KIKUMURA v HURLEY, GALLEGOS
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
MAR 9 2001
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 99_1284
YU KIKUMURA,
Plaintiff_Appellant,
v.
JOHN M. HURLEY, E. J. GALLEGOS,
Defendants_Appellees,
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 98_B_1442)
Philip J. Weiser, University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant.
Melanie Bailey Lewis, of Hall & Evans, (Josh A. Marks with her on the briefs),
Denver, Colorado, for Appellees.
Matthew M. Collette, Appellate Staff Attorney, (Michael Jay Singer, Appellate
Staff Attorney, with him on the briefs), Civil Division, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., for the Intervenor and for Appellant.
Before EBEL, HOLLOWAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, a federal prisoner, brought suit against Defendants, prison
wardens, for their denial of his requests for certain pastoral visits, alleging
violations of his First and Fifth Amendment rights and statutory rights under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb_1. Plaintiff
moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction preventing
Defendants from denying the requested pastoral visits. The district court denied
Plaintiff's motion, reasoning that Plaintiff had not demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits or that he would suffer irreparable harm
absent an injunction. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1) to consider Plaintiff's appeal of the district court's denial of his
motion for a preliminary injunction. Because the district court committed legal
error in holding Plaintiff did not have a substantial likelihood of success on his
RFRA claim and would not be irreparably harmed absent an injunction, this court
affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff_appellant Yu Kikumura is an inmate in the United States
Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum, at Florence, Colorado (the
"Penitentiary"). Defendant John Hurley is Warden at the Penitentiary, and
Defendant E.J. Gallegos is an Associate Warden at the Penitentiary. In early
September 1997, the Reverend C. Harold Rickard, a retired United Methodist
minister, sent a letter to Plaintiff. Rickard explained in the letter that he had
heard about Plaintiff through the Reverend S. Michael Yasutake, a mutual friend
of Plaintiff and Rickard, and that he had served as a missionary in Japan for
numerous years. Rickard asked Plaintiff, who is originally from Japan, if
Plaintiff would accept a pastoral visit from him. Plaintiff replied to Rickard,
indicating that he would welcome the visit and encouraging Rickard to contact
prison officials to request the visit. Rickard's request to visit Plaintiff was
denied by prison officials.
During the next several months Plaintiff, Rickard, and Yasutake repeatedly
contacted prison officials, hoping to persuade them to allow pastoral visits from
Rickard.(1) On December 23, 1997, Defendant Gallegos denied the requests.
Defendant Hurley then sent letters to Plaintiff and Yasutake explaining that the
(1) During this time Plaintiff also requested pastoral visits from two other
Christian ministers who had served in Japan as missionaries. As the denial of
these pastoral visits raises many of the same issues as the denial of the visit by
Rickard, for simplicity this opinion will refer only to Rickard.
requests were denied because they did not meet the criteria for pastoral visits
established by Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 548.19.
Defendant Hurley interprets the regulations to allow pastoral visits if (1) the
inmate initiates the request and (2) the clergy person or representative is from the
inmate's faith group. According to BOP regulations, inmates are also allowed
non_pastoral visits from representatives of civic and religious organizations if
there is an established relationship prior to confinement, although wardens are
given the power to waive the requirement of an established pre_confinement
relationship. See id. § 540.47.
Plaintiff appealed the denial of the visits through the appropriate
administrative appeals, but the original decision denying the visitation requests
was upheld. Defendant Hurley, who reviewed one of the administrative appeals
by Plaintiff, explained that Plaintiff did not meet the criteria for a pastoral visit
because Plaintiff had not initiated the request and because "Reverend Rickard is
of the Methodist faith, and you are of the Buddhist faith." Plaintiff had
registered as a Buddhist for purposes of receiving a special diet at the
Penitentiary, but claims that he practices a mixture of both the Buddhist and
Christian religions. Although prison policy requires inmates to register under a
certain religion for purposes of receiving a special diet, there is no similar
registration requirement for inmates seeking pastoral visits. Defendant Hurley
further explained that although he could have waived the requirement of a prior
relationship so as to permit the visit as one from a community group, he decided
not to do so because of unspecified security concerns. Plaintiff's final
administrative appeals were also denied, with the Regional Director of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons noting that "[w]hile the requested visits in question
may have been generally supportive to you, there is no indication from the
documents submitted by you or from our staff interviews that these visits should
have been considered primarily pastoral in nature."
Having exhausted all administrative appeals, Plaintiff filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Plaintiff claimed that
his religious liberties under the First Amendment and RFRA were violated and
that his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause was also violated. In addition to money damages and a permanent
injunction, Plaintiff also requested a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to allow the pastoral visits.
Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order was referred to Magistrate Judge O. Edward Schlatter. In his
recommendation, Judge Schlatter indicated that Plaintiff had not met the
requirements for granting a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining
order. With respect to the First Amendment claim, Judge Schlatter concluded
that Plaintiff had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits. Judge Schlatter noted the difficult constitutional standard for free
exercise claims by inmates and concluded that it was unlikely Plaintiff could
meet this burden. In addition, Judge Schlatter reasoned that Plaintiff would not
suffer irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction or restraining order
because "[Plaintiff's] contact with the religious advisors at issue appears to be at
least somewhat tangential to his ability to practice his faith and, again, he is
permitted to correspond with these individuals." With respect to Plaintiff's other
claims, Judge Schlatter explained that RFRA had been declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and that
Plaintiff had not adequately supported his equal protection claim. Thus, Judge
Schlatter recommended that Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order be denied. Plaintiff filed objections to the
magistrate's recommendation but the district court adopted Schlatter's
recommendation and denied Plaintiff's motion.
III. DISCUSSION
A district court's denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, legal error, or clearly erroneous factual
findings.(2) See Country Kids `N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1283
(2) Although Plaintiff requested both a preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order in the district court, this court only has jurisdiction to consider
the denial of the preliminary injunction. See Populist Party v. Herschler, 746
F.2d 656, 661 n.2 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating that, absent exceptions which havenot been argued in the present case, denials of temporary restraining orders are
not appealable).
(10th Cir. 1996). A movant is entitled to a preliminary injunction if he can
establish the following: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of
the case; (2) irreparable injury to the movant if the preliminary injunction is
denied; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the other
party under the preliminary injunction; and (4) the injunction is not adverse to
the public interest. See id. Because "a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
remedy, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal." SCFC ILC, Inc. v.
Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
For some requested preliminary injunctions a movant has an "even heavier
burden of showing that the four factors listed above weigh heavily and
compellingly in movant's favor before such an injunction may be issued." Id.
The heightened burden applies to preliminary injunctions that (1) disturb the
status quo, (2) are mandatory as opposed to prohibitory, or (3) provide the
movant substantially all the relief he may recover after a full trial on the merits.
See id. at 1098_99. Because Plaintiff's requested relief would disturb the status
quo, the heightened burden requirement applies. Thus, Plaintiff must
demonstrate not only that the four requirements for a preliminary injunction are
met but also that they weigh heavily and compellingly in his favor.
Plaintiff, however, would have this court apply neither the heightened
standard nor the general standard. Instead, Plaintiff argues a relaxed standard
should apply to the requirement that he demonstrate a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits if he is first able to satisfy the other three requirements for
a preliminary injunction. This court has stated that "[w]hen the other three
requirements for a preliminary injunction are satisfied, it will ordinarily be
enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious,
substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation."
Otero Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Mo., 665 F.2d
275, 278 (10th Cir. 1981) (quotation omitted). This court, however, has
previously addressed the interplay between the heightened burden plaintiffs must
meet for some requested preliminary injunctions and the relaxed standard for
showing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits once the movant has
met the other three requirements for a preliminary injunction. In SCFC this court
stated that "in cases where the requested preliminary injunction alters the status
quo . . . the movant will ordinarily find it difficult to meet its heavy burden of
showing that the four factors, on balance, weigh heavily and compellingly in its
favor, without showing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits." SCFC,
936 F.2d at 1101 n.11.
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants argue Plaintiff is prevented from claiming he has religious
beliefs that incorporate elements of both Buddhism and Christianity because he
failed to adequately explain during his administrative appeals his belief in both
the Christian and Buddhist religions or express a desire to register as both a
Christian and Buddhist. The Prison Litigation Reform Act states that "[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . , or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A litigant's failure to raise
issues during an administrative appeal can constitute a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. See Rivera_Zurita v. INS, 946 F.2d 118, 120 n.2 (10th
Cir. 1991).
While Plaintiff never specifically claimed that his religious beliefs include
elements of both the Buddhist and Christian religions, he was not required to do
so to satisfy the exhaustion requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
Plaintiff's lengthy written administrative appeals adequately reveal his claim that
the denial of the Christian pastoral visits was frustrating his search for "mundane
spiritual help." In addition, although the Penitentiary requires inmates to register
under a certain religion for purposes of receiving a special diet, both parties
concede that the Penitentiary has neither a requirement that an inmate register
under a certain religion for purposes of receiving pastoral visits nor a procedure
by which to do so. Thus, Plaintiff's failure to express a desire to register as both
a Christian and Buddhist can not possibly constitute a failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
Although Plaintiff, arguing pro se, was not as clear about his religious
beliefs as he could have been, his maundering was not so severe as to constitute a
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff is therefore not prevented
from now premising his claims on religious beliefs which incorporate elements of
both Buddhism and Christianity.
B. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
1. First Amendment Claim
The district court determined Plaintiff had not demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claim, partly because
of the deference given prison officials when evaluating prisoners' constitutional
claims. Because the district court's decision was consistent with controlling
Supreme Court precedent, the district court's conclusion was neither legal error
nor an abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court has declared that courts are not to substitute their
judgment on matters of institutional administration for the determinations made
by prison officials, even when First Amendment claims have been made. See
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987). Although inmates
clearly retain their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion,
incarceration necessarily limits that right. See id. at 348. The burden on the
government to defend its action is substantially less demanding when the prima
facie constitutional claim has been made by a prisoner challenging prison policy
as opposed to a similar claim made by a citizen who is not incarcerated. See id.
at 349. Thus, "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
The Supreme Court in Turner identified several factors relevant to whether
a prison regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. First,
there must be a valid, rational connection between the legitimate, neutral
government interest and the prison regulation, so that the policy is not "arbitrary
or irrational." Id. at 89, 90. A second factor is whether there are alternate means
for the inmate to exercise the asserted constitutional right. See id. at 90. Finally,
courts should consider whether ready alternatives to the prison regulation are
available and what impact accommodation of the asserted right would have on
guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources. See id. at 90_91.
Defendant Hurley interprets BOP regulations to impose two requirements
for pastoral visits: the prisoner must initiate the request for the visit, and the
visitor must be a clergy person from or representative of the inmate's faith.
Under the particular facts of this case, it is evident that Plaintiff did not initiate
the requests for the pastoral visits.(3)
Defendants explain that permitting pastoral visits only when the inmate
initiates the requests aids in both keeping the number of pastoral visits at a
manageable level and preventing abuses of the system while also ensuring that
inmates are allowed to receive pastoral visits from appropriate persons whom the
inmates truly desire to have visit. Defendants claim that keeping the number of
pastoral visitors at a manageable level is important because of security concerns
and the limited resources of the Penitentiary.
It is well established that prison administrators can enact regulations that
restrict the number of visitors an inmate can have for purposes of maintaining
institutional security. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827_28 (1974); Ramos
v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 581 (10th Cir. 1980). Because the Penitentiary's policy
of allowing pastoral visits only when the prisoner initiates the request sufficiently
relates to the Penitentiary's goal of allowing prisoners desired pastoral visits
while limiting the overall number of visits and preventing abuses of the system, this court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the regulations, as interpreted
by Defendants, are "arbitrary or irrational." Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
Plaintiff argues the requirement that the inmate initiate the request is not
reasonably related to the penological interest of limiting the number of visitors
because there is no restriction on the number of pastoral visits an inmate can have
if the two requirements are met. Plaintiff's argument, however, ignores the
deference courts are to give prison regulations that attempt to strike a balance
between prisoner rights and legitimate penological concerns. See generally
O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 344_53. The BOP regulation seeks not only to limit the total
number of pastoral visits and prevent abuses of the system, but also to ensure that
desired and potentially beneficial pastoral visits are allowed. A requirement that
the prisoner initiate the request for a pastoral visit is rationally connected to these
legitimate penological interests.
Under the Turner analysis it is relevant that Plaintiff can still communicate
with Rickard through written correspondence. See id. at 345, 352 (noting that
although sincere religious beliefs compelled attendance at Jumu'ah service,
Muslin prisoner denied Jumu'ah attendance still had opportunity to participate in
other Muslim religious ceremonies); Ramos, 639 F.2d at 581 (explaining that
(3) It is unnecessary for this court to address this regulatory interpretation
beyond its application to the denial of Rickard's request to visit Plaintiff. The
evidence before us does not indicate that Plaintiff developed a relationship with
Rickard and thereafter initiated his own request for a visit. Nor is there any
record evidence to suggest that the warden has interpreted or applied the
regulation to forever prohibit a visit by Rickard solely because Rickard initiated
the very first request.
although prison regulations prevented inmate visits from non_family friends,
regulation was reasonable because prisoner was still able to communicate through
written correspondence). In addition, Defendants maintain that the pastoral visitation requirements are necessary to prevent abuses of the program; this is the
"ripple effect" referred to by the Supreme Court in Turner. See Turner, 482 U.S.
at 90. Finally, Plaintiff has not demonstrated "obvious, easy alternatives" to the
pastoral visitation requirements that would accomplish the multiple goals of the
current policy. See id. Thus, the district court did not commit legal error or
abuse its discretion in concluding Plaintiff has not demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on his First Amendment claim.
2. RFRA Claim
The district court determined that Plaintiff had no likelihood of success on
his RFRA claim, stating that RFRA had been declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In reaching this
conclusion the district court committed legal error.
In Flores the Supreme Court considered whether Congress exceeded its
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "in enacting the most far_
reaching and substantial of RFRA's provisions, those which impose its
requirements on the States." Id. at 516. The Court explained that because
RFRA, as applied to the states, was not remedial or preventive legislation
congruent and proportional to the goal of enforcing constitutional free exercise
rights, it exceeded Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See
id. at 519_20, 533_34, 536.
The district court concluded Flores renders RFRA unconstitutional in the
context of Plaintiff's suit against Defendants, who are federal employees in a
federal prison. Both parties concede that this court has yet to squarely address
whether Flores invalidates RFRA as applied to the federal government.
Defendants attempt to buttress the district court's decision by citing to an
unpublished Tenth Circuit case and a handful of federal district court cases in
which Flores was interpreted to render RFRA unconstitutional not only in its
application to the states but also in its application to the federal government.
This court agrees, however, with both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits in their
conclusion that Flores does not determine the constitutionality of RFRA as
applied to the federal government. See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med.
Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 831_33 (9th Cir. 1999); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical
Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 858_59 (8th Cir. 1998). It is clear
from the analysis in Flores that the Court was focusing on Congress' remedial
powers to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against states and local authorities.
See Flores, 521 U.S. at 516_17. Indeed, that was the only issue before the Court
and it involved a decision by local zoning authorities to deny a church a building
permit. See id. at 512. The district court decision on appeal stated only that
Congress exceeded its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it enacted RFRA. See id. Because Congress' ability to make
laws applicable to the federal government in no way depends on its enforcement
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Flores decision does
not determine the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the federal government.
See Sutton, 192 F.3d at 832 ("Congress acts under [the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment] only when regulating the conduct of the states.").
Defendants argue that even if Flores does not directly control the question
of RFRA's constitutionality as applied to the federal government, the rationale of
the decision makes RFRA invalid in its entirety. Defendants rely on the Court's
conclusion in Flores that "RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to
maintain separation of powers and the federal balance," arguing the same
concerns apply with equal force to RFRA as applied to the federal government.
Flores, 521 U.S. at 536.
Defendants' attempt to extrapolate and rely on isolated language from the
Flores opinion is misguided. Although the Court did mention separation of
powers concerns in Flores, this language must be read in the context of the entire
opinion and the question being considered. The Court was considering RFRA in
its application to the states. See id. at 516. Congress relied on its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power to apply RFRA to the states. See id. Congress'
enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to remedial or
preventive legislation that enforces the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 519_20. The RFRA standard was so out of proportion to
any substantive constitutional violation that it could not be considered remedial
or preventive legislation. See id. at 532_34. Thus, the Supreme Court was
compelled to declare RFRA as applied to the states unconstitutional; a contrary
ruling would have effectively allowed Congress to "determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation." Id. at 519. Such a result would, of course,
"contradict[] vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers." Id. at
536.
These separation of powers concerns the Court expressed in Flores,
however, do not apply to RFRA as applied to the federal government. Congress'
power to apply RFRA to the federal government comes not from its ability to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment but rather from its Article I powers. See H.R.
Rep. No. 103_88, at 17 (1993) ("Finally, the Committee believes that Congress
has the constitutional authority to enact [RFRA]. Pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause embodied in Article
I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the legislative branch has been given the
authority to provide statutory protection for a constitutional value . . . ."). That
the RFRA standard for suits against the federal government is more protective
than what the Constitution requires does not make the statute unconstitutional:
"Congress has often provided statutory protection of individual liberties that
exceed the Supreme Court's interpretation of constitutional protection." In re
Young, 141 F.3d at 860; see also United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731
F.2d 1546, 1562 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[C]ongressional disapproval of a Supreme
Court decision does not impair the power of Congress to legislate a different
result, as long as Congress had that power in the first place."). Thus, the
separation of powers concerns expressed in Flores do not render RFRA
unconstitutional as applied to the federal government.(4)
Defendants maintain that even if RFRA as applied to the federal
government is constitutional, it can not be severed from the portion of RFRA
declared unconstitutional in Flores. It is well established that when a portion of
a statute is declared unconstitutional the constitutional portions of the statute are
presumed severable "[u]nless it is evident that the Legislature would not have
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which
is not." I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931_32 (1983) (quotations omitted).
Defendants have presented no evidence that Congress intended RFRA to be
applied to the federal government only if it was also applied to state and local
governments. The invalid portion of RFRA does not alter the structure of RFRA,
it simply prevents the application of the statute to a certain class of defendants.
Thus, RFRA as applied to the federal government is severable from the portion of
RFRA declared unconstitutional in Flores, and independently remains applicable
(4) Defendant's do not challenge Congress's Article I power to apply RFRA
to the federal government. Nor is it necessary in the resolution of this case to
consider Congress's ability to use powers other than its enforcement power in the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply RFRA to the states in certain circumstances, as
it has recently done in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106_274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000cc).
to federal officials. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 859 (reaching the same
conclusion); see also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)
("A court should refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary. .
. . Whenever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable
from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to so declare,
and to maintain the act in so far as it is valid." (quotations omitted)).
The district court also held that Plaintiff had not sufficiently demonstrated
"the restrictions he complains of place a substantial burden on his ability to
practice his faith." Because this conclusion serves as an alternate basis for
affirming the district court's ruling that Plaintiff had not demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success on his RFRA claim, this court must also review
that basis for legal error, clearly erroneous factual findings, or an abuse of
discretion.
RFRA provides that "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb_1(a). Thus, a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie claim under RFRA by proving the following three
elements: (1) a substantial burden imposed by the federal government on a (2)
sincere (3) exercise of religion. See id.; Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1479
n.1 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that a plaintiff's religious belief must be sincerely
held). Since the district court's ruling, Congress has passed the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), Pub. L. No. 106_274,
114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc). In RLUIPA, Congress amended
certain provisions of RFRA, including the definition of "exercise of religion."
See id. §§ 7(a)(3), 8(7)(a). The term "exercise of religion" was previously
defined in RFRA as "the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the
Constitution." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb_2(4) (1999). RLUIPA amended RFRA,
however, so that "exercise of religion" now means "religious exercise, as defined
in [42 U.S.C. §] 2000cc_5." Id. § 2000bb_2(4). "[R]eligious exercise" is
defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc_5(7)(A) to include "any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief."
Plaintiff does not claim the requested pastoral visits were required by his
religious beliefs. Under the definition of "religious exercise" in 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc_5(7)(A), however, a religious exercise need not be mandatory for it to be
protected under RFRA.(5) Plaintiff maintains that his desire to study Christianity and practice Christian prayer necessitated visits by Christian pastors, and that
Reverend Rickard was particularly appropriate because of his experience as a
Christian missionary in Japan, Plaintiff's native country. Pastoral visits of this
nature are protected activities under RFRA, particularly in light of the new
definition of "exercise of religion" adopted in RLUIPA. See id. § 2000cc_
5(7)(A).
Because Plaintiff's request for pastoral visits appear at this initial stage of
the litigation to be a protected religious exercise, and because Defendants do not
challenge the sincerity of Plaintiff's religious beliefs, Plaintiff need only prove
that the denial of the pastoral visits was a "substantial burden" on his "exercise
of religion" in order to show a substantial likelihood of success on the RFRA
claim. Plaintiff has argued that the denial of pastoral visits from Reverend
Rickard is a "substantial burden" because Reverend Rickard is particularly well_
suited to provide religious assistance to Plaintiff. Reverend Rickard, Plaintiff
explains, is a Christian minister who is also familiar with the spiritual culture of
Japan, Plaintiff's homeland. If Plaintiff is able to prove these allegations with
evidentiary support, he will have satisfied his prima facie burden to prove that
(5) Defendants argue the judicial presumption against retroactive legislation
prevents consideration of the amendments to RFRA. See Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994). This appeal arises from the district court's
denial of Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction based primarily on the
conclusion that Plaintiff had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits. Although Plaintiff does request compensatory and punitive
damages in his complaint, the primary relief requested is a permanent injunction
preventing Defendants from denying the pastoral visits. When the plaintiff's
request for relief is a prospective injunction, application of new or amended
statutes is not a retroactive application of the law. See id. at 273_74; Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 2000). Indeed, this
court has a responsibility to consider the law currently in force when the plaintiff
seeks prospective relief. See Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1158 ("To ignore intervening
changes in the statutory and regulatory framework underlying this litigationwould be to shirk our responsibility to strictly scrutinize the real_world legal
regime against which Adarand seeks prospective relief."). If Plaintiff
demonstrates a substantial likelihood of success on his injunctive claims, which
must be considered in light of the amendments to RFRA, he has demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim, thus satisfying this
component of the preliminary injunction analysis.
the denial of the visits was a "substantial burden" under RFRA, which adopts a
protective standard for prisoner religious rights. See generally 139 Cong. Rec.
S14,465 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("[E]xposure to
religion is the best hope we have for rehabilitation of a prisoner. Most prisoners,
like it or not, will eventually be returning to our communities. I want to see a
prisoner exposed to religion while in prison. We should accommodate efforts to
bring religion to prisoners."); id. at S14,466 (statement of Sen. Dole) ("[I]f
religion can help just a handful of prison inmates get back on track, then the
inconvenience of accommodating their religious beliefs is a very small price to
pay."); id. (statement of Sen. Hatfield) ("Mr. Colson's prison ministries group,
which has successfully rehabilitated many prisoners, has been denied access to
prisoners in Maryland . . . who did not identify themselves as [P]rotestants. . . .
[This is an] example[] of the need for us to pass this bill without this amendment
[which would exclude prisons from RFRA]."); cf. Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873,
878 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the opportunity to engage in private prayer was
not an adequate alternative to denial of access to an Orthodox Jewish rabbi,
denial of the ability to congregate with other Orthodox Jews for prayer and
discussion, and denial of a kosher diet). Plaintiff has not, however, submitted
any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, supporting his contention
concerning the particular attributes that make Reverend Rickard so well_suited for
Plaintiff. Thus, this issue must be remanded to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to
provide evidentiary support for his claim.(6)
Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff can establish a prima facie claim
under RFRA, the prison has a "compelling government interest" in denying the
requested pastoral visits. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie claim under
RFRA, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that "application of
the burden" to the claimant "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest" and "is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb_1(b). Although the Supreme Court
in Turner relaxed the government's burden when a prisoner brings a free exercise
claim under the First Amendment, neither the text nor legislative history of
RFRA suggest that a relaxed standard applies to the government's burden when a
prisoner makes a RFRA claim. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 475 (2d Cir.
1996) ("[T]he legislative history of RFRA makes clear that the compelling interest test is to apply to free exercise claims by prison inmates."); Douglas
Laycock, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 Tex. L. Rev.
209, 239_43 (1994) (explaining how various amendments to RFRA that sought to
prevent prisoners from having a claim under RFRA or that would have lessened
the government's burden under RFRA were considered and rejected). Thus, a
different analysis of the government's burden is called for under RFRA as
opposed to a constitutional claim brought by a prisoner after Turner.
Under the Turner analysis, a court is to consider whether the prison
regulation is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner, 482
U.S. at 89. Under RFRA, however, a court is to consider whether the
"application of the burden" to the claimant "is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb_1(b) (emphasis added).
Thus, under RFRA, a court does not consider the prison regulation in its general
application, but rather considers whether there is a compelling government
reason, advanced in the least restrictive means, to apply the prison regulation to
the individual claimant.
This is not to say, however, that prison officials do not have a compelling
interest under RFRA in maintaining institutional safety and order. See 139 Cong.
Rec. S14,468 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Prison
(6) Although this opinion has referred solely to Reverend Rickard in
discussing Plaintiff's desire to have pastoral visits by three former Christian
ministers who served in Japan as missionaries, the "substantial burden" analysis
requires a more precise discussion. Plaintiff would like pastoral visits from all
three ministers. Plaintiff has not, however, demonstrated how each of the
ministers could provide religious counseling unique from the others. Thus, at this
point, Plaintiff has advanced arguments that, if proven, would establish a right
under RFRA to visits from only one of the three ministers. Until Plaintiff
demonstrates an adequate justification for receiving visits from all three
ministers, there is not a "substantial burden" on Plaintiff's "religious exercise" by
allowing Plaintiff to visit with only one of the three Christian ministers. Plaintiff
can attempt to make such a showing on remand.
officials clearly have a compelling interest in maintaining order, safety, security, and discipline."). Defendants argue compelling security concerns involving
Plaintiff justify the application of the prison regulations to Plaintiff. Although
the district court analyzed the prison regulations under the Turner test, it did not
consider the more demanding analysis of government interests required by RFRA.
In addition, although Defendants have addressed this argument, Plaintiff has not
been afforded an opportunity to respond to Defendants' argument.(7) It would thus
not be proper for this court to consider whether Defendants have met their
"compelling interest" burden under RFRA. The resolution of this issue, if
necessary, is remanded to the district court.
3. Equal Protection Claim
The district court determined that Plaintiff had not demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Equal Protection Claim.
Plaintiff has made no argument on appeal to convince this court that the district
court made clearly erroneous factual findings, abused its discretion, or legally
erred in arriving at this conclusion.
4. Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a substantial likelihood of
success on any of his claims because they are entitled to qualified immunity.
(7) Defendants made this argument in their supplemental briefs addressing the
amendments to RFRA by RLUIPA. Because these briefs were submitted
simultaneously, Plaintiffs has not had an opportunity to respond to this argument.
See Kikumura v. Hurley, No. 99_2184 (10th Cir., order filed Oct. 27, 2000).
Qualified immunity, however, does not apply to claims for equitable relief. See
Cannon v. City & County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 876 (10th Cir. 1993). The
primary relief Plaintiff requests is a permanent injunction preventing Defendants
from denying the pastoral visits. If Plaintiff is able to demonstrate a substantial
likelihood of success on his RFRA claim for injunctive relief, to which qualified
immunity does not apply, he will have satisfied this component of the preliminary
injunction analysis.
C. Irreparable Injury
The district court further held that "there is no indication that Mr.
Kikumura will suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction." A plaintiff suffers
irreparable injury when the court would be unable to grant an effective monetary
remedy after a full trial because such damages would be inadequate or difficult to
ascertain. See Tri_State Generation & Transmission Assoc., Inc., v. Shoshone
River Power, Inc., 874 F.2d 1346, 1354 (10th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff claims he will
be irreparably harmed because monetary relief will not properly redress previous
denials of the pastoral visits. "When an alleged constitutional right is involved,
most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary." 11A
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed.
1995). Similarly, courts have held that a plaintiff satisfies the irreparable harm
analysis by alleging a violation of RFRA. See Jolly, 76 F.3d at 482 ("[A]lthough
the plaintiff's free exercise claim is statutory rather than constitutional, the denial
of the plaintiff's right to the free exercise of his religious beliefs is a harm that
cannot be adequately compensated monetarily."); cf. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1981) ("When the evidence
shows that the defendants are engaged in, or about to be engaged in, the act or
practices prohibited by a statute which provides for injunctive relief to prevent
such violations, irreparable harm to the plaintiffs need not be shown."). Because
the relief available to Plaintiff after trial would not adequately compensate him
for the alleged violations of his religious rights, the district court committed legal
error in holding Plaintiff had not satisfied the irreparable injury prong of the
preliminary injunction analysis.
D. Balancing of the Injuries/Public Interest
The district court did not discuss the third and fourth prongs of the
preliminary injunction test. This court therefore has no occasion to examine
these issues, and leaves their resolution, if necessary, to the district court on
remand.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this court affirms in part, reverses in part,
and remands to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
No. 99_1284, Kikumura v. Hurley
HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:
I am in agreement with much of the Majority Opinion concerning the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). In particular, I agree with that
opinion that the district court was in error in stating that RFRA had been declared
unconstitutional by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Flores did not
determine the constitutionality of the RFRA as applied to the federal government;
the Court there decided that Congress exceeded its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the States. Moreover, I agree with the
Majority Opinion that RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal
government, and that such portion of the statute can and should be severed from
the portion of RFRA declared unconstitutional in Flores. Therefore I am in
agreement that we should apply the requirement of RFRA that "Government shall
not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb_
1(a). I further agree with the Majority Opinion in remanding the RFRA claim, as
discussed below.
However, I am unable to join the analysis of the Majority Opinion
concerning the First Amendment free exercise claim of Plaintiff Kikumura. As
recognized in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), protective measures for
security in the prison context must be "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests." I have a fundamental difference with the Majority
Opinion concerning application of the Regulation in question here, 28 C.F.R. §
548.19. My concern is that the Regulation imposes a strict limitation on pastoral
visits to those from clergy or representatives of an inmate's one declared faith.
That to me is an impermissible restriction because it is not "reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests." Turner, 428 U.S. at 89.
Therefore, I cannot agree to uphold the regulation banning all pastoral
visitors of other faiths. Holding such a broad ban invalid under the Turner
standard as not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests does not
violate the teaching of O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987), not to
substitute our judgment on institutional administration for that of "those charged
with the formidable task of running a prison."
The Majority Opinion correctly notes that among the factors identified by
the Supreme Court for determining whether a regulation is reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest is whether there are obvious alternatives to the
prison's regulation. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91. I believe that in this case such
obvious alternatives are readily available to the Defendants; if the Defendants are
troubled by the number of religious visits sought, or by information about the
persons seeking to contact inmates as clergy visitors, there are obvious,
reasonable alternative measures which can afford straightforward protections.
For instance, the Defendants can limit the number and frequency of pastoral
visits to those which the inmate favors or the Defendants can limit the number
and frequency of visits to levels they deem reasonable to maintain security.
Additionally, the clergy seeking to make pastoral visits can be scrutinized for any
potentiality of danger. Indeed, the Regulation itself notes the availability of such
protective measures by providing in § 548.19(a) that the "chaplain may request a
NCIC check and documentation of such clergyperson's or faith group
representative's credentials."
Here, instead of using these recognized alternatives, the Defendants' policy
is to impose a general ban on pastoral visitors not qualifying as representatives of
the inmate's one declared faith. That broad ban reflects an "undifferentiated fear
or apprehension" without any evidentiary background for the imagined threat.
Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)
(invalidating student arm band prohibition based on "undifferentiated fear or
apprehension" of disturbance as not sufficient to overcome First Amendment
freedom of expression).
I find no vice in a requirement that an inmate identify the faith with which
he is affiliated as part of the procedure to request pastoral visits. Thus I do not
suggest striking down that requirement. My objection is with what follows ? the
unjustified use of that identification of the inmate's faith as a means of restricting
to that one faith those from whom pastoral visits or counseling is permitted and
the banning of all other pastoral visitors. Where, as here, the enrichment of other
religious support is desired, the restriction prohibiting such support makes no
sense in light of "the existence of obvious easy alternatives" which serve the
same security interests suggested by the Defendants and which the Supreme Court
has determined "may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an
`exaggerated response' to prison concerns." Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
Turner teaches that:
if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that
fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis
cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider
that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the
reasonable relationship standard.
482 U.S. at 91; see also Lile v. McKune, 224 F.3d 1175, 1191 (10th Cir. 2000)
(stating that a court should look , inter alia, to "whether there are obvious, easy_
to_implement alternatives that would accommodate the prisoner's right at little
cost to valid penological interests"); Abu_Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 135 (3d
Cir. 1998) (holding defendant was "likely to show that the Department's
discriminatory application of the business or profession rule to his writing is an
exaggerated response to the Department's security objectives because there are
obvious easy alternatives to address the Department's concerns"); Mauro v.
Arpaio, 147 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The availability of `obvious, easy'
alternatives that could be implemented at a `de minimis' cost [weighs] against the
reasonableness of a regulation."); Thomas v. Gunter, 32 F.3d 1258, 1260 (8th
Cir. 1994); Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993) ("We
emphasize that the fourth Turner factor is not a `least restrictive alternative" test,
but rather it allows an inmate to point to an alternative that fully accommodates
the prisoners' rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests as evidence
that a restriction is not reasonable.").
This circuit's opinion in Mann v. Reynolds, 46 F.3d 1055 (10th Cir. 1995),
is instructive. It concerned a challenge brought by state inmates to a prison
regulation prohibiting death row and maximum security prisoners from having
"barrier_free or contact visits" with counsel, on the ground that it violates the
inmate's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 1056.
Applying the four_factor Turner test, this court found "a lack of rationality in the
denial of contact visits between Inmates and their counsel" since the prison
allowed those same inmates "unfettered personal contact with virtually all those
with whom they interact except their lawyers." Id. at 1060. We declared:
Thus, we find it disturbing in the Turner context the defendants have
not provided an explanation why they have singled out attorneys for
the restricted contact. Aside from the isolated occasions when
cigarettes, chewing gum, pens, and paper clips have been unwittingly
passed by uninitiated lawyers to Inmates, defendants were unable to
provide any evidence the restrictions on contact were reasonably
related to prison security. When this default is coupled with the
overlay of the "blanket adversarial" attitude of the defendants
specifically towards OIDS attorneys and the lack of restriction on
contact between Inmates and others, Turner suggests the limitation
on contacts between lawyers and clients is not related to a legitimate
penological interest.
Id. at 1060_61 (emphasis added). Likewise here the Defendants have not
provided evidence that pastoral visitors who are not of the same one declared
faith as the Plaintiff present any threat to prison security because of their faith.
As noted, other concerns about those pastors as a security threat are fully
addressed by other measures.
Accordingly, I must dissent from the Majority Opinion's holding that
Plaintiff Kikumura has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on
his First Amendment claim; but, as noted, I agree with the Majority Opinion that
Plaintiff should have an opportunity to prove his allegations that Reverend
Rickard is well suited to provide religious assistance to Plaintiff and to consider
the Defendants' showing on security interests under the standard imposed on the
Government under RFRA.(1)
Turning to Plaintiff Kikumura's RFRA claim, I am in agreement with the
analysis and disposition made in the Majority Opinion. It notes that RFRA
provides that "Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb_1(a). It also notes the passage of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc. The latter statute amended the RFRA and its definition of "exercise of
religion" so that the term now means "any exercise of religion, whether or not
(1) I am mindful that if the Plaintiff prevails on his First Amendment free
exercise claim it may not be necessary to go further to consider his RFRA claim.
By the enactment of RFRA Congress has extended enlarged protection for the
free exercise of religion. Not being in the majority, it seems proper to me to
state my views on both the First Amendment claim and the statutory RFRA claim.
compelled by, or central to a system of religious belief." I join the Majority
Opinion in remanding the RFRA issue to allow the Plaintiff Kikumura an
opportunity to provide evidentiary support for his RFRA claim. If Plaintiff is
able to prove his allegations that Reverend Rickard is well suited to provide
religious assistance to Plaintiff, he will have shown a basis for his claim that
denial of pastoral visitation by Reverend Rickard is a substantial burden to
Plaintiff's exercise of religion. I am agreeable to the remand for this purpose and
so that the Defendants may present any showing they may have on security issues
which they claim to be involved.
There remain the issues of the Plaintiff Kikumura's claim of infringement
of his equal protection rights and the Defendants' qualified immunity defense. I
join the Majority Opinion in holding that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success on his equal protection argument, and in the
holding that the qualified immunity defense does not apply to claims for
equitable relief.
No. 99_1284, Kikumura v. Hurley
EBEL, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I am in general agreement with the majority opinion. I write separately
only to express my disagreement with the majority's conclusion that "[i]f
Plaintiff is able to prove these allegations with evidentiary support, he will have
satisfied his prima facie burden to prove that the denial of the visits was a
`substantial burden' under RFRA." Slip op., supra, at 22 (emphasis added).
Whether a regulation operates as a substantial burden on a person's
exercise of religion is a factual question. I am not prepared to say, on the skeletal
record before us, that the pastoral_visit regulations constitute a substantial burden
in this case. Plaintiff has explained that Reverend Rickard's familiarity with
Japan and Japanese spiritual practices makes him a particularly appropriate
choice as Plaintiff's pastor. However, the record does not establish why other
Christian ministers would not be adequate in the absence of knowledge of
Japanese practices nor does the record establish whether the Defendants would
grant Plaintiff pastoral access to other ministers whose counseling would be
substantially similar to that offered by the ministers Plaintiff has requested. In
short, the record does not yet establish that it would be a "substantial burden" to
Plaintiff's religious exercise if he were required to resort to Christian counseling
from ministers other than Reverend Rickard and the other registered ministers.
Because this is an intrinsically fact_based question, and there has been no
opportunity for the parties to develop these facts, I believe it is inappropriate for
us to rule on the issue as a matter of law at this time. We cannot determine what
would be a substantial burden without the benefit of seeing a full record. Since
we are remanding anyway for a balancing analysis, I would also remand to the
district court for it to determine whether there is a substantial burden in the first
instance, without prejudging the issue.