CRUZ v CITY OF LARAMIE WYOMING
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
FEB 15 2001
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
RONALD J. CRUZ, individually
and as personal representative
of Thomas C. Cruz,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Nos. 99-8045, 99-8049 & 99-8050
(D.C. No. 98-CV-65-D)
CITY (D. Wyoming)
OF
LARAMIE,
WYOMING;
BONNIE
NOEL,
individually
and
in
her
official
capacity
as
Officer,
Laramie
Police
Department;
RICHARD
D.
MICHEL,
individually
and
in
his
official
capacity
as
Officer,
Laramie
Police
Department;
TROY
JENSEN,
individually
and
in
his
official
capacity
as
Officer,
Laramie
Police
Department;
BEN
FRITZEN,
individually
and
in
his
official
capacity
as
Officer,
Laramie
Police
Department,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
BILL
WARE,
individually
and
in
his
official
capacity
as
Chief
of
Police,
Laramie
Police
Department,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Wyoming
(D.C. No. 98-CV-65-D)
Vonde M. Smith (Kent W. Spence with her on the brief) of Lawyers & Advocates for
Wyoming, Jackson, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Karen A. Byrne, Byrne Law Offices, Cheyenne, Wyoming for Defendant-Appellant City
of Laramie; Elizabeth Zerga of Herschler, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Zerga,
Cheyenne, Wyoming for Defendant-Appellants Bonnie Noel, Richard D. Michel, Troy
Jensen and Ben Fritzen.
Before BALDOCK, LUCERO, and POLITZ,(1) Circuit Judges.
POLITZ, Circuit Judge.
The City of Laramie, Wyoming, and four of its police officers appeal the denial of
their motions for summary judgment. For the reasons assigned we affirm in part and
reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
On June 10, 1996, in late afternoon, the Laramie Police Department received a
complaint that a man, later identified as Thomas C. Cruz, was running around naked.
Officer Troy Jensen, the first to arrive on the scene, found the naked Cruz on an exterior
landing of an apartment building, jumping up and down, yelling, and kicking his legs in
(1) The Honorable Henry A. Politz, United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
the air. Officer Bonnie Noel then arrived and, immediately upon seeing Cruz, called for
an ambulance. A few seconds later Officer Richard Michel reached the scene. The
officers sought to calm Cruz and tried to persuade him to come down the steps. Their
efforts initially were not successful. After several minutes, however, Cruz descended and
approached the officers who met him at the bottom of the steps with their batons drawn.
Cruz attempted to go past the officers. During the ensuing struggle the officers wrestled
Cruz to the ground and handcuffed him face down. Cruz continued to yell and flail
about. The officers asked Cruz what kind of drugs he had taken but received no
response.
Officer Ben Fritzen then arrived and, after assessing the situation, applied a nylon
restraint around Cruz's ankles to abate the kicking. The officers fastened the ankle
restraint to the handcuffs with a metal clip. The parties dispute the resulting distance
between Cruz's ankles and wrists. The district court found sufficient evidence in the
record to support an inference that Cruz was "hog-tied" because the separation was one
foot or less. If that distance were two feet or more, it appears that it would have been
deemed a "hobble restraint." Appellee contends that the terms are interchangeable, both
referring to the technique whereby officers' fasten an individuals hands and feet together
behind the individual's back.
Shortly after Officer Fritzen applied the restraint, Officer Michel turned Cruz's
head to check the reaction of his pupils to sunlight. Cruz had calmed markedly after
officers completed the arm-leg restraint. Just before the ambulance arrived, Officer Noel
noticed that Cruz's face had blanched. The restraint was removed. Immediately upon
reaching the scene the ambulance emergency team began CPR. Cruz was pronounced
dead on arrival at the hospital. Autopsy results showed a large amount of cocaine in his
system.
Ronald Cruz, the decedent's brother, brought the instant action against the
officers, individually and in their official capacities, the City of Laramie, and Chief of
Police Bill Ware, both individually and in his official capacity. The action invokes 42
U.S.C. 1983, and advances a state law negligence claim under the Wyoming
Governmental Claims Act. The affidavits of experts provide two different causes of
death, one concluded that Cruz's position while on the ground contributed to his death,
the other concluded that his death resulted solely from cocaine abuse. Defendant police
officers' and the City of Laramie's motions for summary judgment were denied and these
appeals followed.
ANALYSIS
A. Qualified Immunity For Fourth Amendment Claim
1. Jurisdiction
Before reaching the merits, we must first briefly address our appellate jurisdiction.
After the denial of their motion, the officers appealed. Thereafter, the City of Laramie
sought a reconsideration of the initial order of denial. The trial court then issued a
corrective order, modifying the factual basis for its original order, but again denying
qualified immunity to the officers. The officers appealed the corrective order. The City
of Laramie timely appealed both orders. We consolidated the appeals.
Typically, orders denying qualified immunity before trial are appealable only to
the extent they resolve issues of law.(2) The issue of jurisdiction over such appeals, in the
summary judgment setting, has been the subject of significant controversy, one addressed
recently both by the Supreme Court and this circuit. The predicates for determining
whether review is appropriate are intertwined with the qualified immunity analysis,
requiring application of a two-part test. A plaintiff bears the burden of showing that: (1)
the defendants' actions violated a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was
clearly established and reasonable persons in the defendants' position would have known
their conduct violated that right.(3)
2. Constitutional Violation
In applying the qualified immunity standard, the Supreme Court has directed that
appellate courts may not review a district court's resolution of disputed facts, but may
review only purely legal determinations.(4) Consistent therewith, we have noted that the
scope of an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity is limited to:
"purely legal" challenges to the district court's ruling on
(2) See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996); Johnson v. Jones, 515
U.S. 304, 312-14 (1995); Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997).
(3) Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995).
(4) Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313.
whether a plaintiff's legal rights were clearly established, and
cannot include attacks on the court's "evidence sufficiency"
determinations about whether there are genuine disputes of
fact. That is, we can only review whether the district court
"mistakenly identified clearly established law . . .given [] the
facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary
judgment for that (purely legal) reason."(5)
Accordingly, we may review the trial court's ruling as to whether the law was
clearly established, but we lack authority "to the extent that Defendants [ ] seek
interlocutory review of the district court's ruling that genuine disputes of fact precluded
summary judgment based on qualified immunity."(6)
Applying that rubric herein, the first part of the trial court's decision found
sufficient facts to support a claimed violation of appellee's fourth amendment rights. We
therefore lack jurisdiction over the portion of the appealed decision precluding summary
judgment based on disputed facts relating to a constitutional violation.
3. Clearly Established Law
The district court also found, in applying the second part of the test, that the
constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established and that defendants acted
unreasonably. This portion of the ruling decides an issue of law over which we have
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.
We review de novo the decision that the decedent's rights were clearly
(5) Sevier v. City of Lawrence, Kansas, 60 F.3d 695, 700 (10th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, - (1995)).
(6) Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 1996).
established.(7) "Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of
authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains."(8)
The plaintiff is not required to show, however, that the very act in question previously
was held unlawful in order to establish an absence of qualified immunity.(9)
The district court correctly noted that the issue at bar involves excessive force
under the fourth amendment. "[C]laims that law enforcement officials have used
excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop or other `seizure' of a free
citizen are most properly characterized as involving the protection of the Fourth
Amendment."(10) In Mick v. Brewer, we upheld the denial of summary judgment,
concluding that "the district court did not err by ruling that the law governing excessive
force cases was clearly established on June 18, 1992."(11) We therein held that the fourth
amendment "reasonableness" inquiry turned on whether the officers' actions were
"objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard for their underlying intent or motivation.(12) While Mick unqualifiedly denotes that
objectively unreasonable actions by officers constitute a violation of an individual's
constitutional rights, it remains for us to determine whether the contours of this fourth
amendment right were sufficiently clear that reasonable persons in the officers' position
would have known their conduct violated that right.(13)
The conduct at issue involves the tying of the decedent's arms behind his back,
binding his ankles together, securing his ankles to his wrists, and then placing him face
down on the ground. We note that while sister circuits may characterize the hog-tie
restraint somewhat differently, we understand such to involve the binding of the ankles to
the wrists, behind the back, with 12 inches or less of separation.(14) We have not
heretofore ruled on the validity of this type of restraint. We do not reach the question
whether all hog-tie restraints constitute a constitutional violation per se, but hold that
officers may not apply this technique when an individual's diminished capacity is
apparent. This diminished capacity might result from severe intoxication, the influence
of controlled substances, a discernible mental condition, or any other condition, apparent
to the officers at the time, which would make the application of a hog-tie restraint likely
(7) Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 (10th Cir. 1995).
(8) Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.
1992).
(9) Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citing Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 n. 12 (1985)).
(10) Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989).
(11) Mick, 76 F.3d at 1136.
(12) Id. at 1135-36 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397).
(13) Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
(14) Appellants describe Cruz's position as "hobbled" rather than "hog-tied";
the officers say that the distance between Cruz's hands and feet was approximately
two feet. The district court found sufficient evidence to support appellee's
contention that the distance was 12 inches or less.
to result in any significant risk to the individual's health or well-being. In such situations,
an individual's condition mandates the use of less restrictive means for physical restraint.
A review of the known dangers of the hog-tie restraint supports this position.
Initially, case law informs of tragic examples of positional asphyxia stemming from the
hog-tie restraint, especially in instances involving individuals of diminished capacity. In
Gutierrez v. San Antonio, discussed below, the Fifth Circuit found that a 1992 San Diego
Police Study presented sufficient evidence that hog-tying may create a substantial risk of
death or serious bodily injury.(15) In Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, the Southern District of
Ohio found sufficient information existed in the law enforcement community to put the
authorities on notice that positional asphyxia was a problem nationwide.(16) In the civil
arena, a Michigan jury awarded a significant verdict to the family of a mentally ill patient
who died after officers applied a "kickÄstop restraint" analogous to a hog-tie.(17) We
recognize that in Price v. San Diego,(18) the district court rejected the validity of a popular
study connecting positional asphyxia with placement in a prone restraint. Instead, the
court relied on another study, one by appellants' expert herein, concluding that hog-tying
does not result in positional asphyxia. That study, however, is not persuasive herein for it focused on healthy adult males. Our holding today relates to individuals with an apparent
and discernible diminished capacity.(19)
In addition to the case law highlighting problems associated with the hog-tie
restraint, appellee provided the district court with numerous articles and other materials
discussing "sudden custody death syndrome" and noting the relationship between
improper restraints and positional asphyxia. The articles detail the breathing problems
created by pressure on the back and placement in a prone position, especially when an
individual is in a state of "excited delirium." These breathing problems lead to
asphyxiation. The materials provided to the district court include police handbooks,
Justice Department symposia, various journals and periodicals, and newspaper articles
detailing deaths of individuals while in custody. Given the extent of the case law, and the
"legally-related" literature available to law enforcement personnel detailing the serious
dangers involved in application of the hog-tie restraint, it is apparent that officers should
use much caution in applying the hog-tie restraint. In those instances in which it may be
appropriate, such restraint should be used with great care and continual observation of the
well being of the subject.
Turning to the case at bar, the decedent's diminished capacity was apparent to the
officers from the moment they arrived on the scene. Officer Jensen arrived first, and
(15) 139 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 1998) (discussing hog-tying in context of whether
officers used "deadly force").
(16) 39 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
(17) Swans v. City of Lansing, 65 F. Supp. 2d 625 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
(18) 990 F. Supp. 1230 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
(19) See Johnson, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 1017 (noting that the subject study was
"restricted to healthy subjects" and therefore did not affect the admissibility of
testimony regarding "the theory of positional asphyxia").
upon seeing Cruz naked and yelling on the stairs, called for back up. Officer Noel
arrived about 30 seconds later, saw Cruz on the stairway and Jenson below, "and
immediately radioed dispatch requesting an ambulance and additional back-up." Cruz
was yelling continuously about swarming insects, and he was swatting at invisible
objects. After Officer Fritzen applied the hand-ankle restraint, Officer Michel opened
Cruz's eyelid and observed that the pupil was constricted but did not constrict further in
response to sunlight. The officers surmised that Cruz was on some type of drug. It seems
beyond peradventure that Cruz's diminished capacity was apparent to them both before
and after they applied the restraint. We conclude and hold that the fourth amendment
protection against excessive force includes the protection of an individual's right to be
free from a hog-tie restraint in situations such as the one confronting the officers herein.
While the use of a hog-tie restraint in this case falls within the rule we announce
today, we cannot say, however, that a rule prohibiting such a restraint in this situation
was "clearly established" at the time of this unfortunate incident. The decisions from
other circuit and district courts fall shy of the mandated "clearly established weight of
authority from other courts."(20) We find informative the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in
Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio,(21) involving a man placed in a hog-tie restraint who died
(20) Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.
1992).
(21) 139 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 1998).
in the back seat of a patrol car while officers transported him to the hospital.(22) The court
denied qualified immunity because plaintiff demonstrated material disputes of fact
relating to the officers' knowledge of decedent's drug use, whether officers' placed
decedent face-down in their squad car, and whether the San Antonio Police Department
warned its officers of the possible dangers of hog-tying prior to November 1994.(23) While
the facts in Gutierrez are similar to those at bar, this ruling does not suffice to satisfy the
strict requirements governing qualified immunity. It must be viewed in the total
jurisprudential setting which includes the Eighth Circuit decision upholding the use of
what it called a "hobble" restraint,(24) and the Southern District of California opining that
"the hog-tie restraint in and of itself does not constitute excessive force . . . ."(25) We
perforce therefore cannot say that at the time of this tragic incident the decedent had a
clearly established right to be free from a hog-tie restraint under the circumstances.
Accordingly, we must reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment on plaintiff's fourth amendment claims.
B. Officers Immunity for State Law Claims
The district court found genuine issues of material fact respecting the claim of
immunity under state law for plaintiff's tort claims. The court found that while the
officers were acting within the scope of their duties, in good faith, and that those duties
were discretionary rather than ministerial, their conduct was unreasonable under the
circumstances. The court observed that all four factors outlined by the Wyoming
Supreme Court in Kanzler v. Renner(23) must be met and, because defendants acted
unreasonably, their claim for immunity under state law must fail. While the federal
qualified immunity standard focuses on whether a right was clearly established such that
the officers would know their conduct violated that right, state law immunity in Wyoming
requires that the officers' conduct be reasonable. In finding that the fourth amendment
protects against application of a hog-tie restraint in this situation, we necessarily conclude
that the officers acted unreasonably.(24) State law immunity in Wyoming does not require
that a right be clearly established. The district court found the officers' conduct to be
(22) The court described the restraint and the officers' conduct as follows:
"Walters placed the loop around Gutierrez's feet, and Solis linked the clasp around
the hand-cuffs, drawing Gutierrez's legs backward at a 90-degree angle in an "L"
shape, thereby `hog-tying' him." Id. at 443.
(23) Id.
(24) See Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding use of a
"hobble" restraint fastening individuals hands and feet objectively reasonable where
she resisted being placed in a police car).
(25) Price v. San Diego, 990 F. Supp. 1230 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (rejecting a
previous study showing dangers of hog-tying and noting that a new study "has
shown the dangers to be fictitious, which obviates the need for precautions").
(23) 937 P.2d 1337, 1344 (Wyo. 1997) (holding that immunity for police
officers requires that officers be (1) acting within the scope of assigned duties; (2) in
good faith; (3) reasonably under the circumstances; and (4) that the officers' acts
were discretionary and not merely operational or ministerial duties).
(24) Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that fourth
amendment inquiry involves determination as to whether an officer's conduct was
"objectively reasonable").
unreasonable and we find no error in this assessment. We therefore affirm its denial of
summary judgment on the claim of state law immunity on the negligence claims.
C. Denial of Summary Judgment For City of Laramie
The district court found sufficient evidence to deny the City of Laramie's Motion
for Summary Judgment as to the plaintiff's claim of its failure to train adequately the
individual officers.
Initially, we note that while the ruling denying summary judgment to the City is
not independently appealable, we may exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction under
Swint v. Chambers County Commission.(25) The Swint court held that pendent appellate
jurisdiction allows review of an otherwise nonappealable decision that is "inextricably
intertwined" with an appealable decision.(26) That situation exists here because plaintiff's
claim of inadequate training relates directly to the objective reasonableness of the
officers' conduct, the issue involved in the appealable order. We therefore may consider
whether the district court erred in denying the City's motion.
We may grant summary judgment "if the pleadings on file, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
(25) 514 U.S. 35 (1995).
(26) Id. at 50-51.
judgment as a matter of law."(27) There is no genuine issue of material fact if, based on the
evidence in the record, no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party.(28)
Generally, "the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for 1983
liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the police come into contact."(29) With respect to a showing of
"deliberate indifference," the district court determined that material issues of fact
precluded summary judgment. The court cited evidence that the City failed to train its
officers on the use of hobble restraints and that the City put such restraints in its police
cars. The court also noted that high ranking officials were aware of positional asphyxia
attributable to hobble restraints and of a doctor's report stating that "deaths in police
custody with hog-tie restraint[s] have been reported in medical literature a number of
times." The district court found that genuine issues of material fact were in dispute. The
denial of summary judgment to the City therefore was appropriate.
The appealed rulings therefore are REVERSED in part and AFFIRMED in part
consistent herewith.
(27) Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
(28) Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-52, 255 (1986).
(29) City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).