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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 9, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
JIMMIE MARSHALL,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 05-2173
COLUMBIA LEA REGIONAL HOSPITAL;
JANE DOE, Nurse; CITY OF HOBBS;
TONY KNOTT, Captain,
Defendants,
WALTER ROYE, Sergeant; RODNEY
PORTER, Officer,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CIV-99-1363 LH/LCS)
Edward Ricco, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Albuquerque, New
Mexico, for Defendants-Appellants.
Robert J. Gorence, Gorence & Oliveros, Albuquerque, New Mexico for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
Before HENRY, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Circuit Judge.
City of Hobbs, New Mexico, police officers Rodney Porter and Sergeant
Walter Pope, appeal a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Jimmie Marshall for
violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and
seizure. The officers do not dispute that they violated Mr. Marshall's Fourth
Amendment rights when they ordered a warrantless, nonconsensual blood test for
an alleged misdemeanor. Nevertheless, the officers contend the district court
erred in denying their post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law based
on qualified immunity because no clearly established law precluded the test. We
affirm the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual history
We described the factual history of this case Ä including some of the
troubles of the City's police department Ä in Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional
Hospital, 345 F.3d 1157 (10th Cir. 2003) ("Marshall I"):
On December 26, 1996, Mr. Marshall, an African-American
self-employed electrician, was driving his gold Toyota pickup in Hobbs,
New Mexico, when he noticed a police car parked by the side of the
road with its lights off. According to Mr. Marshall, the police
officerÄlater identified as Officer Rodney PorterÄfollowed his pickup
for several blocks. While Mr. Marshall was stopped at an intersection
with his left-turn signal blinking, Officer Porter pulled up alongside the
pickup and "gaz[ed] intently at [Marshall's] face," which Marshall
infers was for the purpose of ascertaining his race. Officer Porter
contends that Mr. Marshall failed to stop at the stop sign, which Mr.
Marshall denies.
Officer Porter then activated his emergency lights, but Mr.
Marshall continued to drive for more than two miles before coming to
a stop at his residence. Mr. Marshall claims that he evaded the officer
for several miles because he was fearful to stop his vehicle outside of
the presence of witnesses, on account of the reputation of the Hobbs
Police Department for racist practices. At that time, Mr. Marshall did
not know Officer Porter and did not have any information about him. In
the criminal complaint filed as a result of the incident, Officer Porter
stated that Mr. Marshall accelerated to 100 miles per hour, drove
through a four-way stop, and weaved from lane to lane, which Marshall
denies. However, Officer Porter made no mention of these allegations
in the affidavit he filed in this case describing the events of December
26, 1996, nor were they mentioned in Defendants' later pleadings.
On the street in front of Mr. Marshall's residence, the two men
emerged from their vehicles. Officer Porter had drawn his pistol. His
first words were to accuse Mr. Marshall of being on crack, which
Marshall has consistently denied. Defendants have proffered no
evidence in support of this accusation. Officer Porter states that Mr.
Marshall had the odor of alcohol on his breath, which Marshall does
not deny, stating that he had imbibed one drink with his brother Alfred.
Officer Porter arrested Mr. Marshall on various charges, including the
traffic violation, driving under the influence, and resisting arrest. On
the written citation form, in the space for indicating the gender of the
person receiving the citation, Officer Porter wrote "B/M," presumably
meaning black male.
After arresting Mr. Marshall, Officer Porter proceeded to search
Marshall's truck. The search revealed a .40 caliber pistol under the
driver's seat (apparently lawful), and Officer Porter claimed also to
have found a small amount of a "green leafy substance," a contention
Marshall denies. Mr. Marshall was taken to the city jail, where several
sobriety tests were performed on him. Mr. Marshall passed two
breathalyzer tests, but had difficulty completing the recitation of the
alphabet (the "ABC test"). There is conflicting testimony about whether
the horizontal gaze stymosis test was administered, and whether Mr.
Marshall passed the finger-number test.
Officer Porter then transported Mr. Marshall to the Columbia Lea
Regional Hospital for blood testing. Mr. Marshall claims his request to
put on his shoes was refused, despite the winter weather, and that his
socks became soaked with urine that had pooled on the back floor of the
police car. While waiting for Sergeant Roye to arrive at the hospital,
Officer Porter interrogated the handcuffed Mr. Marshall for over twenty
minutes, again accusing him of being on crack. ("I know you came from
a crack house. You might as well admit it, because I know you went
there to get some crack.") During this interrogation Mr. Marshall
stated that the blood test might test positive for marijuana.
Thereafter, Sergeant Roye and Nurse Iris Goad entered the room.
When Nurse Goad approached Mr. Marshall, he said, "Ma'am, you
don't have my consent oral or written to take my blood. But if you're
going-and I rather you not stick me with that needle. But if you're go
going to take my blood, I'm not going to resist, but you don't have my
consent oral or written." At that point Sergeant Roye told Nurse Goad,
"Go-ahead and give it to him. I'll consent." Mr. Marshall then held his
handcuffed arms in front of him for the blood test. The record contains
a "consent form," initialed by Officer Porter, which states: "Refused to
sign. Gave verbal consent." Two vials of blood were taken. The
laboratory tests subsequently found no evidence of alcohol or other
illegal drugs, but revealed the presence of THC, the active ingredient
in marijuana, in Marshall's bloodstream.
After the events in the hospital, Mr. Marshall was returned to the
jail, where he was confined for several hours before his mother obtained
his release on bail. Later, he was charged in a criminal complaint with
(i) possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), (ii) resisting,
evading or obstructing a police officer, (iii) negligent use of a firearm
(possession while intoxicated), (iv) reckless driving, (v) running a stop
sign, and (vi) driving under the influence. In May 1997, the DA entered
a nolle prosequi because the evidence obtained in the case had been
suppressed. The record does not contain any further information about
that proceeding, or the legal basis for the suppression of the evidence.
Id. at 1161 (citations omitted).
B. Procedural history
In November 1999, Mr. Marshall filed a 1983 action in federal district
court against the officers, the police chief, the hospital, and the nurse who
administered the blood test. In June 2002, the district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants. In Marshall I, we reversed the district court in part,
holding that critical questions of fact remained with respect to Mr. Marshall's
Equal Protection, Fourth Amendment, and related state-law claims against the
officers and the City. Id. at 1181.
On remand, the district court held a bifurcated trial. In the first phase of
the trial, which involved claims against the officers, the jury rendered a special
verdict in favor of Mr. Marshall on his Fourth Amendment claim against Officers
Porter and Roye. The jury awarded Mr. Marshall compensatory damages of
$90,000 from both Officer Porter and Officer Roye, and punitive damages in the
amount of $300,000 against Officer Porter and $100,000 against Officer Roye.
In the second phase, the court granted judgment as a matter of law to the
City on the supervisory and municipal liability claims. Following entry of
judgment, the officers filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law
based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion.
II. DISCUSSION
The officers contend that the district court erred when it denied their post-
judgment motion for judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity.
They maintain that, at the time they ordered the nurse to draw Mr. Marshall's
blood against his will, no clearly established law precluded a warrantless
nonconsensual blood test. Hence, they argue that they are entitled to qualified
immunity.
A. Standard of review
We review de novo a district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a
matter of law. Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006).
The Supreme Court has recognized that qualified immunity embodies "an
entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, conditioned
on the resolution of the essentially legal question whether the conduct of which
the plaintiff complains violated clearly established law." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
1. Rule 50(a) pre-verdict motion requirements.
We begin by sua sponte addressing one procedural hurdle. Although the
officers raised the qualified immunity defense in their answer to Mr. Marshall's
amended complaint, in their motion for summary judgment prior to the first
appeal in this case, and later in their post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter
of law under Rule 50(b)(1)(C), the officers apparently did not raise qualified
immunity in their pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion,(1) which is a prerequisite to a
(1) Rule 50 provides in pertinent part:
Rule 50. Judgment as a Matter of Law in Jury Trials; AlternativeMotion for New Trial; Conditional Rulings
a) Judgment as a Matter of Law.
(1) If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there
is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that
party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and
may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with
respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be
maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
(2) Motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time
before submission of the case to the jury. Such a motion shall specify
the judgment sought and the law and the facts on which the moving
party is entitled to the judgment.
(b) Renewing Motion for Judgment After Trial; Alternative Motion for
New Trial. If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for
judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence, the
court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to
the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. The
movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing
a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment-and may
alternatively request a new trial or join a motion for a new trial under
Rule 59. In ruling on a renewed motion, the court may:
(1) if a verdict was returned:
(A) allow the judgment to stand,
(B) order a new trial, or
(C) direct entry of judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)-(b)(1) (emphasis added).
post-verdict motion under Rule 50(b).(2) The renewed motion under Rule 50(b) cannot assert grounds for relief not asserted in the original motion. See Anderson
v. United Tel. Co., 933 F.2d 1500, 1503 (10th Cir. 1991) (using the "directed
verdict" and "judgment n.o.v." nomenclature of Rule 50 prior to its amendment in
1991); McCardle v. Haddad, 131 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1997) ("In sum, a posttrial
motion for judgment as a matter of law can properly be made only if, and to the
extent that, such a motion specifying the same grounds was made prior to the
submission of the case to the jury."). "To hold otherwise would be in
contravention of the purposes of Rule 50(a)." Miller v. Eby Realty Group LLC,
396 F.3d 1105, 1115 (10th Cir. 2005).
The provisions of Rule 50(a) and (b) thus serve two purposes: they "`protect[ ] the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury, and ensur[e] that the
opposing party has enough notice of the alleged error to permit an attempt to cure
it before resting.'" Id. (quoting FSLIC v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130, 138 (4th Cir.
1987)). Mr. Marshall does not mention this issue in his response brief before us,
although at oral argument, counsel reminded the panel that qualified immunity
was not raised until after the jury reached its verdict. Mr. Marshall's failure to
challenge the Rule 50(b) motion in his brief specifically on the grounds that the
issue was waived by an inadequate Rule 50(a) motion results in a waiver of the
issue. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir.
1994) (stating that failure to raise an issue in appellate brief waives the issue).
We thus proceed to qualified immunity issue.
2. Review of Rule 50(b) post-verdict motion.
We next consider what impact the officers' Rule 50(b) motion has upon our
standard of review. Where, as here, defendants "assert qualified immunity after
undergoing trial on a 1983 claim, a post-trial grant of immunity would still
confer a benefit by shielding them from any liability for the monetary damages
awarded by the jury." Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 562 n.6 (1st
Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). We note that this two-stage "order of procedure is
designed to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted
demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit."
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
(2) The transcript of the officers' pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion reads as
follows:
I think the most I can tell you is that I respectfully disagree with the
Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Schmerber and its application of the
facts of this case. I'm not sure there is a whole lot we can do about that
with this case. The facts haven't changed, although I would add that I
think that this Court would find that based upon the testimony and lack
of credibility thereof coming from the plaintiff, no reasonable juror
could find that Mr. Marshall had his blood taken against his will and
that he didn't voluntarily give a sample of his blood . . . .
And with respect to the claim against Rodney Porter, again, the
substance of the evidence is simply that if in the light most favorable
to Mr. Marshall that he pulled up next to him and looked at him, again,
I guess I would have to respectfully disagree with the Tenth Circuit
interpretation. I think that no reasonable juror would find that in and
of itself, and that is all he had, is sufficient to vitiate the probable cause
that Rodney Porter has testified to that he had for the stop sign
violations.
Aples' App. vol. III, at 516.
Moreover, whether an asserted federal right was clearly established at a
particular time such that a public official who allegedly violated the right has no
qualified immunity from suit is a mixed question of law and fact we review de
novo. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528; Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239 F.3d 1183,
1187 (10th Cir. 2001). Because the defendants appeal from a denial of qualified
immunity motion raised after the jury's verdict, the evidence is "construed in the
light most hospitable to the party that prevailed at trial." Iacobucci v. Boulter,
193 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 1999). That is, we consider whether the evidence is "so
one-sided that defendants were entitled to prevail as a matter of law" on the
constitutional claim. Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 2002). In this
procedural posture, "deference should be accorded the jury's discernible
resolution of disputed factual issues." Id.
When evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, we "must first determine
whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all,
and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the
time of the alleged violation." Wilson , 526 U.S. at 609 (quoting Conn v.
Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999)).
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what
he is doing violates that right. That is not to say that an official action
is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question
has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in light of
pre-existing law that unlawfulness must be apparent.
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
"In discussing the degree of factual similarity that is required to conclude
that the law is clearly established, the [Supreme] Court [has] noted that all that is
required is that prior case law provide `fair warning' that an officer's conduct
would violate constitutional rights. Thus, `officials can still be on notice that
their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.'"
Denver Justice & Peace Comm., Inc. v. City of Golden, 405 F.3d 923, 932 (10th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-41) (citations omitted).
B. Deprivation of an actual constitutional right
In evaluating a qualified immunity defense, "the first inquiry must be
whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged."
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). We need not linger on this threshold
question because the defendants do not dispute that they "violated [Mr.
Marshall's] [F]ourth [A]mendment rights by forcing him against his will to
produce a blood sample." Aplts' App. vol. I, at 166 (Dist. Ct. Order, filed May
12, 2005); Reply Br. at 2.
C. The constitutional right was clearly established
Since the jury found a violation of Mr. Marshall's Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches, we next consider whether the right was
clearly established at the time of the incident. First, the officers take exception to
the district court's conclusion that it was clearly established that a nonconsensual
warrantless blood test for a misdemeanor offense, conducted upon probable cause
but in violation of state law, fell outside the exigent circumstances exception
recognized in the Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966). Specifically, they contend that when this case arose, (a) the law was
unsettled as to whether violation of a state law barring nonconsensual blood
testing would also amount to a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (b) the
law did not clearly indicate that classification of a driving under the influence
("DUI") offense as a misdemeanor would preclude a finding of exigent
circumstances to sustain a warrantless blood test.
1. Exigent circumstances under Schmerber v. California
Indeed, as the Supreme Court has noted, it is clearly established that blood
tests constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757,
767-68 (1966); Marshall I, 345 F.3d at 1171-72; Anthony v. City of N.Y., 339 F.3d
129, 142 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Schmerber); Ellis v. City of San Diego, 176 F.3d
1183, 1191 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Schmerber). In Schmerber, the Court
emphasized that the "overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusions by the State." 384
U.S. at 767. Similarly, "warrantless compulsory blood tests are unreasonable
unless supported by both [1] probable cause and [2] exigent circumstances."
Ellis, 176 F.3d at 1192 (requiring a search warrant "absent an emergency") (citing
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-70) (emphasis added); Marshall I, 345 F.3d at 1171-
72. Because probable cause is not in question, our focus is on the latter factor,
the requirement of an emergency, or exigent circumstance.
In Schmerber, the police arrested the defendant for driving under the
influence of alcohol. 384 U.S. at 758. "Although ultimately prosecuted for a
misdemeanor, he was subject to prosecution for a felony because of the injury to
the passenger." Marshall I, 345 F.3d at 1172. There was no question the police
had probable cause to arrest Mr. Schmerber. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758-59. Mr.
Schmerber refused the police request to submit to a breathalyzer test. Id. at 765
n.9. Thus, the police had only one way to obtain the necessary evidence, a blood
test. The police then compelled the defendant, over his objections and without a
warrant, to provide blood samples to determine the percentage of alcohol in his
blood. Id. at 759.
The Court noted that "the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to
diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from
the system." Id. at 770. Because the percentage of alcohol in a person's blood is
evanescent, the Court noted that under the "special facts" of the case, "there was
no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant" before the blood alcohol
level had diminished. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71; Marshall I, 345 F.3d at
1172. Because the "delay necessary to obtain a warrant . . . threatened the
destruction of the evidence," the Court upheld the warrantless seizure of blood.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
Further, in delineating the "special facts" or exceptions to the warrant
requirement, we have pointed out that the Supreme Court
reach[ed] this judgment only on the facts of [that specific] record. The
integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society.
That we today [h]old that the Constitution does not forbid the States
minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited
conditions in no way indicates that it permits . . . intrusions under other
conditions.
Marshall I, 345 F.3d at 1173 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772) (emphasis
added); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989)
("In light of our society's concern for the security of one's person, . . . it is
obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The
ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further
invasion of . . . privacy interests.") (citations omitted); California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565 (1991) (stating that "`searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions'") (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390
(1978)).
The officers argue that a reasonable officer in 1996 could have reasonably
understood that a warrantless blood test performed under the exigent
circumstances as described in Schmerber would not violate the Fourth
Amendment, even if the blood test was conducted in violation of state law. At the
time of the officers' conduct, however, it was well-settled that "the scope of a
warrantless search must be commensurate with the rationale that excepts the
search from the warrant requirement." Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295
(1973). Thus, with respect to the exigency exception, the Court had recognized
the "exigency exception permits warrantless searches only to the extent that
exigency exists." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 643 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 761-64 (1969)).
The exigent circumstances that justified the state's bodily intrusion in
Schmerber are not present in the instant case. Unlike the defendant in Schmerber
who refused a breathalyzer test, Mr. Marshall submitted to two breathalyzer tests.
The results of each were negative. The results from the breathalyzer tests and a
blood test are of "similar evidentiary value," and the officers do not argue
otherwise. Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 1998). When a
suspect has taken an "alternative test of equal evidentiary value, the risk that
evidence will be lost disappears and the exigent circumstance that excused the
police from obtaining a warrant likewise disappears, rendering a warrantless
nonconsensual blood test in such circumstances unconstitutional." Id. The fact
that Mr. Marshall had already passed two breathalyzer tests makes the officers'
decision to perform a warrantless nonconsensual blood test all the more
unreasonable.
In sum, we agree with the district court that the officers had fair warning of
exigent circumstances requirement under federal law. Aplts' App. vol. I, at 166-
67 (Dist. Ct. Order, filed May 12, 2005) ("[I]t should have been clear to these
officers that their conduct was unlawful in this case.").
a. New Mexico's implied consent law
As Marshall I concluded, it is appropriate to look to state law to determine
the reasonableness of a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 345 F.3d at 1173
(characterizing Mr. Marshall's argument as contending that "state law does not
authorize New Mexico police to compel a blood test in a misdemeanor case
involving no physical injury . . . ."); see Tenn. v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1985) ("In evaluating the reasonableness of police procedures under the Fourth
Amendment, we have also looked to prevailing rules in individual jurisdictions.");
United States v. Richardson, 86 F.3d 1537, 1544 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that
federal courts are to "conduct an independent inquiry . . . apply[ing] federal law"
into the reasonableness of a search, and noting that federal courts "are not
prohibited from considering state law") (citation omitted). In State v. Richerson,
535 P.2d 644, 648 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975), the New Mexico Court of Appeals,
citing Schmerber, held that exigent circumstances must be present for a
warrantless blood test to fall within the Fourth Amendment's parameters:
the warrantless search of the defendant was justified because, (a) it was
made incident to a lawful arrest, (b) plaintiff smelled of liquor, and (c)
the police officer was confronted with an emergency due to the
progressive diminution of the blood alcohol level during the time
interval incident necessary to obtain a search warrant.
Id. (emphasis added). Assuming the presence of factors (a) and (b), lawful arrest
and that Mr. Marshall had alcohol on his breath, we hold the officers are unable
to establish the presence of an emergency.
The officers argue that New Mexico law was far from clear as to whether or
not a search or seizure conducted in violation of state law would also infringe the
Fourth Amendment. New Mexico's statutes are uniquely clear about the right at
issue. Pursuant to N.M. Stat. Ann. 66-8-105 et seq. (Michie 1998) ("New
Mexico Implied Consent Act"),
If a person under arrest for violation of an offense enumerated in the
Motor Vehicle Code . . . refuses upon request of a law enforcement
officer to submit to chemical tests designated by the law enforcement
agency as provided in section 66-8-107 NMSA 1978, none shall be
administered except when a municipal judge, magistrate or district
judge issues a search warrant authorizing chemical tests as provided in
section 66-8-107 NMSA 1978 upon his finding in a law enforcement
officer's written affidavit that there is probable cause to believe that the
person has driven a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
or a controlled substance, thereby causing the death or great bodily
injury of another person, or there is probable cause to believe that the
person has committed a felony while under the influence of alcohol or
a controlled substance and that chemical tests as provided in section
66-8-107 NMSA 1978 will produce material evidence in a felony
prosecution.(3)
(3) As we noted in Marshall I, "[s]ince Mr. Marshall's arrest, the statute has
been slightly modified. The changes, however, have no bearing on the issue
raised by this case. See N.M. Stat. Ann. 668111(A) (Michie, LEXIS through2003 Sess.).
Id. 66-8-111(A) (emphasis added). As we pointed out in Marshall I:
The statute describes two scenarios under which a magistrate can issue
a warrant for chemical tests, including a blood test: (i) upon probable
cause to believe that a person has driven while under the influence of
alcohol or a controlled substance and has thereby caused the death or
great bodily injury of another person; and (ii) upon probable cause to
believe that the person has committed a felony while under the
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance and that chemical tests
will produce material evidence in a felony prosecution. Under New
Mexico law, the driver's license of a person arrested for driving under
the influence may be revoked if he refuses to submit to a chemical test.
. . . But if the subject refuses to submit to the test, the statute expressly
forbids the police from administering it without a warrant.
345 F.3d at 1173-74 (emphasis added).
The officers contend that, despite the New Mexico Implied Consent Act's
admonitions, New Mexico law was unclear as to whether the warrantless seizure
of blood could violate a defendant's constitutional rights. They cite State v.
Steele for the proposition that "compulsory blood tests do not violate
constitutional rights." Aplts' Br. at 26 (quoting State v. Steele, 601 P.2d 440, 441
(N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). Steele involved
an arrestee suspected of committing vehicular homicide, a felony. Importantly,
Steele involved the admission of the results of a blood test into evidence,
implicating Fifth Amendment self-incrimination concerns. Schmerber held that
the compulsory administration of a blood test and admission into evidence the
test's results does not implicate the Fifth Amendment, 384 U.S. at 761, "it plainly
involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 767. Thus the New Mexico Court of Appeals, despite there
being no Fifth Amendment prohibition against the use of the chemical analysis,
was constrained by the New Mexico Implied Consent Act, noting that "consent of
the offending driver must be obtained before blood test results may be introduced
in a trial charging a criminal act resulting from driving while intoxicated." 601
P.2d at 441 (emphasis added). The sole exception to this consent requirement is a
warrant supported by probable cause. Id.
No such warrant was issued in the instant case. Moreover, pursuant to the
New Mexico Implied Consent Act, "no search warrant could lawfully have been
obtained to compel a test of Mr. Marshall's blood" because Mr. Marshall was not
suspected of having committed a felony. Marshall I, 345 F.3d at 1174; see New
Mexico Implied Consent Act 66-8-111(A) (requiring "probable cause to believe
that the person has committed a felony" before issuance of a warrant).
The officers also cite to State v. Wyrostek, 767 P.2d 379 (N.M. Ct. App.
1988). Wyrostek stated that "[b]ecause [the officer] had probable cause to believe
Wyrostek was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and because of the
evanescent nature of blood-alcohol levels, the trial court found that exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless seizure of blood. Thus, no constitutional
issues are raised by this case." Id. at 380.
Wyrostek involved a very different set of facts. The Wyrostek inquiry
considered whether the New Mexico Implied Consent Act required an officer to
arrest an unconscious driver before administering a blood test. Because the
defendant's freedom of action was already restricted as he was unconscious, the
court determined that an arrest would have been a "useless act." Id. at 381.
Unlike Mr. Marshall, the driver in Wyrostek was incapable undergoing the less-
intrusive breathalyzer test. Reasoning that defendant's unconscious state did not
withdraw his consent under the New Mexico Implied Consent Act(4) the court
concluded that the officers were justified in the taking of the blood test. Id.
No one disputes that Mr. Marshall's refusal to submit to a blood test put
him in violation of New Mexico's implied consent law and that his driver's
license could be suspended as a result. As we discussed with regard to
Schmerber, where, as here, police could and did use an alternative, less intrusive,
means of testing blood-alcohol content, a blood test is not necessary and cannot
be justified by exigent circumstances. The officers needed something more to
justify a blood test after Mr. Marshall's voluntary submission to two breathalyzer tests. See Richerson, 535 P.2d at 648 (requiring that the officer be "confronted
with an emergency"); Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 854 (9th Cir. 1991) ("If
the government is going to use force to pin someone to a chair, stick a needle in
his arm and drain blood from his vein, against his will and despite his
acquiescence in an effective alternative [here, a breathalyzer test] it had better
have a reason.") (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
b. The effect of New Mexico's classification of a DUI
offense as a misdemeanor
Next, the officers contend that the law was not clearly established that New
Mexico's classification of a DUI offense as a misdemeanor would preclude a
finding of exigent circumstances to sustain a warrantless blood test. In their
attempt to reframe the dispositive question, the officers maintain that our opinion
in Marshall I misconstrued Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). According
to the officers, Welsh "did not indicate Ä let alone establish Ä how, if at all, its
rationale should be extended beyond home entries into the area of blood testing."
Aplts' Br. at 34.
As we summarized Welsh in Marshall I,
the defendant's car swerved off the road, coming to a stop in an open
field. A witness, noticing the car driving erratically, contacted the
police, but by the time they arrived defendant Welsh had walked away
(4) The New Mexico's Implied Consent Act states in pertinent part:
Any person who is dead, unconscious or otherwise in a condition
rendering him incapable of refusal, shall be deemed not to have
withdrawn the consent provided by Section 668107 NMSA 1978, and
the test or tests designated by the law enforcement officer may be
administered.
66-8-108.
from the scene. By checking the vehicle identification number, police
were able to identify the car as belonging to Welsh, and proceeded to
his home without first obtaining a warrant. Police entered his home and
took him to the station house to administer a breathalyzer test. Welsh
refused to take the test and as a result was charged and convicted in two separate, but related, proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit
to a breathalyzer test and the second relating to driving while
intoxicated. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the convictions,
ruling that the warrantless arrest was justified under the doctrine of
exigent circumstances.
The Supreme Court reversed both convictions. Although the
government argued that the need to preserve the evidence of Welsh's
blood alcohol level created exigent circumstances, the Court held that
preservation of evidence did not justify a warrantless in-home arrest if
the offense for which probable cause was said to exist is "relatively
minor."
345 F.3d at 1175 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The officers misread Welsh. A person's home is his or her castle, and
throughout history, one of the key purposes of a castle's walls has been to protect
the castle-owner's blood. As the Welsh Court explained:
[T]he police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an
urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed,
the Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, see,
e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot pursuit
of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 (1967)
(same); Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of
evidence); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire).
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50.
As to finding those exigent circumstances, the Court expressed its
hesitation, "especially when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue" and
when "the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is
relatively minor." Id. at 750. Moreover, the Court expressly stated in Schmerber
that non-emergency invasions of the body are due at least the same protections as
are warrantless searches in the home. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 ("Search
warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an
emergency, no less could be required where intrusions of the human body are
concerned.").
Welsh's impact upon the present case is abundantly clear: "[T]he offense
that "[Mr.] Welch was suspected to have committed was `a noncriminal civil
forfeiture offense, for which no imprisonment is possible . . . . Given this
expression of the States' interest, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld
simply because evidence of the petitioner's blood alcohol level might have
dissipated while police obtained a warrant.'" Marshall I, 345 F.3d at 1175
(quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754). Thus, a state law's characterization of the
gravity of the offense is particularly relevant when analyzing Fourth Amendment
violations. See Marshall I, 345 F.3d at 1176 (citing Howard v. Dickerson, 34
F.3d 978, 982 (10th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222,
1229-31 (10th Cir. 2003)).
Here, Mr. Marshall was suspected of having committed a misdemeanor. As
the Marshall I panel stated, New Mexico has a "limited interest in coerced testing
of the blood of a motorist charged with a petty misdemeanor." 345 F.3d at 1176.
Moreover, the statute does not even allow a magistrate the authority to issue a
warrant for such a search. See id.; N.M. Stat. Ann. 66-8-111(A) (requiring
"probable cause to believe that the person has committed a felony" before
issuance of a warrant) (emphasis supplied). Because there was no possibility of
obtaining a warrant, it was readily clear that the exigent circumstances exception
to Schmerber could not exist. Marshall, 345 F.3d at 1176. Accordingly, we
reject the officers' contention that they did not have "fair warning" that, at the
time of the events in question, New Mexico's classification of a DUI offense as a
misdemeanor would preclude the finding of exigent circumstances under
Schmerber. Hope, 536 U.S. at 740.
The jury found that Mr. Marshall's actions in no way amounted to consent.
As the district court concluded, it is difficult to imagine how a competent officer
could think it could make sense or be reasonable to violate state law. Aplts' App.
vol. I, at 167 ("I conclude that even if these officers mistakenly thought what they
did was proper, it was objectively unreasonable for them to think they could
lawfully give this blood test in the absence of Mr. Marshall's consent. . . .");
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) ("As the qualified immunity defense
has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law."); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818-19 (1982) (stating that "a reasonably competent public official should know
the law governing his conduct"). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict, the district court correctly concluded that a reasonable officer,
similarly situated, would understand that his or her conduct violated the rights
clearly established in Schmerber.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of the officers' post-
verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law.
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