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• 10TH CIRCUIT COURT

                                        FILED
                           United States Court of Appeals
                                    Tenth Circuit
  
                                  December 19, 2006
  
                                Elisabeth A. Shumaker
                                   Clerk of Court                                      PUBLISH
         
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
         
                                   TENTH CIRCUIT
         
         
         
         RAYMOND G. CHAPMAN,  individually,
         and on behalf of all  persons    
         similarly situated,              
                                          
                   Plaintiff-Appellant,                             
                                          
         v.                                          No. 06-5064
                                          
         STATE OF OKLAHOMA; W.A.  DREW    
         EDMONDSON, Attorney  General;    
         BRAD HENRY, Governor;  JOSEPH    
         M. WATT, Chief Justice,  Oklahoma
         Supreme Court,                   
                                          
                                           Defendants-Appellees.            
                                          

         
         
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                       FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
                            (D.C. No. 04-CV-722-CVE-PJC)
         
         
         
         Submitted on the briefs:(1)
         
         Raymond G. Chapman, Pro Se.
         
         Gregory Thomas Metcalfe, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma Attorney 
         General's Office, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees.
         





























         (1)     After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 
         unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of 
         this appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).  The case is 
         therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.  
         

         
         
         
         Before TYMKOVICH, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
         
         
         
         TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
         
         
         
         
              Plaintiff Raymond G. Chapman appeals from the dismissal of his amended 

         complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.(1) 

         We conclude that even though federal jurisdiction is not barred by the 

         Rooker-Feldman doctrine, jurisdiction is barred by the Younger abstention 

         doctrine.(2)  We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal but remand for the 

         limited purpose of having that dismissal corrected to be without prejudice.

              Mr. Chapman filed suit in federal court attempting to challenge, on behalf 

         of himself and others adjudicated by an Oklahoma state court to be a noncustodial 

         parent, alleged constitutional violations in the family court system of the State of 

         Oklahoma.  He sought damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against the 

         State of Oklahoma and the Governor, the Attorney General, and the Chief Justice 

         of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, all in their official capacities only.  The district 

         court dismissed the amended complaint, holding that the Rooker-Feldman 

         doctrine barred federal jurisdiction over Mr. Chapman's claims.  On
         
























         (1)     See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 
         (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
         (2)     See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  
         

         Mr. Chapman's "Motion to Correct Errors," the district court reconsidered 

         Mr. Chapman's claims in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Mobil 

         Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), and again reached the 

         same conclusionÄthat the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal jurisdiction.

              On appeal, Mr. Chapman argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is 

         defunct in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lance v. Dennis, 

         126 S. Ct. 1198 (2006) (per curiam), and that the district court had subject matter 

         jurisdiction over his amended complaint.  In their response, defendants concede 

         that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been limited and that its application to this 

         case is questionable, but argue that federal jurisdiction is otherwise barred by 

         (1) the Younger abstention doctrine; (2) the domestic relations exception to 

         federal jurisdiction; and (3) the State of Oklahoma's Eleventh Amendment 

         immunity.

              We review the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter 

         jurisdiction de novo.  Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006). 

         We conclude that the district court erred by dismissing under Rooker-Feldman. 

         In Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court made clear that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

         has a narrow scope, and that federal jurisdiction is not barred by the 

         Rooker-Feldman doctrine if suit "was filed before the end of the state courts' 

         appeal process."  Guttman, 446 F.3d at 1029, 1031-32 (discussing Exxon Mobil, 

         544 U.S. at 290-91).  In Lance, the Supreme Court reemphasized the narrow
         

         contours of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (but, contrary to Mr. Chapman's 

         contention, did not hold that the doctrine is defunct).  See Lance, 126 S. Ct. 

         at 1200-01.  Mr. Chapman's state court proceedings have not reached the end of 

         the state courts' appeal process, and the district court therefore erred by 

         dismissing his complaint under Rooker-Feldman. 

              Defendants argue that the Younger abstention doctrine nevertheless obliges 

         the district court to abstain from hearing Mr. Chapman's claims.  Although 

         defendants did not make this argument to the district court, we can consider 

         Younger abstention for the first time on appeal.  Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 

         1386, 1390-92 (10th Cir. 1996).  

              The Supreme Court has established three factors to be relevant to our 

         decision as to whether abstention is required under Younger.  Seneca-Cayuga 

         Tribe of Okla. v. Okla. ex rel. Thompson, 874 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989) 

         (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 

         432 (1982)).  These factors ask us to determine whether: 

              (1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative 
              proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the 
              claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings 
              involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to 
              state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state 
              policies.
              
         Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 

         (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).  "Once these three conditions are met,
         

         Younger abstention is non-discretionary and, absent extraordinary circumstances, 

         a district court is required to abstain."  Id.  

              The three Younger conditions are met in this case.  First, Mr. Chapman is 

         involved in a state civil proceeding that is ongoing.  Second, he has not shown 

         that the state court is not an adequate forum to hear his constitutional challenges 

         to the state family court system.  Cf. Crown Point I, LLC, 319 F.3d at 1215 

         (holding that state court was inadequate forum where state court held that plaintiff 

         was collaterally estopped from raising constitutional challenges); Joseph A. 

         ex. rel Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1274 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that 

         Younger abstention cannot be avoided by purported class action as long as 

         individual relief can be provided by state court).  Finally, the Supreme Court has 

         long held that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, 

         parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the 

         United States."  Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992).  We 

         conclude that the district court must abstain under Younger from hearing 

         Mr. Chapman's claims. 

              It is unnecessary to discuss defendants' other arguments.

              We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal and REMAND only for the 

         district court to amend its Opinion and Order to reflect that the dismissal is 

         without prejudice and to enter a Rule 58 judgment dismissing the suit without 

         prejudice.