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• 9TH CIRCUIT COURT

WILLIAM and CATHERINE
HOOKS, individually and as
parents and natural guardians
of CHRISTOPHER HOOKS, a
minor,
No. 98-17271
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
D.C. No.
v.
CV-98-00041-DWH/RJJ
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL
OPINION
DISTRICT and BRIAN CRAM, in
his official capacity as
Superintendent of the Clark
County School District,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
David Warner Hagen, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
April 12, 2000--San Francisco, California

Filed September 21, 2000

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, Melvin Brunetti, and
Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Goodwin
SUMMARY 
 
The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, 
is copyrighted C 2000 by West Group. 
_________________________________________________________________

Government Law/Education

Affirming a judgment of the district court in part, the court
of appeals held that under the Individuals with Disabilities
Act (IDEA), states have discretion in determining whether
lawful home education constitutes an IDEA-qualified "private
school."

Appellant Christopher Hooks was a child who received his
education at home from his parents, as is authorized by
Nevada Law. When Christopher qualified for speech-therapy
services, his parents requested that the state subsidize them,
even though they did not claim that home education was nec-
essary to treat his disability, and even though Christopher was
not enrolled in any school within appellee Clark County
School District, in which the Hookses resided. In accordance
with its policy, the District refused to provide the services.

Under Nevada law, students who receive a home-education
exemption from compulsory attendance at public schools do
not have access to instruction and/or ancillary services from
the schools. The District offered the Hookses the options of
either seeking an exception from the Board of Trustees, or
enrolling Christopher in the District. The Hookses chose nei-
ther.

The Nevada Department of Education (NDOE) rejected the
Hookses' complaint, relying on a policy letter from the United
States Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP), which
said that states have discretion to determine whether home
education qualifies as a "private school or facility" that impli-
cates IDEA requirements. Because exempted home education
does not qualify as a "private school" under Nevada law, the
NDOE upheld the District's policy.

The Hookses brought a federal action challenging the Dis-
trict's decision. The district court granted summary judgment
for the District, and the parents appealed.

[1] The IDEA and accompanying regulations provide for
special services for (1) students in public schools, (2) children
placed in private schools by a public agency, and (3) children
placed unilaterally in private schools by their parents. Christo-
pher's parents contended that he came within the third cate-
gory.

[2] Under pre-1999 Nevada law, private schools meant pri-
vate elementary and secondary educational institutions. The
term does not include a home in which instruction is provided
to a child excused from compulsory attendance. Thus, Chris-
topher did not qualify as a "private school" child under the
District's policy. [3] The IDEA leaves discretion to the states
to determine that home education that is exempted from the
state's compulsory attendance requirement does not constitute
an IDEA-qualifying "private school or facility."

[4] According to OSEP, which is charged with implement-
ing and enforcing the IDEA, the determination of whether a
home education constitutes private school placement must be
made on the basis of state law. [5] Congress explicitly ratified
OSEP's view. [6] Nothing in the IDEA requires that school
districts provide services to children whose parents have
rejected the state's offer of an education, and have failed to
enroll in any "school," under the state's definition of that
word.

[7] The challenged regulatory scheme did not regard a sus-
pect classification, impinge on a fundamental right, or fail to
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental pur-
pose.

[8] The regulatory scheme did not unconstitutionally
infringe on the parents' liberty interest in directing Christo-
pher's education. Subject to reasonable government regula-
tion, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does protect the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.

[9] The District's policy did not prohibit the Hooks fami-
ly's desired educational option. Christopher legally received
his education at home. The policy, in accordance with pre-
1999 Nevada law, merely required that certain benefits
attached to school attendance be in fact attached to "school"
attendance. [10] The Hooks family did not have the right to
pick and choose the services offered by the District. [11] Even
if the parents had a constitutional right to educate Christopher
at home, they did not have a constitutional right to state-
funded speech therapy services.

[12] Nevada and its school districts had a legitimate interest
in promoting educational environments that fulfill qualifica-
tions the State deems important. Limiting IDEA services to
qualified "private schools" reasonably advanced that interest
by steering scarce educational resources toward those quali-
fied educational environments. Moreover, school districts also
have a legitimate interest in maximizing the utility of scarce
funds. This is reasonably advanced by limiting services to
environments that are regulated, monitored, and which might
offer beneficial economies of scale.

[13] State discretion under the IDEA to define "private
schools" also has a rational basis. Education is an area where
states have historically been sovereign, and the IDEA
advances a legitimate purpose by preserving some of that sov-
ereignty. Neither the Constitution nor the IDEA abrogates the
IDEA's preservation of the tradition of state and local control
over education.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Michael P. Farris, Purcellville, Virginia, Home School Legal
Defense Association, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Jon Okazaki, Office of General Counsel, Las Vegas, Nevada,
for the defendants-appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:

William and Catherine Hooks appeal the dismissal of their
action against Clark County School District and its Superin-
tendent. Their case presents novel issues regarding (1) the
interpretation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 20 U.S.C. S 1400 et seq. (1996) ("IDEA"), and (2) the
constitutionality of denying benefits to home-educated chil-
dren. We hold that, pursuant to the IDEA, States have discre-
tion in determining whether home education constitutes an
IDEA-qualifying "private school." Further, the challenged
regulatory scheme does not unconstitutionally offend equal
protection principles or infringe on the parents' liberty interest
in guiding their child's education.

BACKGROUND

Christopher Hooks is a child who receives his education at
home from his parents. In August 1996, Christopher was
deemed to be medically eligible for speech therapy services.
The Hooks family requested subsidized services, even though
there has been no claim that home education is necessary to
treat his disability, and even though Christopher was not
enrolled in any school within the school district. The school
district, in accordance with its policy, opted not to provide the
services.

In Nevada, children taught at home can be excused from
Nevada's compulsory attendance law by receiving an exemp-
tion under Nevada Revised Statute ("NRS") 392.070 (1997)
(the "home-education exemption"). Exempted educational
environments avoid certain regulatory requirements imposed
on institutional "private schools" in Nevada. See, e.g., NRS
651.050(2)(k) (1997) (imposing requirements on "private
schools"); NRS 394.251 (1997) (same); NRS 394.130 (1997)
(same).

The Hooks family has applied for and received the home-
education exemption since the 1994-95 school year. For the
1996-97 school year, the Hooks family requested that Christo-
pher be exempted from Nevada's compulsory attendance law
and also that he receive speech therapy services provided in
Nevada's schools. As noted, the school district refused the
services.

By letter in March 1997, the school district explained that
the school district's Policy 5111(IV) provides that, in accor-
dance with Nevada law, students who receive the home-
education exemption "do not have access to instruction and/or
ancillary services with the public schools." Id. The school dis-
trict suggested that the parents either (1) seek an exception
from the Board of Trustees, or (2) enroll Christopher in the
school district, where he would have an individualized educa-
tion plan tailored to his needs. The Hooks family chose nei-
ther option.

Instead, in June 1997, the Hooks family filed a complaint
with the Nevada Department of Education (the "NDOE"),
which the NDOE rejected. The NDOE relied on a policy letter
from the United States Office of Special Education Programs
("OSEP"), which declares that States have discretion to deter-
mine whether or not home education qualifies as a "private
school or facility" that implicates IDEA requirements. See
U.S. Dept. of Educ., OSEP, Policy Letter to Williams, 18
IDELR 742 (Jan. 22, 1992). Because exempted home educa-
tion does not qualify as a "private school" under Nevada law,
NRS 394.103 (1997), the NDOE upheld the school district's
policy.

In January 1998, the parents filed a federal action, alleging
that the school district's policy violated the IDEA and the
Fourteenth Amendment. The parents sought (1) declaratory
relief that Christopher is entitled to receive speech therapy
services, (2) reimbursement for the parents' payments for pri-
vate speech therapy services, and (3) attorneys' fees. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the school
district, and the parents appealed. We affirm.

JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction to review the summary judgment pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and we review de novo. See Wash-
ington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1993). To
successfully challenge a summary judgment, the plaintiffs
must point to some part of the record that demonstrates a gen-
uine issue of material fact and, drawing all reasonable infer-
ences in the plaintiffs' favor, could convince a reasonable jury
to find in their favor. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56; Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323  (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249  (1986).

DISCUSSION

I. Change in Nevada Law

After this action was commenced, the Nevada legislature
amended state law to provide that "[t]he board of trustees of
each school district shall provide programs of special educa-
tion and related services for children who are exempt from
compulsory attendance pursuant to the home-education
exemption and receive instruction at home." Nev. Act Chap.
606, Sec. 45 (1999) (effective July 1, 1999), codified at NRS
392.070(2) (2000). Under the amended Nevada law,"related
services" includes "speech-language pathology . . . services."
NRS 392.070(7) (2000) (referencing 20 U.S.C. S 1401(22)).

Pursuant to this legislation, the school district concedes that
it is now required to provide speech therapy to eligible home-
educated children, and Christopher has been assessed and
deemed eligible for speech therapy services. Thus, there is no
need for us to consider whether the district court erred by
refusing to enter a declaratory judgment. We remand that mat-
ter to the district court for its consideration in light of
Nevada's new law.

However, neither the appeal nor the action is moot, because
the new law does not resolve the reimbursement claim for the
payments already made by the parents for Christopher's ther-
apy, to which we now turn. Cf. Capistrano Unified School
Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1995) (gradu-
ation of disabled student did not moot claims for reimburse-
ment and attorneys' fees).

II. Statutory and Regulatory Scheme

[1] The IDEA and accompanying regulations provide for
special services for three categories of children: (1) students
in public schools; (2) children placed in private schools by a
public agency; and (3) children placed unilaterally in private
schools by their parents. See 20 U.S.C.S 1412(1) (1994); 34
C.F.R. SS 300.400-300.452 (1996); Nieuwenhuis v. Delavan-
Darien School Dist., 996 F.Supp. 855, 865 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
This scheme comports with the current version of the IDEA,
as amended in 1997. See 20 U.S.C. SS 1412(1), 1412(10)(A),
1412(10)(B) (2000). Nothing in the language of the IDEA
provides services for children who are not enrolled in school,
however "school" is defined.

The Hooks family argues that Christopher is a child of the
third category, i.e., a child placed unilaterally in private
school by his parents, and thus that he qualifies for services.
The regulations in effect at the time of Christopher's request
provide that where "parents choose to place the child in a pri-
vate school or facility," 34 C.F.R. S 300.403(a) (1996), provi-
sion shall be made for "special education and related services
of [such a] private school child[ ]," 34 C.F.R. S 300.452
(1996), "[t]o the extent consistent with their number and loca-
tion in the State." Id. (emphasis added). The amended, current
version of the IDEA regarding "private elementary and sec-
ondary schools" reads in similar fashion. See 20 U.S.C.
S 1412(10)(A)(i) (2000).

The question we confront is whether Christopher qualifies
as a "private school child," i.e., a child placed in a "private
school or facility." Neither the IDEA nor the regulations
defines or explains what constitutes a "private school."

III. State Discretion Under the IDEA to Define "School"

[2] The school district contends, and the district court held,
that state law controls the definition of "private school" under
the IDEA, and that therefore Christopher does not qualify,
because exempted home education does not qualify as a "pri-
vate school" in Nevada. "Private schools," under pre-1999
Nevada law, "means private elementary and secondary educa-
tional institutions. The term does not include a home in which
instruction is provided to a child excused from compulsory
attendance pursuant to NRS 392.070." NRS 394.103 (1997)
(emphasis added). Thus, Christopher does not qualify as a
"private school" child under Nevada law, and thereby does
not qualify for ancillary services under the school district's
policy.

[3] The Hooks family does not dispute the school district's
interpretation of Nevada law, and we do not address that issue
of state law interpretation. Rather, the appellants contend that
Nevada's definition, and by extension the school district's
policy, violates the IDEA. The appellants invite us to craft our
own definition of "private school or facility " and impose it
upon the States from the federal level. We decline this invita-
tion.

Instead, we hold that the IDEA leaves discretion to the
States to determine that home education that is exempted
from the State's compulsory attendance requirement does not
constitute an IDEA-qualifying "private school or facility." In
holding that this matter is left to the States, we affirm the dis-
trict court.

We start with the words of the statutory and regulatory pro-
visions. The common meaning of those words--their plain
language--does not require that exempted home education
qualify as a "private school or facility." A "school" can be
commonly defined as an "institution for the instruction of
children." Webster's II, New Riverside University Dictionary
1045 (1994) (emphasis added); and an "institution " can be
commonly defined as an "established organization or founda-
tion, esp[ecially] one dedicated to public service." Id. at 633;
cf. Black's Law Dictionary 800, 1344 (6th ed. 1990) (simi-
larly defining "[i]nstitution" and "[s]chool"). Moreover, a "fa-
cility" can be commonly defined as "[s]omething created to
serve a particular function," such as "a new mental health
facility." Webster's II, New Riverside University Dictionary
460 (1994) (emphasis in original); cf. Black's Law Dictionary
591 (6th ed. 1990) (similarly defining "[f]acility").

These common definitions comport almost precisely with
Nevada's definition of a private school as a private "institu-
tion," which excludes an exempted private home. NRS
394.103 (1997). Under these common definitions, such a
home is neither a "school," a "facility, " an "institution," an
"established organization," nor something created to serve the
"particular function" of education. We do not offer this analy-
sis to suggest, and we do not hold, that a State can never
define "private school" broadly enough to include home edu-
cation within the sphere of IDEA-benefitted educational envi-
ronments. We merely conclude that the plain language does
not compel such a broad definition.

[4] Second, we look to the interpretation embraced by the
policy letter issued by OSEP, which is charged with imple-
menting and enforcing the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. S 1402(a)
(2000). According to OSEP, the "determination of whether a
home education constitutes private school placement must be
made on the basis of state law." OSEP Policy Letter to Wil-
liams, 18 IDELR 742, 744. The Supreme Court has taken
guidance from an OSEP policy letter, as we do today, to
define an ambiguous provision of the IDEA. See Honig v.
Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 n.8 (1988); see also Mary P. v. Illi-
nois State Bd. of Educ., 919 F.Supp. 1173, 1179 (N.D. Ill.
1996).

[5] Third, Congress explicitly ratified OSEP's view that
States must define the ambit of "private schools. " Specifi-
cally, the amended IDEA provides inter alia that "[t]he term
`elementary school' means a nonprofit institutional day or res-
idential school that provides elementary education, as deter-
mined under State law." 20 U.S.C. S 1401(5) (2000)
(emphasis added). Elsewhere, the new IDEA's definition of
"secondary school" is likewise committed to "State law." 20
U.S.C. S 1401(23) (2000).

"When a Congress that re-enacts a statute voices its
approval of an administrative or other interpretation thereof,
Congress is treated as having adopted that interpretation."
United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 134
(1978); see also Ward v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1424, 1430
(9th Cir. 1986) (describing "legislative reenactment doc-
trine"). Here, Congress went further than merely silently reen-
acting the IDEA or tacitly consenting to OSEP's deference to
the States; Congress expressly embraced such deference to the
States.

[6] Contrary to the contentions of the appellants, leaving
such discretion to the States does not clash with Congressio-
nal intent. The appellants rely on Congressional findings con-
tained within the IDEA, providing that "state and local
educational agencies have a responsibility to provide educa-
tion for all children with disabilities." 20 U.S.C. S 1400(b)(8)
(1996); accord 20 U.S.C. S 1400(c)(6) (2000). The school
district has not failed in its "responsibility to provide educa-
tion for" Christopher, id. (emphasis added); indeed, the school
district has offered free enrollment in the public school,
replete with subsidized special services. Cf. Irving Indepen-
dent School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 890  (1984) (By
enacting the IDEA, "Congress sought primarily to make pub-
lic education available to handicapped children and to make
access meaningful.") (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Nothing in the IDEA requires that school districts
provide services to children whose parents have rejected the
State's offer of an education and have failed to enroll in any
"school," under the State's definition of that word.

Nevada's 1999 legislation providing for speech therapy for
home-educated students is but additional evidence that federal
courts need not strain to capture this subject from the States.
On this issue, we affirm the district court.

IV. Section 1983 Claims

[7] The Hooks family also brings suit under 42 U.S.C.
S 1983 and contends that the school district's policy violates
equal protection and due process principles implicated by the
Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution. We reject these
claims as well, because the challenged regulatory scheme
does not regard a suspect classification, impinge upon a fun-
damental right, or fail to bear a rational relationship to a legit-
imate governmental purpose.

To withstand Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny, a regulation
must bear only a rational relation to a legitimate governmental
purpose, unless the regulation implicates a fundamental right
or an inherently suspect classification. See City of New Orle-
ans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303  (1976) (per curiam) (regard-
ing equal protection); Richardson v. City and County of
Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
119 S.Ct. 168 (1998) (regarding due process). Children edu-
cated at home do not comprise a suspect class, so we address
in turn whether the regulatory scheme infringes on a funda-
mental right or lacks a rational basis. See J.B. v. Washington
County, 127 F.3d 919, 931 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
home-educated children do not comprise a suspect class); cf.
KDM v. Reedsport School Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th
Cir. 1999) ("parochial school students are not a suspect
class").

A. Due Process

[8] Addressing the first of these issues, we hold that the
regulatory scheme does not unconstitutionally infringe on the
parents' liberty interest in directing Christopher's education.
Subject to "reasonable government regulation, " Runyon v.
Gonzalez, 427 U.S. 160, 178  (1976) (citations omitted), the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does pro-
tect the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbring-
ing and education of children under their control. " Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 -535 (1925) (striking
down compulsory education law); see also Troxel v. Gran-
ville, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1922). This right is among those that have often been classi-
fied as "substantive due process." E.g. , Troxel, 120 S.Ct. at
2065 (Souter, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Although we
avoid giving currency to the anomalous conflation of sub-
stance and process, we acknowledge that some liberties have
been deemed so fundamental that the only process of law that
would suffice as "due process of law" for their derogation
would be amending the Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend.
VIX, S 1. ("nor shall any State deprive any person of . . . lib-
erty . . . without due process of law.").

[9] Courts outside our Circuit have applied the Pierce
parental liberty to a right of parents to educate their children
at home, and these courts have held that any such right is sub-
ject to reasonable regulation. See, e.g. , Murphy v. Arkansas,
852 F.2d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 1988); Clorlara, Inc. v. Runkel,
722 F.Supp. 1442, 1458 (E.D. Mich. 1989); People v. Ben-
nett, 442 Mich. 316, 327 (1993); State v. DeLaBruere, 154 Vt.
237 (1990); In re Charles, 399 Mass. 324 (1987). As these
cases suggest, identifying a general parental right is far differ-
ent than concluding that it has been infringed.

We locate no infringement here. The school district's pol-
icy does not prohibit the Hooks family's desired educational
option--indeed, Christopher currently and legally receives his
education at home. The school district's policy, in accordance
with pre-1999 Nevada law, merely requires that certain bene-
fits attached to school attendance be in fact attached to
"school" attendance.

[10] A recent case in the Tenth Circuit concerned a similar
issue. In Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School Dist. 1-L,
135 F.3d 694, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1998), our sister Circuit
held that a school district's refusal to allow a home-educated
child to attend classes part-time did not infringe on the par-
ents' right to direct their child's education. The Swanson court
held that parents had no constitutional right "to send their
children to public school on a part-time basis, and to pick and
choose which courses their children will take from the public
school." Id. at 700. As in Swanson , the Hooks family does not
have the right to "pick and choose" the services offered by the
school district.

Parents in Nevada who teach their children at home pursu-
ant to the NRS 392.070 home-education exemption are not
subject to the same educational and institutional controls that
guide educators in institutional private schools or public
schools. For example, a "private school" in Nevada is consid-
ered a "[p]lace of public accommodation," and thus is subject
to expanded legal obligations. See NRS 651.050(2)(k); cf.
Clark County School Dist. v. Buchanan, 112 Nev. 1146
(1996) (requiring institutional school to admit helping dogs).
"Private schools" are required to have a license. See NRS
394.075 (1997) (defining "license"); NRS 394.251 (1997)
(license requirement). Furthermore, "instruction in the sub-
jects required by law for pupils in the public schools shall be
required of pupils receiving instruction in such private
schools." NRS 394.130 (1997).

[11] Under the circumstances of this case, attaching receipt
of IDEA services to institutional school attendance, and ful-
fillment of the according regulatory requirements, constitutes
"reasonable government regulation" that does not offend our
Constitution. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 178. Put differently, even
if the parents have a constitutional right to educate Christo-
pher at home, they do not have a constitutional right to state-
funded speech therapy services.

B. Equal Protection

When neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classifica-
tion is implicated, a classification "must be upheld against
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceiv-
able state of facts that could provide a rational basis" for it.
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320  (1993) (citations omitted).
The drafters need not actually articulate this basis. See id.
(citations omitted).

The appellants challenge two separate governmental direc-
tives: (1) the school district's policy denying services to
home-educated children, and (2) the IDEA's delegation to
States of the power to make such a denial. Both offer rational
bases and thereby survive equal protection challenge.

[12] Nevada and its school districts have a legitimate inter-
est in promoting educational environments that fulfill those
qualifications that the State deems important. Limiting IDEA
services to qualified "private schools" reasonably advances
that interest by steering scarce educational resources toward
those qualified educational environments.1  Cf. Murphy v.
Arkansas, 852 F.3d at 1044 (holding that Arkansas's regula-
tion of home education, but not private schools, was rationally
related to State's interest in insuring that its citizens were
being properly educated). Moreover and relatedly, school dis-
tricts also have a legitimate interest in maximizing the utility
of scarce funds. This interest is likewise reasonably advanced
by limiting services to those environments that are regulated,
monitored, and which might offer beneficial economies of
scale.

[13] State discretion under the IDEA to define "private
schools" also has a rational basis. The appellants contend that
even if the school district's policy is constitutional, the
IDEA's deference to States on this matter offends rationality
by creating haphazard patchwork in which the provision of
IDEA benefits varies from state to state. We see no need to
rend this patchwork. Indeed, the very complexity of regula-
tory schemes surrounding state education counsels in favor of
Congress leaving some definitional matters to the States.

The Supreme Court has recognized that education is an
area "where States have historically been sovereign," United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564  (1995), and the IDEA
advances a legitimate purpose by preserving some of that sov-
ereignty. Neither the Constitution nor the IDEA abrogates the
IDEA's preservation of a portion of the "deeply rooted tradi-
tion of state and local control over education." Bennett v. New
Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 634  (1985). In rejecting the appellants'
constitutional challenges, we affirm the district court.

CONCLUSION

We hold that, pursuant to the IDEA, States have discretion
to determine whether home education constitutes an IDEA-
qualifying educational environment. We also hold that the
school district's policy of limiting IDEA funds to institutional
schools does not unconstitutionally offend equal protection
principles or infringe on the parents' liberty interest in guid-
ing their child's education. We remand to district court so that
it may dispose of this case in accord with this opinion and
with new Nevada law.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part and REMAND./dcs/programs/www/cgi-prod/getfile.sh[51]: rmove:  not found
/dcs/programs/www/cgi-prod/getfile.sh[52]: rmove:  not found

_______________________________________________________________

FOOTNOTES

1 Nothing here is meant to suggest that the Pierce parental right warrants
only rational-basis review. The "reasonable government regulation," Run-yon, 427 U.S. at 178, to which the right is subject might not include every
regulation that is rationally related to some legitimate governmental inter-
est. We leave resolution of this issue to a future case that necessitates it.