's
    statements to the public discussed "a possible serious heart
    valve disorder" and "an unusual type of serious regurgitant
    valvular heart disease," AHP failed to disclose that it had
    been aware of the Mayo data since March 1997, and of the
    European data since early 1995. (App. 57.) According to
    plaintiffs, this omission served to materially mislead
    investors as to AHP's potential exposure to damages from
    products liability litigation arising out of the two drugs.
    
    D. Stock Sales By Individual Defendants.
    
    In the period between the March meeting with Mayo and
    the end of the Class Period, seven of the individual
    defendants sold a total of $40 million of AHP stock,
    resulting in profits of $25 million. Plaintiffs allege that
    these sales were consciously designed to take advantage of
    AHP's artificially-inflated stock price prior to public
    disclosure of the heart-valve data.
    
    E. The District Court Decision.
    
    Plaintiffs filed this securities class action in federal court
    on September 18, 1997, alleging that defendants violated
    Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
    1934, 15 U.S.C. SS 78j(b) and 78t(a), as well as Rule 10b-5,
    17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5. On January 30, 1998, the plaintiffs
    filed an Amended Class Action Complaint (the "Amended
    Complaint"). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint,
    and the District Court granted their motion in its entirety
    without leave for plaintiffs to amend further. See Oran v.
    Stafford, 34 F. Supp. 2d 906 (D.N.J. 1999).
    
    Finding that plaintiffs had failed to plead any material
    misstatement or omission under federal securities law, the
    court noted that on July 8, 1997--halfway through the
    Class Period--there had been full disclosure of the Mayo
    
                                    6
    
    
    data without any appreciable effect on AHP's stock price. As
    a result, the court concluded, "the medical data disclosed
    by AHP on July 8, 1997 was immaterial as a matter of law."
    Id. at 911. The court also held that disclosure of the
    European data and earlier adverse reaction reports would
    not have materially altered the substance of the July 8
    release. In addition, the court held that AHP's failure to
    disclose when it had first learned of the adverse health data
    was not a material omission. As to the individual
    defendants, the District Court held that the Amended
    Complaint was not pled with sufficient particularity to give
    rise to the necessary strong inference of scienter required
    under the PSLRA. Plaintiffs appealed.
    
    II.
    
    Plaintiffs raise four arguments on appeal. First, they
    claim that the District Court erred in holding that AHP's
    misstatements and omissions were not material as a matter
    of law. Second, they argue that AHP violated SEC
    Regulation S-K, Item 303(a), which requires disclosure of
    "known trends and uncertainties," and that such a violation
    can support a claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities
    Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Third, plaintiffs maintain
    that the District Court erred by holding that the claims
    against AHP's insiders were not stated with sufficient
    particularity to satisfy the heightened pleading
    requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the
    Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 15
    U.S.C. S 78u-4 et seq. Finally, plaintiffs claim that the
    District Court should have granted leave to amend in order
    to remedy any deficiencies in the Amended Complaint. We
    address these contentions in turn.2
    _________________________________________________________________
    
    2. We exercise plenary review over the District Court's dismissal of the
    Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, accepting plaintiffs'
    factual allegations as true. See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d
    696, 707 (3d Cir. 1996). We also have plenary review over the District
    Court's interpretation of the federal securities laws. See Shapiro v. UJB
    Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1992). We review the District
    Court's denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See In re
    Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1417 (3d Cir. 1997).
    
                                    7
    
    
    A.
    
    To state a valid securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5,
    a plaintiff must first establish that defendant, in connection
    with the purchase or sale of a security, "made a materially
    false or misleading statement or omitted to state a material
    fact necessary to make a statement not misleading." See In
    re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1417
    (3d Cir. 1997). The plaintiff must additionally establish that
    the defendant acted with scienter and that plaintiff 's
    reasonable reliance on defendant's misstatement
    proximately caused him injury. See In re Phillips Petroleum
    Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989).
    
    The District Court held that the misrepresentations pled
    by the plaintiffs were immaterial as a matter of law, and we
    begin by addressing this issue. Plaintiffs maintain that they
    pled several material misrepresentations and omissions,
    namely: (1) that AHP failed to disclose the Mayo data prior
    to June 8, 1997, and issued misleading statements
    minimizing the import of that data following disclosure; (2)
    that AHP failed to disclose the European data and adverse
    reaction reports, even after the Mayo data became public;
    (3) that AHP misled investors by publicizing the fact of
    Redux's FDA approval without disclosing that it had
    withheld much of the European data from the FDA; and (4)
    that AHP failed to disclose when it had first learned about
    the European data, the adverse reaction reports, or the
    Mayo data. Before we address these alleged omissions and
    misrepresentations in detail, we briefly review this Circuit's
    explication of the materiality standard.
    
    Material information is "information that would be
    important to a reasonable investor in making his or her
    investment decision." Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425.
    Generally, undisclosed information is considered material if
    "there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure would
    have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
    `significantly altered the "total mix" of information' available
    to that investor." See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d
    696, 714 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting T.S.C. Indus., Inc. v.
    Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
    
    In Burlington, however, this Court fashioned a special
    rule for measuring materiality in the context of an efficient
    
                                    8
    
    
    securities market. This rule was shaped by the basic
    economic insight that in an open and developed securities
    market like the New York Stock Exchange, the price of a
    company's stock is determined by all available material
    information regarding the company and its business. In
    such an efficient market, "information important to
    reasonable investors . . . is immediately incorporated into
    the stock price." Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425. As a result,
    when a stock is traded in an efficient market, the
    materiality of disclosed information may be measured post
    hoc by looking to the movement, in the period immediately
    following disclosure, of the price of the firm's stock.
    Because in an efficient market "the concept of materiality
    translates into information that alters the price of the firm's
    stock," if a company's disclosure of information has no
    effect on stock prices, "it follows that the information
    disclosed . . . was immaterial as a matter of law."
    Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425.
    
    With these standards in mind, we turn to plaintiffs'
    specific allegations of material misrepresentation.
    
    1.
    
    AHP first learned of the Mayo data suggesting a link
    between fen-phen and heart-valve disorders in March 1997.
    It did not, however, release this data to the public until
    July 8, 1997. The District Court concluded that AHP's
    failure to disclose this data prior to July 8 was not a
    material omission, and we agree.
    
    Because the Mayo data was actually disclosed on July 8,
    we apply Burlington and look to the movement in the price
    of AHP's stock following disclosure to determine if the
    information was material.3 As the District Court noted, the
    July 8 disclosure had no appreciable negative effect on the
    company's stock price; in fact, AHP's share price rose by
    $3.00 during the four days after the Mayo disclosure.
    Under Burlington's market test, this price stability is
    dispositive of the question of materiality.
    _________________________________________________________________
    
    3. Plaintiffs allege that "the market for AHP common stock was an
    efficient market." Amended Complaint, para. 38. (App. 12.)
    
                                    9
    
    
    Plaintiffs counter, however, that this lack of adverse price
    movement may be traceable to defendant's own "spinning"
    of the Mayo data--which, plaintiffs maintain, itself
    constituted a material misrepresentation. Plaintiffs argue,
    in effect, that had AHP not deceptively downplayed the
    significance of the Mayo data through its sanguine and
    allegedly misleading statements, investors would have
    realized the import of the information, and share prices
    would have tumbled following the June 8 announcement.
    
    We reject this argument, and agree with the District
    Court that AHP's so-called "spinning" of the Mayo data was
    not materially misleading. AHP, in its public statements,
    did characterize the Mayo data as "limited and therefore
    inconclusive," and emphasized that "additional scientific
    investigation must be conducted before any possible link
    can be confirmed." (App. 56.) There is, however, nothing in
    these statements that could reasonably be characterized as
    inaccurate. The FDA's own June 8 press release confirmed
    that "[p]resently there is no conclusive evidence
    establishing a causal relationship between [Pondimin and
    Redux] and valvular heart disease." (App. 54.) Mayo's public
    statement that same day was similarly ambivalent:"We
    believe these cases raise significant concern that this
    combination of appetite suppressants has important
    implications regarding valvular heart disease. But more
    comprehensive study is needed to confirm the associations."
    (App. 52-53) (emphasis added).
    
    These third-party statements support the District Court's
    conclusion that AHP's characterization of the Mayo data as
    "inconclusive" was neither false nor misleading. Plaintiffs do
    not allege that, when AHP made its statements on June 8
    and afterward, there was any conclusive medical evidence
    linking its products to heart valve disorders. From the face
    of the Amended Complaint, then, it is clear that AHP's
    characterization of the Mayo data cannot serve as the basis
    for liability under the federal securities laws.
    
    2.
    
    Plaintiffs next argue that AHP's statements regarding the
    Mayo data must be viewed in light of the company's failure
    
                                    10
    
    
    to disclose the European data and the adverse reaction
    reports. In their view, had this data not been withheld, it
    would have corroborated the Mayo report and alerted
    investors to the possibility of a significant link between the
    two drugs and valvular heart disease. In particular,
    plaintiffs assert that AHP's statements characterizing the
    Mayo data as "inconclusive" became materially misleading
    in light of this additional withheld data.
    
    Plaintiffs do not allege that the European data and
    adverse reaction reports, taken by themselves, established
    any statistically significant relationship between AHP's
    products and valvular heart disease. Nor does the Amended
    Complaint assert that the withheld data, even when viewed
    in conjunction with the Mayo report, could have
    demonstrated any medically conclusive link in light of the
    millions of prescriptions written for Pondimin and Redux.
    In fact, plaintiffs never clearly explain how the
    accumulation of additional anecdotal data, short of the
    point of statistical significance, would have added anything
    to the disclosures already made on July 8, 1997. Because
    the link between the two drugs and heart-valve disorders
    was never definitively established during the relevant period
    even after the withheld data is taken into account, AHP's
    failure to disclose this data cannot render its statements
    about the inconclusiveness of the relationship materially
    misleading.
    
    AHP characterized the Mayo data as inconclusive. Had it
    simultaneously disclosed the European data and the
    adverse reaction reports, the aggregate of available
    information would nevertheless have led a reasonable
    investor to the same conclusion--that the relationship
    between the two drugs and heart valve disorders was still
    inconclusive. As the Second Circuit has noted, "[d]rug
    companies need not disclose isolated reports of illnesses
    suffered by users of their drugs until those reports provide
    statistically significant evidence that the ill effects may be
    caused by--rather than randomly associated with--use of
    the drugs and are sufficiently serious and frequent to affect
    future earnings." In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150
    F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1998). The withheld reports did not
    provide such statistically significant evidence. Therefore, we
    
                                    11
    
    
    agree with the District Court that the disclosure of the
    European data and the adverse reaction reports would not
    have "significantly altered the `total mix' of information"
    available to AHP's investors. Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 714.
    
    3.
    
    Plaintiffs next contend that they were materially misled
    about the FDA approval process for Redux. Although AHP
    had become aware of at least 31 cases of heart valve
    abnormalities in European diet-pill users by the time that
    the FDA Advisory Committee voted to approve Redux in
    1995, the company informed the FDA of only eight of those
    reports. This non-disclosure, plaintiffs contend, rendered
    materially misleading AHP's later statements about the
    approval process, which plaintiffs claim suggested that AHP
    had disclosed to the agency all available safety data.4
    
    As an initial matter, we note that plaintiffs do not allege
    that AHP withheld any information that it was legally
    required to disclose to the FDA. Certainly, the simple
    failure to disclose the additional European cases--which, as
    we have explained above, fail to establish a statistically
    significant causal relationship--cannot by itself serve as a
    basis for securities fraud liability.
    
    Plaintiffs, however, argue that AHP put the subject of
    FDA approval "in play" by publicizing the agency's
    determination that Redux was safe, and that once that
    subject was in play, AHP was required to disclose any
    material facts that would have tended to contradict its
    positive representations. Plaintiffs rely principally on
    Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 281 (3d Cir.
    1992), which dealt with a defendant's characterization of its
    financial management practices as "adequate." Finding that
    such a statement could, in some circumstances, be
    actionable, this Court reasoned that
    _________________________________________________________________
    
    4. For example, on August 19, 1997, AHP issued a press release stating
    that "[t]he FDA cleared Redux for marketing in April, 1996 following a
    thorough review of more than 17 clinical trials which indicated that, at
    the dose recommended for treatment of obesity, dexfenfluramine is an
    effective appetite suppressant with an acceptable safety profile." (App.
    60.)
    
                                    12
    
    
           if a defendant has not commented on the nature and
           quality of the management practices that it has used to
           reach a particular statement of loan loss reserves,
           earnings, assets, or net worth, it is not a violation of
           the securities laws to fail to characterize these
           practices as inadequate, meaningless, out of control, or
           ineffective. However, where a defendant affirmatively
           characterizes management practices as "adequate,"
           "conservative," "cautious," and the like, the subject is
           "in play." For example, if a defendant represents that
           its lending practices are "conservative" and that its
           collateralization is "adequate," the securities laws are
           clearly implicated if it nevertheless intentionally or
           recklessly omits certain facts contradicting these
           representations. Likewise, if a defendant characterizes
           loan loss reserves as "adequate" or "solid" even though
           it knows they are inadequate or unstable, it exposes
           itself to possible liability for securities fraud. By
           addressing the quality of a particular management
           practice, a defendant declares the subject of its
           representation to be material to the reasonable
           shareholder, and thus is bound to speak truthfully.
    
    Id. at 281-82 (citation omitted).
    
    We do not believe that AHP's statements regarding the
    FDA approval process were materially misleading under
    Shapiro. Unlike the defendant in Shapiro, AHP did not
    make any "affirmative characterization" that the FDA's
    approval was based on a complete review of every piece of
    relevant medical information. Rather, AHP made a simple
    (and accurate) factual assertion that the FDA had found
    that Redux had an "acceptable safety profile" following a
    "thorough review of more than 17 clinical trials." (App. 60.)
    Accordingly, we find that these statements did not
    constitute any material misrepresentation or omission.
    
    4.
    
    Finally, plaintiffs charge that AHP's failure to disclose the
    dates on which it first learned of the European data,
    adverse reaction reports, and Mayo data constituted a
    material omission. This information was material to
    
                                    13
    
    
    investors, they assert, because of the light it would have
    cast on AHP's potential products liability exposure.
    According to the plaintiffs, the materiality of this
    undisclosed information was confirmed by the four-percent
    drop in share prices on September 17, the day that the
    New York Times and Wall Street Journal reported that AHP
    had known about possible heart-valve abnormalities since
    at least March 1997.
    
    Under the rationale of Burlington, this share price activity
    does suggest that investors viewed this final category of
    undisclosed information as material.5 This does not end our
    inquiry, however. Even non-disclosure of material
    information will not give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5
    unless the defendant had an affirmative duty to disclose
    that information. "Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not
    misleading under Rule 10b-5." Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
    U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988); see also Burlington , 114 F.3d at
    1432 ("Except for specific periodic reporting requirements
    . . . there is no general duty on the part of a company to
    provide the public with all material information."). Such a
    duty to disclose may arise when there is insider trading, a
    statute requiring disclosure, or an inaccurate, incomplete
    or misleading prior disclosure. See Glazer v. Formica Corp.,
    964 F.2d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 1992); Backman v. Polaroid
    Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc); In re
    General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F.
    Supp. 1119, 1129 (D. Del. 1988).
    
    None of these circumstances were present here. Plaintiffs
    _________________________________________________________________
    
    5. The District Court pointed to an alternative explanation for this share
    price drop that it found more plausible: a delayed investor reaction to
    AHP's withdrawal of Pondimin and Redux two days earlier. While we
    agree that this is a reasonable explanation--more reasonable, perhaps,
    than that proffered by plaintiffs--we note that in deciding a motion to
    dismiss, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
    moving party. Here, there is nothing inherently implausible in the theory
    advanced by plaintiffs. Consequently, we believe that the District Court
    erred in adopting its own interpretation of the September 17 share price
    drop rather than accepting the theory put forward by plaintiffs. We
    believe, however, that this error was harmless because, as we explain
    below, plaintiffs have not pled any affirmative duty on AHP's part to
    disclose the disputed information.
    
                                    14
    
    
    do not allege that there was any statute requiring
    disclosure of this information.6 Nor do they allege that AHP
    was trading in its own stock during the relevant period.7
    Accord Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.
    1981).
    
    Plaintiffs argue, however, that AHP's prior disclosures
    regarding its potential liability--particularly its July 8
    disclosure of the Mayo study--were incomplete and
    therefore misleading because they failed to mention when
    the company first became aware of the adverse heart-valve
    data. We cannot agree. As an initial matter, it is clear that
    until the FDA notified AHP on September 12 of its own data
    showing a link between the two drugs and heart-valve
    disorders, there was no statistically significant evidence
    establishing a serious health risk. Prior to that date, then,
    the threat of product liability exposure was purely
    speculative, and any evidence of when AHP first learned of
    the adverse Mayo and European data was immaterial as a
    matter of law.
    
    Moreover, AHP had no legal duty to correct or update
    even following its September 12 receipt of the FDA report.
    The duty to correct exists "when a company makes a
    historical statement that, at the time made, the company
    believed to be true, but as revealed by subsequently
    discovered information actually was not." Burlington, 114
    F.3d at 1431 (quoting Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co.,
    Inc., 51 F.3d 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1995)). Here, because AHP
    never made any prior statement regarding when it learned
    of the heart-valve data, there can be no legal duty to
    correct.
    
    The duty to update, in contrast, "concerns statements
    that, although reasonable at the time made, become
    _________________________________________________________________
    
    6. For the reasons discussed in section IIB, infra, we reject plaintiffs'
    claim that SEC Regulation S-K, Item 303(a) imposed an affirmative duty
    of disclosure on AHP that could give rise to a claim under Rule 10b-5.
    Moreover, we note that the last of the SEC filings that are governed by
    the regulation was filed in August 1997, well before there was anything
    more than a speculative possibility of tort liability for AHP.
    
    7. We address the insider trading claims asserted against the individual
    officer-defendants in section IIC, infra.
    
                                    15
    
    
    misleading when viewed in the context of subsequent
    events." Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1431. After the release of
    the FDA study, which established a probable link between
    AHP's drugs and heart-valve disorders, AHP's notice of the
    earlier data could be viewed as material by a reasonable
    investor because it beared on the company's potential
    liability. Nevertheless, the omission of material information
    from a prior statement is actionable under a duty to update
    theory only if the previous statement contained an"implicit
    factual representation that remained `alive' in the minds of
    investors as a continuing representation." Burlington, 114
    F.3d at 1432. In this case, AHP never made any factual
    representation--implicit or explicit--regarding when it was
    first placed on notice about potential heart-valve problems.
    AHP's earlier statements about the Mayo and European
    data did not relate any incorrect or misleading information
    about when the company had learned of that data; rather,
    they were simply silent on the subject. In the absence of a
    misleading prior representation, AHP was under no legal
    duty to update.
    
    In short, even assuming arguendo that the date on which
    AHP was put on notice of the adverse health data was
    material at the time the public learned of it, we hold that
    AHP was under no affirmative duty to disclose this
    information under federal securities law. Therefore, this
    omission cannot form the basis for liability.
    
    B.
    
    Plaintiffs next argue that AHP had an affirmative
    obligation to disclose the heart-valve data's effect on AHP's
    future prospects under SEC Regulation S-K, Item 303(a)
    ("S-K 303"), 17 C.F.R. S 229.303. S-K 303 requires a
    company to include in its SEC filings a discussion of "any
    known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the
    registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable
    or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income
    from continuing operations." 17 C.F.R. S 229.303(a)(3)(ii).
    Plaintiffs allege that by omitting material information
    concerning the link between its drugs and valvular heart
    disorder from its 1996 Form 10-K and Annual Report, and
    
                                    16
    
    
    its 1997 First and Second Quarter Form 10-Qs,8 AHP
    breached its duty of disclosure under the regulation.
    
    To succeed on this claim, however, plaintiffs mustfirst
    establish either that S-K 303 creates an independent
    private right of action, or that the regulation imposes an
    affirmative duty of disclosure on AHP that, if violated,
    would constitute a material omission under Rule 10b-5. We
    
    

    FindLaw Career Center

      Search for Law Jobs:

        Post a Job  |  View More Jobs
    Ads by FindLaw