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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 17, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
PHILIP C. BUTLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-1274
SHAWN COMPTON,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 04-cv-2004-LTB-OES)
Submitted on the briefs:(1)
Philip C. Butler, Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro se.
Patricia K. Kelly, City Attorney, Lori Miskel, Senior Attorney, Office of the City
Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado for Defendant-Appellee.
Before LUCERO, BRORBY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
(1) After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Philip C. Butler, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district
court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Shawn
Compton and denying Mr. Butler's motion to amend his complaint. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291, and we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
I. Background
On October 7, 2004, Mr. Butler filed an amended complaint under
42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that Officer Compton, a Colorado Springs Police
Officer, violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using deception to gain entry
into his motel room and arresting him without a warrant. The specific factual
allegations are described in this court's earlier decision in Butler v. Compton,
158 F. App'x 108, 109 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).
Officer Compton filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
arguing that it was permissible to use deception to enter the room and that he was
authorized to arrest Mr. Butler. The motion was granted by the district court and
the complaint was dismissed. Mr. Butler appealed the decision. This court
concluded that Mr. Butler "set forth a cognizable claim that Compton violated his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures." Id. at 111. We
remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to
"consider whether the Supreme Court's ruling in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994) is a bar to Butler's further pursuit
of this action" because the record was "not clear as to the disposition of the two
counts of burglary filed against Butler which arose out of the search of his motel
room." 158 F. App'x at 111-12.
On remand, Officer Compton moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Heck barred Mr. Butler's claims because he pled guilty to three counts of burglary
and those guilty pleas arose from the same incident as Mr. Butler's 1983 action.
In response, Mr. Butler explained that the burglary charges that he pled guilty to
were unrelated to the incident with Officer Compton and that the charges related
to that incident had been dismissed. Officer Compton admitted in his reply brief
that Mr. Butler had not in fact pled guilty to the charges that were related to his
arrest of Mr. Butler. He asserted, however, that those charges were dismissed as
part of a plea agreement that included the guilty pleas on the other unrelated
charges. As a result, he argued that Heck would still bar Mr. Butler's claim
because a successful challenge related to the charges that were dismissed would
invalidate the plea agreement and Mr. Butler's conviction on the other charges.
The district court agreed with Officer Compton's position and granted summary
judgment in his favor. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
We review de novo the district court's summary judgment decision,
applying the same standard as the district court. Simms v. Okla. ex. rel. Dep't of
Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999).
To be entitled to summary judgment, Officer Compton must show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
This case does not involve any disputed issues of fact. The dispute
between the parties involves a question of law: whether Heck applies to bar
Mr. Butler's 1983 action. As we explain below, we conclude that the district
court erred in applying Heck to this case.
The Applicability of Heck
In Heck, the plaintiff was convicted of manslaughter and was serving his
sentence for that crime when he filed a 1983 action. In his complaint, he
alleged that defendants "had engaged in an unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary
investigation leading to petitioner's arrest; knowingly destroyed evidence which
was exculpatory in nature and could have proved [his] innocence; and caused an
illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure to be used at petitioner's
trial." Heck, 512 U.S. at 479 (quotations omitted). The complaint sought relief in
the form of compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiff did not seek
release from custody. The district court dismissed the action because it "directly
implicate[d] the legality of [plaintiff's] confinement." Id. (quotation omitted).
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding:
If, regardless of the relief sought, the plaintiff [in a federal civil
rights action] is challenging the legality of his conviction, so that if
he won his case the state would be obliged to release him even if he
hadn't sought that relief, the suit is classified as an application for
habeas corpus and the plaintiff must exhaust his state remedies, on
pain of dismissal if he fails to do so.
Id. at 479-80 (quotation and footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's petition for certiorari and
affirmed. The Court began by explaining that both 1983 and the federal habeas
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. 2254, "provide access to a federal forum for claims of
unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials, but they differ in their
scope and operation" because exhaustion of state remedies is not required for a
1983 action, but exhaustion is required in order to seek habeas relief. Heck,
512 U.S. 477, 480-81. The Court went on to hold that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a
1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under 1983. Thus, when a state
prisoner seeks damages in a 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it
would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's
action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any
outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should
be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.
Id. at 486-87 (footnotes omitted).
The purpose behind Heck is to prevent litigants from using a 1983 action,
with its more lenient pleading rules, to challenge their conviction or sentence
without complying with the more stringent exhaustion requirements for habeas
actions. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751-52 (2004) (per curiam). The
starting point for the application of Heck then is the existence of an underlying
conviction or sentence that is tied to the conduct alleged in the 1983 action. In
other words, a 1983 action implicates Heck only as it relates to the conviction
that it would be directly invalidating. There is no such conviction here.
The District Court's Expansion of Heck
Although Mr. Butler was not convicted of the burglary charges arising out
of Officer Compton's arrest, he was convicted of three other unrelated burglary
charges after he pled guilty to those charges. He pled guilty to these unrelated
burglary charges as part of the same plea agreement in which the burglary charges
arising out of Officer Compton's arrest were dismissed. In this 1983 action, he
does not challenge any conduct relating to his conviction on the three burglary
charges to which he pled guilty. His sole challenge is to the constitutionality of
Officer Compton's conduct during his arrest for the burglary charges that were
dismissed.
Recognizing that this was an issue of first impression, the district court
concluded that it was appropriate to use Mr. Butler's conviction on the unrelated
burglary charges as the basis for applying Heck to Mr. Butler's case. The district
court reached this conclusion by deciding that, if successful, Mr. Butler's 1983
action would necessarily call into question the validity of his other unrelated
burglary conviction because it was a part of the same plea agreement as the
related burglary charges that were dismissed. The district court explained:
Application of principles of contract law reveal that Plaintiff's
attempt to recover damages in this case necessarily implies the
invalidity of his conviction under the plea agreement, even though
the charges under which the Plaintiff seeks damages were dismissed.
Cf. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 ("[i]f the district court determines that the
plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the
invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff,
the action should be allowed to proceed.") (emphasis added).
R., Doc. 91 at 8. The district court's reliance on this passage from Heck is
misplaced. Taken out of context, this quote appears to demonstrate that Heck
may be used for any conviction regardless of its relationship to the conduct
alleged in the 1983 action. But viewed in the context of the full passage, which
we set forth above, it is apparent that the conviction to which the Court was
referring is the one actually related to the conduct alleged in the 1983 action.
In its more recent decision in Muhammad, the Court focused more closely
on the necessary impact a 1983 action must have on the underlying conviction
or sentence in order for Heck to apply. After the plaintiff in Muhammad was
convicted of a prison disciplinary charge, he filed a 1983 action seeking
compensatory and punitive damages for injuries sustained during his mandatory
prehearing detention. See 540 U.S. at 753. His 1983 action did not challenge
the underlying disciplinary conviction. As the Court explained:
Heck's requirement to resort to state litigation and federal habeas
before 1983 is not, however, implicated by a prisoner's challenge
that threatens no consequence for his conviction or the duration of
his sentence. There is no need to preserve the habeas exhaustion rule
and no impediment under Heck in such a case, of which this is an
example.
Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 751-52 (footnote omitted).
Mr. Butler's 1983 action seeks compensatory and punitive damages based
on conduct that occurred during an arrest by Officer Compton that resulted in two
burglary charges. Mr. Butler was not convicted on those charges because they
were dismissed as part of a plea agreement. There is no related underlying
conviction therefore that could be invalidated by Mr. Butler's 1983 action.
Moreover, the purpose behind Heck is not implicated here because there is no
attempt by Mr. Butler to avoid the pleading requirements of habeas. He cannot
bring a habeas action because he has no conviction to challenge. Mr. Butler's
conviction on unrelated charges may not form the basis for the application of
Heck where there is no challenge to that conviction in Mr. Butler's 1983 action.
III. Conclusion
The district court erred in applying Heck to bar Mr. Butler's 1983 action.
Accordingly, the district court's denial of Mr. Butler's motion to file an amended
complaint on the basis that it would be futile also was in error. The judgment of
the district court is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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