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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 16, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
ETHAN ERWIN ROBERTS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. Deputy U.S. Marshal, Operations
Supervisor, U.S. Marshal Service;
LAWRENCE SANTA FE COUNTY, CORNELL CORRECTIONS,
BARRERAS, INC., CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES
Senior INC.; JOHN/JANE DOES, unknown
Director, at time of filing of this complaint
Cornell and having a nexus to the damages
Correctional of the plaintiff; all parties
Institution/Santa listed above are sued in their
Fe individual capacities and/or
County official capacities,
Detention
Center; Defendants-Appellees.
WILFRED
ROMERO,
Assistant
Director,
Cornell
Correctional
Institution/SFCDC;
ROMERO,
Security
Chief,
Cornell
Correctional
Institution/SFCDC;
HICKMAN,
Supervisor,
Cornell
Correctional
Institution/SFCDC;
CAROLINE
KINGSTON,
Health
Services/Correctional
Medical
Services,
Inc./SFCDC;
DONNA
DEMING,
Health
Services/Correctional
Medical
Services,
Inc./SFCDC;
STOLLER,
Health
Services/Correctional
Medical
Services,
Inc./SFCDC;
ERIN
FIRE,
P.A.C.,
Health
Services/Correctional
Medical
Services,
Inc./SFCDC;
ROBYNN
BELL,
Administrator,
Health
Services/Correctional
Medical
Services,
Inc./SFCDC;
DESORMEAUX,
Administrator,
Health
Services/Correctional
Medical
Services,
Inc./SFCDC;
ANNE
HALL,
Quality
Assurance,
Health
Services/Correctional
Medical
Services,
Inc./SFCDC;
RICK
PLOOF,
No.
05-2373
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D. Ct. No. 03-0686 LCS/MCA)
Submitted on the briefs:
Ethan Erwin Roberts, pro se.
Patrick D. Allen and April D. White, Yenson, Lynn, Allen & Wosick, P.C.,
Albuquerque, New Mexico for Defendants-Appellees Cornell Corrections, Inc.,
Santa Fe County, Lawrence Barreras, and Major Romero. Deborah D. Wells,
Kennedy, Moulton & Wells, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico for Defendant-
Appellee CMS. James R. Wood, Miller Stratvert P.A., Albuquerque, New
Mexico for Defendant-Appellee Donna Deming.
Before MURPHY, SEYMOUR, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.(1)
(1) After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is
therefore submitted without oral argument.
McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
Ethan Erwin Roberts, a federal corrections inmate, filed a claim in the
District of New Mexico on June 9, 2003, pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). He alleges that
while under the care of the defendants, employees of a private prison in New
Mexico, he was exposed to harmful secondhand smoke and denied access to legal
materials in violation of his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed Mr.
Roberts's claim on summary judgment based on a failure to comply with the
statute of limitations and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We reverse
and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Roberts was incarcerated from April 16, 1999 to June 8, 2000, as a
pretrial federal prisoner at the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center.
According to his complaint, "[a]ll cells and the common day area . . . were
constantly saturated with environmental tobacco smoke from 14 to 20 hours a
day," causing him to "suffer irreparable lung damage." R. Vol. I, Doc. 1, at 2.
Mr. Roberts also alleges that he was forbidden from using the facility's law
library or materials.
Mr. Roberts filed suit in the District of New Mexico on June 9, 2003. The
district court dismissed the claims sua sponte at the summary judgment stage,
finding that the statute of limitations had expired before the filing of the
plaintiff's claim. A Bivens action is subject to the limitation period for an action
under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and that limitation period is set by the personal injury
statute in the state where the cause of action accrues. Industrial Constructors
Corp. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 1994); Garcia
v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 651 (10th Cir. 1984). In New Mexico, the limitation on
personal injury claims is three years. N.M. Stat. Ann. 37-1-8. The court held
that, in Mr. Roberts's case, the statute began running no later than September
1999, when Mr. Roberts, in his own words, first "began to experi[e]nce serious
medical problems and sought treatment." R. Vol. I, Doc. 5, at 3.
Mr. Roberts appealed from the ruling to this Court, and a panel of this
Court reversed, finding that the district court had failed to consider equitable
tolling when calculating the elapsed time. Roberts v. Barreras, 109 Fed. App'x
224 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion). We noted that "[e]very circuit to
address the issue has held that the filing of a mandatory administrative grievance
tolls the statute of limitations for 1983 and Bivens claims." Id. at 226. We
remanded to the district court with instructions to consider whether the statute of
limitations should have been tolled. Id.
On remand, both parties presented evidence relating to whether Mr. Roberts
had filed administrative grievances sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. In
a detailed affidavit, Mr. Roberts claimed that he filed approximately fourteen
grievance forms. Among them, he attests, were a grievance in June or July of
1999 complaining of lack of access to legal materials and a grievance "no later
than early September 1999" complaining of exposure to high levels of secondhand
smoke. R. Vol. I, Doc. 69, at 2. He asserts that he received no receipts upon
submission of his grievances, nor any written responses to them.
Mr. Roberts also provided a copy of an investigation of the Santa Fe
County Adult Detention Center conducted by the United States Department of
Justice in 2002. The report noted that:
The County is not providing inmates the tools needed [to challenge their
sentences or the conditions of their confinement] through a law library,
legal assistance, forms system or otherwise.
The grievance system at the Detention Center is not providing a
meaningful path for redress of inmate complaints. . . . [T]he facility fails
to document its actions in response to inmates' complaints and fails to let
the inmate know how it has responded.
R. Vol. I, Doc. 7, Ex. M, at 5. Mr. Roberts requested an evidentiary hearing,
arguing that a number of witnesses could testify to the fact that they had seen him
fill out and file grievance forms.
In response, the defendants offered an affidavit from Linda LeCroy-Ortega,
the institution's records custodian. Ms. LeCroy-Ortega testified that a review of
the institution's records revealed that Mr. Roberts filed six formal grievances.
Appellee App. at 59-60, 61-74. Then, in the words of the defendants' brief,
"[s]everal weeks later, while searching for documents in an unrelated case,
counsel for the SFCADC Defendants located two additional documents which . . .
reflected the possibility that Roberts may have filed a seventh administrative
grievance." Appellees' Joint Answer Br. at 17. None of the seven grievances
produced by the Defendants related to the subjects of Mr. Roberts's suit.
The Defendants conceded that they do not maintain full records of the
grievance process: "Given the amount of time that has transpired since these
alleged incidents and the retirement of individuals formerly charged with the
responsibility for managing these records, it is unclear what the disposition of
Roberts' grievances actually was." Id. at 18-19. They also noted that, despite
searching their records, they were unable to locate any of the institution's
grievance logs or summaries.
The district court again granted summary judgment to the defendants,
adopting in full the recommendations of the magistrate judge. The magistrate
judge found that equitable tolling did not apply because the Plaintiff did not show
that he had, in the language of Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.
2000), "diligently pursue[d] his claims and demonstrate[d] that the failure to
timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control." R.
Vol. II, Doc. 88, at 7-8. The court also held that the plaintiff had shown no proof
of administrative exhaustion, finding that Mr. Roberts "failed to show that he ever
filed a grievance related to the subject matter of this lawsuit." Id. at 8. As a
result, the court concluded both that the statute of limitations had expired and that
Mr. Roberts had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Mr. Roberts timely
appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, using the
same standards applied by the district court. Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1216
(10th Cir.2005). We view the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, id., and will affirm a grant of
summary judgment only where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Because legal
sufficiency is a question of law, we review the district court's disposition of a
summary judgment dismissal de novo. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf &
Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999).
B. Burden of Proof
What might seem to be one question-whether Mr. Roberts had exhausted
his administrative remedies-is really the foundation for two distinct legal issues:
whether equitable tolling applies to halt the statute of limitations, and whether the
Plaintiff met the PLRA's exhaustion requirement before filing suit. Both
questions rely on Mr. Roberts's use of the institutional grievance process, and
both must be answered in the affirmative in order for his suit to proceed. But
although these two issues ask the same question of the same set of facts, they
entail different burdens of proof.
In the prior appeal in this case, we left open the question of whether New
Mexico law or federal law provides the appropriate rules-including, presumably,
the setting of the burden of proof-for equitable tolling. Roberts, 109 Fed. App'x
at 226. On remand, the district court seemed to assume without deciding that
federal law governed the standards for tolling. We disagree. Our Court has held
that "state law governs limitations and tolling issues" in 1983 cases. Garrett v.
Fleming, 362 F.3d. 692, 697 (10th Cir. 2004); Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673,
675 (10th Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985) ("[T]he length
of the limitations period, and closely related questions of tolling and application,
are to be governed by state law.") (superseded by statute on other grounds).
Under New Mexico law, "the party claiming that the statute of limitations
should be tolled has the burden of setting forth sufficient facts to support its
position." City of Carlsbad v. Grace, 966 P.2d 1178, 1181 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
Because it is Mr. Roberts who seeks equitable tolling, it falls on him to prove that
his claim merits it.
This Circuit enunciated its rule for administrative exhaustion under the
PLRA in Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2003). Steele
adopted the language of the Sixth Circuit, characterizing administrative
exhaustion as a pleading requirement that fell on the plaintiff, rather than as an
affirmative defense. Id. at 1210. As a result, prisoner-plaintiffs were required to
"attach[] a copy of the applicable administrative dispositions to the complaint, or,
in the absence of written documentation, describe with specificity the
administrative proceeding and its outcome." Id. (quoting Knuckles El v. Toombs,
215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000). The district court order in this case relies
heavily on Steele in rejecting Mr. Roberts's claims, finding that he "does not
adequately indicate that he has completed the formal grievance process." R. Vol.
II, Doc. 88, at 9.
The Supreme Court recently rejected our rule in Steele, however, and set
forth a new standard to govern PLRA lawsuits: "failure to exhaust is an
affirmative defense under the PLRA, and . . . inmates are not required to specially
plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints." Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct.
910, 921 (2007); see also Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL
646150 (10th Cir. Mar. 5, 2007).
Jones does not spell out the proper burden of proof to use in evaluating
exhaustion claims, but circuits that treated exhaustion as an affirmative defense
prior to Jones have all put the burden of proof on defendants, to the extent that
they addressed the issue. See Munson v. Norris, 435 F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir.
2006); Anderson v. XYZ Correctional Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 681 (4th
Cir. 2005); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); Ray v. Kertes,
285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d. Cir. 2002); Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir.
1999). These holdings comport with the common-law premise that the burden of
proving all affirmative defenses rests on the defendant. Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977). "This common-law rule accords with the general
evidentiary rule that `the burdens of producing evidence and of persuasion with
regard to any given issue are both generally allocated to the same party.'" Dixon
v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2437, 2443 (2006) (quoting 2 John W. Strong,
McCormick on Evidence 337, at 415 (5th ed. 1999)). We therefore hold that the
burden of proof for the exhaustion of administrative remedies in a suit governed
by the PLRA lies with the defendant.
In sum, for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the burden lies
with the plaintiff; for administrative exhaustion under 42 U.S.C. 1997, the
burden lies with the defendants.
C. Statute of Limitations
In our prior opinion in this case, we noted that "[e]very circuit to address
the issue has held that the filing of a mandatory administrative grievance tolls the
statute of limitations for 1983 and Bivens claims." Roberts, 109 Fed. App'x at
226. On remand, the district court applied the federal tolling standard applicable
to habeas suits, holding that tolling "is only available when an inmate diligently
pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by
extraordinary circumstances beyond his control." R. Vol. II, Doc. 88, at 7 (citing
Marsh 223 F.3d at 1220).
As noted above, however, in a 1983 suit, state tolling rules, not federal
ones, apply. Fratus, 49 F.3d at 675. That holds both for determining whether the
filing of mandatory grievances requires tolling at all, and, if so, how that tolling
is to be calculated. See Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156-59 (5th Cir.
1999).
i. Time Calculation
Mr. Roberts was removed from the Cornell facility on June 8, 2000. He
filed this suit three years and one day later, on June 9, 2003. Under New Mexico
law, as under federal law, the day of release is not included when calculating the
statute of limitations, and when the period ends on a Saturday or Sunday, the
deadline is extended to the following Monday. N.M.R.A., 1-006; Fed. R. Civ. P.
6. June 8, 2003 was a Sunday. Therefore, if tolling is found to apply for the
length of Mr. Roberts' stay in the Santa Fe facility, his suit will not be time-
barred.
ii. Equitable Tolling
New Mexico has both statutory and equitable tolling provisions. Gathman-
Matotan Architects and Planners, Inc. v. State, 787 P.2d 411, 414 (N.M. 1990).
The state's equitable tolling provision applies both before the commencement of
an action and after the filing of a complaint. Gathman-Matotan, 787 P.2d at 414.
"Equitable tolling typically applies in cases where a litigant was prevented from
filing suit because of an extraordinary event beyond his or her control." Ocana v.
American Furniture Co., 91 P.3d 58, 66 (N.M. 2004). Such "extraordinary
event[s]" include conduct by a defendant that caused the plaintiff to refrain from
filing an action during the applicable period. In re Drummond, 945 P.2d 457, 462
(N.M. Ct. App. 1997); Molinar v. City of Carlsbad, 735 P.2d 1134, 1137 (N.M.
1987). This, then, seems the appropriate provision under which to consider Mr.
Roberts's claim that he was prevented from accessing the law library for the
majority of his incarceration.
The complaint and its appendices contain allegations that Mr. Roberts was
denied the ability to use the prison's library or legal materials in order to draft a
complaint against the defendants. Mr. Roberts alleges that, after being permitted
to use the library twice in May and June, 1999, he repeatedly asked again to use
the library, and was told that "the U.S. Marshals Office has ordered [the
institution] to prohibit all federal prisoners from using the law library." R. Doc.
1, at 4-B-1. Allegedly, further inquiries obtained similar responses. Appellant
notes that, without the use of the library, he was unable to "learn the necessary
elements to establish and support his claims and the law and procedures necessary
for him to proceed in a timely manner." Id. at 4-B-2. In other words, the
plaintiff's lack of access to the library kept him from researching the very
question at issue in this appeal: the applicable statute of limitations.
In a federal habeas proceeding, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act permits tolling only "`in rare and exceptional circumstances,'" and
thus a claim of insufficient access to relevant legal resources is not enough to
support equitable tolling. Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998). That principle is
not controlling here.
We are not aware of any New Mexico caselaw determining whether an
inmate's lack of access to a law library is a sufficient basis for equitable tolling.
Nonetheless, even on the heuristic assumption that it is sufficient, we conclude
that Mr. Roberts is not entitled to equitable tolling under New Mexico law. In
New Mexico law, equitable tolling-sometimes referred to as fraudulent
concealment-only applies when the defendant is prevented from filing
throughout the entire length of the statutory period: "[I]f a plaintiff discovers the
injury within the time limit, fraudulent concealment does not apply because the
defendant's actions have not prevented the plaintiff from filing the claim within
the time period and the equitable remedy is not necessary." Tomlinson v. George,
116 P.3d 105, 111 (N.M. 2005). When Mr. Roberts was released from the Cornell
correctional facility, a full two years remained for him to file suit under the
statute of limitations. Accordingly, equitable estoppel as a result of denial of
library access is not sufficient to prevent any of his claims from expiring.
iii. Statutory Tolling
The state's statutory tolling provision, however, does appear to apply to
Mr. Roberts's use of the grievance process. A New Mexico statute requires that,
"[w]hen the commencement of any action, shall be stayed or prevented by
injunction order or other lawful proceeding, the time such injunction order or
proceeding shall continue in force shall not be counted in computing the period of
limitation." N.M. Stat. Ann. 37-1-12, 1978. Although New Mexico has no
caselaw specifically addressing the tolling requirements upon the filing of
mandatory administrative grievances, the language of the statute ("any . . . lawful
proceeding") seems to encompass mandatory grievance proceedings.
We cannot agree with the district court that Mr. Roberts failed to show that
he filed an administrative grievance on the issue of environmental smoke.
Although neither a copy of the grievance nor a response is part of the record, Mr.
Roberts submitted an affidavit describing with specificity the grievances that he
filed and the dates on which he filed them, and adequately explained why he
could provide no paper documentation. He also proffered testimony by fellow
inmates that he filled out and filed forms, along with a report from a Department
of Justice investigation to the effect that the facility "fails to document its actions
in response to inmates' complaints and fails to let the inmate know how it has
responded." The defendants, in their answer, virtually admit that the institution's
record-keeping is so incomplete that it cannot conclusively deny that Mr. Roberts
filed the grievances.
The defendants argue that, even assuming Mr. Roberts properly filed an
administrative grievance regarding environmental smoke, the tolling period would
last only 32 days, and Appellant's claims would still be time-barred. This is, in
effect, a request that we affirm on alternative grounds.
Under the New Mexico statute, tolling occurs only so long as "such
injunction order or proceeding shall continue in force." N.M. Stat. Ann.
37-1-12, 1978. Our habeas corpus precedent concerning the grievance process,
though not binding in the context of 1983 actions, is instructive. It holds "the
failure to respond to a grievance within the time limits contained in the grievance
policy renders an administrative remedy unavailable." Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304
F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002). In order to determine how long Mr. Roberts's
claim should be tolled, we must know how long his grievance remained viable
under the institution's grievance procedures in effect at the time of Mr. Roberts's
grievance.
The extant grievance forms filled out by the Appellant incorporate the
institution's grievance policy by reference. They all read, in part, "Policy and
Procedure #30500/30501 explain Cornell's grievance process. Familiarize
yourself with the guidelines outlined within the policy." Appellees' App. at 65.
The forms are all signed and dated by Mr. Roberts, and the dates range from
October 6, 1999 to May 26, 2000. Mr. Roberts alleges, and we accept as true for
the purposes of summary judgment, that he filed a secondhand-smoke grievance
in September 1999.
The Appellees argue the entire grievance process, if properly followed by
the institution, takes no more than thirty-two days. In support of that contention,
Appellees provide a copy of a grievance policy labeled "Policy Number: 246-1."
Appellee's App. at 49-55. The corner of the document reads "Revised 11/99."
Appellees also provide a blank grievance form, identical to the ones filled out by
the Appellant, with one exception. In place of the sentence "Policy and
Procedure #30500/30501 explain Cornell's grievance process," it reads "Policy
and Procedure SFCDC 246-1 explain Cornell's grievance process." Appellee's
App. at 56. Appellees provide an affidavit from Linda Lecroy-Ortega, the former
records custodian at the institution, stating that the above documents "constitute
the policies and procedures pertaining to inmate grievances that were in effect at
the time of the incident which gives rise to Plaintiff's Complaint." Appellee's
App. at 60.
Appellees provide no explanation, however, of what policy is contained by
forms 30500 and 30501, which were represented as the institution's grievance
policy on the grievances filled out by the plaintiffs. Nor do they explain how or
why the grievance policy they provided was "Revised 11/99," as noted on form
246-1, or how to square that language with Ms. Lecroy-Ortega's assertion that the
grievance policy remained unchanged from April 1999 to June 2000.
The Appellant claims that his grievance was filed under an earlier
grievance process, presumably 30500/30501, which was not provided as part of
the record. Moreover, Mr. Roberts claims in an affidavit that, despite multiple
requests, he was never provided with any copy of any grievance policy.
In short, the accounts of the grievance process, and of Mr. Roberts's access
to it, are inconsistent and incomplete. We may affirm on alternative grounds only
when those grounds are "dispositive, indisputable," and appear clearly in the
record. Colorado Property Acquisitions, Inc. v. United States, 894 F.2d 1173,
1175 n.5 (10th Cir. 1990). We find the record unclear as to what grievance
process was in place at the time Mr. Roberts allegedly filed his grievance. We
therefore find it necessary to remand to the district court with instructions to
determine the nature of the grievance process, as conveyed to Mr. Roberts, in
September 1999.
E. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Because Mr. Roberts had no affirmative requirement to prove exhaustion
for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1997, we reverse the district court's ruling that he had
not exhausted his administrative remedies. Jones, 127 S.Ct. at 921. On remand,
the defendants are entitled to raise exhaustion as an affirmative defense. We
remind the district court that, under the newly announced rules of Jones,
administrative exhaustion on one claim does not warrant dismissal of the entire
action. Id. at 923.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico is REVERSED and REMANDED. Appellant's motion to "File
Previously Stricken Briefs" is denied.
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