FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
SEP 8 2000
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
In re: VALETA MAE ENGLEHART,
Debtor,
No. 99_3339
(D.C. No. 98_CV_1322_MLB)
VIA CHRISTI REGIONAL MEDICAL (D. Kan)
CENTER,
Plaintiff_Appellant,
v.
VALETA MAE ENGLEHART,
Defendant_Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT(1)
Before BRORBY, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Via Christi Regional Medical Center, Inc. (Via Christi), plaintiff in this
adversary proceeding, appeals from a district court order affirming a decision of
the bankruptcy court granting debtor Valeta Mae Englehart discharge of a debt
Via Christi contended was exempt from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
We review the bankruptcy court's legal determinations de novo and factual
findings for clear error, mindful that "[i]t is especially important to be faithful to
the clearly erroneous standard when the bankruptcy court's findings have been
upheld by the district court." Osborn v. Durant Bank & Trust Co. (In re Osborn),
24 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1994). We affirm for the reasons stated below.
Under § 523(a)(6), a debtor is denied discharge from liabilities arising out
of "willful and malicious injury" to another or another's property. The Supreme
Court has held the quoted phrase encompasses "only acts done with the actual
intent to cause injury." Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998), aff'g
Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
The burden of proving such intent, by a preponderance of the evidence, rests on
the creditor asserting nondischargeability. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279,
289 (1991). Relying on Geiger, the bankruptcy court held that Via Christi failed
(1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
to prove Ms. Englehart intended to injure Via Christi when insurance checks for her husband's medical bills at Via Christi were received and cashed and the
proceeds spent (by Ms. Englehart and/or her husband) elsewhere. The dispute in
this case requires us to (1) identify the proper legal standard for determining
actual intent consistent with Geiger, and (2) review the bankruptcy court's factual
findings under that standard for clear error.
Legal Standard for Intent under Geiger
The Eighth Circuit decision affirmed by the Supreme Court in Geiger relied
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965) to hold that the intent element
of § 523(a)(6) requires that the debtor either "desires to cause [injury], or . . .
believes that the [injury is] substantially certain to result." Geiger, 113 F.3d
at 852 (quotation omitted and emphasis added). As the emphasized terms reflect,
the Eighth Circuit adopted the Restatement's dual approach to intent in toto, i.e.,
while extending the concept to include undesired yet substantially certain injury,
the court kept the focus of the inquiry subjective__on the debtor's belief in the
substantial certainty of injury, not on a factfinder's independent view of the
likelihood of injury. Indeed, the court took pains to explain the point, which
was crucial to its holding in the case:
In our case, there is no suggestion whatever that [the debtor]
desired to cause the very serious consequences that [the creditor]
suffered. . . . [T]herefore, . . . he would have to have believed that
[the creditor] was substantially certain to suffer harm as a result of
his actions. Although the district court opined that "expert
testimony" established that [the debtor's] conduct was "certain or
substantially certain to cause [injury]," that is not enough. There is
nothing in the record, so far as we can tell, that would support a
finding that [the debtor] believed that it was substantially certain that
[the creditor] would suffer harm. Indeed, [the debtor] testified that
he believed [to the contrary] . . . .
This is an important distinction, one in fact that defines the boundary
between intentional and unintentional torts: Even if [the debtor]
should have believed that his [conduct] was substantially certain to
produce serious harmful consequences, he would be guilty only of
[negligence or recklessness], not of an intentional tort.
Id. at 852_53. While the Supreme Court's opinion in Geiger does not address the
matter directly, the Court's affirmance of the Eighth Circuit's holding and evident
approval of its use of the Restatement's treatment of intent, see 523 U.S. at 61_62,
certainly support its approach. Further, the closest the Court came to defining
intent for § 523(a)(6) purposes?characterizing "unintended" injury as "neither
desired nor in fact anticipated by the debtor," id. at 62 (emphasis added)?used
terms which map very closely onto the test adopted from the Restatement by the
Eighth Circuit. In short, both the Restatement test and the quoted formulation
articulated by the Supreme Court require courts "to focus on the subjective intent
of the debtor to determine whether the injury was intended or unintended."
Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Powers (In re Powers), 227 B.R. 73, 76
(Bankr. E. D. Va. 1998).
Since Geiger was decided, however, the lower courts have generated some
confusion over the focus of the substantial certainty test. Some have followed the
subjective formulation adopted by the Eighth Circuit, looking specifically to the
debtor's knowledge or belief regarding the consequences of his actions. The
Sixth Circuit, for example, has stated that "the mere fact that [the debtor] should
have known his decisions and actions put [the creditor] at risk is also insufficient
to establish a `willful and malicious injury' [under § 523(a)(6)]. He must will or
desire harm, or believe injury is substantially certain to occur as a result of his
behavior." Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455, 465 n.10
(6th Cir. 1999); see also Via Christi Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Budig (In re Budig), 240
B.R. 397, 400_401 (D. Kan. 1999) (looking to knowledge of debtor in applying
substantial certainty test); Mitsubishi Motors Credit of Am., Inc. v. Longley (In re
Longley), 235 B.R. 651, 657 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 1999) (same).
Other courts, following the Fifth Circuit, have used an objective notion of
substantial certainty, looking to the factfinder's assessment of the likelihood of
injury instead of the debtor's knowledge or belief. See Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc.
(In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603_04 (5th Cir. 1998); Baldwin v. Kilpatrick
(In re Baldwin), 245 B.R. 131, 136 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2000); Bowers v. Williams
(In re Williams), 233 B.R. 398, 405 (Bankr. N. D. Ohio 1999). In our view, this
second line of authority is not only at odds with the considerations discussed
above in connection with both Geiger opinions, it is internally inconsistent.
In support of an objective test, Miller recites what is actually a subjective
formulation from the literature on intentional tort: "`the defendant acted with . . .
the substantial certainty that his action would injure the plaintiff.'" Miller,
156 F.3d at 604 (quoting Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort:
The Origins of a General Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 447
(1990)) (emphasis added). Similarly, in adopting Miller's objective test, Baldwin
indicates it is also following Markowitz, and even quotes the subjective
Restatement formulation applied in Markowtiz (and Geiger) without ever noting
the difference. See Baldwin, 245 B.R. at 136.
The error in this line of authority ultimately derives from the tacit premise
that the only alternative to subjective desire is objective substantial certainty,
see Miller, 156 F.3d at 605 (assuming subjective standard equates with "evil
motive," requiring use of objective standard to distinguish substantial certainty).
This assumption denies the purely subjective dichotomy of desire/belief actually
set out in § 8A, and ignores the history of intent jurisprudence encapsulated in the
pertinent illustration to that section. See Illustration 1 to § 8A ("A has no desire
to injure C, but knows that his act is substantially certain to do so. C is injured
by [A's act]. A is subject to liability to C for an intentional tort."). Miller fails
to appreciate that the notion of subjective substantial certainty extends the scope
of intent well beyond the compass of evil motive, without extending it to so far as
to include consequences entirely outside the actor's ken, which would be contrary
to the whole thrust of the Supreme Court's decision in Geiger.
In sum, the "willful and malicious injury" exception to dischargeability in
§ 523(a)(6) turns on the state of mind of the debtor, who must have wished to
cause injury or at least believed it was substantially certain to occur. When injury
was "neither desired nor in fact anticipated by the debtor," it is outside the scope
of the statute. Geiger, 523 U.S. at 62.
Review of Bankruptcy Court's Findings
Ms. Englehart failed to pay her husband's substantial medical expenses at
Via Christi, despite having received insurance proceeds for such expenses. After
she filed a no_asset bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7, Via Christi brought this
adversary proceeding to block discharge of the debt under § 523(a)(6). After an
evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court held Via Christi had not shown that
Ms. Englehart intended to cause financial injury to Via Christ as required by
Geiger, which the Supreme Court had issued several months earlier. The essence
of the bankruptcy court's decision is reflected in the following two passages, the
first taken from its factual discussion, the second taken from its legal conclusions:
Englehart testified that she was working twelve hour shifts and
that her husband opened the mail and reviewed the bank statements.
According to Englehart, she did not see the bank statements, the
explanation of benefit forms, or the notices that the funds were to be
paid to the hospital. She also testified that her husband used cocaine
and may have forged her signature on the checks since he had forged
her name on government bonds and other documents in the past.
Englehart admitted to signing and depositing one check for $8,410.00
because she thought that BCBS [the insurance company] would pay
Via Christi directly. Englehart did not understand that she was
supposed to use the funds to pay the hospital. Indeed, for some
reason, some of the bill were paid directly by BCBS but the vast
majority of the benefits were paid directly to Englehart. She testified
that she would have used the money to pay Via Christi if she had
known that the money was for that purpose. Instead, Englehart used
the money from the two checks that BCBS sent after her husband's
death to pay bills. Although she did not remember signing the other
checks, Englehart testified that she was under tremendous stress at
the time and she may have signed them.
. . . .
The record simply does not support the necessary finding that
Englehart intended to harm Via Christi. While the Court recognizes
that this type of situation is a major problem for Via Christi and all
medical care providers, § 523(a)(6) is not the answer. At best, the
facts here present a case for breach of contract. There is simply no
evidence of the debtor's state of mind at the time that she endorsed
and deposited the checks. The debtor has only minimal education
beyond high school and apparently has no special knowledge of
health care insurance. She was working long hours as a home health
care aid and having to endure her husband's drug addiction at the
same time. There is no direct evidence of her state of mind through
statements and there is no evidence from which the Court might infer
it, such as the use of the proceeds to buy luxuries or exempt assets.
Appellant's Appendix Vol. I at 102, 105 (emphasis added and reference to
exhibit omitted).
The bankruptcy court rested its decision regarding Ms. Englehart's intent
largely on its assessment of her credibility as a witness?a matter on which we owe
it special deference. See Dalton v. IRS, 77 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 575 (1985)). After
reviewing the record, we cannot say the bankruptcy court clearly erred in
determining that Ms. Englehart lacked the actual intent to injure Via Christi.
Further, while the bankruptcy court did not specifically address the question of
substantial certainty, given the subjective character of that inquiry, the court's
broad findings regarding the absence of evidence concerning state of mind suffice
to settle that question as well. See Budig, 240 B.R. at 401 ("Unless the debtors
knew of Via Christi's rights, they could not intend to injure Via Christi and could
not have known with substantial certainty that injury would result from their
actions." (emphasis added)).
Finally, Via Christi's continued insistence that it had a property interest in
the insurance proceeds is simply immaterial to the dispositive issue in this case.
As the bankruptcy court made clear, and the district court specifically reiterated,
"[e]ven if the Court were to hold that . . . Via Christi [had] a property interest in
the BCBS benefit checks, it has not proven that the debt is nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(6)." Appellant's Appendix Vol. I at 105; see also id. at 120;
cf. Budig, 240 B.R. at 401_02 (rejecting similar § 523(a)(6) claim by Via Christi,
because, whatever its property rights in the insurance proceeds, "debtors did not
know the money belonged to Via Christi"). See generally Geiger, 523 U.S.
at 63_64 (noting treatment of conversion claims under § 523(a)(6) is in accord
with that of other claims of injury).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court to grant debtor a discharge over
plaintiff's objection is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge