|
|
http://laws.findlaw.com/10th/066266.html |
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 18, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
ROGELIO CARDOSO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-6266
SAM CALBONE, Warden; TANYA VANWEY,
Recreation Officer; GREG COURTNEY,
Recreation Supervisor; JEREMY
DAVIS, Correctional Counselor/Case
Manager; JEWEL BEASLEY, Correctional
Officer, Lt.; RUSSELL STEWART,
Correctional Officer; TRAVIS
SMITH, Assistant Warden; JOE
SPRUIELL, Unit Manager; HORACE
ALEXANDER, Correctional Counselor/Case
Manager; MELINDA GUILFOYLE,
Director's Designee; RON WARD,
Director,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. CIV-04-1212-L)
Submitted on the briefs:(1)
Rogelio Cardoso, Pro Se.
Anne E. Zachritz, Jennifer B. Scott, of Andrews Davis, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees Sam Calbone, Tanya Vanwey, Greg
Courtney, Jeremy Davis, Jewel Beasley, Russell Stewart, Travis Smith, Joe
Spruiell, and Horace Alexander.
Linda Soper, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma Attorney General's Office,
Litigation Section, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees Ron
Ward and Melinda Guilfoyle.
Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Rogelio Cardoso, an Oklahoma inmate proceeding pro se here as
in the district court, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendants on his claims that they violated his constitutional rights.
He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that defendants abridged his
due-process rights when they reduced his security-classification level from four to
two, which adversely affected the rate at which he could earn credits against his
sentence. In addition, he seeks damages for defendants' violation of his rights in
a disciplinary proceeding that resulted in a sentence to administrative segregation
(1) After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case istherefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
and a loss of 180 earned credits. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291
and affirm.
Background
During the relevant time, Mr. Cardoso was incarcerated at Great Plains
Correctional Facility, a private prison. On February 3, 2004, he was called out of
his cell during a shakedown. While waiting to return to his cell, he had an
exchange with prison personnel, including defendant Vanwey, a prison
recreational officer. Shortly thereafter, defendant Spruiell, his unit manager,
informed him that his security classification level would be lowered from four to
two because during the shakedown he had been disrespectful and had exhibited a
poor attitude to staff. Under Oklahoma's inmate-classification system, an inmate
is entitled to have his term of imprisonment reduced based upon the class level to
which he is assigned. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, 138(A). While at level four,
Mr. Cardoso earned forty-four credits per month, but at level two, he earned only
twenty-two. See id. 138(D)(2)(b).
The next day, February 4, Mr. Cardoso's adjustment review committee
issued a report officially dropping his security classification level to two. On
February 6, Mr. Cardoso prepared request-to-staff forms and presented one form
each to defendants Vanwey and Smith. As a result, Mr. Cardoso was issued a
citation for coercion of staff, later reduced to a charge of individual disruptive
behavior. Following a disciplinary hearing, Mr. Cardoso was found guilty and
sentenced to thirty days in administrative segregation and a loss of 180 earned
credits.
Mr. Cardoso filed grievances challenging both the reduction in
classification and the resolution of the disruptive-behavior charge. The
grievances were ultimately denied; each was concluded by a decision issued
by defendant Guilfoyle. Mr. Cardoso then filed suit. Defendants submitted
a special report and filed motions for summary judgment. A magistrate judge
recommended granting summary judgment in defendants' favor, and the district
court adopted that recommendation following a de novo review.(1)
On appeal, Mr. Cardoso argues (1) the district court, sua sponte, should
have construed his 1983 complaint as a habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C.
2241; (2) the prison officials who reduced his credit-earning status did not
comply with Okla. Stat. tit. 57, 138(F); (3) the reduction of his classification
level, which adversely affected his opportunity to accrue earned credits,
implicated a liberty interest that required due-process protections; (4) defendants
maliciously conspired to fabricate the misconduct charge; and (5) defendants acted with malicious intent and violated due process by charging and convicting
him in a prison disciplinary proceeding, thus entitling him to money damages.
Standard of Review
"We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard the district court should apply under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)." Steffey v.
Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). For
dispositive issues on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial,
he must "go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts so as to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [his] case
in order to survive summary judgment." Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205,
1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). "[E]vidence, including testimony,
must be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise.
Unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative weight in summary judgment
proceedings." Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir.) (citation and
quotations omitted), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 131 (2006). Because Mr. Cardoso is
representing himself, we liberally construe his pleadings; however, we do not act
as his advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
(1) Mr. Cardoso concedes that defendant Ward did not participate personally in
any of the actions that allegedly violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly,
he has not stated a claim against Mr. Ward. Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210,
1227 (10th Cir. 2006) ("In order for liability to arise under 1983, a defendant's
direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right
must be established."). We construe Mr. Cardoso's pleadings liberally to
conclude that they state a claim against each of the remaining defendants.
Discussion
A. Construe as 2241 Habeas Petition
Mr. Cardoso contends that the district court should have construed his
claims as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, even though he never made
that request in the district court. His complaint did not challenge the execution of
his sentence, which is the proper purpose of a 2241 petition. See Dulworth v.
Evans, 442 F.3d 1265, 1268 (10th Cir. 2006). Rather, the complaint sought
money damages based on various defendants' allegedly improper actions. We
decline to impose upon district courts a requirement to address claims and legal
theories not presented. In addition, "we find no reason to deviate from the
general rule that we do not address arguments presented for the first time on
appeal." United States v. Helmstetter, 479 F.3d 750, 755 (10th Cir. 2007)
(quotation and alteration omitted).
B. Reduction in Credit-Earning Status
Mr. Cardoso alleges that his constitutional rights were abridged by the
reduction in his ability to earn credits against his sentence. He first claims that
the defendants who signed the adjustment review report reducing his
classification level failed to comply with Okla. Stat. tit. 57, 138(F) (pertaining
to adjustment review committees). He complains that they did not hold a meeting
to review his case and that Mr. Spruiell wrote up the report for the others to sign,
thus preventing them from exercising their discretion. "An action under 1983,
however, cannot be maintained on the basis of alleged violations of state law."
Stanko v. Maher, 419 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2005). Accordingly,
Mr. Cardoso is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Mr. Cardoso also asserts that he was deprived of his due-process rights
when defendants reduced his classification level, which, in turn, reduced the
number of earned credits he could accrue each month. He contends that Okla.
Stat. tit. 57, 138 created a liberty interest in the rate at which he could accrue
earned credits. Therefore, he maintains that he was entitled to due process to
determine whether Mr. Spruiell's assessment of his behavior as disrespectful was
supported by any evidence. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)
(announcing the process due in prison disciplinary proceedings).
Mr. Cardoso relies on Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113, 1120-21, 1123
(10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 158 (2006), the most recent published
Tenth Circuit case addressing an Oklahoma prisoner's credit-earning status.
Inexplicably, defendants did not mention Wilson in their appellate briefs.
In Wilson, the plaintiff, an Oklahoma state prisoner, was convicted of a Class X
misconduct, which required his classification level to be reduced from four to
one. 430 F.3d at 1115. The mandatory reduction implicated a liberty interest
because "[p]rison officials exercised absolutely no discretion over the imposition
of [the punishment] and had no discretion to allow [plaintiff] to avoid
[punishment]." Id. at 1120-21. Because the misconduct conviction "`inevitably
affect[ed] the duration of [the prisoner's] sentence,'" id. at 1120 (quoting Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995)), he was entitled to the due-process
protections of Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, Wilson, 430 F.3d at 1124.
In contrast to Wilson, the reduction of Mr. Cardoso's classification level
was not mandatory. Under the applicable scheme, an adjustment review
committee is vested with discretion to determine a prisoner's classification level
based on various subjective factors, including evaluations for participation in
work, education, or program assignments; an ability to maintain adequate
standards for his personal hygiene and maintenance of his living area; and
cooperative behavior toward facility staff and other inmates. Okla. Stat. tit. 57,
138(D)(1) & (3). The committee uses an evaluation scale from "outstanding"
to "poor" to assess an inmate's performance and assign a classification level.
Id. 138(D)(4). Objective factors, such as length of incarceration and whether an
inmate has been given a work, education, or program assignment, must also be
considered in determining an inmate's classification level, see id. 138(D)(1),
but the majority of the criteria are subjective, see id. 138(D)(1), (3) & (4).
Accordingly, we reject Mr. Cardoso's argument that Wilson recognized an
unconditional liberty interest in an Oklahoma prisoner's credit-earning
classification. We conclude that because the determination that Mr. Cardoso was
disrespectful to staff and the attendant decision to reduce his classification level
were discretionary, no liberty interest was implicated. This conclusion comports
with "the view expressed [by the Supreme Court] that federal courts ought to
afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a
volatile environment." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482.
We turn to Mr. Cardoso's final argument in support of a liberty interest
in his classification level. He claims that a liberty interest was implicated by
Mr. Spruiell's memorandum reducing his credit-earning level because it contained
derogatory remarks that injured his reputation. The memorandum characterized
Mr. Cardoso's behavior toward prison staff as disrespectful. He contends that
this injury to his reputation, coupled with the reduction in his credit-earning level,
satisfied the "stigma plus" standard articulated in Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d
1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2004), where this court held that classifying the plaintiff as
a sex offender, together with the registration and treatment requirements for sex
offenders, implicated a liberty interest. The Gwinn plaintiff therefore was entitled
to due process before being classified as a sex offender. Id. at 1217. In contrast,
the characterization of Mr. Cardoso's conduct as disrespectful to prison staff does
not rise to the level necessary to injure his reputation. Gwinn is inapposite.
Because the reduction in Mr. Cardoso's classification level does not implicate a
liberty interest, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to
defendants.
C. Disciplinary Proceedings
Mr. Cardoso asserts that some or all of the defendants conspired to violate
his rights by fabricating the misconduct charge of coercion of staff, later changed
to individual disruptive behavior. He has not alleged "specific facts showing an
agreement and concerted action amongst the defendants." Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd.
of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, his conclusory
allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to state a 1983 claim. See id.
Mr. Cardoso next alleges that defendants violated his due-process rights as
follows: (1) defendants conspired with malicious intent to charge and convict
him of the misconduct violation; (2) defendant Courtney prepared a memo falsely
accusing him of "bugging [M]rs. Vanwey about his write up," R. Vol. I, Doc. 22,
Attach. 7 at 6; (3) he did not receive advance notice of the disciplinary hearing;
(4) the disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) ruled against him, finding erroneously
that "some evidence" supported the conviction; (5) the DHO did not state the
facts on which inferences were based or give reasons for finding that the report of
the prison official was more credible than the reports by Mr. Cardoso and his
witness; and (6) the DHO based her decision, in part, on a mistaken belief that
Mr. Cardoso violated a rule against handing request-to-staff forms directly to
prison personnel. As relief for the alleged due-process violations, Mr. Cardoso
is seeking to recover money damages. Id., Vol. II, Doc. 46, at 5.
Mr. Cardoso's claims are foreclosed by Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641
(1997). There, the Supreme Court explained that "a state prisoner's claim for
damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 if `a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,'
unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously
been invalidated." Id. at 643 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487
(1994)). This rule also applies to challenges to punishments imposed as a result
of prison disciplinary infractions. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 648. We have
considered the allegations underlying Mr. Cardoso's due-process claim, and we
agree with the district court that a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction. Consequently, because Mr. Cardoso
has not shown that the conviction for individual disruptive behavior has
previously been invalidated, his request for damages resulting from his prison
disciplinary proceedings was correctly denied based on Heck and Edwards.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FindLaw Career Center
- Search for Law Jobs:
Ads by FindLaw
Copyright © 2009 FindLaw, a Thomson Reuters business. All rights reserved.